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THE NEW DEMOCRATIC PARTY IN THE CANADIAN

POLITICAL SYSTEM

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INTRODUCTION

Political parties are almost without exception one of the fundamental features of contemporary political systems. This is true regardless of the political system involved, be it totalitarian, emergent, liberal-democratic, or some variation thereof. The amount of attention which scholars and journalists have given to parties and the party systems is indicative of their importance. Data have been collected concerning most aspects of party life. Many parties throughout the world have been described, analyzed, and criticized. Some handy classification schemes have been formulated that have proved to be useful tools for approaching the bewildering array of information about parties and party systems. Unfortunately, there is no general or "systematic" theory which adequately comprehends the phenomenon of party life.

This study is not intended to overcome this deficiency. General theory, even if it is of a "narrow gauge" order, must be premised upon detailed empirical data about parties and the relevant features of the political environment in which they operate. Furthermore, general theory at any level must be based upon sophisticated analyses of the interaction between parties and the concomitant factors which influence them. Neither task has been adequately performed relative to Canadian parties. This is a serious shortcoming since the Canadian political system mixes important British and

American influences within a unique Canadian national setting, influences which primarily have been tested and appraised separately.

Examination of numerous bibliographic sources reveals that there have been exceedingly few studies about the total party system in Canada. The most noteworthy effort in the direction of a broader view of the Canadian party system is a collection of essays edited by Hugh Thorburn.¹ Leon Epstein's article, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," is probably one of the most analytical treatments of Canada's total party system.² Inquiry into specific parties has not been much more exhaustive. Aside from scattered periodical and journal articles, only one comprehensive study has been made of the Progressive Conservative Party.³ Only three studies have concerned the Liberal Party.⁴ There is an excellent account of the Social Credit Party, but unfortunately it is now somewhat dated.⁵ The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF), which went out of existence in 1961, has been studied by several scholars whose works provide a point of departure for this inquiry. But no one has provided a comprehensive analysis of the CCF's successor, a gap which this study

¹ Hugh Thorburn (ed.), Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1963).

² Leon Epstein, "A Comparative Study of Canadian Parties," American Political Science Review, Vol. 58 (March, 1964), pp. 46-59.

³ John R. Williams, The Conservative Party of Canada (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1956).

⁴ J. W. Pickerskill, The Liberal Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1962); P. H. Heppe, "The Liberal Party of Canada" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Michigan, 1952); and S. Peter Regenstreif, "The Liberal Party of Canada: A Political Analysis" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University, 1963).

⁵ J. R. Mallory, Social Credit and the Federal Power in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1954).

will hopefully fill.

The Canadian Party System

Despite this comparatively limited amount of inquiry into Canadian party life, it is possible to classify Canadian parties at least in terms of the traditional classification schemes utilized for western democratic party systems. Most Canadian parties, for example, have established branch or constituency associations, provincial and national councils or conventions, and rudimentary schemes for soliciting party members. Yet, by Duverger's standards, most of them are pale imitations of a "mass" party.⁶

The political dialogue in Canada is primarily non-ideological, and parties are generally of the non-class variety. Robert Alford, in his systematic comparison of the left-right dimension of parties and the class basis thereof in Britain, Australia, the United States, and Canada, concluded that even the United States presented a more discernible left-right, class-oriented political dialogue than Canada.⁷ Canada, according to Alford's analysis, exhibited "pure non-class politics" in which the political dialogue is highly pragmatic and patterns of party support are premised upon French-English and

⁶ Maurice Duverger delineates between mass parties and caucus or cadre parties. Mass parties organize a large proportion of the masses either by obtaining members directly or through affiliated organizations such as trade unions. They are usually centralized structures and function as educational movements as well as electoral machines. Active membership in caucus or cadre parties is narrowly recruited. They are decentralized parties and are primarily vehicles for winning elections and organizing governments. See his Political Parties (New York: John Wiley, 1954), pp. 1-132.

⁷ Robert Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963), pp. 219-49.

regional-economic terms.⁸ Other observers have noted that, in lieu of ideology or class, the salient feature of Canadian party life often appears to be party leaders around whom ethnic and sectional groups unite.⁹

Fitting the Canadian party system into either a two-party or a multi-party scheme is perhaps the most difficult task. Although only the Conservative and Liberal Parties have been in contention as parties of government at the national level, no House of Commons has been without "third" parties since 1921. Several Parliaments prior to that contained minor parties. More importantly, six of the ten Canadian provinces have been governed, at one time or another, by parties other than the Conservative or Liberal. "Third" parties have been the official opposition in almost half of the provinces for some time. Hence, the Canadian party system might be characterized as a "hybrid multipartism," operating essentially along pragmatic and non-class lines and composed of parties most of which ascribe to the structural accouterments associated with mass-based parties.

While most Canadian parties have tried to come to terms with the existing ethnic, religious, linguistic, or regional-economic peculiarities of Canadian political life, few of them could be called successful parties of integration defined as having transcended these

⁸ Ibid., pp. 250-86.

⁹ S. Peter Regenstreif, "Ideology and Leadership in the Canadian Party System," Paper delivered before the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 9-12, 1964, pp. 1-2.

cleavages. Some parties, such as the Union Nationale of Quebec, have been spokesmen for specific ethnic and/or regional interests and have been satisfied to work within the Canadian federal system to capture a certain province. Others have sought limited representation for specific ethnic or regional interests in the House of Commons (e.g., Social Credit Rally). Even the two major parties, despite their efforts to become nationally integrative, are noticeably different in orientation and in their bases of support. The Conservatives have been characteristically an English-speaking, Protestant, and centralist party. The Liberals have been more responsive to French-speaking, Catholic, and provincially-oriented interests.

In August of 1932, however, delegates from numerous minor parties and several interest groups emerged from the Western Labour Conference at Calgary committed to the formation of a "new" party. The following year delegates left Regina, Saskatchewan, proclaiming the organization and program of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) as a fait accompli. Canada's "new" party was explicitly socialistic and determined to transform the Canadian party system. The CCF program said that the party was a

federation of organizations whose purpose is the establishment . . . of a Co-operative Commonwealth in which the principles of regulating production, distribution and exchange will be the supplying of human needs and not the making of profits [and whose aim it is] to replace the present Capitalist system, with its inherent injustice and inhumanity, [with] a social order from which the domination and exploitation of one class by another will be eliminated. . . . ¹⁰

¹⁰ Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Program (Regina Manifesto), adopted at the First National Convention held at Regina, Saskatchewan, July, 1933. Cited in Leo Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), pp. 160-69.

Furthermore, the CCF's view of the existing party system and its intention to transform it was stated as follows:

This social and economic transformation can be brought about by political action, through the election of a government inspired by the ideal of a Co-operative Commonwealth and supported by a majority of the people. We do not believe in change by violence. We consider that both the old parties in Canada are the instruments of capitalist interests and cannot serve as agents of social reconstruction, and that whatever the superficial differences between them, they are bound to carry on government in accordance with the dictates of the big business interests who finance them. The CCF aims at political power in order to put an end to this capitalist domination of our political life.¹¹

Implicit in these goals were certain assumptions. First, the CCF implied that it intended to substitute a left-right and class-oriented dialogue for the existing one in which, according to the CCF, only the capitalist class was being represented. It opposed, in other words, the allegedly prevailing sham battle of Canadian politics. Second, the Regina Manifesto implied that, having altered the political dialogue by creating a voice for the democratic left, the CCF would either replace one of the "old" parties or force them to merge. The ultimate extension of the CCF's raison d'être, therefore, suggested a party system quite different from that which existed.

Over the years the CCF had its electoral successes. It hit its peak on the national scene in 1945 when it polled 812,836 votes (15.6 per cent) and captured 28 of the 265 seats in the House of Commons. Its sagging performance of 1949, when it won thirteen seats, was reversed in 1953 and 1957 by the capture of twenty-three and twenty-five seats respectively. Provincially, it won control of

¹¹ Ibid.

Saskatchewan and became an official opposition in British Columbia during the early 1940s. It was a member of a coalition government in Manitoba during World War II and the official opposition from 1945 and 1953. In Ontario, the CCF served as the official opposition in 1943 and 1945.

In 1958, CCF representation in the House of Commons was reduced to eight seats by John Diefenbaker's historic landslide. But, even in its peak years the CCF had never become a national challenger. The 1958 election merely underscored its dilemmas. Its provincial and national strength had settled in Saskatchewan and British Columbia, with marginal patches of success in Ontario and Manitoba. Although the Maritimes generally were never considered a potential CCF area, Nova Scotia could be expected to return one CCF MP on a fairly consistent basis. Quebec was a complete loss throughout the history of the CCF. In short, the CCF had neither reconstructed the "hybrid multipartism" nor significantly realigned the political dialogue in Canada.¹²

In August of 1961, delegates streamed out of the humid Ottawa Coliseum proclaiming another "new" Canadian political party--the New Democratic Party (NDP). It had a new leader and a new name. It promised a moderate version of social democracy, and it threatened an organizational base premised upon the support of organized labor, farm organizations, and progressively-minded individuals. Its founders felt that the Conservative and Liberal Parties continued

¹² Summaries of trends in popular votes and seats won by Canadian parties in provincial and federal elections were obtained from Harold Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser Press, 1962), pp. 230-36.

to "represent, in the main, the viewpoint of big business" and that the only alternative was to reconstruct the Canadian democratic left with the hope that it would eventually govern.¹³ This reconstructed democratic left would not pose the proletariat opposite capitalists. Rather, the political dialogue would be realigned to unite "all Canadians who put human rights and human dignity above the mere pursuit of wealth, and public welfare before corporate power."¹⁴ Thus, the CCF was officially disbanded, and a "new" party was formed to do essentially what its defunct predecessor had failed to do.

Two elections occurred during the formative period of the NDP. The 1957 election resulted in narrow defeat for the Liberals--the first since 1930. The 1958 contest transformed the Progressive Conservative's (PC) hold on the government into a massive majority. Since the official creation of the NDP, Canada has had two more elections. Both of them produced indecisive mandates, and both resulted in minority governments. One scholar has become convinced that these election results indicate that a "pronounced state of flux" has developed in Canadian politics.¹⁵ Another observer has noted that the "electorate continues to react like a gyroscope that

¹³CLC-CCF Joint National Committee, A New Political Party for Canada (Ottawa: November, 1958), p. 5.

¹⁴NDP, The Federal Program of the New Democratic Party, adopted at the Founding Convention held at Ottawa, Ontario, July 31 to August 4, 1961, p. 26.

¹⁵Regenstreif, "Ideology and Leadership in the Canadian Party System," p. 4.

is out of kilter."¹⁶ Recent trends have also been described as the "fragmentation of Canadian politics."¹⁷

There is evidence to support these assertions. The Liberal Party, for example, has shown remarkable strength in Ontario, once the bastion of PC power. The 1962 and the 1963 national elections in Quebec seem to have been more of a battle between traditional Liberal attachments and an emergent support for a French-speaking and nationalistic version of the Social Credit Party. Urban centers outside Quebec have tended to become battlegrounds for the Liberals and the NDP. Finally, the PC has started to dominate national elections in the prairie provinces where the Liberal, Social Credit, and/or Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Parties once reigned supreme.¹⁸

Purpose

It would be highly questionable to attribute the apparent flux in Canadian politics or the two minority governments which have sat since 1962 to the propitious formation of the NDP in 1961. Indeed, it remains to be seen to what extent this situation is the product of such trends as growing urbanization and industrialization, the emergence of a service-centered economy, or the expanding army of

¹⁶ Dennis Wrong, "Canadian Politics in the Sixties," Political Science Quarterly, Vol. 78 (March, 1963), p. 4.

¹⁷ Donald Heasman, "The Fragmentation of Canadian Politics," Parliamentary Affairs, Vol. 17 (Winter, 1963-64), pp. 77-86.

¹⁸ Drawn from data in the Appendix of Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 230-35; Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Twenty-Fourth General Election, 1962, passim; Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, Twenty-Fifth General Election, 1963, passim.

white collar workers. Yet, the coincidence of these phenomena offers a unique opportunity to document, analyze, and appraise the New Democratic Party relative to the Canadian political system. What, for example, are the unique features of the NDP relative to its predecessor, and have these changes or alterations been translated into significant gains or shifts in the electoral support obtained by the New Democrats? How do these changes and alterations in the organization, program, behavior, and bases of support of the NDP relate to the persistent and changing patterns of Canadian politics? What functions have the NDP performed in the politics of the nation, and how does the NDP relate to the minority status of recent Canadian governments? Finally, what can be said about the viability of the NDP as a party of the democratic left, facing not only the dilemmas of appealing to an increasingly affluent and middle-class society, but also the persistent ethnic, religious, and regional cleavages in Canadian life?

A Note on the Scope of the Inquiry and Sources of Data

This inquiry is concerned with the NDP relative to Canadian national politics and the national dimension of the Canadian party system. It is imperative that certain aspects of the organization, program, and behavior of provincial New Democratic Parties be included, but emphasis will be placed upon them only as they relate to the existence and behavior of the national party. Furthermore, while the study is concerned with the NDP and its efforts to insert itself into the national political life of Canada between its founding in 1961 and the summer recess of the Twenty-Sixth Parliament

in 1965, it will be necessary to establish the basic nature of the NDP's predecessor in order to evaluate the "new" party. Otherwise, analysis of the patterns of continuity and change within the Canadian democratic left would be seriously wrenched out of context.

Information about the NDP's predecessor has been drawn almost entirely from secondary accounts,¹⁹ as have the salient features of the Canadian party system, federalism, regionalism, and ethnic divisions. Among the more important general treatments are Evolving Canadian Federalism by A. R. M. Lower and F. R. Scott et al., Canadian Dualism edited by Mason Wade, and R. McGregor Dawson's classic work The Government of Canada. Election data for the CCF era have been compiled in Howard Scarrow's Canada Votes, and numerous studies have analyzed the patterns of electoral support obtained by the CCF.

Conversely, the bulk of the materials pertaining to the NDP as it has attempted to relate itself to Canadian political life has been drawn from primary sources. Party documents, official national and provincial election statistics, the Canadian Census, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), and the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup Polls) constitute the core of this data. Various Canadian newspapers, particularly the Globe and Mail (Toronto), have been valuable sources of information about the NDP's campaign tactics, internal operations, national and provincial conventions, and behavior

¹⁹The CCF has been the subject of at least three major published works, numerous articles, and academic theses. The three best published works include: Dean McHenry, The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950); Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed; and S. M. Lipset, Agrarian Socialism (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1950).

in the House of Commons. Finally, the author conducted some field research in Canada. Interviews were held with a number of NDP members of Parliament and with several members of the permanent headquarters staff in Ottawa. All party files concerning the closing years of the CCF, the National Committee for the New Party, and the Founding Convention were made available. Selected data and files covering the period since the formation of the NDP were also made available.

Despite the available data about the NDP and the Canadian political system, many conclusions concerning the relationships between them must remain inferential. There are many gaps in the data; and existing data vary in precision, particularly concerning intra- and inter-party relationships and behavior. Moreover, neither the NDP nor the Canadian political system can be treated as independent variables; the volatile condition of both is subject to significant change in the near future. Nevertheless, there are elements of the NDP's organization, program, leadership, and patterns of support that can be related to the discernible features of the Canadian political system with reasonable accuracy.

CHAPTER I

A NEW PARTY FOR CANADA: THE CCF

The CCF represented the merger of numerous protest groups into a political party dedicated to a socialist ideology rather than ad hoc reform and to the establishment of a party system premised upon class rather than ethnic or sectional interests. Ironically, it attempted to implement these objectives as a party that originated and flourished in western Canada. The history of the CCF is therefore one of frustrating efforts to transcend its own sectional limitations. In the process, the party experienced internal conflicts which ultimately set the stage for the formation of the NDP. Hence, a rather detailed examination of the origins of the CCF and its subsequent development in terms of structure, leadership, program, and electoral support is imperative for an adequate understanding of the NDP. Since the formative period of the NDP overlaps with the latter stages of CCF history, the details of the period 1958-1961 will be explicated in the next chapter.

The Protest Era

Compared to Europe, where socialist parties were well established by the opening of the twentieth century, the formation of a socialist party of more than local consequence in Canada was delayed by several decades. Socialism had been the product of the environment

generated by the industrial revolution and was primarily an urban phenomenon.¹ Canada, on the other hand, continued to be a non-urban and non-industrial society until well into the twentieth century.

Census data reveal that between 1901 and 1931 the percentage of Canada's population residing in urban places (i.e., incorporated municipalities) ranged between 35 and 50 per cent.² Almost half of this urban population, however, was concentrated in small urban centers of 30,000 people or less; almost one third of it was centered in urban places of 10,000 or less. The percentage of Canada's population residing in cities of 100,000 or more ranged between nine per cent in 1901 and 22 per cent in 1931.³

Analysis of data concerning the national employed labor force reveals the non-industrial nature of Canadian society during the pre-CCF era. Agricultural employment accounted for an average of 40 per cent between 1901 and 1931. Manufacturing, usually associated with urbanization, employed only an average of 13 per cent during this period.⁴ Thus, while the excesses of laissez faire capitalism were being politically challenged in the more urbanized and industrialized societies of the western world, Canada remained essentially a non-urban and non-industrial nation with a vast and untapped wilderness

¹Carl J. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy: Theory and Practice in Europe and America (2d ed.; Boston: Ginn, 1954), pp. 425-59.

²See Illustration I, Appendix.

³See Illustration II, Appendix.

⁴See Illustration III, Appendix.

open to individualistic exploitation and development.⁵

Leftist activity that did exist in Canada during the opening decades of the twentieth century was largely non-indigenous in inspiration and rarely of the doctrinaire variety. What passed for the Canadian democratic left until 1932 was a collection of labor movements, agrarian protest groups, and a limited number of socialist organizations. The most politically active segments of each of these were centered in the prairie provinces, western mining and logging camps, and the growing urban centers of British Columbia.

The Politics of Organized Labor During the Protest Era

The Canadian labor movement was imported from the United States, but it was influenced by the experiences of immigrant trade unionists from Britain and continental Europe. From the Americans, the Canadian labor movement inherited the Gompersian tradition of non-alignment with political parties. The British and continental European workers who immigrated to Canada introduced a tradition of political activism into Canadian unions. Both influences were evident throughout the early history of the Canadian labor movement, the American tradition dominating at the national level and the European tradition making inroads among local unions.

The development of trade unionism beyond a local scale can be traced to 1883 when the craft unions in the Toronto area formed a "trade assembly." This organization grew to provincial proportions

⁵ Stanley Knowles, The New Party (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1961), p. 22.

and became known as the Trades and Labour Council. In 1886 it joined other Canadian unions to organize the Trades and Labour Congress (TLC). In 1902 the TLC purged its few industrial-type affiliates and became the Canadian arm of the American Federation of Labor. The industrial unions that were purged from the TLC organized themselves into a small amalgamation which, after many changes in name, became the All-Canadian Congress of Labour. It wasn't until 1939 that this organization joined with some industrial unions that had affiliated with the American-based Congress of Industrial Organization (CIO) to form the powerful Canadian Congress of Labor.⁶ These strains of union activity represented two of the major elements of organized labor in Canada until they merged in 1956.

A separate organization of Roman Catholic unions provided a third strain. Catholic syndicates began to develop after 1891, especially in Quebec. They were confined to the local level until 1921 when a national organization of Catholic labor syndicates was formed called the Conference of Catholic Workers of Canada. Although it was ostensibly national in scope, its numerical and organizational strength was centered in the province of Quebec. It was organized on a craft basis and heavily influenced by the Church. Consequently, it demonstrated the strong antipathy of both craft unions and the Church toward the subject of political action in general and socialist parties in particular.⁷ In 1962, after many changes in name, Catholic trade unionism became known as the Confederation of National Trade

⁶ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 17-22.

⁷ Ibid., p. 21.

Unions.⁸

During the period preceding the formation of the CCF, however, the major elements of Canadian trade unionism were affiliated with the TLC. The rest were scattered among what was then called the All-Canadian Congress of Labor, the Quebec-centered Catholic syndicates, and a few autonomous industrial-type unions. The TLC rigidly adhered to the Gomperian tradition until 1900. In that year it reluctantly agreed to the principle of a separate party for labor, and six years later it granted its provincial and local organizations autonomy regarding the establishment of labor parties.⁹ This development was actually pro forma because many TLC locals had been engaged in party politics for several years. TLC locals had conspired with the Knights of Labour to form the Workingmen's Party in British Columbia in 1886. A Labour Party with local TLC support had been formed in the same province in 1899. It ran on a platform calling for an eight hour day, public ownership, and a single tax.¹⁰

More importantly, the TLC's official resistance to becoming actively engaged in the party life of the nation did not prevent union members or leaders from engaging in politics as independent candidates supported by labor votes. D. J. O'Donoghue, a leader in an Ottawa typographical union, was the first of these so-called independent "labor" candidates to be elected in Canada. He won a seat

⁸ Knowles, The New Party, p. 63.

⁹ Ibid., p. 10.

¹⁰ Paul W. Fox, "Early Socialism in Canada," in J. H. Aitchison, ed., The Political Process in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 86-87.

in the Ontario legislature in 1874. Subsequently, "labor" candidates were elected to provincial legislatures in British Columbia and Nova Scotia.¹¹ At the national level, TLC President Ralph Smith was elected as an independent "labor" candidate in 1898. Two years later he joined the Liberal caucus. A. W. Puttee, editor of the socialist-titled Peoples' Choice, published by the Winnipeg Trades and Labour Council, was elected as an independent "labor" MP in 1900. Alphonse Verville, president of the TLC, was elected as a "labor" MP from a Winnipeg riding in 1906.¹² In 1921, J. S. Woodsworth of Winnipeg and William Irvine of Calgary were elected as independent "labor" MPs to form what Irvine facetiously called the "new group" in the House of Commons.¹³

Except for some activity in Nova Scotia, the most politicized segment of the trade union movement was manifested in western Canada, partly because early trade unionism in the West had been influenced by the existence of the militant Industrial Workers of the World (IWW). The IWW was particularly strong in Calgary, Winnipeg, Vancouver, and among the miners and loggers in British Columbia.¹⁴ After the IWW declined, many of its leaders and members infiltrated the emerging TLC locals. Furthermore, the West was the center for doctrinaire socialism in Canada, and many socialist leaders were also active in local trade unions.

¹¹ Ibid., p. 86.

¹² Ibid., pp. 86-87; Knowles, The New Party, pp. 10, 23-24.

¹³ Knowles, The New Party, pp. 10, 23-24.

¹⁴ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 20; Fox, "Early Socialism in Canada," p. 85.

Early Socialist Agitation

Separating the political activities of organized labor from the more doctrinaire dimension of left-wing activity is extremely difficult. Men such as A. W. Puttee were not only labor union officials but doctrinaire socialists as well. Unions not only provided electoral and financial support for independent "labor" candidates or labor parties but sometimes supported small socialist or socialist-labor parties. Nevertheless, the following aspects of Canadian socialism can be delineated.

Like trade unionism, doctrinaire socialism was not indigenous to Canada. Swedish and German immigrants brought the more militant versions of continental socialism to Canada. Fabianism was transplanted to Canada by British intellectuals. The programs and concepts of the British Labour Party were widely circulated during visits by Keir Hardie and Ramsay MacDonald in 1907. Eugene Debs, a leading figure in American socialism, traveled extensively in Canada. His ideas were received especially well in the western provinces. Daniel De Leon's ideas permeated Canada through the IWW. Finally, the intellectual basis of Canadian socialism was influenced as much by the works of Upton Sinclair and Edward Bellamy as by Marx.¹⁵

Western Canada, particularly British Columbia, was the seedbed of Canadian socialism. Paul Fox attributes this to the high percentage of immigrant and semi-skilled labor that came to British Columbia to work the mines and forests. Working conditions were poor, and there was competition from cheap Oriental labor. This

¹⁵Fox, "Early Socialism in Canada," pp. 80-85.

produced a volatile political atmosphere which was susceptible to radicalism.¹⁶

It was not surprising that socialist parties tended to gravitate West. A socialist party did take shape in Ontario during the 1880s, but it shifted westward to become the Socialist Party of British Columbia in 1903. In 1904, it changed its name to Socialist Party of Canada (SPC). Although it remained centered in British Columbia, the SPC succeeded in creating branches in every territory and province except Prince Edward Island. It won three seats in the British Columbia legislature in 1907.¹⁷

The SPC became hopelessly divided. Proselytizers with obsessions for doctrinaire Marxism expelled the more moderate elements. In British Columbia some of the purged elements formed the Independent Labour Party. The remaining moderates formed the Social Democratic Party (SDP), and a branch was established in Ontario. A rival Dominion Labour Party was created in Alberta, and in the other prairie provinces the moderates eventually merged into the Federated Labour Party. In 1920, the SPC split again. This time the most militant Marxists withdrew because the party had rejected the "Twenty-One Points" adopted at the Third International. The militants formed the Workers' Party of Canada--forerunner of the Canadian Communist Party. Thus, moderate democratic socialists were scattered among several rival parties; a revolutionary Marxist party had been created on the left; and the

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 85.

¹⁷ Ibid., p. 93.

SPC was depleted, dispirited, and disorganized.¹⁸

Agrarian Ferment

Numerous farm organizations spread to Canada from the United States. At first, organizations like the National Grange refrained from partisan politics. Excepting some brief and unfruitful negotiations with several trade union leaders in 1886 concerning political activity, the Grange confined itself to social and educational activities among its members. Other farm groups, such as the Grain Growers, did become more politically conscious. Their efforts never went beyond endorsing specific policy proposals such as a low tariff policy. Not until the so called "United Farmers' Era" did agrarian protest groups move in the direction of sustained electoral activity.¹⁹

In 1919, the United Farmers of Ontario (UFO) won a resounding victory in the provincial election. Labor votes were acquired in exchange for the UFO's sympathetic support of the general strike against the dreaded Section 98 of the Canadian Criminal Code (i.e., anti-picketing law). The UFO formed the government, and E. C. Drury was chosen Premier. He governed Ontario until 1923 when the UFO, demoralized by defeat and internal dissention, withdrew from party politics. The United Farmers controlled Alberta from 1921 to 1935. In Saskatchewan, the Grain Growers and later the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) campaigned and elected several members to the provincial legislature, most of whom entered the Progressive

¹⁸ Ibid., pp. 92-98.

¹⁹ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 11.

coalition in 1922. Elsewhere, the United Farmer movement was not so spectacular. It elected a few legislators in British Columbia and in the Maritimes. Only in Quebec did the movement fail to elect legislators.²⁰

The Progressive Party of Canada

During World War I various agrarian groups formed the Canadian Council of Agriculture. It had a platform entitled the National Policy which was intended to express the views of the organized farmers of the nation. In 1920, the Council called a conference at Winnipeg to explore the possibilities of electing MPs favorable to the National Policy. Farm organizations from the prairies constituted the core of the delegates, although representatives from Ontario and New Brunswick also attended.

From this conference emerged the National Progressive Party. It was little more than a parliamentary caucus composed of eleven MPs representing Liberal Unionists, United Farmers of Ontario, United Farmers of Alberta, one Liberal, and several independents. Although it did work for improved farm conditions, monetary reforms, and tariff changes, it was a loose organization with little philosophical premise except to check the power of the Conservatives.²¹ In 1921, the Progressives elected 65 MPs, enough to make them the official opposition. They refused this status, preferring to continue as a large protest or reform bloc within the House of Commons. In 1925,

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 11-15.

²¹ Knowles, The New Party, p. 24.

they lost all but twenty-four of their seats.²²

Following this defeat, a segment of the remaining Progressives called the Ginger Group began to work with the handful of independent "labor" members in the House of Commons. This coalition, led by J. S. Woodsworth (labor) and Robert Gardiner (Ginger Group), forced the Liberals to accept some of their demands including the Old Age Pension Act of 1926.²³ Thus, the labor bloc was joined with the most reform minded farm elements of the Progressive Party.

Left-wing forces in Canada remained suspended in this disorganized condition until the early 1930s when a combination of national economic depression and Tory electoral victory gave impetus to reorganization. At the national level, the Ginger Group met with the "labor" MPs in room 607 of the House of Commons to discuss the formation of a "Commonwealth Party" or a federation to coordinate farm groups with labor.²⁴ Meanwhile, various groups began to coalesce in the provinces. A Farmers' Political Association was created in Saskatchewan, and labor created the Provincial Independent Labour Party of Saskatchewan under M. J. Coldwell.²⁵

Several important events took place in 1931 that led to the merger of protest movements into a single party. First, the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) was established. It was composed primarily of intellectuals from the faculties of McGill University

²² Ibid.

²³ M. J. Coldwell, Left Turn Canada (New York: Duell, Sloan, & Pearce, 1945), p. 2.

²⁴ Knowles, The New Party, p. 26.

²⁵ Coldwell, Left Turn Canada, p. 3.

and the University of Toronto. As the Canadian equivalent of the Fabian Society in Britain, it published numerous tracts and books which explicated the philosophic dimensions of the "new" party.²⁶

Second, J. S. Woodsworth and Robert Gardiner decided to utilize the annual convention of the Western Conference of Labour Parties to promote the "new" party.²⁷ The labor convention resolved that a union with farmer groups for joint political action should be considered. This was followed by more concrete action when farm and labor groups merged to create the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party.²⁸

When the Western Conference of Labour Parties opened its next convention in the Calgary Labour Temple in July of 1932, the creation of a new party was virtually assured. Delegates from the United Farmers of Alberta, United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section), the newly formed Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party, and the (national) Canadian Brotherhood of Railway Employees met jointly with the western labor delegates at the convention. Out of this meeting came the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation on August 1, 1932.²⁹

The CCF

²⁶ Regarding the LSR movement, see McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 23, and Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed.

²⁷ The Western Conference of Labour Parties consisted of the Canadian Labour Party (Alberta), Dominion Labour Party of Alberta, Independent Labour Party (Saskatchewan), Co-operative Labour Party (Saskatchewan), Independent Labour Party (Manitoba), and the Socialist Party of Canada (British Columbia). Knowles, The New Party, p. 26.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 27.

The CCF was predominately a western phenomenon. It was a federation of protest movements composed of agrarian and labor groups as well as various socialist-inspired parties that permeated the provinces of Manitoba, Alberta, and British Columbia. Its initial leadership was drawn from the agrarian and more moderate labor elements within the party. Every aspect of the early CCF, including its name, reflected the background and dominance of these leaders.³⁰ Although they represented the moderate wing of the party, they quickly acquiesced to a more doctrinaire version of socialism in order to hold socialist elements in line and to make common cause against the exploiting moneyed interests of the East who were viewed as the perpetrators of the depression.³¹

Within the first five years of the CCF's history, however, a rival power center developed in the East, particularly Ontario. It consisted of middle-class, Anglo-Saxon, and Protestant intellectuals and professionals who resided in a few large eastern cities, especially Toronto. Members of this group were sympathetic to Fabianism and familiar with the organizational concepts of the British Labour Party. It was this eastern, urban-oriented group within the CCF which eventually pressed for a more moderate program and led the way in implementing the concept of broad-based union affiliation with the CCF. Thus, the programmatic and structural development of the CCF represented the emergence of this eastern, urban, middle-class, union-conscious faction and its eventual alliance with the

³⁰ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 35.

³¹ Ibid.

moderate leadership from the prairie provinces.³²

CCF Organization and Leadership

The CCF began as a small, informal, and decentralized organization. It was quickly transformed into a comparatively large, bureaucratized, and institutionalized political party. Oligarchic tendencies were part of this transformation and ultimately led to the development of an influential "inner circle." "This inner circle had neither an official existence nor a formal structure."³³ Its members exerted influence because they occupied strategic positions within the formal structure of the national party.

On the surface, this formal structure changed little over the years. A national convention served as the official policy-making body of the party. It was supplemented by a national council and a smaller, more active national executive. Conventions met annually until 1938 when the constitution was amended to provide for biennial meetings. Until 1942, the council was required to meet at least once a year. After that it was required to meet at least twice a year, although it usually averaged three working sessions per year of about three days' duration. The executive, being smaller, met more frequently and dealt with both routine and emergency questions.³⁴

During the 1940s the council and executive began to assume more importance. They planned the agenda and procedures for the national conventions, appointed resolution committees, and controlled

³²Ibid., pp. 35-37.

³³Ibid., p. 26.

³⁴McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 38-41.

the order in which resolutions reached the floor of the conventions. It also became standard practice for the conventions to refer contentious issues to the council for consideration and passage.³⁵

The council consisted of over fifty people and consequently much of the burden for developing policy was delegated to the twelve-man executive.³⁶ Even then, the day-to-day management of the party required more constant attention. Hence, the office of national secretary, appointed by the council, grew in importance. What started as an unpaid, part-time position assisted by scattered volunteers was transformed into a full-time, salaried position supplemented by a salaried education and information secretary, a research secretary, a parliamentary secretary, and several stenographers.³⁷

An interlocking directorate was established linking these vital centers of intra-party control with the party caucus in the House of Commons. The CCF made it a practice to have the national secretary elected to the national committee as a voting member. The national leader and key members of the CCF caucus were commonly elected to the council and ultimately represented in the executive.³⁸ The national chairman, vice-chairmen, president, secretary, and

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 36-41.

³⁶ The council consisted of the president, chairman and vice-chairmen, ten representatives elected by the convention, plus the provincial presidents, provincial leaders, and two representatives elected by the provincial conventions. The executive was composed of the president, chairman, vice-chairman, secretary, treasurer, and six other individuals selected by the national council. Ibid.

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 42-45.

³⁸ Interview with Terence Grier, Federal Secretary, NDP, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

treasurer were automatically members of the executive.³⁹

Starting with the early 1940s when these offices began to acquire important policy-making functions, the history of the CCF is full of references to M. J. Coldwell, David Lewis, T. C. (Tommy) Douglas, and Stanley Knowles. These four men, supported by other intra and extra-party individuals and groups, were the core of the so-called "inner circle" in the CCF. Coldwell was constantly on the council and executive either as national secretary, national chairman, or national parliamentary leader. Lewis served on both bodies from 1936 to 1960, first as national secretary and later as national chairman. Douglas was a perennial member of the council and executive either as a leading member of the national CCF caucus or as Premier of Saskatchewan. Knowles of Winnipeg became a member of the council in 1934 and of the executive in 1942. In 1954, he became CCF National Vice-President. He served as chairman of national conventions from 1948 to 1958 and held the posts of chief whip and later deputy leader in the CCF caucus.⁴⁰

They not only held strategic positions within the party hierarchy but also enjoyed common personal backgrounds and viewpoints. They were moderate in their ideological commitments. All of them were urban oriented. Coldwell as an MP represented the rural riding of Rosetown-Biggar, but he was considered the spokesman of the urban group in the Saskatchewan section of the party. Douglas

³⁹ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 41.

⁴⁰ Biographical materials supplied by the NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa, October, 1964.

as MP represented an urban riding composed of the city of Weyburn, and Knowles represented a riding in Winnipeg. Lewis was from Toronto. All were sympathetic to trade unionism, and most had important connections with the professional union leaders. Coldwell had been active in the party phase of labor union activity since the days of the old Independent Labour Party of Saskatchewan. Knowles was very active in labor unions and eventually became an executive in the Canadian Labour Congress, which was formed when the TLC and the CCL merged in 1956. Lewis had intimate ties with powerful trade unions in Ontario. His law firm specialized in labor law and had many unions as clients. Douglas had fewer direct connections with organized labor but had belonged to a printers' union since his youthful experience as a printer's apprentice.⁴¹

Hence, given their official positions and personal backgrounds, it was feasible for Coldwell, Knowles, and Douglas to combine with the emerging eastern establishment led by David Lewis. Their efforts were most evident in the area of modifying party program and least cohesive in the area of establishing a system for incorporating members into the party.

CCF Policies and Programs

The first CCF program, adopted at the Calgary Convention in 1932, was a brief and moderate one by general socialist standards. It presented no grand design. It contained no analysis of the evils of capitalism, nor did it explicate the reasons why the "old" parties

⁴¹ Ibid. Data on Coldwell in McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 61.

could not be relied upon to effect reforms. The eight-point statement merely called for public ownership of natural resources and various forms of social security.⁴²

Many of the early CCF leaders felt that this provisional program was unsatisfactory. Some of them feared that, unless the party elaborated its program and philosophy, it would suffer the fate of the Progressive Party. Others were totally unsatisfied with moderation and labored for a more doctrinaire statement of socialist principles. These views permeated the program committee that had been appointed by the provisional National Council of the CCF. For several months this committee reviewed proposals submitted by individuals and constituent groups. Coldwell, one of the authors of the provisional program, submitted a proposal urging the retention of the moderate tenor of the 1932 program. The League of Social Reconstruction pushed for a more doctrinaire set of principles.⁴³

The draft program which was presented to the 1932 CCF National Convention represented a shift toward a more doctrinaire position. It represented the views of the Fabian-inspired League for Social Reconstruction and undoubtedly was attractive to the rank and file socialists in the party. It contained an analysis of Canadian capitalism and concluded that the country was plagued with the increasing concentration of economic power, especially into the hands of United States' investors. It also concluded that the two old parties were instruments of capitalistic interests

⁴²Coldwell, Left Turn Canada, p. 20.

⁴³McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 265.

and that they could not serve as agents of fundamental reform.

Therefore, it was to be the purpose of the CCF to replace the existing socio-economic order with a "planned and socialized economy."⁴⁴

The CCF Convention of 1933 adopted the committee's draft program. It became known as the Regina Manifesto, the basic programmatic statement of the CCF until 1956. Elaborations and additions were made at subsequent CCF national conventions, but they did not substantially alter the socialistic premises contained in the original manifesto.⁴⁵

Details of the program and ideology of the CCF from 1933 to 1956 have been explicated in several sources.⁴⁶ A brief summary of the CCF program is sufficient to indicate the basic ideological positions of the party throughout most of its history. Many of these ideological positions continued to attract the allegiance of numerous CCFers following the promulgation of the more moderate 1956 program. The New Democratic Party is still plagued by members with nostalgic memories of the Regina Manifesto.

The Regina Manifesto contained the traditional socialistic concepts concerning public ownership of banks, insurance companies, basic industry, and natural resources. As a gesture to the farmer, the program urged public ownership of railroads and grain elevators but not land. Economic planning was also stressed, although the question of which level of government would perform this task was

⁴⁴Text of the Regina Manifesto. Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 160-69.

⁴⁵McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 266.

⁴⁶Summaries can be found in Ibid., pp. 265-300 and Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, passim.

constantly debated. Other proposals included government crop insurance, lower tariffs, marketing schemes, co-operative movements, import-export controls, and a national labor code. Expanded educational services was a key plank in the CCF program probably because a large number of CCF leaders were teachers by profession. Health programs were set forth in rather vague terms. The national CCF officially refrained from committing itself to a national public health program until the early 1950s.⁴⁷ The CCF Government in Saskatchewan, however, led the way in promoting specific health programs culminating in the medicare program established in 1962.⁴⁸

The CCF understood that many of these domestic programs would come into serious conflict with the existing system of government in Canada. The Canadian federal system had been transformed into a rather decentralized version of federalism by judicial review.⁴⁹ CCF policy, on the other hand, had definite centralistic implications. Hence, the Regina Manifesto called for the amendment of the British North America Act (BNA) to reverse the decentralizing trends instituted by the courts while assuring religious and racial minorities that they would retain their rights and that legitimate provincial claims to autonomy would be respected. The Senate was also viewed as a threat to CCF policy because Canadian Senators are

⁴⁷Report of the Thirteenth National Convention, CCF, held at Edmonton, Alberta, July 28-30, 1954, p. 22.

⁴⁸McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 249-53, 266-88; Globe and Mail (Toronto), August 4, 1962.

⁴⁹A. R. M. Lower and F. R. Scott et. al., Evolving Canadian Federalism (Durham, N. C.: Duke University Press, 1958), passim.

appointed for life. Should a CCF government come to power, it would face a Senate composed entirely of members from the two "old" parties. So the Regina Manifesto urged the abolition of the Canadian Senate.⁵⁰

Unlike the party's domestic program, the CCF approach to external affairs shifted significantly during the period 1933 to 1956. The Regina Manifesto urged a foreign policy designed to obtain economic co-operation, disarmament, and world peace. It endorsed the League of Nations and the International Labor Organization. It opposed Canadian participation in "imperialistic wars" or wars fought to make the "world safe for capitalism."⁵¹

The party was able to adhere to these premises during the early stages of World War II. Led by J. S. Woodsworth, an ardent pacifist, the CCF caucus in the House of Commons asserted that this war, like the last one, was caused by imperialism and a political struggle for power. When the Commons voted on a declaration of war, the CCF caucus stood with the French-Canadian isolationists in opposition to the war and to the use of troops overseas. Once an expeditionary force had been sent to Europe, however, the CCF voted for military supply bills.

Following Pearl Harbor, the CCF attitude shifted. America's entry into the war made strict neutrality an impossible position. Furthermore, the CCF's semi-pacifist position had resulted in the loss of several seats in Parliament. Consequently, M. J. Coldwell superseded J. S. Woodsworth as the party's chief spokesman on foreign

⁵⁰ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 281-84.

⁵¹ Regina Manifesto, in Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 106.

policy. The CCF supported Prime Minister W. L. Mackenzie King's 1942 national plebiscite designed to free his Government from its 1940 election pledge not to conscript men for overseas service. It voted against legislation to implement the results of the plebiscite because it permitted the Government to implement conscription when it deemed necessary rather than establish an explicit policy that would go into effect immediately. Furthermore, the CCF was disturbed over the inadequate gestures that were being made by the Government toward equality of sacrifice, public ownership of war industry, and limitations on profits and earnings.⁵²

As the war began to end, the CCF was on record as being in favor of a humane and just peace without harsh reparations or lengthy military occupation. It was on record as favoring the establishment of a world association of nations which would work for economic development, the end of colonial empires, and an international police force.⁵³ Hence, many party leaders openly endorsed the concept of a United Nations. M. J. Coldwell joined Prime Minister King as a delegate to the San Francisco conference which formally created the United Nations.⁵⁴

As the cold war developed, pacifist and isolationist elements again harassed the party. The UN began to show signs of inherent defects, and so the promoters of world government joined in criticizing

⁵²McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 281-84.

⁵³For Victory and Reconstruction (Ottawa: CCF National Office, 1942), passim.

⁵⁴McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 299.

the party's approach to world affairs. In 1946, the CCF National Convention voted down persistent proposals from the pacifists, isolationists, and disgruntled promoters of world government. This victory did not mean that the more moderate and internationalist leaders such as Coldwell, Lewis, and Knowles could easily maneuver the party beyond the acceptance of an admittedly imperfect United Nations.⁵⁵ The rise of regional defense organizations, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), presented particularly knotty problems. Many CCF leaders were attracted to the social and economic provisions in the NATO Charter. A few even endorsed the military aspects of NATO. Pacifists and isolationists, of course, rejected the entire concept of regional alliances. Unable to reach a consensus for several years, the CCF program did not include a proposal concerning NATO until 1960. This was to become a serious issue during the formative years of the NDP.

The Regina Manifesto continued as the official program until 1956, but intellectual debates about the socialist principles contained in it were muffled while the party concentrated on extending its electoral victories during the late 1940s.⁵⁶ Even in Saskatchewan, where the party obtained an opportunity to implement some of its socialist ideas, the CCF Government proceeded in an ad hoc fashion. Aside from a brick plant, a shoe factory, a tannery, a bus company, and certain aspects of the province's electric power system, there was no mass socialization of the means of production. Emphasis was

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 86.

placed on marketing boards, encouragement of co-operative enterprises, and government insurance schemes to provide competition for private insurance companies. A government medicare program designed for all citizens of the province, however, was not forthcoming until 1962. Until then, there was provincial assistance to hospitals, government clinics for cancer and tuberculosis, provincial loans and grants to community hospitals, and a contributory hospitalization plan. Old age pensions and public assistance were, of course, major items in Saskatchewan provincial budgets throughout the CCF reign.⁵⁷

When the party's national electoral appeal began to slip, the whole question of principles was reopened. Moderates blamed the depression inspired Regina Manifesto for the electoral decline of the CCF. Doctrinaire socialists denounced the revisionary tendencies that were evident in CCF campaign appeals. Unable to reconcile these differences, the party vacillated between nostalgic tales of the CCF as the voice of socialism and recollections of all of the reforms they had foisted upon the old parties.⁵⁸

This vacillation continued until 1955 when Lewis, National Chairman of the CCF, delivered a speech entitled "A Socialist Takes Stock." The speech was a succinct and cogent statement of the moderate position which, according to Lewis, represented the view of the majority of the National Executive and the National Council. In it, Lewis denounced public ownership as a panacea. "The Soviet experiment,"

⁵⁷ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 229-64.

⁵⁸ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 85-90.

he said, "was conclusive evidence that public ownership alone does not guarantee freedom."⁵⁹

Perhaps this speech was a "trial balloon." If it was, the feedback apparently indicated that important segments of the party were ready to formalize the moderating trends that had characterized the behavior of the party for almost a decade. At all events, the basic logic of the speech by the National Chairman was built into a draft program which was submitted to the CCF National Convention in 1956.

The National Council and the National Executive worked hard to translate the basic logic of David Lewis' speech into a draft program which would not totally alienate ardent socialists and pacifists. The draft program, adopted as the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles, stressed the continuity between the new program and the revered Regina Manifesto.

The aim of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation is the establishment in Canada by democratic means of a co-operative commonwealth in which the supplying of human needs and the enrichment of human life shall be the primary purpose of our society. Private profit and corporate power must be subordinated to social planning designed to achieve equality of opportunity and the highest possible living standards for all Canadians.

This is, and always has been, the aim of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation. The Regina Manifesto . . . has had a profound influence on Canada's social system. Many of the improvements it recommended have been wrung out of unwilling governments. . . . Canada is a better place than it was a generation ago, not the least because of the cry for justice sounded in the Regina Manifesto. . . .⁶⁰

⁵⁹David Lewis, "A Socialist Takes Stock," cited in Ibid., pp. 90-92.

⁶⁰Winnipeg Declaration of Principles, adopted at the CCF National Convention, Winnipeg, Manitoba, July, 1956. Cited in Ibid., pp. 169-73.

The Winnipeg Declaration, moreover, noted that inequalities persisted in Canada and that capitalism continued to be basically immoral. Private profit had led to a waste of natural resources. The lack of social planning had produced unemployment and a further concentration of corporate power. Finally, it noted that the CCF had always recognized public ownership as the most effective means of breaking monopolistic power and achieving a planned economy.⁶¹

Having said all this and having promised that the CCF would extend public ownership where necessary, the Winnipeg Declaration pointed out that

the CCF also recognized that in many field there will be need for private enterprise which can make a useful contribution to the development of our economy.⁶²

Thus, the CCF vowed to promote private as well as public-owned industry, to protect and extend the ownership of family farms, and to stress the co-operative form of ownership to protect producers and consumers.⁶³

In the field of foreign affairs, the Winnipeg Declaration pledged the party's support to the United Nations and all other international agencies which provided assistance to underdeveloped countries. It denounced the spread of nuclear weapons and called for continued efforts toward disarmament.⁶⁴ Noticeably absent was

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² Ibid.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

any explicit reference to NATO.

Although the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles embodied many of David Lewis' ideas, he was aided in getting it accepted by influential allies representing the more moderate elements from the prairie provinces. Coldwell, then CCF National Leader, had never been satisfied with the Regina Manifesto. As early as 1945, he wrote in his book Left Turn Canada that had the 1932 program "remained in its original, simple form the CCF might have made more rapid progress. . . ." ⁶⁵ Douglas made his position clear in an interview a few years after the Winnipeg Declaration was passed in which he asserted that the CCF had been dominated too long by a depression psychology. Although the CCF had come to terms with the affluent post-war world in 1956, Douglas had always felt that it should have done so in 1945. ⁶⁶

Quest for a Viable Party Base

One of the issues which constantly separated the rising eastern establishment from the rest of the CCF leadership involved the premise upon which the "grass roots" of the party should be organized. There was a tradition of indirect membership affiliated groups. However, a concept of direct membership organized along federal and/or provincial election constituencies also developed. A conflict was generated over which of these two concepts of party organization was to be emphasized. The western leadership

⁶⁵ Coldwell, Left Turn Canada, p. 20.

⁶⁶ Michael Best, "Bad Times--Program Blamed for CCF Drop," Toronto Daily Star, August 6, 1960.

represented segments of the party which tended to emphasize direct membership, while the eastern forces (Ontario) tended to gamble on the affiliation approach.

The Regina Manifesto made it clear that the CCF was to be a "federation of organizations." According to the first CCF Constitution, membership would consist of "approved provincial organizations which accepted the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation Program."⁶⁷ Initially, this definition applied to most of the provincial labor or socialist parties and the provincial farm organizations that had banded together to create the CCF at the Calgary Conference of 1932. It also included a small number of CCF Clubs which were formed at the local level. Thus, the early CCF was essentially a holding company designed to coordinate congeries of provincially autonomous labor parties, socialist parties, farm groups, and CCF Clubs. The coordinative function was to be performed by an annual convention composed of delegates from these provincial organizations, a national council, and a smaller national executive.

As time passed, the CCF Clubs became the basic device for soliciting party members. Gradually they absorbed members who had previously adhered to the provincial labor or socialist parties which for practical purposes ceased to exist shortly after the CCF was formed. As the various United Farmer organizations withdrew from politics, many of their members became active in CCF Clubs.

The club system began to break down as the party became

⁶⁷ CCF Constitution, adopted at the First National Convention, Regina, July, 1933.

concerned about electoral success. Since they were organized on a community basis and not on the basis of provincial or federal election constituencies, they proved to be ill-suited for the task of mobilizing voters behind the CCF. The Saskatchewan CCF initiated a reorganization of the provincial party along constituency lines. After its provincial victory in 1944, other provincial CCF parties emulated them. CCF constituency associations began to replace CCF Clubs as the basic device for soliciting and organizing individual members.⁶⁸ By 1946, the CCF National Convention had adopted a formula for representing constituency associations at national conventions.⁶⁹

The concept of direct membership, organized into constituency associations and represented at provincial and national conventions, continued to grow. In fact, some provinces dropped provisions for affiliated membership. The Manitoba CCF, for example, required that the provincial convention consist of the provincial council and delegates from constituency associations.⁷⁰ The New Brunswick CCF allowed CCF Clubs, youth groups, and university chapters to exist; but it refused them direct representation in the provincial convention.⁷¹ In Prince Edward Island and Nova Scotia, the CCF followed

⁶⁸ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 62-67.

⁶⁹ McHenry, Third Force in Canada, p. 33.

⁷⁰ CCF Constitution (Manitoba Section), Art. I, Sec. 3 and Art. IV, Sec. 2, as amended 1959.

⁷¹ CCF Constitution (New Brunswick Section), Parts IV and V, as amended 1959.

a similar pattern.⁷²

The concept of indirect membership through affiliated groups continued to have enthusiastic supporters, but there was little pressure to mount a major campaign to implement the idea until the mid-1940s. Farm organizations had withdrawn from formal participation in party life following the formation of the CCF.⁷³ The TLC, despite repeated resolutions to endorse the CCF, officially adhered to its Gompersian tradition. The Catholic unions followed a similar path for different reasons. The CCL, which was formed in 1939, made no move toward endorsing any political party until 1943 when it resolved to make the CCF its "political arm."⁷⁴ Provincial socialist and labor parties had ceased to exist shortly after the formation of the CCF.

More importantly, the affiliate approach to membership was thwarted by a lack of consensus among CCF leaders concerning the mechanics of implementing the scheme. Some TLC locals had affiliated with provincial CCF parties in Ontario, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.⁷⁵ However, unions of the industrial variety often transcended provincial boundaries. The initial response of the CCF National Council to this dilemma was to channel these unions through provincial organizations anyway. Thus, the Canadian

⁷²CCF Constitution (Prince Edward Island Section), Art. III, as amended 1959; CCF Constitution (Nova Scotia Section), Art. III, as amended 1958.

⁷³McHenry, Third Force in Canada, pp. 106-107.

⁷⁴Ibid., pp. 101-104.

⁷⁵Ibid., p. 103.

Brotherhood of Railway Employees joined the Ontario section of the party in 1933.⁷⁶ In 1938, District Twenty-Six of the United Mine Workers (UMW), which covered Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, resolved to affiliate with the CCF. They were allowed to affiliate with the national party.⁷⁷ When the steel workers of Nova Scotia inquired about affiliation, the national leadership was in a quandary. Finally the National Executive ruled that all unions should affiliate with the CCF through provincial organizations even though some provinces made no provisions to represent such affiliates in their provincial conventions.⁷⁸

It is difficult to obtain precise figures about the effect that affiliated unions had on the CCF's membership or votes. The Saskatchewan section of the CCF stated in 1959 that the effect of allowing unions to affiliate was never spectacular in that province and that the advantages of union affiliates in terms of increased membership were never translated into a significant increase in CCF votes. Hence, the Saskatchewan section of the CCF preferred to emphasize individual memberships.⁷⁹ The Ontario CCF, on the other hand, obtained most of its membership from affiliated unions. While the Saskatchewan CCF listed 24,069 individual members and only a

⁷⁶ Ibid., p. 46.

⁷⁷ CCF, National Committee, CCF Twenty-Fifth Anniversary (Ottawa: November, 1957), p. 29.

⁷⁸ Minutes of the CCF National Executive, Ottawa, February 2, 1942.

⁷⁹ CCF (Saskatchewan Section), Provincial Executive Meeting Minutes, Regina, September 12, 1959.

few thousand affiliated members in February of 1960, the Ontario CCF, with a much larger population to draw upon, listed only 9,165 individual members in January of 1960. However, it recorded 19,594 affiliated members. Most of these were brought into the party by locals of the United Auto Workers, United Packinghouse Workers, and the United Steel Workers, which had affiliated with the Ontario CCF. Available figures indicate that the only other provincial CCF to have a membership pattern like that of Ontario was British Columbia which was, as previously noted, the historic center for the more radical and politically active trade unions.⁸⁰

Part of the reason for this heavy concentration of trade union affiliates in Ontario was due to the location of the major steel and automobile industries in that province. Consequently, major segments of the politically active CCL unions (USW and UAW) were located in the urban centers of Ontario. Although Leo Zakuta reports that significant financial assistance was given to the CCF in Ontario by these affiliated unions,⁸¹ the affiliated memberships apparently were not translated into votes. Excepting a few victories during federal by-elections, CCF victories in federal elections tended to be registered in the non-urban and sparsely populated constituencies of Timiskaming and Port Arthur. The experiment with a union-based party in Ontario suggested little that deserved emulation by other provincial CCF organizations, particularly since the TLC continued officially to resist endorsement of

⁸⁰ NDP Founding Convention Delegates File, NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa. File dated July, 1961.

⁸¹ Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 106-109.

the party.

Electoral Support for the CCF

Electurally, the CCF remained overwhelmingly a western party. As Illustration IV in the Appendix indicates, CCF national electoral support was languid in eastern Canada. The Maritimes, except for the pocket of CCF support around the coal mining community of Cape Breton in Nova Scotia, were a total loss. The Social Democratic Party, the CCF equivalent in Quebec, never elected representatives to Parliament and consistently obtained a paltry percentage of the vote. Outside of the western provinces, only in Ontario did the CCF enjoy more than ten per cent of the vote on a consistent basis and elect more than a single MP.

Not only was the party's electoral support in federal elections basically centered in western Canada, but a substantial proportion of it was located in the bailiwick of the most ardent socialist elements in the party--British Columbia. As long as these elements continued to produce electoral successes for the party, they could not be ignored by the national leadership.

These basic trends were repeated at the provincial level. The CCF became the party of government in Saskatchewan in 1944 and remained in that position for twenty years. In British Columbia, it has served as the official opposition since 1941. The CCF was in a coalition government in Manitoba during World War II and served as the official opposition between 1945 and 1953. In Alberta, it obtained twenty-five per cent of the vote in 1945 only to decline to less than five per cent.

In eastern Canada, the CCF was as unsuccessful at the provincial level as it was in federal elections. The party served as the official opposition in Ontario between 1943 and 1945 only to drop to a small bloc of votes in the legislature. East of Ontario, the CCF succeeded in electing members to provincial legislatures only in Nova Scotia. Its best effort there was three seats. In only one other eastern province, New Brunswick, did the CCF ever capture as much as ten per cent of the provincial vote.⁸²

Once the outcome of the 1958 Diefenbaker landslide had been assessed, it became apparent that the moderate leadership from the West had suffered most. Manitoba's CCF representation in the House of Commons was wiped out, including the seat held by Stanley Knowles. Saskatchewan dropped from ten CCF seats to one, eliminating national party leader Coldwell in the process. In only two provinces could the CCF claim that it had survived the 1958 election relatively intact--British Columbia and Ontario. Three of the seven CCF seats in British Columbia were eliminated, but the party had increased its proportion of the popular vote by over two percentage points. In Ontario, the CCF maintained its three seats even though its percentage of the vote dropped slightly.

Although it is difficult to document exactly how the defeated western leaders perceived the 1958 fiasco, it can be reasonably inferred that they had a choice between admitting that the CCF was essentially a western party or seeking to rejuvenate the party to

⁸² Harold Scarrow, "Voting Patterns and Canada's New Democratic Party," Political Science, Vol. 14 (March, 1962), pp. 6-7.

serve its original raison d'être (i.e., to build a national party of the democratic left in order to reconstruct the Canadian party system along left-right lines). The former was less appealing. It not only meant the abandonment of the CCF's claim to existence but also an alliance with the more socialistic faction of the party centered in British Columbia. Furthermore, the Liberals had been defeated in 1957 and soundly trounced in 1958. This gave a new twist to an old CCF hope. "Instead of expecting, as it had for almost two-decades, to replace the stagnating Conservatives as Canada's second major party, it pinned its new hope on a Liberal collapse."⁸³ The right wing of a demoralized Liberal party, it was argued, would move into the Conservative camp. The leftist and progressive elements would eventually swell the ranks of the CCF.⁸⁴

In order to implement this new strategy, the coalition between western moderates and the emergent eastern establishment centered in Ontario remained intact. References to a major reconstruction of the party began to circulate, and the names of Stanley Knowles and David Lewis were immediately associated with them.

⁸³Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 134-35.

⁸⁴Ibid.

CHAPTER II

A NEW PARTY FOR CANADA: PREPARATIONS FOR THE NDP VERSION

"Every defeated party, cause or interest must decide whether or not it will continue to fight along the old lines or abandon the fight and try to form a new combination."¹ Throughout the post-war period, support for the CCF during national elections had steadily declined.² The CCF's national electoral bastion in Saskatchewan finally crumbled in the federal elections of 1958. A "new combination" seemed to be required if the Canadian democratic left was to survive let alone expand.

The concept of a "new" party was advanced as a possible alternative to simply freezing a seemingly obsolete political alignment and perpetuating it as a permanent minority party in Canadian national politics. Public preparations for implementing this concept began one month after the 1958 federal election and culminated with the founding convention of the new party in the early Fall of 1961. The characteristics of the milieu in which this concept was advanced and the sequence of the preparatory moves to implement it will be discussed in the present chapter. The development of the more substantive aspects

¹E. E. Schattschneider, The Semisovereign People (New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1960), p. 75.

²See Illustration IV, Appendix.

of NDP program, structure, leadership, and internal cohesion will be discussed in subsequent chapters.

The CCF in a Changing Nation

The socio-economic and political milieu facing the proponents of the new party concept was radically different from that which existed when the CCF was formed. Canada had become prosperous, urbanized, and industrialized. Furthermore, Canadian governments had become committed to progressive, even welfare state-oriented programs.

Economic Changes

The CCF emerged in the midst of a historic and obdurate economic depression. Post-war Canada enjoyed record prosperity notwithstanding the development of some pockets of chronic unemployment in the late 1950s and early 1960s.³ The real weekly income of workers in the nine leading industries used for statistical purposes by the Department of Labour rose nearly 40 per cent between 1949 and 1960.⁴ The depression-wracked wheat belt that had played a vital role in the formation and early history of the CCF had become affluent and contented.⁵ Rural and urban purchasing power was high, and consumer goods were abundant.⁶

³Unemployment in 1946 was 3.4 per cent. It continued at approximately that level until 1958 when it jumped to 7.1 per cent. Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Statistical Review, Historical Summary (August, 1963), p. 25.

⁴Canada, Department of Labour, Working and Living Conditions in Canada (10th ed.; Ottawa: April, 1961), pp. 29-32.

⁵Globe and Mail, December 7, 1963.

⁶Working and Living Conditions in Canada, pp. 33-43.

Social Changes

The social context in which this post-war prosperity developed had also changed. When the CCF was formed, barely half of the national population resided in urban places; and 40 per cent of that resided in urban places of 30,000 people or less. According to the 1951 census, approximately 54 per cent of the population lived in urban places. The distribution of this urban population among urban places of various sizes, however, remained essentially the same as it had been in 1931.⁷

In 1956 the Dominion Bureau of Statistics took cognizance of the burgeoning population growth in the suburbs surrounding core cities and redefined the concept of urbanism. Consequently, 67 per cent of the population was considered urban in the special 1956 census. Unfortunately, this new definition was not included in the reported figures indicating the location of this urban population according to the size of urban places. A comparison of the population breakdowns by size of urban place given by the Bureau of Statistics applying the old definition to 1961 census data with a recalculation of those same breakdowns incorporating the suburban population figures reveals the trend that was taking place. Most noticeable was the expansion of the population percentage living in large metropolitan areas of 100,000 people or more. Instead of 40 per cent of the 1961 urban population living in urban centers of 100,000 people or more as reflected by the old definition of urbanism, over 61 per cent of the urban population

⁷See Illustration II, Appendix.

resided in such areas.⁸

The extent to which suburbanization affected the figures concerning urban population is reflected in the fact that almost 480 per cent of the growth in metropolitan Calgary took place in the suburbs during the decade between 1951 and 1961. The figure for Edmonton was over 300 per cent. Over 100 per cent of the growth in metropolitan Hamilton and Toronto was recorded outside of the cities' boundaries. Over 75 per cent of the metropolitan growth was recorded in the suburbs of Ottawa, Halifax, Montreal, Windsor, Winnipeg, Vancouver, and St. John's.⁹

This urban growth was concomitant with a significant shift in the nature of Canada's labor force. When the CCF was born, about one-third of the employed labor force was engaged in agriculture. In 1951 only a fifth of the employed labor force was engaged in agricultural occupations. By 1961, agricultural occupations accounted for only 11 per cent of the total employed labor force. At the same time, manufacturing absorbed an increasing proportion of the labor force. After 1951, the service sector of the economy also became a major employment factor in the Canadian economy.¹⁰

The remaining agricultural economy had also changed. Much of the CCF's support had come from prairie farmers owning small, family-

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Summaries of the population figures of these cities during the period 1901-1961 and calculations for the percentage of suburban growth in them for the period 1951-1961 can be found in Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 7, Part 1, Bulletin 2, pp. 17, 30-34.

¹⁰ See Illustration III, Appendix.

sized farms.¹¹ After World War II, the number of farms declined rapidly only to be replaced by larger corporate enterprises with substantial capital investments.¹²

Even French-Canadian society had changed. The peasant motif began to crack under the pressure of modern mass society.¹³ A society premised upon self-sufficing farm families linked together by parish institutions gave way to an urban model.¹⁴

Political Changes

The CCF was seriously affected by these socio-economic changes. As Professor Frank Underhill pointed out to a group of progressive-minded people, efforts to create a clearly discernible, left-right political alignment along British lines might have been possible had the tendencies toward class-distinction created by the depression continued. But capitalism had made a marvelous recovery after World War II. A politically-conscious proletariat disappeared in a world of television sets, automobiles, and home mortgages.¹⁵

¹¹ "The New Party," New Statesman, Vol. 62 (July 7, 1961), p. 78.

¹² The average size farm in Saskatchewan, the prairie bastion of the CCF, increased from an average of 400 acres in 1931 to an average of over 600 acres in 1956. Data drawn from Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 5, Part 3, Bulletin 2, Table 2, pp. 1-2. The average capital investment for each Canadian farm increased from \$5,800 to more than \$25,000 between the end of World War II and July of 1963. Globe and Mail, July 19, 1963.

¹³ Everett C. Hughes, French Canada in Transition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, paperback ed., 1963), passim.

¹⁴ Michael Oliver, "Confederation and Quebec," Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (November, 1963), p. 179.

¹⁵ Text of a speech by Frank Underhill delivered at a meeting of the Metro-Toronto Co-ordinating Committee for Liberal-Minded People, November 24, 1960. File 1 (d), National Committee for the New Party, "Releases and Statements," NDP Headquarters, Ottawa. File undated.

In addition, most of the political parties in Canada had emerged from the experiences of depression and war committed to various degrees of public ownership, economic planning, and/or public welfare schemes. Most of them agreed that government at some level must perform functions that were alien to even the broadest definition of laissez faire philosophy. Excepting Prime Minister MacDonald's publicly-owned Canadian National Railroad, most Canadian parties had adhered to the basic tenets of this philosophy until the depression. Even then, Prime Minister Bennett's belated "new deal" was largely reversed by the courts.¹⁶ In 1936, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation was established. A national unemployment insurance program came after 1940. A family allowance system was developed in 1944, and the way was paved for a national contributory pension plan in 1951. Provincial governments, alone or working with the federal government, developed workmen's compensation, mothers' allowances, aid to the aged and the infirmed, and various public health programs.¹⁷

In view of these socio-economic and political changes, many of the proposals set forth in the CCF's Regina Manifesto became increasingly irrelevant. But when the party finally formalized its moderate behavioral tendencies by adopting the Winnipeg Declaration in 1956, it lost much of its distinction vis-à-vis the two "old" parties. The CCF simply was not novel or exciting to members of an

¹⁶ R. MacGregor Dawson, The Government of Canada (4th ed.; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 98-99.

¹⁷ A comparison of the social services in Canada with those in other western nations that operate through a federal system of government can be located in K. C. Wheare, Federal Government (4th ed.; New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), pp. 145-68.

urbanized mass society, many of whom could recall neither the depression nor a more laissez faire version of government.¹⁸

Urban Canada and the CCF Vote

While cities can and have existed in pre-industrial societies, the tendency for a majority of a nation's population to live and work in cities--that is, to urbanize--is a characteristic of industrial societies. Urbanization represents a revolutionary change in the whole pattern of social life. Itself a product of basic economic and technological changes, once established, it tends to affect every aspect of existence.

It exercises its pervasive influence not only within the urban milieu strictly defined but also in the rural hinterland. Once established, [urban areas] tend to be centers of power and influence throughout the whole society, no matter how agricultural and rural it may be.¹⁹

To the extent that the process of urbanization tends to reflect basic changes in the socio-economic and political patterns of a nation, it is possible to demonstrate that the post-war CCF became electorally isolated from the major changes sweeping Canadian society. Although there was a belated attempt to adjust the party's programmatic posture to these changes, the CCF continued to be essentially a western, non-urban party in national elections. Most of its seats in the House of Commons during the period 1949 to 1957 came from Saskatchewan. It also recorded its highest levels of popular vote in

¹⁸Text of a speech by Frank Underhill.

¹⁹Kingsley Davis, "The Origins and Growth of Urbanization in the World," American Journal of Sociology, Vol. 60 (March, 1955), p. 429.

that province.²⁰ Yet, the population of Saskatchewan remained predominately non-urban even as late as 1961.²¹ Some of the most consistently CCF federal ridings also included the sparsely populated logging and/or mining ridings of Skeena and Kootenay West in British Columbia plus Port Arthur and Timiskaming in Ontario.

While it is almost impossible to juxtapose the exact dimensions of federal constituencies with those of the "metropolitan" and "major urban" areas as defined by the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, it is possible to construct a fairly accurate list of federal ridings located within or heavily affected by these urbanized areas.²² Comparisons of the official reference maps of metropolitan and major urban areas with the official maps of the federal constituencies utilized since 1952 reveal approximately 108 ridings which are totally within or substantially affected by the population of these urban areas.²³ Hence, there are 153 ridings, excluding the Yukon and Northwest Territories, which are inferentially non-urban in character.

²⁰ See Illustration IV, Appendix.

²¹ See Illustration I, Appendix.

²² "Metropolitan areas" are defined as "groups of urban communities which are in close economic, geographical, and social relationship, [and are] characterized by substantial suburban development around core cities." "Major urban areas" are defined as "having the same characteristics as metropolitan areas, but in most cases refer to urban areas with smaller core cities." Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 1, Part 1, Bulletin 11, pp. 10-11.

²³ "Constituencies that are substantially affected" by the population of urbanized areas means that at least half of the total population of the riding as recorded in the Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1963 Federal Election is located in the urbanized portion of the riding. A list of these ridings appears in Illustration V, Appendix.

Since there is a double-member constituency in each of these categories (i.e., Halifax in the urban category and the Prince Edward Island riding of Queens in the rural category) there are 109 and 154 seats at stake in urban and rural ridings respectively.

Election data arranged according to ridings by Scarrow relative to the three federal elections held after the 1952 reapportionment indicate that the CCF had concentrated its candidates in urban ridings.²⁴ The following table summarizes this generalization.

TABLE 1

CCF Candidates Run in Urban and Non-Urban
Federal Constituencies: 1953-1958

	1953	1957	1958
Number of CCF candidates run in urban ridings (out of 109 seats)	93	87	94
Number of CCF candidates run in non-urban ridings (out of 154 seats)	77	74	75
Total seats in federal ridings excluding the Yukon and Northwest Territories	263	263	263

Admittedly, the party tended not to run candidates in many eastern non-urban ridings, especially in Quebec. But if it is assumed that parties tend to run candidates where they have some vote potential or at least where they have a candidate who is willing to run, then the same criteria essentially affected the decision to run in both

²⁴ Scarrow, Canada Votes, passim.

urban and non-urban ridings. Consequently, if the party tended to run candidates in a larger percentage of urban ridings, it should have performed as well or better in urban ridings during federal elections as in the contested non-urban ridings. However, this was not the case with the CCF.

When the number of victories in urban ridings is compared to the total federal seats captured by the party, an average of about one-third of all federal CCF seats between 1953 and 1958 were won in urban ridings (i.e., 8 out of 23 in 1953, 7 out of 25 in 1957, and 3 out of 8 in 1958). But the percentage of urban victories--in terms of the number of candidates run in such ridings--was much lower than in non-urban ridings. The following table illustrates this generalization.²⁵

TABLE 2

CCF Victories in Urban and Non-Urban
Federal Constituencies: 1953-1958*

	1953	1957	1958
Urban	9 (10%)	7 (8%)	3 (3%)
Non-urban	14 (18%)	18 (24%)	5 (7%)
Total CCF seats	23 (13%)	25 (15.5%)	8 (5%)

*The numbers in parentheses represent the percentage of CCF victories out of the total number CCF candidates run in each category.

Not only was the CCF's performance in urban ridings in terms of victories generally unimpressive, but its performance in terms of the percentage of the popular vote in such ridings was even more

²⁵ Calculated from election data in Ibid.

mediocre.²⁶ Since almost all of the ridings (urban and non-urban) in which the CCF ran candidates were seriously contested by at least two other parties, roughly thirty per cent of the popular vote was needed to put the CCF into contention. The following table illustrates the fact that only about one-tenth of the CCF candidates in urban ridings obtained thirty per cent of the vote or more, while about one-third of the CCF candidates in non-urban ridings were able to obtain that status until the 1958 election crushed the party's non-urban support.²⁷

TABLE 3

Number of CCF Candidates in Urban and Non-Urban
Federal Constituencies According to Percentages
of Popular Vote: 1953-1958

Percentages of CCF Vote	1953		1957		1958	
	U	N-U	U	N-U	U	N-U
49.1 - 59	3	6	1	0	0	0
39.1 - 49	4	10	2	10	5	4
29.1 - 39	4	8	7	12	3	11
19.1 - 29	16	4	15	7	12	10
9.1 - 19	29	14	28	15	32	15
0 - 9	37	35	34	30	42	35
Total candidates in each category	93	77	87	74	94	75
Total seats in each category	109	154	107	154	107	154

²⁶ See Illustration V, Appendix. It should be noted that the CCF also had strong support in Nanimo and Port Alberni in British Columbia, two smaller urban places that fall into neither the metropolitan nor major urban categories. They are in the federal ridings of Nanimo and Comox-Alberni respectively. The city of Weyburn, Saskatchewan, was a federal riding and CCF bastion until it was merged with the rural riding of Assiniboia in 1952, also a perennial CCF bailiwick. *Ibid.*

²⁷ Figures for urban and non-urban ridings drawn from Illustration V, Appendix.

In short, the CCF had been basically unable to capitalize on the electoral implication of the urbanization trend and, by inference, had failed to make serious gains among the voters from the industrial, service and other urban-oriented sectors of the economy. This was especially true in terms of the larger urban areas of Toronto and Montreal. Even if some of the ridings utilized for the above calculations were inhabited by people who would never support a leftist party because of wealth, position, religion, or tradition, the results of the CCF's efforts in urban areas were so unimpressive that the generalization remains valid.

Admittedly Canada has operated upon a historic principle that rural rather than urban constituencies should be more generously represented.²⁸ As the urbanization trend continued, however, the disparities between the population of rural and urban ridings rapidly increased. By 1961, the disparities were as follows.²⁹

TABLE 4

Population Disparities Between Urban and
Non-Urban Federal Constituencies, 1961

	Urban	Rural
Range	34,020 - 267,252	12,479 - 102,717
Mean	92,801	54,356
Median	84,246	50,805

²⁸ Dawson, The Government of Canada, pp. 341-42.

²⁹ Population data for all federal ridings are listed in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1963 Federal Election, pp. xii-xviii.

The burgeoning growth of the urban population in Canada, particularly in the larger urban centers, stimulated pressures to grant urban areas a more equitable quota of the seats in the House of Commons.³⁰ After much debate over how much deviation from a strict population formula ought to be allowed (e.g., deviations of 10, 20, 33, and 40 per cent were suggested), the House of Commons finally passed a bill creating an electoral boundary commission for each of the ten provinces and granting them the power to adjust the boundaries of federal constituencies on the basis of population. Commissions may deviate from a strict population principle by as much as 25 per cent. A tolerance of more than 25 per cent may be applied in the two dual-member ridings should the commissions responsible for them decide to perpetuate their existence.³¹ Regardless of the actual deviations allowed by the various commissions within the 25 per cent limit--and it would be premature to judge what the trends will be since none of the commissions had made final reports as of May, 1965³²--the urban areas of Canada stand to gain a more generous quota of seats in the House of Commons.

Belated as this legislation was, the probability that urban areas would become a more significant factor in Canadian elections

³⁰ Bernard Dufresne, "Gerrymandering on the Way Out," Globe and Mail Magazine, October 12, 1963, p. 2.

³¹ Canada, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), November 27, 1963, pp. 5163-82; December 3, 1963, p. 5395; December 10, 1963, p. 5642; November 13, 16, 1964, pp. 10055-65, 10113.

³² The Newfoundland Boundary Commission has issued its preliminary report. Public hearings on this report were started in May of 1965. Globe and Mail, May 15, 1965.

was apparent throughout most of the post-war period. The Canadian democratic left, however, was faced with the reality of the situation during the late 1950s. As long as the CCF was able to hold its rural base, the over-representation of rural areas insured the CCF a respectable number of seats in the House of Commons, even though its percentage of the vote steadily declined. When its rural base crumbled in 1958, the CCF representation in Commons was shattered. Conversely, it had not made a serious encroachment in urban areas despite the fact that these were the very areas which were likely to become vital centers of electoral power as the pressure mounted to grant them a more equitable share of the seats in Commons. The party clearly needed a new basis of support if it were to be revived and expanded as a force in Canadian national politics.

Preparations for a New Party

A historic event occurred within the Canadian labor movement which offered hope that a more extensive financial and electoral base could be appended to the democratic left in Canada. In April of 1956, delegates from the TLC and the CCL met in Toronto to merge the two organizations into the Canadian Labour Congress (CLC). At the time of merger the CLC represented 5,238 affiliated branches and 1,030,000 members or 76 per cent of the total organized labor membership in Canada.³³

³³Canadian Year Book, 1957-58, p. 803. About 101,000 members belonged to the Catholic unions, 175,000 belonged to unaffiliated unions, and about 1,000 belonged to AFL-CIO unions that had not joined the CLC.

The CLC

One of the major questions at the founding of the CLC, of course, concerned the nature of the political action that the new union organization would endorse. "The powerful body of CCF supporters in the CCL and the smaller core in the TLC together constituted the best organized group within the new Congress on the subject of political action."³⁴ These CCF supporters reportedly wanted to push the CLC into an explicit endorsement of the party, but they were restrained by various leaders on the grounds that a strong, pro-CCF resolution was premature and that a rebuff at the founding convention of the CLC would jeopardize further progress.³⁵ Consequently, a compromise resolution on political action was passed which called upon the appropriate committee of the CLC

to initiate discussions with free trade unions not affiliated with the Congress, with principle farm organizations . . . , with the co-operative movement, and with the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation or other political parties pledged to support the legislative program of the CLC, excluding the Communist and fascist-dominated parties, and to explore and develop co-ordination of action in legislative and political action.³⁶

On the surface, the CLC seemed to be affirming a desire to channel its political activities through any interested political party. By naming the CCF, however, it seemed to reveal an expectation that only the CCF was likely to respond. If so, their expectation was confirmed several months later when the CCF National

³⁴Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 110.

³⁵Ibid., p. 111.

³⁶Resolution cited in Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), p. 6.

Convention recorded a vote which made it the only Canadian party to endorse the CLC resolution.³⁷

The New Party Concept

In April of 1958, one month after the national election, the CLC held its second national convention at Winnipeg. When discussions were opened concerning political action, the concept of a "new party" was introduced by the leadership and passed in the form of a resolution. The resolution called for a

broadly based people's political movement which would embrace the CCF, the labour movement, farm organizations, professional people and other liberally-minded persons interested in basic social reform and reconstruction through the parliamentary system of government.³⁸

The resolution also empowered the CLC Executive Council to

initiate discussions with the CCF, interested farm organizations and other like-minded individuals and groups, to formulate a constitution and a program for such a political instrument . . . ; and to report on such a plan, draft constitution and program to the next Convention of the Congress.³⁹

One month later, the CCF National Council expressed its support for the CLC resolution and drafted a similar one to be submitted to the party's national convention scheduled for July of that year. Meanwhile, the council negotiated with the CLC leadership and created the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee to begin discussions with farm organizations plus other groups and individuals, and to work on a draft

³⁷Ibid.

³⁸ Resolution passed at the CLC Convention held at Winnipeg, April 21-25, 1958. Cited in CLC-CCF Joint National Committee, A New Political Party for Canada, pp. 20-21.

³⁹Ibid.

constitution and program for the proposed party.⁴⁰

In July of 1958 three-hundred CCF delegates attended what one major newspaper called a "fateful convention." They were to be asked to sanction the giving up of their party identity and probably its name in order to form the core of a "people's political movement."⁴¹

Claude Jodoin, President of the CLC, addressed the convention and assured the delegates that organized labor did not intend to dominate the party. Indeed, he stressed the fact that CLC affiliates would not be forced to support the still unnamed party.⁴² David Lewis, then CCF National Chairman, noted that the CCF had always been interested in greater farm and labor support and that the merger of the TLC and the CCL had merely made that goal more approachable.⁴³ Premier Douglas of Saskatchewan told the delegates: "The CCF has come to the crossroads. It could go on as a small, effective needling group or emerge as a strong force with labor and farmer support."⁴⁴ Hazen Argue, temporary leader of the CCF caucus in the House of Commons due to Coldwell's defeat in 1958, called the CLC move a "historical offer to build a new political force on a broader base but with the same principles of social ownership and social democracy on which the CCF was founded."⁴⁵

⁴⁰ Knowles, The New Party, p. 36.

⁴¹ Toronto Daily Star, July 23, 1958.

⁴² Ibid., July 25, 1958.

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

Following these endorsements of the new party concept by prominent labor and party leaders, the convention unanimously approved a resolution calling for a "broadly-based people's party" and empowering the national party's council and executive to initiate and conduct discussions within the party and with the CLC, the Catholic unions, farm organizations, and other like-minded groups and individuals relative to the establishment of such a party. Furthermore, the resolution required that the council and executive report the results of such discussions at the next regular convention, or special convention called for that purpose, and to submit any draft constitution or any other propositions concerning the new party to all CCF Clubs and associations prior to such regular or special party convention.⁴⁶

The idea of a new party of the democratic left had not been a "grass roots" phenomenon. The new party resolutions passed by the CLC and the CCF in 1958 had not been introduced spontaneously from the floor of either convention. Furthermore, neither resolution had been independently conceived by the CLC or the CCF. Impetus for and the development of both resolutions came from the coordinated efforts of the executives of the union and the party. Two people in particular--Stanley Knowles and David Lewis--had sufficient official or unofficial ties with the executives of both organizations to provide the needed coordination.

Between the formation of the CLC in 1956 and the adoption of the new party resolutions by the party and the union in 1958, Knowles

⁴⁶ Resolution passed at the CCF National Convention held at Montreal, July 23-25, 1958. Cited in A New Political Party for Canada, pp. 21-22.

served as an officer in both the CLC and the CCF. He was a delegate to the founding convention of the CLC and subsequently became Executive Vice-President of that organization. During the same period he served the CCF, at one time or another, as national vice-president, chief whip of the national caucus, deputy leader of the national caucus, and chairman of the 1956 and 1958 national party conventions.⁴⁷

Lewis, on the other hand, had official connections only with the party. But aside from being national chairman and then national president after the 1958 convention, he utilized the ties he had established with labor as a lawyer specializing in labor law to promote the new party. In fact, he either authored or co-authored the 1958 new party resolution passed by the CLC.⁴⁸ Although the author has no information revealing who wrote the CCF resolution, Lewis probably contributed to its authorship as well.

National Committee for the
New Party

Given the apparent elite origins of the new party concept, it was necessary that "grass roots" support be created. This task, in addition to that of developing a draft program and constitution for the new party, fell to the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee, later

⁴⁷ NDP, "Biographical Materials,"

⁴⁸ Douglas Fisher, CCF MP (Port Arthur), asserted that Lewis authored the CLC resolution. See his "The Last CCF Roundup," Canadian Forum, Vol. 40 (September, 1960), pp. 122-23. In the "Correspondence" column of a subsequent issue of this periodical, Fisher noted that he had received a letter from Eugene Forsey, Research Director of the CLC, admonishing him for such an assertion. Forsey, according to Fisher, said that Lewis merely co-authored the resolution. "This," said Fisher, "was quibbling." Ibid., Vol. 40 (November, 1960), p. 184.

renamed the National Committee for the New Party (NCNP).

The NCNP was originally composed of nine representatives from the CLC and nine from the party. Almost immediately another representative from each organization was added. Subsequently other members were added to represent farmers, new party clubs, and intellectuals.⁴⁹ Knowles, representing the CLC, was chosen Chairman of the NCNP. Carl Hamilton, National CCF Secretary, was selected to serve as secretary of the committee. Ten sub-committees were established to work on a new party program and constitution, promotion and public relations, and other specialized aspects of the NCNP's activities.⁵⁰

NCNP Promotes the New Party Concept

The NCNP, through its various members and committees, began intensive operations immediately after the 1958 CCF Convention had successfully endorsed the new party resolution. It published a booklet entitled A New Political Party for Canada.⁵¹ In it were posed questions concerned with why a new party was needed, what a new party could do, and key questions that would have to be considered relative to the program and structure of such a party. It also included copies of the 1958 CLC resolution and the 1958 CCF resolution concerning the new party. Finally, it provided a brief outline comparing the policy statements of the CLC, CCF, Canadian Federation of Agriculture, and the Interprovincial Farm Union Council in order to explicate the

⁴⁹ See Illustration VI, Appendix, for names of the members of the NCNP.

⁵⁰ See Illustration VII, Appendix, for a complete list of sub-committees and the members thereof.

⁵¹ Knowles, The New Party, p. 40.

similarities, where applicable, among them. The policies of these organizations relative to pensions, taxation, automation, natural resources, health insurance, unemployment insurance, labor legislation, agriculture, public ownership, education, and foreign policy were briefly compared.⁵²

A New Political Party for Canada served as the basic resource guide for hundreds of institutes, seminars, conferences, and study groups during the two years that had been allotted for discussing the new party resolution.⁵³

A part of these seminars or conferences was held at Winnipeg on August 28-30, 1959. Speeches were presented by leaders of the new party movement. Reports were given by various unions, party groups, and other organizations that had endorsed the new party concept and were trying to promote it in various parts of Canada. There also were reports of the various seminar committees. Although the Winnipeg Seminar was the largest conducted by the NCNP, a brief summary of the speeches and reports given there indicates the general nature of the promotional approach used by the new party leaders and the problems they encountered.

Claude Jodoin told the three-hundred seminar participants that the union chose the new party as its political action vehicle because the old parties had given evidence that they did not share the views and aspirations of labor. He noted that the Diefenbaker Government had not disallowed the infamous Bill 43 which had been

⁵²A New Political Party for Canada, pp. 5-40.

⁵³Knowles, The New Party, p. 59.

passed in British Columbia outlawing secondary boycotts, regulating picketing, and making unions legal entities subject to law suits for losses incurred during strikes. The Government had also refused to disallow the recently passed legislation in Newfoundland which banished the International Woodworkers of America (IWA) from that province. Furthermore, the Liberal Party had not denounced this legislation which was, after all, rammed through the legislature by Liberal Premier Joey Smallwood. Therefore, the CLC regarded it necessary to form a new party in order to establish a left-right dialogue in which labor could have a choice and a voice.⁵⁴

Lewis stressed the historic ties between the CCF and the Canadian labor movement. The formation of the CLC had made it possible to strengthen those ties. Labor aligned with the CCF to form a new party because the CCF continued to be viable and because it had contributed to the defeat of the Liberals by exposing the pipeline scandal of 1956. The CCF aligned with labor in an age when many claimed that unions were corrupt and unpopular because those charges were basically false. Turning to the subject of farm organizations, the third part of the proposed triumvirate that would ostensibly form the new party, Lewis admonished the seminar participants not to become victims of the propaganda about labor. Wage increases, he noted, accounted for little of the cost-price squeeze facing the farmer.⁵⁵

⁵⁴Proceedings of the National New Party Seminar, held at Winnipeg, Manitoba, August 28-30, 1959. Issued by the Political Education Department, CLC, pp. 6-9.

⁵⁵Ibid., pp. 10-17.

Premier Douglas of Saskatchewan told the seminar participants that labor and farmers had identical interests. Saskatchewan farmers never made money when the weekly wage of workers in the province was \$9.00. Farmers need parity to buy farm machinery, exactly the industry that Premier Leslie Frost of Ontario had singled out as the major factor causing Canada's unemployment figures. Only the smear campaign of the press was responsible for camouflaging these common interests.⁵⁶

Reports by the seminar panels or committees indicated the programmatic and policy orientations that were discussed at Winnipeg. The committee on agriculture reported that emphasis had been placed upon developing policies that would insure parity prices and deficiency payments, enhance the co-operative movement, strengthen marketing boards, establish a world food bank under UN auspices, develop crop insurance, and save the family farm as an institution. Other committee reports revealed proposals for a Galbraithian approach to social capital, massive housing programs, world tariff policies, mitigating the effects of automation, handling the needs of the growing number of white collar workers, a nationwide medicare and pension program, increased unemployment compensation, and additional family allowances. On the subject of nationalization, the delegates were treated to a long discourse on the notion of a mixed economy.⁵⁷

Reports by various organizations concerning the progress of the new party promotional efforts in a number of Canadian provinces were both encouraging and disconcerting. The Joint Liaison Committee

⁵⁶ Ibid., pp. 139-50.

⁵⁷ Ibid., pp. 60-91.

of the CCF-British Columbia Federation of Labour, an organization that had been formed after the latter endorsed the party in 1957, reported that a provincial version of the Winnipeg Seminar had been conducted in June of 1958. It also reported that this joint party-union committee had assisted in selecting and financing CCF candidates for the provincial election.⁵⁸ The report, however, stressed the working relationship that had been successfully established between the CCF and labor in that province and revealed little about the status of the new party concept.

The Ontario CCF-Federation of Labour Political Action Committee report, however, revealed an enthusiastic endorsement for the new party concept, especially in the Toronto area. The report included a financial statement that stressed the contributions of organized labor in that province to the promotional campaign being conducted for the new party.⁵⁹

The basically positive tenor of the report from British Columbia and the glowing report from Ontario, however, were in sharp contrast to reports from other provinces. The Alberta Federation of Labour reported that half of its affiliates supported Premier Manning and the Social Credit Party. It admonished the CCF for running an overwhelming proportion of teachers and farmers in provincial and federal elections. The report of the Alberta CCF Provincial Council emphasized the need to retain "fundamental socialist principles" in the new party program if the Alberta CCF was to be expected to endorse

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 23-29.

⁵⁹ Ibid., pp. 47-49.

it. The report indicated that few farm organizations in Alberta were interested in the new party and that there was much fear on the part of farmers that the party would be dominated by labor. After all, the report concluded, the Alberta ridings in which the CCF was ostensibly premised upon labor support had failed to elect CCF candidates in the past.⁶⁰

Other groups also presented disturbing reports. The Saskatchewan Federation of Labour reported that there had been little cooperation between unions and the CCF relative to the new party. A few seminars had been held by the party, but unions were basically not involved in them. Farm leaders, it was reported, feared a labor takeover. The Manitoba CCF Provincial Council opposed any plans for affiliated memberships and indicated a basic suspicion of the "top brass" of the CCF and the CLC. The Nova Scotia CCF Provincial Council and the Nova Scotia Federation of Labour reported that no decision had been made relative to the new party at the meeting on May 24, 1959. The Prince Edward Island CCF Provincial Council reported that no new party schools or seminars had been held on the island. New Brunswick delegates reported the same information and underscored the problem by admitting that farmers were suspicious of the idea and that CCFers favored it only if CCF principles were retained.⁶¹

Finally, the report of the Joint Committee of the Quebec Federation of Labour and the Social Democratic Party for a New Party stressed the need for the new party to avoid the mistakes of the CCF

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 30-34.

⁶¹ Ibid., pp. 35-46, 57-59.

relative to Quebec and French-Canadians. Part of the Quebec group argued that the new party would have to place heavy emphasis upon provincial parties. Other Quebec delegates argued the need for a strong national party that considered the legitimate aspirations of Quebec and its people as fundamental premises.⁶² There was some interest in the new party on the part of the Catholic Farm Union and among elements in the Catholic trade union movement, but only if it were to be conceived in terms of the interests of Quebec.⁶³

The proceedings of the Winnipeg Seminar reveal much of the style used by new party leaders in promoting their project. They also reveal the problems that they met during the course of promoting the idea. The minutes of NCNP meetings between June 25, 1958 and the New Party Founding Convention in the Fall of 1961 provide additional information about the groups contacted and the problems encountered in an attempt to create support for the party. These groups can be divided into five categories: women's groups, farm organizations, labor unions, new party clubs, and the special category of French-Canadians in Quebec.

The NCNP decided to approach various farm organizations immediately after it was formed. A sub-committee was appointed to contact the Inter-provincial Farm Union (IFO) and the Canadian Federation of Agriculture (i.e., the organized aspect of various wheat

⁶² It should be noted that the divisions between the adherents of a provincial party and a national party sympathetic to Quebec continue to plague the NDP in that province. This will be discussed in a subsequent chapter.

⁶³ Proceedings of the New Party Seminar, pp. 54-56.

pools and co-operatives).⁶⁴ The sub-committee reported that efforts to arouse these groups concerning the new party, especially the IFO, were futile.⁶⁵ Hazen Argue later reported that the convention of the Alberta Farm Union had failed even to discuss the party. In Saskatchewan, he noted, the Farm Union convention defeated a resolution calling for cooperation with the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee.⁶⁶ The new party leaders also received a report from the Joint Liaison Committee in British Columbia that the prospects of getting cooperation from the farm union in that province was nil.⁶⁷

The lack of success among farm organizations prompted the NCNP to consider hiring workers to promote the new party among individual farmers.⁶⁸ Although some of this was apparently done, the job of contacting dispersed farmers was gigantic unless they could be approached collectively at various types of meetings. Sometimes even this was impossible. A letter from the Co-operative Union of Canada, for example, requested that the NCNP not send workers to its convention, an assemblage that would undoubtedly attract many individual farmers.⁶⁹

Promotion of the new party concept among labor unions resulted in more success. The steelworkers' union sent \$20,000 to the NCNP,

⁶⁴ Minutes of the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee Meeting, Ottawa, June 25, 1958.

⁶⁵ Ibid., August 22, 1958.

⁶⁶ Ibid., January 23, 1959.

⁶⁷ Ibid., June 29, 1959.

⁶⁸ Minutes of the NCNP Meeting, Ottawa, December 16, 1959.

⁶⁹ Ibid., April 10, 1960.

and the transport workers followed with a contribution of \$2,000. The autoworkers sent \$5,000 of their \$15,000 pledge which was subsequently raised to \$28,000. Other unions pledged a total of approximately \$18,000 to finance its operations. Most of this, however, was pledged by former CCL unions and the NCNP leaders noted that efforts to obtain support from ex-TLC craft unions had been only partially successful.⁷⁰

Catholic unions were also approached. Indeed, there had been some evidence that these unions would abandon the adamant anti-party position that had characterized their history. For example, the Quebec Catholic unions joined the CLC-affiliated Quebec Federation of Labour to give a reception for the delegates at the 1958 CCF National Convention.⁷¹ Although continued contact with the Catholic union officials revealed a basic concern over the anti-labor legislation sponsored by Maurice Duplessis, there seemed to be little hope that this concern would be openly translated into an affiliation with the new party.⁷²

In view of the lagging response from organized farmers in general and from particular aspects of the Canadian labor movement, it was decided that members of these groups should be approached as individuals. The CLC and the CCF new party resolutions had urged the incorporation of liberally-minded persons into the new party. Thus, in order to provide a vehicle for liberally-minded persons, plus

⁷⁰Minutes of the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee, April 26, 1959; Minutes of the NCNP, December 16, 1959.

⁷¹Toronto Daily Star, June 23, 1958.

⁷²Minutes of the NCNP, April 10, 1960.

farmers and union members whose organizations were not likely to join the party, the NCNP created New Party Clubs.⁷³ The club idea was the brainchild of R. Desmond Sparham, who became the director of new party club activities. He organized clubs among professional and ethnic groups starting in Ontario and then in Manitoba, Alberta, Saskatchewan, and British Columbia.⁷⁴ Eventually, a National Council for New Party Clubs was established composed of Leo McIssac, Walter Pitman, and Sparham.⁷⁵

It was not long before complaints were filed with the NCNP that the club approach was being used to organize people who belonged to unions affiliated with the new party project and people who belonged to CCF constituency associations. It was apparent that some unions and CCF groups were exploiting the club system as a means of enhancing their representation at the proposed new party founding convention. Because of these complaints, the NCNP warned all provincial CCF organizations, unions, and other groups that the clubs were designed only for organizing non-CCF and non-union people.⁷⁶

In addition to New Party Clubs, the NCNP decided to make a more specialized appeal to women. The establishment of a new party women's organization was discussed and adopted.⁷⁷ Andrew Brewin, CCF Treasurer, became the first chairman of the Women's Advisory

⁷³Minutes of the Joint CLC-CCF National Committee, August 25, 1959.

⁷⁴Ibid., December 16, 1959; January 30, 1960.

⁷⁵Minutes of the NCNP, July 6-7, 1961.

⁷⁶Ibid., March 25-26, 1961.

⁷⁷Ibid., January 27-28, 1961.

Committee of the NCNP shortly before the founding convention.⁷⁸

Finally, a specialized effort was made to promote the new party concept among the French-Canadians in Quebec. Professor Michael Oliver was requested to prepare background materials on Quebec and the French Canadians that would serve as a basis for discussing the new party idea with representatives from that province.⁷⁹ The April, 1960 NCNP meeting devoted much attention to the Quebec issue. It was decided that a system of new party clubs should be used in Quebec to circumvent the lack of success in obtaining the support of the Catholic unions.⁸⁰

A special conference was arranged with new party sympathizers in Quebec to consider the problems of formulating policies and organizing the party in terms of the unique social problems in that province. It was suggested that the conference include Catholic clerics and laymen to help resolve the new party concept with the teachings of the Church. Although records of the NCNP do not indicate whether this suggestion was acted upon, it is significant that a party of the democratic left seeking support in Quebec considered the possibility of conferring with what has been viewed as one of the more unprogressive and unreformed segments of Roman Catholicism.⁸¹ Nevertheless,

⁷⁸ Ibid., April 21-22, 1961.

⁷⁹ Minutes of Joint CLC-CCF National Committee, January 23, 1959.

⁸⁰ Minutes of NCNP, April 10, 1960.

⁸¹ Ibid., August 19, 1960. The role of the Church in Quebec is set forth in Pierre Elliott Trudeau, "Some Obstacles to Democracy in Quebec," Canadian Dualism, ed. by Mason Wade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 250-58.

the NCNP did create an ad hoc committee to meet with the Quebec New Party Committee in order to draft specific resolutions reflecting the programmatic interests revealed at the conference held in Quebec. These resolutions were then forwarded to the NCNP's Program Committee for consideration.⁸²

The GLC and CCF Approve the Work
of the NCNP

In addition to promoting the new party concept and attempting to create "grass roots" support for it, the NCNP had the task of organizing and administering the founding convention. Since neither the GLC new party resolution nor that of the CCF empowered the NCNP to call a founding convention, it was necessary that it report to both organizations as outlined in the resolutions and to obtain permission to proceed with plans for a founding convention.

In April of 1960, the GLC held its biennial convention at Montreal. It passed a resolution approving the work performed by the NCNP and empowered it to call a convention for the purpose of implementing the new party concept. Delegates representing the auto-workers, packinghouse workers, and steelworkers were most enthusiastic. Some opposition was raised by a number of craft unions, particularly the Ontario Building and Construction Trades Council.⁸³ Delegates from the Brotherhood of Electrical Workers walked out of the convention. The only other opposition to the resolution came

⁸²Minutes of NCNP, July 6-7, 1961.

⁸³John T. Saywell (ed.), Canadian Annual Review for 1960 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961), pp. 53-54.

from the Alberta Federation of Labour. The British Columbia Federation of Labour voted for the resolution after expressing reservations about the implications that the new party might have relative to the rather successful relationship that it had established with the existing CCF in that province.⁸⁴

The regularly scheduled CCF National Convention met at Regina during the early part of August in 1960. Although much of the convention's time was taken by a bitter leadership fight, it did endorse the report of the NCNP and approved the calling of a founding convention for the new party. Some dissension was heard from agrarian delegates to the convention. In fact, Tommy Douglas had been able to persuade the heavily agrarian Saskatchewan section of the party to endorse the new party move by only five votes at its July convention. Even then he had to promise that the new party would continue to be known as the CCF in that province and that the provincial program of the party would remain unaltered by the formation of the new party.⁸⁵

On August 22, 1960, the NCNP formally announced that a founding convention would be held in Ottawa starting July 31, 1961.⁸⁶ Prepara-

⁸⁴ Toronto Daily Star, April 28, 1960.

⁸⁵ Saywell (ed.), Canadian Annual Review for 1960, p. 55.

⁸⁶ Files of the NCNP, "News Releases," announcement dated August 22, 1960, NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa. It should be noted that the date originally proposed by the NCNP was April, 1960 and the place was to be Ottawa. T. C. Douglas complained that April was planting time for farmers, and a convention in Ottawa would give the people in the West the "impression that the CCF had been taken over by the industrial workers of Ontario." Letter from T. C. Douglas to Hazen Argue, February 24, 1961. While this may suggest that a quid pro quo was established whereby the new party leadership received the

tions were made for an expected 1,800 to 2,000 delegates.⁸⁷ The Ottawa Coliseum was selected as the convention headquarters, and provisions were made for extensive press, radio, and television coverage. Simultaneous translation of all convention activities into English and French was made available to every delegate on the floor via an elaborate system of individual earphones, a service that was unprecedented in the history of party conventions in Canada.⁸⁸

Decorations for the Ottawa Coliseum were planned especially for television. Yellow and gold bunting highlighted the decor, and the slogan "A Choice, A Change, A Challenge" was prominently displayed.⁸⁹ The NCNP symbol consisting of a green maple leaf superimposed with a white pen, wrench, and pitch-fork was supplanted by a semi-impressionistic version of the Peace Tower on Capital Hill in Ottawa designed by CLC Art Director Harry Kelman.⁹⁰

Joe Glazer, the popular labor troubadour from the United

choice of location and Douglas received a postponement of the date of the convention, it must also be recalled that the NCNP would have had to utilize the provisions for calling a special CCF convention in order to make its report to the party and obtain its permission to proceed with a founding convention in April.

⁸⁷ A report given to the NCNP by the sub-committee on the Founding Convention estimated that between 700 and 800 CCF delegates, 800 to 1,000 union delegates, and 300 to 500 representatives of New Party Clubs would file into the convention hall. Minutes of the NCNP, April 11, 1961.

⁸⁸ Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), pp. 30-31.

⁸⁹ Globe and Mail, July 31, 1961.

⁹⁰ Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), pp. 30-31.

States, was engaged to lead the convention in song.⁹¹ A song book was printed containing nostalgic songs like "Down the Soup Line," the lyrics of which recalled an economic era which contrasted sharply with that being experienced by the new party delegates.⁹² The old picket-line song, "Solidarity," and a new one entitled "We Are Building a New Party" were also included.⁹³ "The Mill Was Made of Marble," composed by Joe Glazer for the occasion, added certain utopian overtones to the convention's musical repertoire.⁹⁴

Finally, appearances were scheduled for dignitaries representing various new party elements and socialist parties from abroad. André Philip, representing the socialists of France, accepted an invitation to attend. Hugh Gaitskell, Leader of the British Labour Party, agreed to address the closing session of the convention.⁹⁵ The convention was to be opened with an address by Stanley Knowles, Chairman of the NCNP, followed by remarks from Claude Jodoin, representing the CLC, David Lewis, speaking for the CCF, and Leo

⁹¹Toronto Daily Star, August 3, 1961.

⁹²Song Book, New Party Founding Convention, Ottawa, July 31-August 4, 1961, p. 5. Symbolic of the changed economic conditions was the fact that most of the delegates stayed at the plush Chateau Laurier while many of the delegates to the CCF Founding Convention utilized tents. Paul Fox, "Exit: Red-Hot Socialist--Enter: The New Party," Toronto Daily Star, July 31, 1961.

⁹³Song Book, pp. 6-7.

⁹⁴Globe and Mail, July 31, 1961.

⁹⁵The visit by André Philip is recorded in Noël Perusse's "Le NDP Créera un Canada Nouveau," Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), pp. 42. Excerpts from Hugh Gaitskell's address are reprinted in Ibid., pp. 15-17.

McIssac, representing the New Party Clubs.⁹⁶

All of this was to be financed by gifts and donations from various groups plus receipts from the \$10.00 delegate registration fee and the \$3.00 fee paid by all observers. It was estimated that the promotion of the new party concept and the operation of the founding convention would cost between \$150,000 and \$200,000.⁹⁷ Although the actual expenditure has not been made public, the press estimated that about \$250,000 had been spent and that approximately \$160,000 of this had come from various trade unions.⁹⁸ The stage was set for launching a new political party in Canada.

Testing the New Party Concept

Throughout the period between 1958 and 1961, the NCNP promoted the concept of a new party of the democratic left. As preparations moved toward implementing the concept, the NCNP had several opportunities to appraise the response given to the idea of a new party. As noted above, reports from the various elements that were supposed to become institutionalized segments of the party were both promising and pessimistic. Available indications concerning the response given to the new party in the general context of Canadian society were similarly divided. Scattered election results were either very encouraging or unrevealing. The press was generally hostile, and public opinion polls indicated only moderate enthusiasm for the new party.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 31.

⁹⁷NCNP, "Report on Plans and Activities," Ottawa, September, 1960, p. 3.

⁹⁸Toronto Daily Star, July 29, 1961.

Electoral Response to the
New Party, 1958-1961

Although there were several general provincial elections between the passage of the CLC and CCF new party resolution and the founding convention in 1961, they revealed little about the electoral possibilities of the new party concept. Candidates for provincial legislatures ran under the CCF label in the Manitoba (1959), Alberta (1959), Saskatchewan (1960), and British Columbia (1960) provincial elections. In most cases the CCF percentage of the votes was comparable to that of the previous provincial election. In agrarian Saskatchewan, however, the CCF's declining support in provincial elections continued. The party's popular support receded from 45% in 1956 to 41% in 1960.⁹⁹

Of more significance to the new party leaders was the federal by-election held in the Ontario ridings of Niagara Falls and Peterborough on October 31, 1960. In both cases there were candidates who ran under a "New Party" label and not that of the CCF. Pauline Jewett, a prominent Canadian scholar and member of the Liberal Party, did a detailed study of these by-elections and concluded that the most interesting fact about them

was not so much that the Conservatives lost them--or, rather, lost the one and failed to gain the other--as that the New Party won the Peterborough seat with 46 per cent of the vote and got 23 per cent of the vote in Niagara Falls. Taking the two . . . together, the New Party polled a larger popular vote than did either the Liberals or Conservatives: no minor achievement for a party that was making its first two appearances on the Federal election scene, a party that at the time

⁹⁹ Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 201-32.

had neither a name nor a national leader and whose platform was still . . . being formulated.¹⁰⁰

Furthermore, these New Party candidates succeeded in equaling or surpassing any previous CCF voting record. The best the CCF had ever done was to capture 12 per cent of the vote in Peterborough (1945) and 23 per cent in Niagara Falls (1949).¹⁰¹

Closer examination of the returns indicates that the party attracted young voters in both ridings (e.g., 80% of the New Party voters were between 21 and 30 years of age). The proposed marriage between labor and the more agrarian-oriented CCF seemed to be substantiated when it was found that one of the most important elements in the New Party vote came from organized labor. The rural vote, moreover, was even more surprising. Over 42 per cent of the rural vote in Peterborough went to the New Party candidate compared with about 47 per cent of the urban vote. The trend was less promising in Niagara Falls where only 15 per cent of the rural vote went to the New Party compared to 25 per cent of the vote in urban areas.¹⁰² The rural vote, at least in these instances, seemed more promising than support from farm organizations.

Some qualifications must be appended to the results of these elections. The personality of Walter Pitman in Peterborough had much

¹⁰⁰ Pauline Jewett, "Voting in the 1960 Federal By-Elections at Peterborough and Niagara Falls: Who Voted New Party and Why?", Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 28 (February, 1962), p. 35.

¹⁰¹ Ibid.

¹⁰² Ibid., pp. 39-49.

to do with the party's success.¹⁰³ Conversely, Mr. Mitchelson, New Party candidate in Niagra Falls, lacked popular assets and had to run against a very personable and able Liberal--Judy La Marsh, who was later appointed to the Cabinet in the Pearson Liberal Government. The strong endorsement given the party by young voters, moreover, had to be interpreted as a fickle asset. They had also voted Conservative in 1958. Finally, the New Party candidate did better where the Liberals were weakest (i.e., Peterborough) indicating that there might be some problem in creating a distinct image for another moderately leftist party.¹⁰⁴ On balance, however, the experiences of the New Party candidates in Niagra Falls and especially in Peterborough revealed a basic electoral endorsement of the new party concept.

Press Response to the New Party

While preparations for the founding convention proceeded, the Canadian press was editorializing about the new party. Generally, the editorials were negative and critical. In order to appraise the nature of the criticisms being leveled at the new party, the NCPN conducted two surveys of the editorial opinion in the English language press. The first survey analyzed editorial opinion between April 20 and May 20, 1961. The second survey covered the period between May 20 and June 20, 1961.

¹⁰³W. D. Young, "The Peterborough Election: The Success of a Party Image," Dalhousie Review, Vol. 40 (Winter, 1961), pp. 509-19.

¹⁰⁴Jewett, "Voting in the 1960 Federal By-Elections at Peterborough and Niagra Falls," p. 49.

The complete report contained vital information concerning which English language newspapers were sampled, the number of editorials involved, and notations about congenial editorial comment; but this information was not released to the author. The following summary of the results, however, was made available.¹⁰⁵

TABLE 5

Summary of the Results of Two Surveys of Editorial Opinion Concerning the New Party

Category of Critical Editorial Opinion	Survey I	Survey II
	No. of editorials	No. of editorials
1. New Party (NP) stands for socialism, state control, and threatens free enterprise	53	25
2. NP program spells utopia or demagoguery	24	22
3. NP not new	22	11
4. NP torn by internal strife	13	12
5. Contract-out system undemocratic	12	18
6. NP policy spells dangerous weakening of national defense	7	2
7. NP dominated by labor	7	5
8. NP program calls for extravagant public spending	5	2
9. Miscellaneous	18	13
10. NP doomed to failure	--	45
11. Communist support for NP harmful	--	10

While there are certain statistical limitations inherent in this summary which could have been overcome had the entire report been

¹⁰⁵ NCNP Files, "Results of Surveys on Editorial Opinion in the English Language Press Conducted Between April 20, 1961 and June 20, 1961," NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa, file undated.

made available, it reveals several interesting things. First, there was a distinct drop in the number of editorial comments claiming that the new party was socialistic or threatened free enterprise. While there may have been numerous reasons for this, it should be noted that the survey indicating a decline in this type of criticism occurred after the moderate new party draft program was published in May of 1961. A similar argument might be applied to the decline in editorial comment asserting that the new party was not "new," that the new party policy would be dangerous to national defense, and that the new party program called for extravagant public spending.

As editorial opinions on these items declined, there was a slight increase in the criticism leveled at the proposal to have all members of affiliated groups pay dues to the party unless they chose not to do so. This so-called contract-out scheme generally favors the party treasury since most individuals involved forget to implement or ignore the procedure even though they may have no sympathy for the party. More importantly, two new categories of criticism were unveiled. First, it was simply stated that the party, for various reasons, was doomed to fail. Second, the specter of Communist infiltration was attached to the new party by some editors.

Public Opinion Polls

Public opinion polls concerning the new party during the period prior to the founding convention are extremely limited. However, the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (Gallup) conducted periodic polls in Canada in which the question was asked: "If a federal election were held today, which party's candidate do you think

you would favor?" The results of such polls were reported on July 19, 1961. The following is a summary of the results expressed in terms of the percentage of respondents favoring each party.¹⁰⁶

TABLE 6

Party Preferences of Canadians During the
Formative Stages of the New Party

Canada-at-large	PC	Liberal	CCF	New Party	Other
Results of 1958 election	54	34	9	-	3
Jan., 1961	38	44	8	3	7
April, 1961	38	45	8	2	7
May, 1961	40	42	9	1	8
July, 1961	41	39	8	3	9
Quebec					
Results of 1958 election	50	46	2	-	2
Jan., 1961	25	65	2	-	8
April, 1961	29	58	2	-	11
May, 1961	34	50	2	1	13
July, 1961	32	45	2	2	19
Ontario					
Results of 1958 election	56	33	11	-	0
Jan., 1961	46	40	7	4	3
April, 1961	43	44	9	2	2
May, 1961	44	43	10	3	-
July, 1961	48	37	11	4	-
West					
Results of 1958 election	54	18	19	-	9
Jan., 1961	37	28	17	3	15
April, 1961	38	30	16	1	15
May, 1961	38	31	15	1	15
July, 1961	38	31	13	3	15

Clearly the new party lacked much significance in the minds of

¹⁰⁶ Toronto Daily Star, July 19, 1961.

the respondents. It was almost irrelevant in Quebec, but then so was the CCF. In the West, people seemed to prefer the old CCF over the new party by a substantial margin. Only in Ontario did opinion for the new party run ahead of the national averages, probably because it was the province with the largest concentration of auto and steel workers' unions, which were among the most enthusiastic supporters of the new party concept. It was also the home province of many new party leaders, including David Lewis.

The evidence concerning the prospects of the party that was to be launched in the middle of 1961 was hardly conclusive. Although farm organizations and some unions refused to endorse the party, the large industrial-type unions in the CLC were enthusiastic. There was much apathy within several provincial sections of the CCF but apparently not much overt hostility. Quebec, of course, was always an enigma so far as the democratic left in Canada was concerned. The press was not favorable, but the surveys of editorial opinion had indicated some promise that it might soften its attack. Public opinion polls were disappointing, but then the respondents had a choice between the CCF and a still unformed party of the left. The results of the Peterborough election, however, could inspire some confidence that the new party concept had promise.

CHAPTER III

INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF THE NDP

The NCNP had promoted the idea of a new party of the democratic left and made preparations for implementing it for almost two years. On July 31, 1961, the Founding Convention of what became known as the NDP opened at the Ottawa Coliseum; five days later, at 4:03 P.M. on August 4, the party was formally launched.¹

Since that time, it has attempted to manifest itself in Canada as a "mass" rather than a "caucus" or "cadre" type party. Consequently, heavy emphasis has been placed upon the structural accouterments usually associated with this type of party, including the establishment of local branches or constituency associations composed of formally enrolled members and an elaborate hierarchy of conventions, councils, and executive bodies.²

It is the purpose of this chapter to document the development of the basic structural format of the party as it has evolved since the introduction of the new party concept. Emphasis will be placed upon the proposals submitted by the NCNP and the response given them at the NDP Founding Convention as well as upon the nature of the national and provincial portions of the NDP structure that were

¹Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

²Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 1-202.

subsequently established. An appraisal of the actual organizational base of the party and certain structural problems that have occurred will be set forth in a later chapter.

The Basic Structural Format of the NDP

The notion of creating a new party of the democratic left in Canada raised several issues relative to organization and structure. First, there was the problem of providing a system of membership to incorporate the various elements for which the new party concept was ostensibly designed. Second, there was the problem of establishing an adequate and equitable system of dues for all members and allocating receipts among the national, provincial, and local sections of the party. Third, there was the problem of establishing and defining the powers of the various officers and internal control mechanisms.

The Formula for Membership

The purpose of the new party, as stated in the 1958 CLC and CCF resolutions, was to unite farm organizations, labor unions, the CCF, and liberally-minded individuals for purposes of political action. The mere mention of labor and farm organizations presupposed some system of affiliated membership, a concept over which the CCF had been divided for some time. Ultimately, the CCF had placed the burden of deciding whether to admit affiliated members upon the provincial sections of the party. Only if they refused to implement some scheme for incorporating affiliates would the national party step in.³ As noted previously, several provincial sections of the CCF had

³CCF Federal Constitution, Art. IV, as amended 1960.

rejected the idea of affiliated memberships.

The new party leadership, however, envisioned a more explicit and mandatory system for incorporating affiliated members into the party. For purposes of discussion, the NCNP offered two formulas for membership in the proposed party. "Formula A" outlined the system utilized by the British Labour Party. There would be individual members organized into constituency associations plus organizations affiliated with the party. The latter would pay a per capita fee to the party for all of their members except those who elected to contract out. The proposal did not spell out the rights and privileges of affiliated members opposite those of individual members, but the subject was posited for discussion.⁴

"Formula B," on the other hand, would have required a member of an affiliated organization to apply for membership in the party the same as any other individual. If accepted, these affiliated members would have the same rights and privileges as an individual member and would exercise them through the constituency associations. The only difference would be that the affiliated member would pay his dues through the affiliated organization to which he belonged.⁵

By January of 1960, the NCNP had prepared a study paper that posited a more explicit position regarding a membership formula for the new party.⁶ The basic proposals contained in this document were

⁴A New Political Party for Canada, pp. 11-12.

⁵Ibid., pp. 13-14.

⁶NCNP, A New Party for Canada: Study Paper on Constitution, Ottawa, January, 1960, pp. 7-8.

included in the draft constitution published by the NCNP in March, 1961. As presented to the Founding Convention later that year, the membership section of this draft constitution contained a basic endorsement of "Formula A" as outlined above, including the contract-out provision. In addition to individual members organized into constituency associations, the new party would allow affiliated memberships open to "trade unions, farm groups, co-operatives and other groups and organizations which . . . undertake to accept and abide by the principles of the Party and are not associated or identified with any other political party."⁷ International, national, provincial, or regional organizations could apply for affiliation with the party. Provincial and/or local branches to these organizations were also made eligible for affiliation.⁸

A mandated system of affiliated membership throughout all levels of the party and specific application procedures for various types of organizations were included. There was no provision that would allow provincial sections of the party to choose the option of not establishing procedures for affiliated members as had been the practice in the CCF. According to the draft constitution, organizations with membership in more than one province were required to forward applications for party affiliation to the national council of the party. Those with memberships in only one province were to apply to the appropriate provincial section which was granted the

⁷ NCNP, The New Party Draft Constitution, Ottawa, March, 1961, pp. 7-8.

⁸ Ibid.

authority to deal with such applications subject to ratification by the national council.⁹

Proposals concerning membership as stated in the draft program were adopted at the NDP Founding Convention.¹⁰ Dissent was reportedly vocal but of minor consequence.¹¹ This minor dissent can probably be attributed to the constant assurances given by Claude Jodion and other labor leaders that it was not the intention of the labor movement to control the party. The adopted constitution, moreover, did not offer unions and other affiliated groups direct representation on intra-party structures except at national conventions.

Dissent was potentially more serious relative to the issue of what to do with the New Party Clubs that had been formed during the promotional phase of the new party in Canada. Not only did the NCNP, as previously noted, have to issue a warning about utilizing the club system as a device for enhancing the representation of unions and/or the CCF at the founding convention, but some objections were raised about representing these clubs at the convention and thereby risking their continuation as dysfunctional units operating somewhere between the affiliated groups and the constituency associations. Others objected to them because they ostensibly represented moderation and a vague liberalism.

Colin Cameron, a spokesman for the socialists in British Columbia, questioned the idea of forming clubs composed of so-called

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ NDP Federal Constitution, as adopted at the Founding Convention, Ottawa, August, 1961, Art. II, secs. 1-4.

¹¹ Globe and Mail, August 7, 1961.

"liberally-minded" people let alone granting them representation at the founding convention.¹² For a while the promotion of clubs floundered but then moved forward under the leadership of Des Sparham. Cameron again expressed concern. He asked the new party leaders what principles these people were being asked to adopt; if none, how would the party know that they shared its views? "Here we are enrolling people for no stated purpose except the formation of a new party of no stated aims," he added. Thus, according to Cameron, the British Columbia section of the CCF needed assurance that these clubs would not water down CCF goals.¹³ There was no evidence in the files made available to the author that any such assurances were made.

Another argument presented by the anti-club forces was that it was doubtful that there were many individuals who could be brought into the new party by this device. Mrs. Grace McInnis of British Columbia complained that there were few people, especially in her home province, with a "socialistic outlook who were merely waiting for some vehicle other than the CCF."¹⁴ Her argument was countered with the fact that the CCF membership was substantially lower than the CCF vote in federal elections. Therefore, it was concluded that there were many who were potentially disposed toward membership in the party. New Party Clubs were merely an attractive means to that

¹²Letter from Colin Cameron to Carl Hamilton, CCF National Secretary, November 18, 1960.

¹³Ibid., April 6, 1961.

¹⁴Letter from Grace McInnis to Donald MacDonald, Ontario CCF Leader, October 6, 1959.

end.¹⁵

Although delegates representing New Party Clubs were granted representation at the NDP Founding Convention, the draft constitution presented by the NCNP contained no explicit reference to them. Article II did mention "other groups and organizations, which by official act, undertake to accept and abide by the constitution and principles of the Party" as eligible for affiliation with the new party.¹⁶ Such groups, along with affiliated unions and farm organizations, were to be granted representation at national conventions, but not on the council or executive. Otherwise, the only provision in the draft constitution mentioning a special group was that related to the youth section of the party.¹⁷

These provisions were adopted without change.¹⁸ Hence, the only possible provision that could be construed to perpetuate New Party Clubs was that which guaranteed all provincial sections of the party autonomy over their constitutions and programs, providing they did not conflict with those of the national party.¹⁹ The question of what to do with New Party Clubs was substantially shifted to the provincial level, a matter which will be discussed later in the chapter.

¹⁵Letter from Donald MacDonald, Ontario CCF Leader, to Grace McInnis, September 22, 1959.

¹⁶Draft Constitution, p. 7.

¹⁷Ibid., pp. 11, 13-14.

¹⁸NDP Federal Constitution, Arts. II, V, VII, VIII, IX.

¹⁹Ibid., Art. X.

Establishing and Allocating
Membership Fees

Having adopted provisions for dual membership, the NDP Founding Convention was asked to endorse a system of dues or fees for all members in the party. Both the study paper developed for discussion purposes and the draft constitution promised that each provincial section would have the power to establish the amount of individual dues and that such dues would cover membership in the national, provincial, and constituency levels of the party. However, both documents also suggested that the annual dues for individual membership not be less than \$2.50.²⁰ The draft constitution added a provision that allowed provincial sections to establish a joint family membership plan under which the second and all additional members of a family could be enrolled for less than \$2.50 but not less than \$1.00 per year. In either case, the provincial section would be required to forward \$1.00 of each individual membership and 25 cents of each family member paying the reduced amount to the national party.²¹

After some debate at the convention, the recommendations contained in the draft constitution concerning dues for individual members were passed.²² The convention also added a provision allowing the youth section of the party in each province to establish the amount of dues to be levied on all members, provided that \$1.00 of such dues be sent to the national party. The payment of dues guaranteed all new party youth equal rights and privileges in the party.

²⁰ Study Paper on Constitution, p. 9; Draft Constitution, p. 8.

²¹ Draft Constitution, p. 9.

²² Globe and Mail, August 5, 1961.

Finally, the convention also included a provision allowing provincial sections to establish reduced dues for those dependent upon social insurance or assistance, providing that 25 cents of the amount established be sent to the national party.²³

Of more serious consequence was the question of establishing and allocating dues and/or fees obtained from affiliated members. At one time the NCNP had considered a proposal to require all affiliated members to pay \$2.00 a year as individuals. An additional 60 cents per capita would be paid on their behalf by their affiliated organizations.²⁴

This scheme had several obvious advantages. It would have made the amount paid by affiliated and individual members nearly equal. It would have helped an affiliated member to identify himself with the party by getting him to pay the greater part of his dues directly as an individual rather than have all of it collected by an impersonal system of per capita fees paid by the affiliated group to which he belonged. The latter advantage might have gone a long way toward satisfying those CCFers who claimed that a simple system of per capita fees would create a cadre of party members who had little, if any, personal involvement with the party except that they belonged to an organization that happened to affiliate with it.

On the other hand, there was the obvious problem of collecting an extra \$2.00 from many members of affiliated organizations who had failed to initiate contract-out procedures to avoid having the

²³NDP Federal Constitution, Art. III, sec. 1.

²⁴Study Paper on Constitution, p. 9.

extra 60 cents paid to the party in their behalf. In short, what would the status have been of a member of an affiliated trade union who failed to contract out, had 60 cents taken out of his pay for his contribution to the party, but refused to pay the extra \$2.00 to be collected from him as an individual?

This idea, however, did not appear in the draft constitution presented to the convention. Rather, it contained a provision to establish a per capita fee of five cents per month for each member of an affiliated organization who did not choose to contract out. If an affiliated member wished to become an individual member, he would pay the difference between the annual per capita fee paid on his behalf by his affiliated organization and the prescribed individual membership dues.²⁵ These proposals were passed as they appeared in the draft constitution.²⁶ Finally, although it was not stated in the constitution, it was assumed that affiliated unions could decide if they wanted to utilize a check-off system to collect the per capita fees.²⁷

The NCNP did not publish proposals relative to the allocation of per capita fees obtained from affiliated organizations until the draft constitution appeared in March of 1961. That document called for a three to two split of the five cents to be collected per month for each affiliated member. Two cents, it was suggested, would go to the provincial section involved, and three cents to the national

²⁵Draft Constitution, pp. 8-9.

²⁶NDP Federal Constitution, Art. III, sec. 1 (5), sec. 2.

²⁷Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

party.²⁸

This became a contentious issue at the convention since it was apparent that affiliated fees, particularly those from several large unions which had already expressed a desire to affiliate, would become a substantial part of the resources raised by the party. The provinces wanted a larger share of this potentially lucrative source of income. Provincial opinions ranged from that of Mrs. Peg Stewart of the Ontario CCF, who urged that three cents be allocated to the provinces so that a "grass-roots organization could be built," to that of A. H. Mackling of Manitoba, who simply stated that he would sit on his "backside" unless the 3-2 split was reversed.²⁹ The vote on the issue was reportedly very close; but the 3-2 split, as proposed in the draft constitution, was sustained.³⁰

Creating and Defining the Powers
of the Internal Structures
of the Party

Once the issues of membership and dues were settled, the establishment of the various officers and internal structures of the party was largely a tranquil affair. Furthermore, the draft constitution did not include any radical departures from the basic internal structural arrangements that had been utilized by the CCF. The new party was to be federal in nature with full autonomy granted to all provincial sections, providing their constitutions and programs did

²⁸ Draft Constitution, p. 9.

²⁹ Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

³⁰ Globe and Mail, August 5, 1961.

not conflict with those of the national party.³¹ The national party was to hold a biennial convention, operated on the basis of one-delegate-one-vote and designed to serve as the supreme governing body. A national council would govern the party between conventions, and a smaller national executive would conduct and administer the affairs of the party between meetings of the council. A youth section was also proposed in the draft constitution.³²

As advocated in the draft constitution and passed by the convention, representation at national conventions was accorded to

- (1) All members of the national council and the federal caucus;
- (2) All constituency associations on the basis of one delegate for every 50 members or major fraction thereof for the first 200 members and one delegate for each additional 100 members or major fraction thereof with a minimum of one delegate per constituency association;
- (3) Members of the youth section's national executive, plus two delegates from each provincial youth section, and one from each youth club;
- (4) Each affiliated group or organization and each affiliated local, lodge, or branch of a group or organization on the basis of one delegate per 1,000 members (apparently meaning those who had not contracted out) or major fraction thereof with a minimum of one delegate;
- (5) All central bodies composed of affiliated organizations not

³¹Draft Constitution, p. 14.

³²Ibid., pp. 10, 13-14.

eligible for direct affiliation with the party but which accept and abide by the constitution and principles of the party and are recognized by the national council on the basis of one delegate from each such central local body and two delegates for each such central national and provincial body.³³

This final provision concerning central bodies composed of affiliated organizations was ostensibly included because many central bodies (e.g., the CLC or trades and labor councils of a metropolitan, provincial, or regional character) would not have the authority to bind their own affiliates to the party. However, to the extent that they adhered to the constitution and principles of the new party, they would receive some representation at national party conventions.³⁴

The very noticeable under-representation afforded affiliated groups vis-à-vis constituency associations at national conventions can be inferentially attributed to at least two reasons. First, it strengthened the contention of the NCNP that labor unions would not be allowed to take over the party. Second, it weighted representation at national conventions against the "60 centers," as they became known in the Saskatchewan section of the party, and in favor of the individual members who decided to join the new party and pay at least \$2.50 a year.³⁵

Numerous rules of procedure applicable to national conventions

³³ NDP Federal Constitution, Art. V.

³⁴ Study Paper on Constitution, p. 7.

³⁵ Globe and Mail, November 4, 1961.

were presented to the NDP Founding Convention. Those adopted were appended to the constitution. Only one of these procedural rules was seriously challenged from the floor of the convention. It involved the proposal that reports made by the various convention committees could not be amended from the floor. Instead, they had to be referred back to committee for reconsideration in the light of debate. The motion to refer, moreover, was not to be debatable except in certain specific cases. Bert Herridge, MP from Kootenay West in British Columbia, led a fight to eliminate this CLC-inspired rule. A standing vote had to be taken after the convention chairman was unable to discern the results of a voice vote. Herridge lost his campaign by a vote of 709 to 679.³⁶

The NCNP recommended several minor adjustments relative to the national officers of the party. Some of these merely involved changes in the titles of certain officers. For example, the new party would have a national president and an associate president, whereas the CCF had a national chairman and two vice-chairmen.

The most significant change contemplated by the NCNP, however, involved the proposal to have all national officers (i.e., leader, president, associate president, five vice-presidents, secretary, and treasurer) elected at national conventions.³⁷ This deviated from the CCF regulations which allowed the convention to elect only the leader, chairman, and vice-chairmen. The national secretary

³⁶Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

³⁷Study Paper on Constitution, p. 12; Draft Constitution, p. 12.

and the national treasurer were selected by the national council.³⁸ As previously noted, however, the CCF also made it a practice to have whoever had been named secretary elected to the national council as a full-fledged member by the national convention.

The subject of electing a secretary rather than having the office filled by a national council appointment was debated at some length at the founding convention. The details of the maneuvering that surrounded the subject are not very clear, but it is known that the NCNP had recommended in its draft constitution that the office be filled by a vote of the convention. Conversely, the committee on constitution recommended that the secretary be appointed by the national council.³⁹ After three separate votes, the convention rejected the proposal to elect the national secretary.⁴⁰

The exact reasons for rejecting an elected secretary and continuing the CCF practice of having the office filled by an appointment of the national council are not entirely clear. It can be inferred that the move did not represent simply a rejection of a proposal to deviate from the old CCF practice because the convention accepted the equally non-CCF idea of electing a national treasurer.⁴¹ Furthermore, there is some evidence that CCF National Secretary Carl Hamilton had aroused criticism by blatantly supporting the anti-Argue faction during a leadership struggle that developed

³⁸ CCF National Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 1.

³⁹ Toronto Daily Star, August 3, 1961.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ NDP Federal Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 1.

at the 1960 CCF National Convention.⁴² The NDP, moreover, has not yet re-established the old CCF practice of electing whoever has been appointed secretary to the national council.⁴³ These bits of information suggest the possibility that there is some desire to keep the full-time national secretary at least in the technical position of a neutral "civil servant," a term utilized by two CCF MPs who had voiced displeasure with Carl Hamilton's role during the 1960 leadership fight.⁴⁴

On the related subject of the national treasurer, the NDP Founding Convention rejected a proposal to make the office a full-time, salaried position. It was decided, at least for the initial phases of new party development, that the money required to hire a salaried treasurer could be better spent on organizational and promotional activities.⁴⁵

In addition, it had been suggested prior to the publication of the draft constitution that the offices of national president and associate president would represent between them the two official languages in Canada.⁴⁶ The provision did not appear in the draft

⁴²Letter from Douglas Fisher and Murdo Martin to the CCF National Council Meeting at Regina, August 11, 1960.

⁴³Interview with Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

⁴⁴Letter from Fisher and Martin to the CCF National Council Meeting at Regina, August 11, 1960.

⁴⁵Globe and Mail, August 4, 1961.

⁴⁶Study Paper on Constitution, p. 12.

constitution, but it was adopted by the convention.⁴⁷ The same arrangement was passed relative to the offices of national secretary and associate secretary.⁴⁸

Finally, the NDP Constitution contained a section which explicitly provided for a procedure to eliminate a recurrence of the embarrassing situation that had been threatened by Coldwell's vacillating promises concerning his retirement following his defeat in the 1958 election. Should the position of national leader be vacated between conventions, the national council has the power to appoint an acting leader to serve until the next convention is called. Since the constitution states that the national leader shall act as the leader of the party in the House of Commons, the choice available to the national council--or the national convention for that matter--was limited to Members of Parliament or someone who could hopefully obtain a seat therein within a reasonable period of time.⁴⁹

Aside from establishing national officers for the party, it was the function of the NDP Founding Convention to establish and define the powers of various internal structures of the party other than the national convention. The draft constitution proposed that a national council be established which would be composed of the officers, fifteen members elected by the party's convention, two members elected by the federal caucus, five members representing the youth section, plus the leader, president, secretary, and two

⁴⁷NDP Federal Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 7.

⁴⁸Ibid., Art. VI, sec. 5.

⁴⁹Ibid., Art. VI, sec. 3.

additional members from each provincial section of the party elected by provincial conventions.⁵⁰ Except for the national secretary, who was not to be an officer elected by the national convention, the membership of the national council remained as proposed in the draft constitution.⁵¹

The national council was required to meet at least twice a year and constituted the official governing body of the party between conventions. It was empowered to issue policy statements and election statements in the name of the party that were consonant with decisions of the national convention.⁵²

The national executive of the new party, as proposed in the draft constitution and endorsed by the founding convention, was to be composed of all national officers plus ten other members elected from and by the national council.⁵³ Again, the rejection of the idea to have the national secretary elected by the national convention affected the voting status of that officer during meetings of the national executive. The executive was to have the power to conduct and administer the business of the party between meetings of the council and to issue statements in the name of the party subject to confirmation by the council. It was also given the authority to establish departments to carry out the work of the party.⁵⁴ A hint as to the

⁵⁰ Draft Constitution, p. 13.

⁵¹ NDP Federal Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 1.

⁵² Ibid., Art. VII, secs. 2-3.

⁵³ Ibid., Art. VIII, sec. 1.

⁵⁴ Ibid., Art. VIII, sec. 2-3.

types of departments that might be included in this secretariat-type arrangement had been revealed in an earlier document issued by the NCNP suggesting departments of research, organization, women's activities, and education.⁵⁵

One aspect of the development of the national council and executive must be carefully noted. The fear that the new party would be dominated by trade unions had to be rebutted again and again. Claude Jodoin of the CLC constantly reassured the delegates at the Winnipeg seminar, various CCF conventions, and the NDP Founding Convention that the unions did not intend to run the party.⁵⁶ In an apparent effort to re-enforce these arguments, the NCNP had carefully avoided endorsing the practice utilized in the British Labour Party whereby trade unions are entitled to elect a constitutionally fixed number of members to the party's National Executive Committee.⁵⁷ Except for the representation allocated to all affiliated groups at national conventions, trade unions and other affiliates were not to be formally represented on the national council or the national executive.

The NCNP at one time considered the establishment of a national consultative council composed of representatives from the party, the federal caucus, farm organizations, central labor bodies,

⁵⁵ Study Paper on Constitution, p. 13.

⁵⁶ Jodoin's remarks at Winnipeg and those at the 1958 and 1960 CCF Conventions were recorded previously. His remarks to the Founding Convention are reproduced in Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), pp. 5-7.

⁵⁷ R. T. McKenzie, British Political Parties (2d ed.; New York: Fredrick Praeger, 1963), pp. 517-26.

co-operatives, credit unions, and similar groups to consult on matters of mutual concern.⁵⁸ Even this seemingly innocuous consultative council, with its proposed representation for trade unions and other groups, was eliminated from the draft constitution submitted to the founding convention.

The most contentious issues relative to the development of the structures and powers of the various internal control mechanisms of the party involved two proposals that appeared in the draft constitution. First, it was proposed that the national council be given the power to discipline all affiliated organizations of an extra-provincial character that had affiliated with the consent of the national council and all other elements of the party if the interests of the national party were at stake and if the provincial sections of the party failed to act. Second, it was proposed that the national council have the authority to intervene in all nominating procedures for federal elections or by-elections regardless of the procedures prescribed by the provincial sections if the person nominated adversely affected the interests of the national party.⁵⁹

The first proposal was partially rejected. The NDP Constitution allows the national council to discipline only those organizations of an extra-provincial character which are required to apply for affiliation with the national council.⁶⁰

⁵⁸ Study Paper on Constitution, pp. 13-14.

⁵⁹ Draft Constitution, pp. 12-13.

⁶⁰ NDP Federal Constitution, Art. XI, sec. 2.

The second proposal was almost totally rejected.⁶¹ At least the party adopted procedures similar to those utilized by the CCF requiring the national council to intervene in the nomination of federal candidates only if the provincial section concerned failed to act. If such a case should arise, however, the council was required to order the national secretary to notify the candidate, the constituency, and the provincial party concerned. Then the candidate, plus authorized representatives from the constituency and the provincial section, had the right to a hearing before the national council or its representatives before a decision could be rendered.⁶²

This cumbersome procedure severely limits the technical control that the national level of the party can exercise over the selection of candidates. Of course, there are a number of informal ways to punish constituency associations that select questionable candidates so far as the national party is concerned. Although there is no technical provision in the constitution allowing the national party to withhold campaign funds from such constituencies, this could conceivably be done. If the constituency association in question has the support of the provincial party, however, this type of punishment has limited utility. A more effective device would be to by-pass that constituency association when scheduling the campaign tours of the "big names" in the party. National leaders draw crowds at rallies, stimulate contributors, and personify the party in the minds of voters. No evidence that any of these informal punishments have

⁶¹Globe and Mail, August 2, 1961.

⁶²NDP Federal Constitution, Art. XII, secs. 2-3.

been used has come to the attention of the author.

Structural Embellishments Since the Founding Convention

Technically, the founding convention created only the internal structures of the national NDP. Provincial sections still had to be created, although it was essentially a matter of converting the provincial sections of the CCF into NDP vehicles. The national administrative apparatus had been provided for in the NDP Constitution, but technically it still had to be established. In fact, it was really a matter of converting and hopefully embellishing the existing CCF national staff to serve the NDP.

Provincial Roots of the Party

The principle of federalism has been central to the internal organization of the NDP and consequently provincial sections are vital to the entire operation of the national level of the party. All individual members and all but a minute fraction of the affiliated groups--those of extra-provincial proportions--are incorporated into the NDP through provincial sections. They determine the nature and powers of the local constituency associations. Except for the rather cumbersome procedures through which the national level of the party can intervene, the power to control the nomination of NDP candidates for all elections rests with the provincial organizations. The power to discipline all members, including those of the youth section, rests entirely with them.

For purposes of the present discussion, a composite description, rather than a detailed review of the structure of each provincial

section, is sufficient. Details of the party's organizational base and treatment of organizational problems relative to certain provincial sections will be explicated in a subsequent chapter.

The composite has been drawn from the constitutions of the NDP provincial sections in Ontario, British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba. The party's organization in these provinces, as will be demonstrated in a subsequent chapter, represents the most developed provincial operations in existence. The same basic organizational format technically prevails in the other provinces, but they have been only nominally implemented or, as is the case in Quebec, established on a provisional basis.

The formal structure of a provincial section of the NDP parallels that of the national party. A provincial convention serves as the governing body. A provincial council and a smaller executive govern the party between conventions. Typically, the elected officers include a leader, a president, and between two and five vice-presidents. In some cases, a secretary or secretary-treasurer is elected by the provincial convention; in others, the secretary is appointed by the council, and a separate treasurer is elected at conventions.

Conventions are held annually except in Ontario, where the national practice of biennial conventions is observed.⁶³

⁶³The NDP of Ontario held its founding convention on October 7-8, 1961. Since the biennial national conventions would be dated from the NDP Founding Convention held in 1961, the Ontario section convened a special convention in 1962. Thus, the sequence of provincial conventions would regularly fall during even-numbered years while those of the national party would take place during odd-numbered years. Globe and Mail, October 8, 1962.

Representation at provincial conventions basically follows the pattern adopted by the national party, including the practice of allocating a significantly disproportionate amount of representation to affiliated groups as compared to that allocated to constituency associations.

Provincial councils are composed of officers, representatives from the provincial NDP caucus (if any), the youth section, and the constituency associations. As has been the case at the national level, affiliated groups have not been formally represented on provincial councils.

Aside from officers, the composition of the provincial executive varies somewhat from that which prevails nationally. In Manitoba, for example, the provincial caucus elects two of its members to serve on the executive. In Ontario, the two delegates elected by the provincial convention to the national council are ex officio members of the provincial executive. The most significant difference, however, is that provincial conventions elect the remaining members of the executive rather than have them elected by and from the council.

The CCF, as noted previously, had a difficult time trying to provide a clear and effective local organization. While CCF Clubs generally gave way to constituency associations, some provinces (i.e., British Columbia and Alberta) maintained a cumbersome system that included both forms of local organization.⁶⁴ Establishing affiliated memberships was even more difficult, and several provincial sections of the CCF refused to provide for them.

Although the pattern is not completely set, the NDP has moved

⁶⁴McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, pp. 63-72.

toward a clear emphasis upon constituency associations as the basic unit of local organization. Individual members belong to a provincial constituency association for purposes of selecting delegates to the provincial convention, nominating NDP candidates for provincial elections, and executing these election campaigns. Provincial constituency associations located within a federal riding join forces to establish a federal constituency association to select delegates to national conventions, nominate candidates for Parliament, and organize the party's campaign efforts during national elections. Several constituency associations, particularly those in metropolitan areas, have established area councils to co-ordinate the efforts of the NDP in the total urban complex.

Members of affiliated groups who do not contract out are allowed to participate in the affairs of the local constituency association except electing delegates to provincial or national NDP conventions. Affiliated groups are afforded their own representation at these conventions.

This rather uncomplicated system of local organization has been muddled somewhat by attempts to settle the issue of what to do with the New Party Clubs that had been established prior to the NDP Founding Convention. The issue was not settled at the national level, and various provincial sections have responded differently to the problem.

At one extreme, the Manitoba section adopted a provision that empowered the provincial council, upon request, to charter New Party Clubs in order to promote the party among those who did not become

full-fledged members. If members of such clubs wanted to participate in the internal affairs of the party, they also had to join a constituency association or be a member of an affiliated group.

In Ontario, where the development of New Party Clubs had been most successful, no mention was made of the clubs in the provincial constitution. But it did mention "special sections" which are granted formal representation at provincial conventions and on the provincial council and executive. These "special sections" are composed of farmers, professional people, and ethnic groups. In most cases these categories covered existing New Party Clubs.

At the other extreme, the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP has been openly hostile to the perpetuation of New Party Clubs or any other structural arrangement that might tend to erode the effective and proved system of constituency associations. It was only because of the insistence of the provincial leadership that five New Party Club delegates were allowed to join the 576 other delegates at the annual CCF Provincial Convention in 1961 to help amend the provincial constitution to accommodate the establishment of the NDP at the national level.⁶⁵ Although these clubs were not ordered to disband, the provincial constitution was not amended to provide an institutionalized place for them within the Saskatchewan section of the party. A similar situation prevailed in British Columbia, although hostility to the New Party Clubs apparently was not as overt. Twenty-nine out of the 443 delegates at the NDP (Provincial) Founding Convention in British Columbia were from New Party Clubs, but they were offered no official

⁶⁵Regina Leader Post, November 3, 1961.

status in the party.⁶⁶

Aside from New Party Clubs, or "special sections" in the case of the Ontario NDP, the party has created women's sections at the provincial and local levels. Ordinarily the women of a constituency association have organized for social purposes and to promote the party among female voters. Otherwise, members of a women's section operate through the regular channels of the constituency association. Unlike the national party, however, provincial parties often grant the women's sections formal representation at conventions and/or on the council.

Mass parties attempt to organize a substantial proportion of the electorate partly to help finance the party. Although the national NDP established \$2.50 as the minimum annual dues for individual members, amounts established by the provincial conventions range as high as \$4.00 in Manitoba and \$5.00 in Ontario. Affiliated fees are, in all cases, set at 60 cents a year as established by the national party. Family memberships are utilized in every province.

The provincial sections have also established a category of dues for individual members that was not mentioned by the national constitution. For a sum in excess of the regular individual dues, usually \$10.00, a person is entitled to the distinction of being a "sustaining member" of the NDP. Ordinarily the provinces divide the

⁶⁶Vancouver Sun, October 10, 1961.

extra money with the constituency associations and the national party.⁶⁷

The National Administrative Apparatus

In addition to establishing the national convention, council, and executive, the NDP Founding Convention empowered the national executive to create administrative departments and to hire the necessary staff to run them. This administrative apparatus attempts to focus full-time attention upon certain aspects of the party's internal operations including servicing and coordinating the organizational development of the party in the various provinces.

The NDP National Secretary is director and coordinator of the administrative apparatus. Carl Hamilton, formerly the CCF National Secretary, was immediately appointed to that post in the NDP following the adoption of the party's constitution. He served in that capacity from August, 1961, to the Fall of 1962 when he resigned to return to law school. His assistant, Terence Grier, was appointed to succeed him.⁶⁸

Although he was only 25 years old when appointed, Grier had firm connections with the new party movement and with the NDP leadership. He had entered the CCF through the party's club on the campus

⁶⁷ Except as noted, the information concerning this composite description of the NDP organization at the provincial level was drawn from: Constitution of the NDP, Manitoba Section, as amended 1963; Constitution of the NDP of Ontario, as amended 1964; Constitution of the NDP of British Columbia, as amended 1963; Constitution of the CCF, Saskatchewan Section of the NDP, as amended 1964.

⁶⁸ Interview with Terence Grier, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

of the University of Toronto along with Stephen Lewis, son of David Lewis, and John Brewin, son of the CCF National Treasurer Andrew Brewin. He was brought into the new party organization as an assistant to Hamilton shortly after the NCNP was formed. Since then he has come to be considered one of the top image-makers of the party in addition to being a financial overseer, pamphleteer, poster designer, fund raiser, coordinator of NDP television promotion, and chief architect of Douglas' campaigns for the party.⁶⁹

The national council, pursuant to provisions in the NDP National Constitution, appointed an associate national secretary. Since Hamilton and then Grier were English-speaking, a French-speaking candidate was required. André L'Heureux was chosen, but he resigned in 1963 during the disruptions created by the split within the Quebec section of the party. The post remains vacant.⁷⁰

Seven administrative departments were created by the NDP National Executive. Technically each department operates under the national secretary, but at present the secretary also serves as the head of the Departments of Administration, Public Relations, and Membership-Finance. He also headed the Department of Organization until the Fall of 1964 when Russ Brown was appointed Director of Organization.

Brown was the Industry and Information Minister in the CCF Government in Saskatchewan prior to its defeat in 1964. From 1950 to 1956 he was CCF Provincial Secretary in Saskatchewan and has been

⁶⁹Winnipeg Free Press, March 9, 1963.

⁷⁰Interview with Terence Grier, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

credited with having instituted major organizational reforms that led to substantial increases in party membership.⁷¹ He is assisted by Erhart Regier, ex-MP from Burnaby-Coquitlam in British Columbia.⁷² These two men are now responsible for helping provincial sections of the party to build a structural and membership base throughout Canada.

The Department of Research had been an active part of the CCF national staff for many years, but it had become dormant during the latter part of the party's existence. The NDP National Executive decided to revive it. The task was assigned to Russell Irvine, an energetic young man who had joined the CCF Club at the University of Toronto along with Grier, Stephan Lewis, and John Brewin.⁷³ During his tenure as Director of Research, Irvine built an impressive library of books, government documents, newspaper clippings, and statistical materials at the NDP National Headquarters. He also compiled a comprehensive volume of speakers' notes, helped prepare campaign materials for Douglas and other NDP campaigners, and collected research data for the NDP Members of Parliament.⁷⁴ In February of 1964, he

⁷¹New Democratic Newsletter, October, 1964.

⁷²Ibid. Regier gave up his seat in Parliament following his victory in 1962 in order to allow NDP National Leader, T. C. Douglas, to run in a "safe" NDP riding. Douglas had been defeated in his home riding of Regina (Saskatchewan) during the 1962 general election. Globe and Mail, August 6, 1962.

⁷³Winnipeg Free Press, March 9, 1963.

⁷⁴NDP, Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, held at Regina, Saskatchewan on August 6-9, 1963, p. 22.

resigned to join the research department of the CLC.⁷⁵ He was replaced by Robert Gordon from Manitoba who, in addition to continuing the tasks performed by his predecessor, has worked on a major study of the proposals made by various Royal Commissions concerning government organization and operation.⁷⁶

It has been noted in a previous chapter that the NCNP had formed a women's advisory committee to promote the new party concept among the females of Canada. This committee had recommended that a full-time director be appointed to work with women's groups and to administer the promotional efforts of the committee. This recommendation had never been implemented. Following the NDP Founding Convention, however, the NDP Federal Women's Committee was formed. In January of 1962, the national executive appointed Miss Eva Latham Director of Women's Activities.⁷⁷

Her function is to coordinate the activities of the women's committees that have been organized at the national, provincial, and local levels of the party. She has traveled extensively in an attempt to promote interest in the party among women's groups and women's auxiliaries to various trade unions. Pamphlets have been designed to stress the NDP approach to those aspects of public policy which are of special interest and concern to housewives and mothers. Other services of less immediate concern to the fate of the nation but nonetheless politically oriented are performed by the NDP Federal

⁷⁵Globe and Mail, February 4, 1964.

⁷⁶Interview with Terence Grier, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

⁷⁷Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, p. 22.

Women's Committee and the Director of Women's Activities. These include the preparation and sale of New Democratic jewelry, New Democratic Christmas cards, and a New Democratic cook book.⁷⁸

The NDP Constitution included provisions for a young people's section of the party.⁷⁹ The CCF Youth had become practically defunct during the last years of the party's existence. An attempt was made to revitalize a youth movement during the preparatory phase of the new party, but progress was concentrated almost entirely in British Columbia where remnants of the CCF Youth continued to be somewhat viable. Thus, the handful of delegates who met in Ottawa on August 5-6, 1961, to form the New Democratic Youth (NDY) represented less than 200 new party youth from all of Canada.⁸⁰

Provincial sections of the NDY were ultimately formed, but the NDP National Executive felt it necessary to assist in the promotion and organization of youth groups at the provincial and local levels. Consequently, William Picket was hired to serve as the full-time National Youth Director in August of 1961. Partly because of his efforts, enrollments increased from less than 200 in 1961 to over 2,500 in 1963.⁸¹

Lyle Kristiansen, an active volunteer youth organizer from British Columbia, replaced Picket in the Fall of 1963. According

⁷⁸ Ibid., pp. 22, 24-25.

⁷⁹ NDP Federal Constitution, Art. IX.

⁸⁰ New Democratic Youth Federal Office, Report of the Second Federal Convention of the NDY, held at Regina, Saskatchewan, on August 4-5, 1963, pp. 22-26.

⁸¹ Ibid.

to him, the NDY now has over 3,000 members and approximately 84 youth groups in Canada. Twenty-three groups are located in British Columbia, concentrated in the Vancouver area. About 20 are organized in Saskatchewan. Ontario has 22 groups, located in the metropolitan centers of Toronto and Hamilton. Quebec has five groups, all of them in Montreal and all composed of English-speaking members. Three groups are organized in New Brunswick. Nova Scotia has six groups, all but one of them located in the Halifax and Cape Breton areas. Most of the members, moreover, are organized on the campuses of the various colleges and universities. Some success has been obtained in organizing young trade union members, especially in Ontario, and plans have been made to begin organizational efforts among high school age youth.⁸²

Three-thousand members can hardly be equated with the large youth movements attached to the Swedish or German socialist parties, but the NDY has become almost twice as large as the CCF Youth at its peak.⁸³ At any rate, it has been considered worth the effort to have a full-time youth director to promote the NDP among 14 to 30 year-old people and to afford them direct representation at national conventions and on the national council.

As formally constituted, the structure of the NDP differs only slightly from that of its predecessor. Perhaps the most significant changes included the formal solution to the problem of providing for affiliated members in the NDP. By embedding the concept

⁸² Interview with Lyle Kristiansen, NDP Federal Youth Director, Ottawa, October 25, 1964.

⁸³ Report of the Second NDY Convention, pp. 22-26.

of affiliates in its national constitution, the party forced all provincial sections to make at least a formal gesture toward implementing it. Second, the NDP granted French Canada certain recognition in its formal structure by insisting that either the national president or associate president and the national secretary or associate secretary be French-speaking, a situation that never prevailed in the CCF.

CHAPTER IV

THE PROGRAMMATIC POSTURE OF THE NDP

Formal programs have played an important role in the NDP's attempt to manifest itself as a unique and responsible alternative to the other parties in Canadian politics. Like its predecessor, the NDP has devised programs for its national and provincial party sections. The NDY has developed a similar hierarchy of programmatic statements.

At the national level, the NDP program consists of the document adopted at the founding convention and subsequently embellished by the Policy Statement passed at the party's 1963 convention. The following discussion is concerned with the development of the national program and the embellishments appended to it in 1963. Since this study is concerned primarily with the national dimensions of the NDP, the discussion of provincial programs and that of the NDY will be confined to an appraisal of the deviations between them and the programmatic posture of the national party.

Development of the NDP Federal Program of 1961

Dissention over the NCNP's proposals concerning the internal structure were limited and tranquil compared to the dissention aroused by certain portions of the draft program that it submitted to the NDP Founding Convention. Essentially there were three aspects of the

draft program that were sharply contested. First, there was serious debate over the extent to which the program would reflect a socialist ideology, including the question of public ownership. Second, there was the issue concerning what, if any, consideration ought to be given to French Canadians. Finally, there was controversy over external affairs and defense policies, particularly as they related to Canada's position with respect to NATO and atomic weapons.

A Socialist Program for the NDP

The CCF had officially moderated its version of socialism by adopting the Winnipeg Declaration over the protests of a few but vociferous leftists. The draft program published by the NCNP extended the moderating trends pronounced at Winnipeg in 1956. The proposed preamble advocated a "fully free and just society in which all citizens participate, and all share equitably in its fruits." It denounced the "dangerous extremes of opulence and misery both at home and abroad" and offered the new party as a vehicle for rebuilding society along new lines by intelligent planning and prudent use of Canada's human and material resources.¹

Specifically, the draft program promised economic planning at the national and provincial levels of government, public investment in certain private corporations, redistribution of wealth by progressive taxation, area development, and control of the adverse effects of automation. To the farmer it promised parity prices, marketing boards, low interest government loans, encouragement of co-operatives in the areas of fertilizer and farm machinery production, co-operative

¹ NCNP, The New Party Draft Program, Ottawa, May, 1961, p. 7.

and/or publicly-owned storage and processing facilities, and governmental efforts to dispose of surpluses through expanded trade and a world food bank operated under the United Nations. It promised assistance to small business and the Canadian fishing industry. The draft program also included the old CCF plank calling for a national labor code that would insure minimum wages, a forty-hour week, two weeks paid vacation, statutory holidays, safety codes, equal pay for both sexes, and the right to collective bargaining in the entire nation. It openly endorsed welfare schemes such as a national medicare system, a national contributory pension system, a public sickness and survivors' insurance scheme, an expanded unemployment insurance program, and increased family allowances. Finally, it contained provisions calling for massive governmental assistance in the fields of housing and education.²

Doctrinaire socialists, while not opposed to most of the specific proposals set forth in the draft program, were disappointed with the bland moderation of the document. In general, they felt that any departure from a tightly drawn ideology would leave the party "wallowing in the swamps of neo-liberalism," a position already occupied by the Liberal and Conservative Parties.³ But having failed to obtain representation on the program committee for the convention, the more doctrinaire delegates--especially those from British Columbia--had to challenge the moderates from the floor.⁴

²Ibid., pp. 9-23.

³Globe and Mail, July 27, 1961.

⁴Toronto Daily Star, July 31, 1961.

Colin Cameron of British Columbia led the attack by saying that the new party would fail if it developed as a "mildly leftist liberalism rather than as a new political force."⁵ "The convention," he added, "was succumbing to the North American fairy tale promulgated by [John] Galbraith that one can compromise with capitalism and the affluent society."⁶ Cedric Cox, ardent socialist and CCF MLA in British Columbia, voiced a similar argument.⁷ J. M. Thomas of Esquimalt-Saanich in British Columbia called the preamble a "bunch of pious expressions that could just as easily have been promulgated by a bunch of Liberals." He closed by shouting, "Give us a statement of principles."⁸

The moderates retaliated, with the burden of countering the leftists' arguments falling almost entirely upon the New Party Clubs. Leo McIssac, representing the clubs, urged the convention to adopt a program that would appeal to "independent voters" and not one that clung to socialism, a position that could only threaten the establishment of a broader electoral base for the party. The New Party Clubs, he went on, would "oppose vigorously any irrational attempt to impose unnecessary controls or to usurp unnecessarily any freedom from ourselves or our neighbors."⁹

H. L. Wipprecht, speaking for the Timiskaming New Party Club,

⁵ Ibid.

⁶ Ibid., August 2, 1961.

⁷ Globe and Mail, July 29, 1961.

⁸ Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

⁹ Ibid.

said that he would like to see the new party become heir to a truly liberal position, a position that had been recently vacated by the Liberal Party of Canada. "The word liberal was a good word, and it is more respected than socialism," he shouted over a chorus of boos. "The delegates could have all the socialism they wanted, but it would not put any new party members into Commons."¹⁰

Des Sparham, director of New Party Clubs, said that the new party could be guilty of a "masquerade" if it tied itself to doctrinaire socialism.

The original appeal concerning the formation of a new party had gone out to liberally-minded people--those who were able to understand and have some sympathy for those who do not hold the same views as they do. The preamble and program presented by the NCNP did justice to such people.¹¹

For several days the convention debated the meaning of socialism opposite the equally vague notion of liberalism. But not all of the debate was confined to what Murry Cotterhill of the USW, in one of the rare pronouncements from the union delegation, called "arguments over words."¹² Several specific issues were at stake.

The ardent leftists tried to amend the proposed plank that promised consumers some protections from unscrupulous promotion techniques, misleading advertising, poor quality, and over-priced goods, as well as additional protection in the areas of food and drug regulation and interest rates being charged for consumer credit.¹³

¹⁰ Ibid., August 2, 1961.

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Draft Program, pp. 21-22.

The leftists wanted to include a specific promise that the new party would promote a price control program. At first their efforts failed to pass. Later the leadership conceded to a provision calling for the regulation of "levels of prices."¹⁴

The proposed public ownership plank was particularly disturbing to the assiduous leftists. It called for "public and co-operative ownership for such purposes as the operation of utilities, the development of resources, the elimination of monopoly concentration of power, and the operation of major enterprises immediately and directly affecting the entire nation."¹⁵ The new party leaders hoped to unite the badly split convention by also endorsing a plank guaranteeing a job to every Canadian citizen who was willing and able to work.¹⁶ To this end, the draft program promised governmental aid for manpower retraining and a massive system of public works projects to create new jobs.

To the leftists the public ownership plank was simply "socialism if necessary, but not necessarily socialism."¹⁷ Furthermore, the guaranteed job proposal could not be effectively implemented unless the public ownership plank was strengthened to include an endorsement of massive nationalization.¹⁸ Their criticism of the guaranteed job idea was supported, for different reasons, by the moderate Eugene Forsey, research director for the CLC. It was Forsey's contention

¹⁴Globe and Mail, August 3, 1961.

¹⁵Draft Program, p. 10.

¹⁶Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

¹⁷Globe and Mail, August 2, 1961.

¹⁸Toronto Daily Star, August 2, 1961.

that this attempt to buy the support of certain elements at the convention presupposed a government with totalitarian powers to order workers to move and to take jobs.¹⁹ After vigorous debate, both the public ownership and the guaranteed job planks were passed as stated in the draft constitution.²⁰

In addition to these planks, the draft constitution stressed the fact that "most large corporations in Canada are themselves controlled from other countries, chiefly from the United States." To reduce this threat to the right of Canadians to direct their own economic activities--a threat which ultimately endangered Canada's political independence--the draft program suggested the use of the investment and taxation policies explicated above as the "only adequate solutions."²¹

During the course of debate on the section entitled "Control by Canadians," a complete paragraph was added which promised that government investments in foreign-owned corporations would be held by resident Canadians and that "selective repatriation of Canada's resources and industries" would be "negotiated" by the federal government and, where possible, by provincial governments.²² The press quickly dubbed the new paragraph a program for "selective nationalization of natural resources and industries controlled by foreign companies."²³

¹⁹ Globe and Mail, August 7, 1961.

²⁰ Toronto Daily Star, August 2, 1961.

²¹ Draft Program, p. 12.

²² NDP Federal Program, as adopted at the Founding Convention, Ottawa, August, 1961, pp. 30-31.

²³ Toronto Daily Star, August 2, 1961, and Globe and Mail, August 3, 1961.

While the additional paragraph may have placated certain elements in the party, particularly some of the more marginal socialists, it did not shift the program substantially toward a more doctrinaire position.

The small, vociferous, doctrinaire socialist faction present at the NDP Founding Convention was basically overwhelmed by the moderating trend that swept the convention. The preamble of the draft program had been slightly revised, but the adopted version contained no attack on capitalism and no promise of socialism. The guaranteed job plank was adopted in virtually the same form as that proposed in the draft program. The public ownership plank remained unaltered in the adopted version. The promise of economic planning was embellished with specific procedures to implement it, particularly in the area of federal-provincial relations. The idea of a public investment board remained untouched as did the planks on taxation, transportation, housing, agriculture, area development, automation, small business, consumer protection, and labor legislation. A paragraph had been added concerning foreign-owned corporations and one emphasizing the party's commitment to co-operatives and credit unions. But these were more explanatory than substantive in nature.²⁴

Because of prolonged debate over several of these issues, however, the new party leadership was unable to obtain a convention mandate for several important aspects of the domestic section of the program. Among those which had not been voted upon when the convention came to a close was a promise to liberalize Canada's immigration policies. The entire health plank, which endorsed a comprehensive system

²⁴NDP Federal Program, pp. 26-44.

of surgical, dental, optical, and pharmaceutical services by the national government, was neglected by the convention. The plank urging an increase in the existing old age pension payments to \$75.00 a month plus the creation of a fully portable contributory pension system under government auspices suffered a similar fate as did the proposals for a government operated program of sickness and survivor benefits. The plank calling for massive expenditures by the national government in the field of education was ignored at the convention.²⁵

All of these proposals were sent to the National Council for consideration and passage. All of them were later passed by that body and appeared in the printed version of the 1961 NDP Federal Program exactly as they had appeared in the draft program submitted to the convention by the NCNP.

The New Party and the Canadian Nation

Historically, Canada has been divided between French and English-speaking peoples. Much of the character of the Canadian federal system and Canadian politics is attributable to the existence of this linguistic and cultural division. Custom and law have been utilized to construct an elaborate system of guarantees to the populous province of Quebec and the overwhelming percentage of French Canadians who live there.²⁶ Consequently, parties that are inclined toward competing for a majority of seats in Parliament must seriously consider the kind of appeals that they will direct toward the French

²⁵Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

²⁶Norman Ward, "The National Political Scene," Canadian Dualism, ed. by Mason Wade (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1960), pp. 260-76.

Canadians, particularly those in the province of Quebec with its 75 seats in the House of Commons.

The CCF had been singularly unsuccessful in Quebec. Its support in that province during federal elections had been pitifully small.²⁷ Provincially, it had to operate through the small and almost autonomous Quebec Social Democratic Party.

Part of the reason for the CCF's very limited strength in Quebec can be attributed to the lack of attention given to the aspirations of French Canadians in general and the citizens of Quebec in particular. The Regina Manifesto failed to mention French Canadians or Quebec. Most of the domestic aspects of the Regina program were centralistic in implication, a position that ran counter to the historical views of French Canadians in Quebec.²⁸ The only protection offered Quebec was the plank promising that a CCF government would not impinge upon the racial and religious rights granted by the BNA Act if and when it instituted sweeping amendments to that document, amendments designed to strengthen the federal government so that the party could cope with the economic and social problems of the country.²⁹

The Winnipeg Declaration offered few additional incentives to placate French feelings. It confirmed the CCF's basic confidence in the Canadian federal system plus the British and French traditions

²⁷ See Illustration IV, Appendix.

²⁸ Dominique Cliff, "Transfer of Nationalism Affects New Party," Globe and Mail, July 1, 1961.

²⁹ Regina Manifesto, cited in Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 165.

upon which it was premised. Properly applied, it went on, the Canadian federal system could "safeguard the national well-being and at the same time protect the traditional and constitutional rights of the provinces."³⁰

Part of the appeal of the new party concept was that it would enable the democratic left in Canada to make a fresh approach to the interests of French Canadians in Quebec. Much attention, as noted previously, was devoted to promoting the new party in Quebec. In addition, the NDP Federal Constitution offered certain concessions to the French relative to the internal operations of the party. Either the national president or vice-president was supposed to be French-speaking. The same provision applied to the positions of national secretary and associate secretary.

The draft program, moreover, included a rather lengthy statement on the subject of "Co-operative Federalism" and a shorter one on "Canada As a Nation." The former offered a guarantee that the party would protect the essence of the federal system and work toward social and economic planning at all levels of government. It promised "extensive consultation between responsible governments to co-ordinate plans and administration and to set national minimum standards." It advocated a department of federal-provincial relations and regular conferences between the prime minister and the premiers of the provinces.³¹ The section on "Canada As a Nation" acknowledged the enrichment contributed to Canadian life by the many "national, cultural,

³⁰ Winnipeg Declaration, cited in Ibid., p. 172.

³¹ Draft Program, pp. 23-24.

and linguistic strains" in its population. It promised that the party would respect the traditions and cultures of "Canadians of all backgrounds." Finally, it advocated a distinctive flag and anthem for Canada.³²

The Quebec delegation was not entirely satisfied with these gestures. Michael Chartrand, leader of the Quebec delegation, insisted that bilingualism be instituted at all party functions as it had been at the NDP Founding Convention. Furthermore, the Quebec delegation demanded that the words "nation" and "national" be taken out of all party documents and replaced with either the word "country" or "Canada" for the former and the word "federal" or "Canadian" for the latter.³³

Eventually the new party leadership conceded to Chartrand's demands while working to avoid the risk of having the party labeled as one believing that Canada is not a nation.³⁴ To prevent such an allegation, the program was amended to include a statement explaining that the term "nation," as used in the French language, had an ethnic connotation and is therefore used to "describe French Canada itself."³⁵ Otherwise the section on "Canada As a Nation" remained intact.

The section on "Co-operative Federalism" was embellished with additional references to French Canada. As adopted, it affirmed the NDP's belief in the federal system but noted that only federalism

³² Ibid., p. 24.

³³ Globe and Mail, August 2, 1961.

³⁴ Ibid., August 7, 1961.

³⁵ NDP Federal Program, p. 46.

insured the united development of the "two nations which originally associated to form the Canadian partnership."³⁶ The NDP had come close to explicitly endorsing the two-nation concept of confederation, a concept historically associated with Quebec and French Canada.

It should be noted that one of the historic points of contention between Quebec and the national government, and to a lesser extent between it and the other provinces, has been the issue of inter-governmental fiscal relations. Various forms of federal grants, tax-sharing arrangements, and cost-sharing programs have evolved in Canada.³⁷ The NDP, however, did not establish a very precise approach to these issues. It favored the general principle of equalization grants, as stressed in the famous Report of the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations (Rowell-Sirois Report),³⁸ In effect, the party rejected the traditional emphasis upon per capita grants, special grants awarded on the basis of some particular need in a given province and often politically oriented, and conditional grants made on the basis that the money must be spent for a specific purpose in all provinces. The NDP's position, in short, seemed to be that provinces should receive federal grants on the basis of need (i.e., in terms of their relative wealth) and be allowed to set their own priorities for spending them.

Nothing was included in the 1961 program concerning tax-sharing

³⁶ Ibid., p. 44.

³⁷ Dawson, The Government of Canada, pp. 103-24.

³⁸ A general summary of the Rowell-Sirois Report relative to federal grants is set forth in Ibid., pp. 114-16.

schemes except that the party promised to negotiate all aspects of government finance with the provinces and that provisions would be made for a province to opt out of any tax, grant, or cost-sharing program established by an NDP government after such negotiations were concluded.³⁹ This is quite a concession for any party to make, especially one which emphasizes the virtues of economic planning for the nation.

External Affairs and Defense Policies

The draft program presented to the convention was basically internationalist in its orientation toward external affairs and non-nuclear in its position on defense. Some of the channels selected for the implementation of these general positions were quickly endorsed while others were vehemently attacked. The sections concerning the United Nations and the British Commonwealth fell into the first category. Proposals concerning NATO and NORAD were relegated to the latter.

The draft program pledged the new party's support to the United Nations. It endorsed the idea of a permanent international police force under the auspices of the UN and expressed interest in the expanded use of the UN as a vehicle for administering international economic aid. It also recommended the seating of the People's Republic of China in the world organization. All of these recommendations were adopted by the convention.⁴⁰

³⁹NDP Federal Program, pp. 44-45.

⁴⁰Draft Program, pp. 26-27; NDP Federal Program, pp. 47-48.

The NCNP's draft program also affirmed the new party's faith in the Commonwealth, and it singled out the stand taken by that unique international body against racism as worthy of admiration. The Colombo Plan for Southeast Asia, the draft program explained, should be expanded. A similar device should be established to assist newly independent states in Africa and the West Indies.⁴¹

Both of these sections were quickly passed by the convention, as was the proposal endorsing the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD).⁴² The section on economic aid, which was partially concerned with various international organizations, had to be sent to the National Council for consideration and passage due to lack of time at the convention.⁴³

The latter section, as adopted by the National Council, stressed the need to channel more aid through the UN and the Commonwealth. In addition, it suggested a system of grants and long-term, interest-free loans equal to two per cent of the Canadian national income to be made available to developing nations. A Joint Training and Technical Expert Program was adopted which promised Canadian experts to underdeveloped nations while natives of these countries were trained in Canada. A Canadian version of the American Peace Corps was contemplated to help staff the program.⁴⁴ The only substantive change made in the section on economic aid involved the deletion of the idea of subsidizing trade

⁴¹Draft Program, pp. 27-28.

⁴²NDP Federal Program, pp. 48-50.

⁴³Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

⁴⁴NDP Federal Program, pp. 52-53.

with underdeveloped countries.⁴⁵

The subject of Canada's relationships with certain regional associations and certain defense pacts was hotly contested. It has been noted previously that the last major revision of the CCF's program adopted at Winnipeg in 1956 did not mention the subject of NATO or NORAD. There had been an attempt to get the CCF to go on record in favor of withdrawing from NATO at the 1958 CCF National Convention. The effort failed. But the British Columbia delegation led by Colin Cameron was able to get the party to express a highly critical view of military pacts in general.⁴⁶

Despite this move, there was little consensus concerning various regional associations of a military nature. The defense committee of the CCF federal caucus was unable to agree on the NATO issue or on a policy concerning NORAD. In a report to the entire caucus on January 17, 1959, the members of the defense committee (i.e., Argue, Winch, and Peters) concluded that agreement was impossible. Argue and his executive assistant, Russ Bell, favored withdrawal from both NATO and NORAD. Winch, joined by CCF National Secretary Carl Hamilton, concluded that such policies would be unrealistic. It was inevitable, in their estimation, that Canada be tied to the defense policies of the United States. This meant that, if Canada was to retain a voice in defense matters as well as other issues relating to foreign affairs, it had to remain active in both organizations.⁴⁷

⁴⁵Draft Program, pp. 29-30.

⁴⁶Toronto Daily Star, July 26, 1958.

⁴⁷CCF Caucus, Defense Committee, Report to the Caucus, Ottawa, January 17, 1959.

There was also little consensus over NATO and NORAD in other sections of the party. Delegates to a CCF study conference on foreign policy and defense matters held in February of 1960 were similarly divided. Some wanted instant and unequivocal withdrawal from NATO and NORAD. Others wanted to reform them, and others remained committed to one or both of them as then constituted.⁴⁸

In 1960, the CCF National Convention adopted a policy statement advocating Canada's withdrawal from NATO and NORAD.⁴⁹ The party was clearly faced with a dilemma. Andrew Brewin, CCF National Treasurer, was quoted by the Globe and Mail as favoring Canadian membership in NATO and NORAD regardless of the CCF's official policy. The CCF National Executive discussed the problem at a meeting on October 21, 1960 but was unable to resolve the dilemma between party policy and the prevailing attitudes of many CCF leaders that such an unequivocal position was harmful. All that the council did was to ask Carl Hamilton to speak to Brewin about his remarks to the press.⁵⁰

On January 10, 1961, Hazen Argue reopened the sensitive subject for public consumption. In a speech delivered on the CBC radio program called "Nation's Business" he defended the official CCF position calling for Canada's immediate withdrawal from NATO and NORAD. He also drew attention to the party's internal problems by asserting

⁴⁸ CCF, Summary Report of a CCF Conference on Canada's Foreign Policy in the 1960s, held at the Guild Inn, Scarborough, Ontario, on February 26-28, 1960, pp. 2-6.

⁴⁹ Toronto Daily Star, August 12, 1960.

⁵⁰ Letter from Carl Hamilton, CCF National Secretary, to David Lewis, CCF National President, January 10, 1961.

that "all those who favor our remaining in NATO . . . are either illogical or sentimental."⁵¹

The speech caused a furor among several CCF leaders, primarily because it had not been cleared with Hamilton according to established CCF procedures. Furthermore, the National Secretary complained to David Lewis, the speech was insulting not only to pro-NATO leaders in the CCF but to the CLC as well, which had endorsed a pro-NATO policy. Thus, in the light of Brewin's remarks to the press and Argue's unfortunate radio address, the party was making a public display of its own internal schism. Lewis was asked to raise the whole subject at the next meeting of the CCF National Executive.⁵²

Apparently little could be done to resolve the CCF's internal dilemmas over NATO and NORAD policies. The promise of a new party, however, provided an opportunity to make certain programmatic readjustments relative to these subjects. The draft program presented to the NDP Founding Convention proposed a NATO policy that was in direct contrast to that outlined in the 1960 CCF Policy Statement and explained in Argue's radio speech. It favored "a reappraisal and change in NATO's policies and objectives" to stress the economic and social portions of the NATO Charter. It also recommended that Canada withdraw from NATO if "forces under [its] command should be provided with nuclear weapons." On the subject of NORAD, however, the draft program recognized the obsolescence of the pact as a defense against manned bombers, especially since it was armed with BOMARC missiles in an age

⁵¹ Hazen Argue, "We Must Prepare for Peace not Suicide," text of a speech delivered on CBC radio at 7:45 P.M., EST, January 6, 1961.

⁵² Letter from Hamilton to Lewis, January 10, 1961.

of ICBMs.⁵³

To prevent a long discussion over the proposed NATO policy which--unlike the proposals concerning NORAD--was highly contentious, the new party leadership adopted a procedure designed to limit debate. A panel of six persons was established composed of two pro-NATO men, two anti-NATO men, and two representatives favoring the NATO plank in the draft program.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the NATO debate raged until the last day of the convention. After much effort on the part of Douglas, Coldwell, Lewis, and Knowles, the moderate NATO plank as well as the less contentious NORAD proposal were adopted as they appeared in the draft program.⁵⁵

The adopted program also included a plank urging a ban on all nuclear weapons on Canadian soil and the rejection of atomic arms for Canadian troops stationed at home or abroad. It also called for universal disarmament and immediate cessation of nuclear testing. Finally, it proposed a "non-nuclear club of nations pledged not to manufacture, store, or permit nuclear weapons on their soil nor to use such weapons at any time."⁵⁶

The NDP was unequivocally opposed to the spread of nuclear

⁵³Draft Program, pp. 28-29.

⁵⁴Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

⁵⁵Globe and Mail, August 5, 1961. Bert Herridge, an advocate of withdrawal from NATO, claimed that the proposed plank was defeated by a show of hands, but someone demanded a poll of the delegations. The anti-NATO forces among the union delegates then succumbed to the demands made by the union leaders and Stanley Knowles. A de facto bloc vote by the unions passed the moderate plank. Interview with H. W. Herridge, MP Kootenay West, Ottawa, October 24, 1964.

⁵⁶NDP Federal Program, pp. 50-52.

arms but hardly committed to an emotional ban-the-bomb position. It was forthrightly opposed to NORAD, but amenable to a non-nuclear NATO that would take steps to implement its economic and social goals in addition to those concerned with defense. On balance, moderation had prevailed.

Reform of the Canadian Constitution and Parliament

Among the sections of the draft program that were never voted upon at the founding convention were those related to the NDP's approach to reforming the BNA Act and the Canadian Parliament. Like its predecessor, the NDP was concerned about reforming those aspects of the constitution and Parliament that might tend to prevent the implementation of its program should it become a party of government. Like its predecessor, it viewed the appointed Senate as a potential obstacle and suggested that it be abolished. Similarly, the NDP endorsed the repatriation of the final power over amending the BNA Act from the British Parliament. It was careful, however, not to set forth its exact position concerning the amendment formula that would have to replace what then existed. All that the NDP promised was that such a formula would have to be worked out with the provinces; that it would have to be flexible; and that it would have to preserve existing educational, religious, and language rights. The party also recommended that the Bill of Rights law that had been passed by the Diefenbaker Government be embedded into the BNA Act.⁵⁷

Reform of the procedures used in the Canadian Parliament had

⁵⁷Ibid., pp. 45-47.

also been a historic pledge of the CCF. Except for the promise to abolish the Senate, the CCF and the NDP envisioned reforms that would enhance the position and impact of minor parties in the House of Commons. The NDP, for example, urged extended research facilities for the members of opposition parties and more comprehensive use of parliamentary committees. It stressed that the integrity of Parliament rests upon the integrity of political parties and therefore endorsed full publicity of all campaign contributions and a limit upon campaign expenditures, a proposal that could only enhance the position of minor and less affluent parties if it were adopted.⁵⁸

The 1963 NDP Policy Statement

The party has been more programmatic than ideological in its orientation. Consequently, it has had to amend and embellish its program in response to changing conditions. Two years after the NDP Founding Convention and two national elections later, the party held its biennial convention at Regina, Saskatchewan. That convention adopted a rather lengthy Policy Statement which elaborated upon some sections of the original program and added some new dimensions to NDP policy. There is evidence that more revisions and elaborations will emerge in the near future.

Economic Welfare Policies

The economic and welfare aspects of the domestic section of the NDP Federal Program were amended to include three new features. Among them was a proposal concerning the rail line abandonment

⁵⁸ Ibid., pp. 47-48.

policies that had been advanced by the publicly-owned Canadian National Railway (CNR) and by the privately-owned railroads. The NDP asserted that the abandonment of many branch lines and the elimination of many scheduled stops were a result of the Government's failure to develop an integrated transportation policy and recommended that all scheduled rail line abandonments be postponed until a detailed survey of their consequences could be made. Such a survey, the NDP insisted, should weigh the impact of changes in transportation services against the costs that would be incurred by the affected community. If a line abandonment created a loss to the community in excess of the savings to be realized by the railroad, cancellation of the service by the publicly-owned or a privately-owned railroad should not be authorized. Where savings to the railroad exceeded the loss to the community, the line abandonment should be allowed, provided that public assistance be given to the provincial and local governments to help underwrite road, bridge, and other costs that would be incurred to provide alternative transportation facilities.⁵⁹

Although the planks concerning automation and full employment in the 1961 NDP Program mentioned manpower retraining, the 1963 NDP Convention adopted a separate and more comprehensive provision entitled "Learning New Skills." The NDP promised to introduce, in full co-operation with the provinces, a comprehensive plan to prepare the Canadian work force for the needs of a technologically-oriented labor market. Specifically, it recommended that the National Government make a full study of the problem to be followed by the

⁵⁹Policy Statement, adopted at the Second NDP Federal Convention held at Regina, Saskatchewan on August 6-9, 1963, p. 10.

establishment of adult institutes to provide training in technical skills as well as all other areas where advanced training is needed. Coverage would extend to farm labor. A system of counseling services would be instituted to sort candidates according to interest, ability, and aptitude. Participation would be encouraged by providing trainees with government grants in addition to the existing unemployment insurance payments. Private companies would be encouraged to institute in-plant training to upgrade their own employees by offering tax concessions and expert assistance from the Department of Labour.⁶⁰

The third new feature added to the domestic section of the NDP Program pertained to the hazards of radioactive fallout. The NDP promised to set up adequate devices for measuring fallout and radioactive contamination of foods, water, and soil. It promised to provide complete information to the public concerning the hazards of fallout and radioactivity and methods for combating them. An NDP government, moreover, would insist that such "contamination be removed from foods where possible and would give financial assistance to this end."⁶¹

Some of the details inserted into the program were procedural in nature. In the area of economic planning, for example, the party promised to create a full-time planning board, assisted by a secretariat and responsible to the Cabinet. This idea replaced the notion of having a committee composed of all cabinet ministers who headed

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 10-11.

⁶¹ Ibid., p. 15.

major economic departments as the agency for developing and coordinating national planning activities.⁶² The section concerning consumer protection was revised to include a proposal to establish a consumers' bureau headed by a cabinet minister specifically charged with consumer problems. The revised agricultural section also included plans for a new government agency. This one would administer a family farm improvement fund to assist provincial governments with programs for the improvement of rural services.⁶³

Other details included in the 1963 NDP Policy Statement involved more precise explanations of certain sections of the 1961 program. The section on full employment qualified and defined what had been labeled in 1961 as the "Job for Everyone" section of the program. Full employment, according to the 1963 Policy Statement, meant that the party envisioned an annual unemployment rate of "at most 2.5 per cent and probably as little as 2 per cent." The means of accomplishing this remained essentially as they had been set forth in 1961, except that the party had gone on record in favor of a more detailed and comprehensive manpower retraining scheme.⁶⁴

Instead of merely calling for the establishment of a national minimum wage, the 1963 NDP Policy Statement set forth recommendations concerning the amounts to be legislated. Wage workers were promised a minimum of \$1.25 an hour and salaried workers were guaranteed a minimum of \$50.00 a week if an NDP government were elected. Similarly,

⁶²Ibid., pp. 3-4.

⁶³Ibid., pp. 7-9.

⁶⁴Ibid., pp. 5-6.

details were set forth concerning the party's position on medicare. It was specified that an NDP government would cover at least 60 per cent of the costs of the plan and promised that it would make special arrangements with provinces that had established or planned to establish their own plans.⁶⁵

The NDP's position relative to pensions remained essentially the same, including the proposal calling for the immediate raising of the monthly benefits under the existing old age plan to \$75.00. The 1963 statement emphasized that any contributory retirement plan that might be set up by an NDP government would be completely portable; that is, retirement benefits would follow a person from job to job and province to province. Such a plan would be created after negotiations between the federal government and the provinces with special attention to be given to Quebec should it desire a different plan.⁶⁶

Otherwise, the economic and welfare planks of the 1961 NDP Federal Program remained intact. The party continued to be committed to a planned economy, full employment, progressive taxation, government investment in "social capital," deficit spending, consumer protection, parity incomes and government loans to farmers, expanded housing programs, increased unemployment insurance, a national labour code, a national health plan, increased pensions and a contributory retirement system, and massive support to education.⁶⁷

⁶⁵ Ibid., pp. 13-15.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 16.

⁶⁷ Ibid., pp. 3-17.

Since the document adopted in 1963 was a policy statement and not a completely new program, the economic and welfare items that were not repeated in the statement continue to serve as official party policy. Among those not repeated in 1963 were the area redevelopment plank, the separate plank on automation, proposals for a sound fishing industry, and the plank concerning small business. The entire proposal entitled "Control by Canadians" was not repeated, but the promise to inaugurate "selective repatriation" of Canada's resources continues to be official dogma.

One observer equated the 1963 NDP Policy Statement adopted at Regina with the famous Regina Manifesto. At least he felt that the 1963 document represented a definite shift to the left just as the Regina Manifesto represented a leftward thrust from the original CCF program adopted at its founding convention. He placed the 1963 document somewhere between the Regina program of 1933 and the Winnipeg Declaration of 1956 in terms of the party's posture on domestic economic and welfare matters.⁶⁸

Although the preamble to the 1963 document actually states that the party is committed to the "principles of democratic socialism," a term that had not appeared anywhere in the program adopted at the NDP Founding Convention, it is difficult to agree with the thesis that the party shifted left in 1963. None of the specific planks suggested programs that would entail massive nationalization, the hallmark of doctrinaire socialism. Even the preamble of the 1963

⁶⁸Walter Young, "Regina, Thirty Years Later," Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (September, 1963), pp. 124-26.

document stressed controlling the economy in the public interest through a variety of means including public, joint public and private, and co-operative organizations.⁶⁹ Furthermore, there is no evidence in the official proceedings or in the press reports concerning the 1963 convention of an organized group of leftists that might have initiated a move to propel the NDP toward a more doctrinaire position relative to the domestic economy. Even the small but vociferous band of leftists who aroused so much controversy at the founding convention were less obvious in 1963.⁷⁰ Dissent was more blatant when the issues of federalism and biculturalism were discussed. It was certainly more prolonged when the subjects of nuclear arms and NATO were debated. As has been the case in other parties of the democratic left, the zeal of the doctrinaire leftists has apparently shifted from the subject of public ownership toward international issues.

Federalism and Biculturalism

One of the more noteworthy portions of the original NDP program concerned the subjects of federalism and biculturalism. The 1963 document elaborated upon these basic themes and urged a "complete rethinking of [the] federal system and of the relations between the two

⁶⁹ NDP Policy Statement, p 1.

⁷⁰ A vocal minority of doctrinaire leftists was present at the 1963 NDP Federal Convention, but proved to be unable to extract any compromises from the moderate leadership. One of them lamented: "We've [the NDP] become mature. We're not mad at anyone now. Perhaps there is nothing new about us. If they [the leaders] continue stifling the minority, then we won't be democratic. After that there won't be a party." New York Times, August 11, 1963.

nations which established Canada."⁷¹ It explicitly committed the party to work for an amendment to the BNA Act guaranteeing French Canadians the same language rights outside of Quebec as English Canadians have inside that province. The CBC, moreover, would be directed by an NDP government to expand its French and English coverage throughout Canada. The Federal Civil Service would be required to establish equality for both cultures, and to that end it would be ordered to require bilingualism as a qualification for appointment or promotion to higher posts in the service after a reasonable transition period. It would have to establish a language school for federal civil servants to be attended during working hours, and both languages would be recognized as the working language of the service. Finally, a federal agency would be established to provide simultaneous and written translation services at low cost.⁷²

Although this embellished version of the two nation concept and the specific promises relative to the two major languages in Canada were adopted, there was some criticism generated on the floor of the 1963 convention when the NDP Federal Council presented these proposals on biculturalism. Alex Macdonald, MLA from British Columbia, led the opposition by arguing that legal guarantees would not insure the survival of the French Canadian culture and language and that the two nation interpretation of Canada's origins and existence is a divisive doctrine.⁷³

⁷¹ Ibid., p. 20.

⁷² Ibid., p. 21.

⁷³ Globe and Mail, August 7, 1963.

Andrew Brewin and Michael Oliver led the fight for the council's proposal by assuring the delegates that, although the recommendations involved something relatively new to many members of the NDP, it was important for a party committed to a just society to begin by insuring justice to all ethnic and cultural groups which had made Canada their home.⁷⁴

The NDP's approach to federalism is closely related to its views on biculturalism. The 1961 program had proposed a department of federal-provincial relations, a regular prime minister's conference, emphasis upon equalization grants to the provinces, and repatriation of the power to amend the BNA Act from the British Parliament. These items were again included in the 1963 Policy Statement. The idea of a Bill of Rights was also reasserted in 1963 with special attention being given to religious and minority rights as well as freedom of speech, assembly, and association.

The original NDP program did not mention the subject of taxation from the standpoint of federal versus provincial jurisdiction or the issue of shared tax revenues. The 1963 document merely asserted that any changes in the Canadian federal system would have to include consideration and clarification of the allocation of tax powers among the federal and provincial governments. Similarly, the 1961 program promised that arrangements would be made by an NDP government to permit any province to remain outside joint federal-provincial schemes designed to finance various programs. The 1963 document asserted that this opting-out formula would probably apply

⁷⁴Ibid.

only to Quebec which, by "reason of its special character, may not wish to participate in joint programs."⁷⁵

The original draft of the resolution entitled "Federalism and Biculturalism" that was presented to the 1963 convention included a proposal to establish a bicultural council composed of five members appointed by the NDP Federal Council and five appointed by the Quebec section of the party. This council was to be charged with furthering intra-party discussion on the subjects of federalism and biculturalism, and it was supposed to call a special party conference on Canadian federalism prior to the next national convention. The conference, according to the resolution, would hopefully be able to make recommendations concerning specific policies that the party ought to endorse relative to the "renewal of the Canadian Constitution."⁷⁶

The portion of the resolution calling for the creation of a bicultural council was inserted into the NDP Federal Constitution.⁷⁷ Subsequently the NDP Federal Council, at its meeting in February of 1964, activated the council, instructing it to make preparations for holding the special party conference on federalism.⁷⁸ To date the conference has not been held and is apparently still in the planning stage, although part of an extensive public opinion survey ordered by the federal executive will include questions to test the views of

⁷⁵NDP Policy Statement, p. 22.

⁷⁶"Resolution C. 1., Federalism and Biculturalism," Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, p. 31.

⁷⁷NDP Federal Constitution, Art. VII, sec. 4, as amended August, 1963.

⁷⁸Globe and Mail, February 4, 1964.

English-speaking Canadians relative to Quebec and French Canada.⁷⁹

Defense and External Affairs

Defense matters and foreign policy aroused some of the most bitter fights recorded at the NDP Founding Convention, particularly as they related to Canada's participation in NATO. The anti-NATO forces reasserted themselves at the 1963 NDP Federal Convention. Douglas countered with the argument that a resolution favoring Canada's withdrawal from NATO would give the Government something to use against the NDP in Parliament. Furthermore, the NDP Federal Council's recommendation to add a plank urging that the East and West sign a non-aggression pact could not be implemented very well if Canada was outside one of the major organizations (NATO) that would have to be a part of that pact.⁸⁰

After almost two days of debate the party reaffirm its position that Canada remain active in a non-nuclear NATO. It added a statement to the effect that even the NATO policy of reliance upon tactical nuclear weapons must be reversed, an idea that the British Labour Party and the German Social Democratic Party had already endorsed. The proposals concerning NATO and the related statements concerning the NDP's opposition to a multilateral nuclear force and its endorsement of a non-aggression treaty between NATO and the Warsaw Pact nations were passed by a two-thirds majority.⁸¹

⁷⁹ Ibid., February 17, 1964; February 20, 1964.

⁸⁰ New York Times, August 11, 1963.

⁸¹ Globe and Mail, August 10, 1963; NDP Policy Statement, pp. 24-25.

The party also repeated its position on disarmament and the subject of nuclear weapons for Canadian troops at home and abroad. After the convention defeated a resolution from the Saskatchewan delegation calling for an endorsement of a world government with powers to prevent war, the convention reaffirmed the party's belief in the UN and a permanent UN police force. The 1961 proposal to support the recognition of Red China and to work for its admission into the UN was again passed in 1963 after the convention put down a move to include similar promises relative to East Germany.⁸² As was the case in 1961, the NDP avoided mentioning the controversial subject of Red China's admission into the UN while Nationalist China remained a member of that organization. A promise to work for the admission of the People's Republic of China probably represented the maximum possible agreement that could be developed within the party. Whether it could come to grips with the primary question of a two China opposite a one China policy is highly debatable.

The details of the economic aid and development proposals set forth in the 1961 program were not repeated in the 1963 document, but the party elaborated its position concerning aid to nations of the Western Hemisphere. Although it did not endorse Canada's participation in the Organization of American States (OAS), the NDP noted that the events of the Cuban crisis underscored the need for Canada to fulfill her responsibilities as the second wealthiest country in the Americas. The confrontation between Cuba and the US, the NDP maintained, was directly attributable to the grinding poverty and misery

⁸²Globe and Mail, August 10, 1963.

of the Cuban peoples which led to revolution and Castro. The party, therefore, recommended that Canada promote and encourage the development of nations in Central and Latin America, including Cuba, and assist all peoples in the hemisphere who wish to raise themselves from poverty.⁸³

Parliamentary Reform

In 1963, the party added four new proposals concerning parliamentary reform. In addition to its previous insistence upon expanded use of committees, the NDP recommended the establishment of the office of parliamentary commissioner or ombudsman to assist the legislature with the myriad complaints of interference by the government or its agencies with the rights of individuals. It recommended a review of the voting procedures in the House of Commons, including non-confidence votes and more adequate consideration of private bills presented by MPs. The party promised to work toward a broader public awareness of the operations of the Parliament. To this end it recommended wider distribution of Hansard and arrangements for radio and television broadcasting of some of the debates and activities of the House of Commons. Finally, the office of Speaker of the House of Commons, according to the 1963 NDP Policy Statement, should be filled on a permanent basis.

Suggested electoral reforms were also included in the 1963 document. Aside from recommending that the Canada Election Act be amended to require public disclosure of campaign contributions and expenditures, the party recommended that radio and television campaign

⁸³NDP Policy Statement, p. 25.

broadcasts be publicly financed and that the Canada Elections Act be amended to require that urban polls in rural ridings be treated the same as polls in urban ridings. That is, lists of electors and their addresses should be supplied at government expense, and official enumerators should be appointed to handle election returns in the urbanized segments of rural ridings.⁸⁴

It should be noted that some of these planks, if adopted, would favor a minor party. Government payment of the burden of radio and television campaign costs, concentrating all election spending to a specified and hopefully shorter period of time, and having the polling lists in urban sectors of rural ridings drawn up at government expense would place a minor party in a more competitive position vis-à-vis larger ones who are able to bring greater financial resources to bear upon campaigns and sustain their efforts over a longer period of time.

Future NDP Programs

While it is impossible to forecast the precise dimensions of the NDP's future programmatic posture, there is some evidence that the basic moderation trend will continue and that it may take the form of a shift away from the current emphasis placed upon welfare measures. Moderation is basically entrenched because the more radical elements in the party, while quite vocal at times, have been overwhelmed. They were not a potent force in the CCF, and even the verbal gestures toward a more doctrinaire position were abandoned with the adoption

⁸⁴ Ibid., pp. 19-20.

of the Winnipeg Declaration in 1956. This process was completed at the NDP Founding Convention and reinforced in the 1963 NDP Policy Statement.

The belief that this continued moderation may move away from the current emphasis upon welfare measures is supported by the tenor of speeches and reports given at a recent NDP study conference sponsored by the Hamilton and District NDP Council. A speech by Douglas Fisher (MP for Port Arthur) that was read by Reid Scott (MP for Danforth) urged the party to "forget the slogans of the 1930s and start working on the problems of the 1970s." Other speakers noted that welfare measures were part of the political landscape in Canada and most parties endorse them. Dr. William Howe (MP for Hamilton South) asserted that the party would continue to promote its welfare programs but would also attempt to emphasize new facets in its future programs.⁸⁵

An indication of what one of these new facets might be was discussed at length at the Hamilton study conference. The issue of cybernation was explored by academicians, politicians, and labor leaders. Stephen Lewis, MLA-Scarboro West, summarized the potential political effects of cybernation by saying that "technology is becoming the dominant force in society by bringing with it an all-embracing system of values, attitudes, and action." The consensus of the conference was that the NDP should prepare for these changed values and attitudes by developing a program aimed at automation and

⁸⁵Globe and Mail, May 4, 1964.

its effects.⁸⁶ Similar views were expressed at a labor-sponsored educational conference held at Niagra Falls.⁸⁷

Another hint concerning the future direction of NDP policy has recently emerged. The NDP Federal Executive has been working on a so-called "Third Plan" which it will probably submit to the 1965 biennial convention. Although all of the details have not been made public, it has been reported that the plan includes more emphasis upon federal-provincial planning and special attention to the place of Quebec in the Canadian federal system. An entirely new concept of cost-sharing and tax-sharing procedures between the federal and provincial governments is reportedly at the heart of the plan. According to the details that have come to the attention of the press, the federal government would collect most tax revenues except in Quebec should it desire to opt out of the program. Tax funds would then be redistributed on the basis of the revenue raised in each province, and the provinces would be entirely free to establish their own priorities for spending them. Equalization grants would be used to help overcome the disproportionate spread of the nation's wealth.

The whole approach to agriculture supposedly has been shifted away from the NDP's former emphasis upon a sentimental endorsement of the family farm. The "Third Plan" ostensibly envisions financial incentives offered to farmers and fishermen on the basis of their capacity and competence to produce. Inefficient farmers and fishermen would be given financial assistance to move into areas where they could

⁸⁶ Ibid.

⁸⁷ Ibid., February 17, 1964.

be retrained and employed. Rural poverty would thus be attacked at its roots rather than being perpetuated by government subsidy.

The automation plank of the NDP program is reportedly still under study, but the "Third Plan" may include a provision urging the creation of a national labour market board with the power to supervise adult training and provide projections of employment needs and surpluses as far ahead as ten years. It would also administer government funds to help move workers to regions with surplus jobs.

The consumer is supposed to become one of the prime interests of the NDP. The "Third Plan" ostensibly includes provisions to tighten anti-combines legislation, new legislation to prevent price fixing and restrictive trade practices, and encouragement of consumer co-operatives. Advertising is supposed to come under increased fire from the NDP with promises to implement many of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Price Spreads. Among them would be legislation to allow consumers to choose a cash discount in lieu of trading stamps, and laws to limit commercial time on broadcasts made by privately-owned television and radio stations.⁸⁸

Canadian federalism, rural poverty, automation, and consumer protection seem to be the new points of emphasis. The whole area of welfare programs seemed destined to a less conspicuous place in the list of policy priorities that are likely to emerge in the next NDP policy statement.

Programs of the Provincial Sections and the NDY

⁸⁸ Ibid., December 4, 1964.

A federated party structure has as its corollary a federated system of party programs in which provincial programs are technically subservient to those developed nationally. In addition, the establishment of a rather autonomous youth section has led to a system of national and provincial youth programs which parallel that of the party itself, although they must also conform to the principles of the parent organization. Within these technical limitations, there has been room for emphasis upon certain programmatic positions that do not appear or are only generally posited in the NDP Federal Program.

The Federal Program of the NDY

Except for some minor concessions, the program adopted at the NDP Founding Convention and the Policy Statement adopted in 1963 have represented the views of the party's leadership. The programmatic proposals offered by the leaders and subsequently adopted at the party's conventions have stressed moderation. Public ownership has been consistently viewed as merely one means of achieving a planned and socially responsible domestic economy. There has been no mention of exactly what segments of the economy or which types of enterprise would be "nationalized" if the NDP assumed control of the House of Commons. Similarly, the NDP's approach to foreign policy and defense matters has included a carefully worded endorsement of NATO under certain conditions and a somewhat desultory approach to the subject of Cuba and the Western Hemisphere. At least, the party has avoided any overt attacks upon the United States on these subjects.

The NDY Federal Program, however, has set forth some specific enterprises that should be placed under the ownership of the national

government. For example, it has approved resolutions urging public ownership of all transcontinental transportation facilities, all oil and gas pipelines, plus all intermediate forms of distribution used in the production and distribution of gas in Canada.⁸⁹ The latter proposal may involve some complex constitutional questions which the NDY has not bothered to examine in their program. The NDY also has been much more brutal and overtly anti-American about foreign policy and defense matters. Not only has it gone on record in favor of Canada's immediate withdrawal from NATO, but it has boldly stated that the OAS "does not represent the true will of the peoples of the Americas" because it is dominated by one country. Therefore, the NDY recommended that Canada concentrate her efforts in the UN rather than divert energy into such undemocratic organizations as the OAS.

It was even more direct on the related subject of Cuba. The NDY denounced the military harassment of Cuba then being carried out by the US and called for an immediate halt to the American economic boycott, all counter-revolutionary activities directed against Cuba, the American violation of Cuban air space and coastal waters, and the withdrawal of all US forces stationed at Guantanamo. It also resolved that the parent party use its good offices to urge the US State Department to restore diplomatic relations with Cuba.⁹⁰

Although most of these NDY proposals tend to deviate from the programmatic posture of the national party only in terms of emphasis and bluntness, the NDY position on NATO is in direct conflict with

⁸⁹Report of the Second NDY Convention, pp. 11-12.

⁹⁰Ibid., pp. 14-15.

that of the parent organization. Yet, the party has not attempted to denounce openly the NDY for its violation of the NDP Federal Constitution, which states that the youth section shall be fully autonomous provided that its program and constitution are not in conflict with the principles of the party or its constitution.⁹¹ One reason for this, it can be inferred, is that the NATO plank is not considered a principle by the NDP. The preamble of the Policy Statement of 1963 entitled "Objectives and Principles" merely states that the party's approach to foreign policy and defense is premised upon the "spirit of brotherhood" between nations in the search for "peace and for a just world order." If the youth program must be in harmony only with the principles of the federal NDP, then a suggestion that withdrawal from NATO may be a means toward achieving the spirit of brotherhood, peace, and a just world order is not out of line.

Provincial Programs

Programs adopted by the provincial sections of the party generally have been addressed to problems facing provincial governments. Hence, there is little to be gained from a detailed description of the programs adopted by each of the provincial sections of the party. It is sufficient to note that the two general programmatic themes which have provided the most controversy at the national level--doctrinaire socialism opposite moderation and the NATO issue--have also been manifested at the provincial level. But none of the larger and more publicized provincial sections has adopted a program which endorses public ownership as the only or even the primary means to

⁹¹NDP Federal Constitution, Art. IX, as amended August, 1963.

a democratically controlled economy, and none of them has endorsed the idea of Canada's withdrawal from NATO.

Some of the major provincial sections of the NDP have adopted programs calling for the public ownership of certain industries. Provincial ownership of national gas was endorsed by the Manitoba NDP, and the Alberta section also included public ownership of electric power.⁹² The most exhaustive list of enterprises scheduled for public ownership if an NDP government should be elected has been set forth by the party in British Columbia. Provincial ownership of oil, gas, telephone, and transportation services has been included in its program. It also promised to create a system for handling appeals from the owners of all properties scheduled for public ownership, thereby rejecting the demands of the radicals who urged the party to allow the government to set an uncontestable price for such properties.⁹³ In a province where there are "Bennett ferries," a "Bennett bank," and a "Bennett electric company," the NDP's position on public ownership is hardly a radical one.⁹⁴

The Ontario NDP, on the other hand, adopted a position on public ownership that almost paralleled that of the national party

⁹² Winnipeg Free Press, January 22, 1962; NDP, Manitoba Section, Report of the Second Annual Convention, held at Winnipeg on November 2-3, 1962, p. 18.

⁹³ Globe and Mail, November 3, 1961; Vancouver Sun, October 30, 1961.

⁹⁴ Premier Bennett (Social Credit Party) took over electric power in the province in 1963; he has had the province purchase shares in a federally chartered bank in British Columbia. He has also established an elaborate network of provincially-owned ferries. Globe and Mail, July 11, 1963; September 28, 1963; January 24, 1964; February 8, 1964; April 3, 1964.

by promising to "control monopolies by public ownership if necessary."⁹⁵ In Saskatchewan, where the CCF remained in power for almost three years after the NDP had been formed, the provincial section continued to use the basic programmatic orientation that had been established long before the new party concept was introduced. Although the CCF Government had established public ownership over portions of the province's electric power and some aspects of the insurance business, there has been no attempt to extend the concept into other areas.⁹⁶

Given the peculiar nature of Canadian federalism arising from the property and civil rights clauses and the local works clause of Section 92 of the BNA Act, it is proper that provincial NDP programs be concerned with explicating more precisely which facets of the private economy the party wants to place under public ownership.⁹⁷ Except for transportation, telegraph, and other public works of an inter-provincial nature, the national level of the NDP would be hard pressed to devise a schedule of enterprises to be "nationalized"

⁹⁵ Ibid., October 10, 1961; September 19, 1962; August 11-15, 1964.

⁹⁶ Chapter I details the kinds of public ownership and policies instituted by the CCF Government in Saskatchewan. Programmatic debates and resolutions at recent CCF-NDP provincial conventions are reported in Regina Leader Post, November 3-4, 1961; Globe and Mail, November 4, 1961; July 17, 1964.

⁹⁷ Section 92 of the BNA Act gives provinces exclusive power to legislate in relation to all matters pertaining to property and civil rights in the province, and the power to control all local works that are solely intra-provincial in nature (e.g., intra-provincial ship and rail transportation, telegraph communications, et. al.). Dawson, The Government of Canada, pp. 80-102; B. L. Strayer, "Constitutional Aspects of Nationalization of Industry," Canadian Bar Journal, Vol. 7 (June, 1964), pp. 226-34.

without committing itself to fundamental constitutional changes.

Given the NDP's careful consideration to provincial rights, particularly with reference to Quebec, this could become a horrendous undertaking. In short, the contrast between the list of enterprises recommended for public ownership by some of the major provincial sections of the NDP and the generalities set forth at the national level is probably rooted more in the constitutional differences between the national and provincial governments than in the ideological differences between the two levels of the party. Both levels seem committed to limited and selective public ownership.

The NATO issue is beyond the legal powers of the provinces and therefore of little technical relevance to provincial sections of the NDP. Nevertheless, the anti-NATO forces have tried to get at least one of the major provincial sections to pass a resolution calling for Canada's withdrawal from that organization. The Ontario NDP debated the issue for more than thirty minutes at its two-day founding convention in 1961. It finally adopted a resolution endorsing the national party's anti-nuclear and pro-NATO position.⁹⁸

On balance, the NDP has extended the moderating trend that formally manifested itself in the CCF after 1956. There has been a basic harmony and continuity between the formal programs adopted at the national and provincial levels. The candidly anti-American theme that permeates the program of the NDY and its deliberate flouting of the party's NATO position are undoubtedly embarrassing. At present, the party can tolerate this deviation because the NDY, like the vocal

⁹⁸Globe and Mail, October 9, 1961.

groups of pacifists and doctrinaire socialists in the party, represents only a small fraction of the NDP's membership and adherents. If the NDY were larger, more extensively organized, and more publicized, the parent organization would probably have to take steps to bring it into line.

CHAPTER V

THE QUEST FOR INTERNAL ORGANIZATION AND COHESION

A party's ability to manifest itself in the political milieu of a country depends upon a substantial degree of internal consensus concerning policy and leadership, and upon the degree to which its formal organizational machinery is functional and operative. The NDP, in its formative stages and throughout its subsequent history, has experienced problems in both areas. Although the NDP leadership has been able to establish and maintain a basic consensus concerning program, structure, and its own status within the party, it has done so despite continuous pressure. Of more serious consequence to the party and perhaps eventually to the leadership is the flaccid organizational and financial condition of the NDP.

Internal Cohesion: The Transition from CCF to NDP

Tinkering with an established institution, even one experiencing decline and morbidity, raises the possibility that the existing leadership arrangement will be threatened and perhaps altered. The coalition between the moderate westerners and the rising eastern establishment centered in Ontario, as previously noted, had gained a rather firm hold over the CCF. This same coalition--led by Knowles, Lewis, Douglas, and the aging Coldwell--sparked the formation of a new party following the formation of the CLC in 1956. Although it

had been pressured by dissidents before, the leadership coalition exposed itself to renewed and sometimes bitter attacks when it started to promote this idea. The trick was to make the transition from the CCF to the new party without seriously impairing the leadership's own position and interests. This meant that it had to perpetuate its own control over the important posts within the forthcoming party, obtain an endorsement of its programmatic position, and prevent serious alteration of the structural format that it had planned for the new democratic left in Canada.

Obtaining an Endorsement of the Draft Program and Constitution

As noted in the previous chapters, the NDP Founding Convention was a smashing success for the new party leadership relative to its position on a program and structure for the party. Few programmatic concessions had been made, and none of them represented a major shift toward the position taken by the doctrinaire leftists or the rabidly anti-NATO forces. Some modifications had been made in the language of the program and constitution to placate the Quebec delegation, but these were of marginal substantive significance. The draft constitution had been passed almost without change. The minor revisions, particularly those concerning the disciplinary powers of the federal council, did not represent major concessions to any of the dissidents. Certainly, the anti-union forces were not placated by any changes at the convention, and the spirited protest over the splitting of fees from affiliated groups was defeated.

There are a number of explanations for the success enjoyed by the new party leadership. The CCF had formally embarked upon a

moderation trend in 1956, and the concept of affiliates was not totally alien to most members of that party. Nevertheless, some items in the draft program and constitution could have reflected a priori concessions to certain elements in the party. The guaranteed job plank and the proposal to repatriate foreign-owned corporations did much to weaken the ranks of the ardent socialists. The promise of a non-nuclear NATO and the prohibition of nuclear arms for Canadian armed forces split the pacifists from the neo-isolationists who were fighting to get the party to endorse Canada's withdrawal from NATO. The decision not to adopt the British Labour Party technique of granting trade unions and other affiliates the power to elect representatives to the council or executive, plus the inference that national and central bodies of the labor movement would receive only limited representation at federal conventions, undoubtedly reduced the fears of a labor takeover.

More importantly, the dissidents were simply overwhelmed at the NDP Founding Convention. Almost all of them were members of delegations representing the CCF, which numerically accounted for almost half of all the delegates at the convention. On opening day the CCF had 661 delegates, plus the 31 delegates representing the CCF national officers and the 54 delegates representing the party's provincial officers.¹ The trade unions registered 630 delegates on opening day, the New Party Clubs had 186, and the Newfoundland

¹The decision to represent the national and provincial CCF officers originated with a resolution passed by the CCF National Council to insure that the party would be at least numerically superior to the CLC at the founding convention. CCF, National Council Meeting Minutes, Ottawa, March 24-25, 1961.

Democratic Party, celebrating its second anniversary, was represented by 17 delegates.² Additional delegates arrived during the week, but the proportionate strength of these groups remained essentially the same.³

The dissidents among this purposely large delegation of CCFers had some of their strength offset when some of the more radical delegates from British Columbia had to leave the convention to attend a session of the provincial legislature called by Social Credit Premier W. A. C. Bennett.⁴ Even so, the leftists were badly split and the anti-union forces could not coalesce with them on programmatic issues. The union forces, on the other hand, approximated a single voice in support of the new party leadership on both programmatic and constitutional issues. With a few votes drawn from the CCF or the New Party Clubs, the unions could control the convention.

Before the convention was over, the dissidents were baffled at the solidarity and tactics of the union delegation. While the dissidents argued at length, the union delegates ignored the debates. Union delegates rarely used the floor microphones unless they spotted a television camera scanning the floor of the convention. But when it came time to vote, the union leaders were able to muster unanimity even though bloc voting was technically forbidden. The non-union forces, on the other hand, voted along an ever shifting pattern of

²Globe and Mail, July 31, 1961.

³Toronto Daily Star, August 5, 1961.

⁴Ramsay Cook, "Moderation Wins down the Line in the NDP," Saturday Night (September 2, 1961), p. 10.

factional alliances.⁵

Aside from a few minor concessions, the dissidents were able to accomplish little. They contributed to the more than 800 resolutions pertaining to the proposed constitution and program. They prolonged debate until the five hours allocated for discussion of the draft constitution and the selection of officers had been consumed. They argued until the twelve and a half hours set aside for debating the program was exceeded. All that this accomplished, however, was to force about half of the draft program to be referred to the NDP Federal Council for consideration and passage, the very place where the dissidents had almost no representation.⁶

The Leadership Conflict

One of the more prolonged threats to the establishment of internal cohesion involved the selection of a national leader for the new party. The struggle raged for almost three years preceding the NDP Founding Convention. Although the vote at the convention was overwhelmingly in favor of the candidate supported by the new party leadership, the threat was of more serious dimensions than the final vote indicated, and the repercussions that it generated were bitter and divisive. A rather detailed examination of the development of this crisis is therefore required.

The CCF had never experienced a bitter struggle for the leadership of the party. When J. S. Woodsworth became ill during the split

⁵Toronto Daily Star, August 3, 1961.

⁶Globe and Mail, July 31, 1961.

over the party's response to World War II, he quietly retired and was moved into the office of Honorary President of the CCF, a position created especially for him shortly before his death. Another of the founders of the party, M. J. Coldwell, became National Leader, and the party experienced no further disruptions over leadership for almost two decades.⁷

Following Coldwell's defeat in 1958, however, there were rumors that the aged leader would retire from active participation in politics.⁸ He remained silent throughout the first three days of the 1958 CCF Convention at Montreal, apparently adhering to his decision to retire. The party caucus traditionally had much to say about who from its ranks would be leader.⁹ The leading CCF members of the caucus, including Coldwell and Knowles, had been defeated in the 1958 election. Hazen Argue, the only CCF MP from Saskatchewan to survive the election, had been thrown into the national limelight by his victory.¹⁰ However, he was reportedly not interested in succeeding Coldwell. Douglas, then Premier of Saskatchewan, was also reported to be uninterested in the post even if a seat in Commons could be obtained for him.¹¹

Finally, on the last day of the convention Coldwell announced

⁷ McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, p. 191.

⁸ Toronto Daily Star, July 23, 1958.

⁹ McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, p. 190.

¹⁰ William MacEachern, "Undeclared Hazen Argue Faces a Fight of His Life," Toronto Daily Star, August 21, 1961.

¹¹ Toronto Daily Star, July 26, 1958.

that he would not retire. He was subsequently re-elected as the National Leader of the CCF by a unanimous vote. Hazen Argue became temporary leader of the CCF caucus in the House of Commons.¹² The leadership crisis had been officially averted, but it was not solved.

As a result of action taken at the 1958 convention, the official links between the CCF caucus and the official policy-making machinery of the party between conventions (i.e., CCF National Council) had been reduced to Hazen Argue and Erhart Regier. Neither was regarded as a member of the so-called "inner circle."¹³ Hence, the top leadership of the party was officially isolated from the caucus which, without the daily influence of Coldwell or Knowles, soon became a rival power center.

Some of these CCF MPs wanted to promote someone from within the ranks of the caucus to replace Coldwell who, it was felt, would probably resign at the 1960 CCF Convention. They were also interested in making their move while Coldwell and Knowles were out of the caucus so that the traditional domination of caucus affairs by the "top brass" of the party could be broken. Finally, they knew that whoever was chosen leader in 1960 would be in an advantageous position to compete for the leadership of the new party when it was officially launched.¹⁴

When Argue made it known in 1959 that he wanted to run for the post of CCF National Leader, four members of the federal caucus

¹² Ibid.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

immediately backed him: Frank Howard from Skeena (British Columbia), H. W. (Bert) Herridge from Kootenay West (British Columbia), Douglas Fisher from the riding of Port Arthur (Ontario), and Arnold Peters from Timiskaming (Ontario). At the time, no one else was actively seeking the position; hence, none of the four Argue supporters felt constrained to be secretive about promoting him. Besides, they hoped to convince the new party leadership that the farm-oriented Argue would bring many farmers into the new party fold.¹⁵

As the Argue forces emerged, certain new party leaders became alarmed. The position of the new party leadership was candidly and succinctly stated by David Lewis in a letter to Coldwell. Lewis asserted that the CCF convention to be held in Regina had no right to elect a new leader should Coldwell refuse to postpone his retirement. The CCF, he added, should not present the founding convention of the new party with the alternatives of rejecting the CCF leader and thereby alienating the CCF delegates or forcing the new party to accept him and alienate the non-CCF delegates. Furthermore, according to Lewis, the best candidate for the new party leadership was Douglas. But he could not be convinced to abandon the post of Premier in Saskatchewan in the midst of the forthcoming medicare fight. Hence, the way had to be kept clear for Douglas to enter the race at the very last moment.

Lewis also told Coldwell that

until some month ago I considered his [Argue's] candidacy undesirable, although not fatal; but Hazen's blatant and ruthless campaign to get the leadership is terrible. I must frankly say

¹⁵Ibid.

to you . . . that Hazen's behavior in the last while has made me exceedingly fearful about entrusting the leadership of a socialist party to a man of that sort.

Consequently, Lewis pleaded with Coldwell to continue as leader to prevent not only an embarrassing leadership fight, but eliminate such "hair brained" stunts as that proposed by Alistar Stewart (ex-MP from Winnipeg North) who intended to seek the office of CCF National President in order to run around the country promoting Douglas for new party leader while preventing whoever was elected CCF leader at Regina from becoming "entrenched."¹⁶

When the 1960 National CCF Convention opened at Regina, the new party leadership was aware that it faced a hostile audience. There was little chance that Coldwell would again postpone his retirement, and many CCF delegates wanted to elect a new leader because of the rumors about a federal election being called in the near future.¹⁷

Lewis and Knowles joined forces in an attempt to get the convention to accept an alternative to selecting a new national leader. They offered the convention a "compromise" drafted by the CCF National Council whereby the office of leader would remain vacant, and Argue would act as leader in terms of the activities of the federal caucus. He would be called "party leader" and would be empowered to speak for the party outside the Parliament. In effect, this meant that he would campaign as party leader should a federal election be called.¹⁸

¹⁶Letter from David Lewis to M. J. Coldwell, July 29, 1960.

¹⁷Toronto Daily Star, August 6, 1960.

¹⁸Ibid., August 8, 1960.

Meanwhile, Alistar Stewart apparently gave up the idea of running for the office of CCF National President that Lewis had mentioned in his letter to Coldwell. Instead, he decided to run for the post of CCF National Leader. He was backed by two members of the anti-Argue faction in the federal caucus--Murdo Martin from Timmins (Ontario) and Erhart Regier from Burnaby-Coquitlam (British Columbia).¹⁹ All three men were reportedly in favor of Douglas for the post of new party leader. Hence, it can be inferred that they hoped to prevent Argue from winning the office of CCF leader and also squash his chances for defeating Douglas at the new party founding convention. Yet, the Stewart forces did not agree with the compromise offered by the council because of the possibility of a federal election before the new party was launched. In fact, Regier and Martin threatened to walk out of the convention if it accepted the council's compromise.²⁰

On August 9, 1960, Coldwell was reported to have offered to remain as leader until the new party's founding convention. At that point Argue accepted the compromise solution. Stewart also accepted it.²¹ It appeared that the leadership crisis had once again been averted.

Argue's supporters, however, were angry with him for accepting the compromise and pressured him to reverse his decision and run as

¹⁹ Ibid., August 9, 1960.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Ibid., August 10, 1960.

originally planned.²² Douglas Fisher, one of Argue's supporters, clashed with Knowles on the floor of the convention calling Knowles and Lewis a "pair of bureaucratic manipulators" for their efforts to block the selection of a new leader. He also urged the large Ontario delegation to fight the compromise because the MPs had a right to select their own leader even though the CCF executives tended to regard the party's federal caucus as unrepresentative.²³

Stewart's supporters were equally angry with their candidate. Martin and Regier tried to solicit the necessary two-thirds of the delegates to petition for an amendment to the party's constitution that would retain the office of leader and require that it be filled by a vote of the convention.²⁴ A revolt was developing on the floor of the convention.

The Knowles-Lewis faction responded to the growing discontent among the delegates by meeting with every delegation to explain the purpose of the compromise suggested by the CCF National Council. The delegations from Ontario and Saskatchewan were singled out for special attention since each of them had over 100 votes. Both delegations were reticent, even though Douglas led one of them and Lewis was a prominent member of the other.²⁵ In addition, Knowles and Lewis attempted to thwart the efforts of the seven MPs (i.e., the four Argue

²² Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

²³ Toronto Daily Star, August 10, 1960.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

and three Stewart supporters) who were advocating defiance of the CCF National Council by having Douglas speak to the convention in favor of the compromise solution.²⁶

These last ditch efforts to prevent Argue from becoming the CCF National Leader failed. The compromise was quashed by a vote of 309 to 50, and Hazen Argue was elected by an overwhelming vote. The new party leadership, however was not totally rejected. A resolution endorsing the work of the NCNP had been passed. Fred Zaplitny, an ex-MP from Dauphin (Ontario), challenged Lewis for the office of CCF National President and was swamped by a vote of 195 to 78. Fisher tried to oust Knowles as CCF Vice-President but lost by a margin of 174 to 94.²⁷

The revolt by the rank and file that culminated in the rejection of the council's compromise and the election of Argue settled nothing relative to the leadership of the new party. The Lewis-Knowles faction still wanted Douglas as leader of the new party. The Argue faction wanted to transform its recent victory into a platform from which it could promote Argue for the same position. The 1960 CCF National Convention was not officially closed before fighting began.

Murdo Martin, secretary of the CCF federal caucus, and Douglas Fisher sent a letter to the CCF National Council prior to the close of the party's convention in Regina complaining that Carl Hamilton, CCF National Secretary, had told the caucus that he was working for the "anti-Argue forces." It was the contention of Fisher and Martin that

²⁶ Ibid., August 11, 1960.

²⁷ Ibid., August 12, 1960.

the role of the CCF National Secretary was equivalent to that of a civil servant; therefore, the secretary was supposed to be neutral in all party matters. They suggested that, unless the council admonished Hamilton, the caucus would question his right to attend caucus meetings.²⁸

The council discussed this letter at its meeting on August 12, 1960, and instructed Lewis to draft a reply to Fisher and Martin. Lewis told them that the council had passed a resolution emphasizing the fact that the CCF National Secretary Carl Hamilton was not just a "civil servant" but also an individual elected to the council by the CCF National Convention. Furthermore, while the council was anxious to assist the caucus in any way, it reserved the right to select the secretary of the party.²⁹

The battle continued as preparations for the new party founding convention proceeded. A few days before the convention opened, four MPs (Howard, Fisher, Herridge, and Peters) issued a press release charging that the CCF National Leader Hazen Argue was being "officially and discourteously relegated to a subordinate position" in all plans for the new party. Specifically, they mentioned the fact that Argue was not to be permitted to make the traditional report of the national leader until after balloting for the new party leader was over.³⁰ In addition, they charged that they had been refused access to the list

²⁸ Letter from Murdo Martin and Douglas Fisher to the CCF National Council Meeting at Regina, August 11, 1960.

²⁹ Letter from David Lewis to Douglas Fisher and Murdo Martin, August 19, 1960.

³⁰ Toronto Daily Star, July 27, 1961.

of delegates to the founding convention while the pro-Douglas new party leaders obviously knew who each of them would be.³¹

Lewis replied to these charges by saying: "It would be presumptuous for those people who are making these attacks to think that they can say what they like today and have it all forgotten tomorrow."³² Harold Winch from British Columbia was chosen by the new party leaders to make an official reply to the charges made by the four MPs. He called the charges "incorrect, unfounded, and misleading." He added that even the CCF had never made it a practice to give out the names of the delegates.³³ When Douglas arrived in Ottawa, he also referred to the charges by telling reporters that both he and Argue served on the NCNP and that both participated in the discussions of the convention procedures.³⁴

As delegates to the new party founding convention arrived in Ottawa, they were hustled to two well stocked rooms at the plush Chateau Laurier for refreshments and a quick sales pitch by members of the "Citizens for Douglas Committee" headed by Erhart Regier. The Argue forces rented a less auspicious storeroom on Bank Street near the Coliseum which, except for the noisy demonstration staged for Hazen by the arriving Manitoba delegation, underscored the unorganized and unsophisticated promotional efforts of the Argue camp.³⁵

³¹ Ibid., July 28, 1961.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid., July 29, 1961.

³⁵ Ibid., July 31, 1961.

On the opening day of the convention, there was an effort to get Argue's report as CCF National Leader presented as part of the general reports made by various party organizations as traditionally done at CCF conventions. The attempt to allow Argue to speak to the convention prior to the balloting for the new party leadership failed by a vote of 3 to 1.³⁶

On August 2, after two days of debate on various policy statements, the nominations for new party leader were opened. Douglas was nominated by Coldwell, and his nomination was seconded by Miss Huguette Plamandon, an organizer for the United Packinghouse, Food and Allied Workers' Union of Montreal. Argue's nomination was presented by Fisher and seconded by Michael Chartrand, leader of the Quebec Social Democratic Party.³⁷

The two candidates told the convention and the television audience that they would lead the new party to victory on a platform of public ownership, banning nuclear weapons from Canadian soil, and the destruction of corporate power. Douglas did not mention the sensitive subject of NATO, but Argue promised to support any NATO policy endorsed by the convention.³⁸ Argue closed his speech by saying: "No matter what my role in the years ahead, I shall speak for you, I shall work for you, I shall never let you down."³⁹ The statement was almost prophetic, because the following day Thomas L. Douglas was elected

³⁶ Ibid., August 1, 1961.

³⁷ Ibid., August 3, 1961.

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ Globe and Mail, August 3, 1961.

leader of the new party by a four to one margin, 1,391 votes out of 1,771 ballots cast.⁴⁰

After Lewis declined the nomination, Michael Oliver, Professor of Political Science at McGill University, was elected NDP Federal President. His election was viewed as a symbolic victory for the New Party Clubs which, by design at least, represented liberally-minded professionals from the middle class.⁴¹ Gerald Picard, Chairman of the Montreal Central Council of the CNTU, was elected Associate President. Eamon Park, Assistant to the Director of the United Steelworkers of America (Canadian Branch), was elected Treasurer.

Harry Pope, assistant to Hazen Argue, cynically declined the nomination to become one of the five Federal NDP Vice-Presidents on the grounds that he intended to vote for the officially non-existent slate of candidates supposedly selected by the leaders of the CLC and the CCF. The chairman ruled that no such slate had been endorsed by the leaders of these organizations and that the delegates should ignore all rumors to that effect.⁴² Subsequently, Lewis, Winch, McIssac, plus Fred Dowling and Romeo Mathieu were elected Federal Vice-Presidents of the NDP.⁴³

The struggle between Argue and Douglas for the office of NDP Federal Leader and the feeble attempts to challenge the new party leadership for the other elective federal offices in the party were

⁴⁰ Ibid., August 4, 1961.

⁴¹ Ibid., August 3, 1961.

⁴² Toronto Daily Star, August 4, 1961.

⁴³ Canadian Labour, Vol. 6 (September, 1961), p. 11.

more than personality contests. They were inextricably involved with cleavages over program and structure. The major candidates of both factions fighting for control of the NDP were essentially moderate in their personal ideological orientations. But Douglas received the support of the moderate new party leadership and the union delegations, while Argue attempted to manufacture support from a collection of dissidents on the floor of the convention. The anti-NATO forces, left-wing socialists, some moderate CCF delegates, and reportedly about half of the Quebec delegation aligned themselves behind Argue.⁴⁴

This seemingly illogical alliance was apparently sustained by a basic anti-establishment orientation on the part of its members. The anti-NATO and doctrinaire leftists opposed the new party leadership on programmatic grounds. The moderate CCFers, including some of the Argue forces in the federal caucus, generally opposed what was viewed as a labor takeover of the party.⁴⁵ Finally, the segments of the Quebec delegation that reportedly supported Argue represented the separatist faction. They questioned the sincerity of the new party leadership relative to the "legitimate claims of Quebec."⁴⁶

Argue's campaign to unite the various factions that opposed the new party leadership was thwarted, in large part, by careful strategy. The decision of the new party leadership to support Douglas represented a keen tactical move. He was neither an easterner as was Lewis nor associated directly with the CLC as was Knowles. His brand

⁴⁴Toronto Daily Star, August 2, 1961.

⁴⁵Globe and Mail, August 3, 1961.

⁴⁶Ibid., August 5, 1961.

of revivalist oratory was popular and reflected his background as a Baptist minister.⁴⁷ A moderate program could be given emotional fervor by such an orator. In addition, Stanley Knowles, the "political marriage broker between the CCF and the CLC," sought no formal leadership post in the party.⁴⁸ Jodoin adhered to an identical policy. Lewis refused the office of president for the lesser position of one of five vice-presidents. The new party leadership was extremely cautious about thrusting itself upon the convention, but men such as Oliver, Winch, Park, and McIssac could be trusted to keep the party on a moderate course.

Naming the Party

The only successful challenge to the wishes of the new party leadership at the founding convention came as a result of a revolt over naming the party. Throughout the period between 1958 and the NDP Founding Convention, the temporary title, "New Party," was utilized by the promoters and leaders of the movement. It appeared in all NCNP publications and served as the name of the forthcoming party in all press reports.

The leadership, it was reported, favored the retention of this well-known, temporary title.⁴⁹ Others preferred a different name. Among those recommended were the "Social Democratic Party" (SDP) and "Canadian Democratic Party" (CDP). Green leaflets were circulated

⁴⁷ William MacEachern, "'Church of CCF Ultimatum' Launched Douglas into Politics," Toronto Daily Star, August 2, 1961.

⁴⁸ Globe and Mail, August 2, 1961.

⁴⁹ Ibid., August 3, 1961.

proposing the "New Democratic Party." According to the leaflet, this name had the endorsement of Tommy Douglas.⁵⁰

Demonstrations against the name endorsed by the new party leadership became so loud that it consented to a system of polls, technically for advisory purposes only, to determine the wishes of the delegates at the convention. The results of the first poll were: NP (614), NDP (329), SDP (164), and CDP (156).⁵¹ Subsequent polls were taken, each one eliminating the name with the lowest number of votes, until the name of New Democratic Party prevailed over New Party by a margin of 784 to 743.⁵²

After considering the results of the polls, the leadership announced the name--New Party. Although the exact reasons for this blatant disregard of the various polls has not been made public, it is possible that the leadership assumed that the great bulk of the votes given to the title NDP between the first and last ballot (i.e., 455) basically represented those who had voted for it after their first preference was eliminated. In short, it could be inferred that over half of the votes given the title NDP on the last ballot were not firmly committed to it, whereas only about a sixth (129) of the votes added to the title NP between the first and last ballot fell into that category.

Whatever the logic of the leadership in flouting the results of the polls, it underestimated its ability to maneuver the convention

⁵⁰Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

⁵¹Globe and Mail, August 3, 1961.

⁵²Toronto Daily Star, August 4, 1961.

on this seemingly minor issue. A near riot broke out on the floor of the convention, and the leadership had to concede to the name that had survived the various polls. Canada's new political party was to be known as the New Democratic Party.⁵³

Maintaining Internal Cohesion in the NDP

The new party leadership coalition survived the conversion from the CCF to the NDP without having to make serious concessions. Since that time, there has been almost no organized threat to the moderate programmatic position, the structural format, or the leadership coalition that survived the founding convention. There have been, however, some embarrassing situations perpetrated by individuals and factions within the party which represent limited cracks in the party's internal cohesion.

Defections from the Ranks

The national leadership of the NDP has changed relatively little since the founding convention. Douglas was re-elected to a two year term as NDP Federal Leader in 1963. Mervin Johnson, a farmer from Saskatchewan, was elected NDP Federal President to replace Michael Oliver, who resigned to head the research arm of the Royal Commission on Bi-Lingualism and Bi-Culturalism. Stanley Knowles, who had been re-elected to Parliament in 1962, joined the NDP Federal Council as one of the two MPs officially representing the federal caucus.⁵⁴ Finally, Gerald Picard, Associate President, resigned because of poor

⁵³Globe and Mail, August 4, 1961.

⁵⁴Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, pp. 5-6.

health. The council subsequently replaced him with Robert Cliché, leader of the NDP in Quebec.⁵⁵

However, there has been a rash of defections from the party since its founding. Some were disgruntled CCFers of minor consequence.⁵⁶ Others, such as David Gauthier, found the NDP constituted differently from his expectations when he first joined an Ontario New Party Club.⁵⁷ Others, such as Walter Erb, were of more consequence in party affairs. Erb had been Minister of Public Health in the CCF Government in Saskatchewan. He resigned, according to his press release, because of differences with Premier Lloyd over the medicare plan in that province. He added, however, that his move should not have come as a surprise to CCFers whose party had been "swallowed by the NDP."⁵⁸

Perhaps the most publicized defection was that of Hazen Argue, defeated candidate for the post of NDP Federal Leader. Argue's withdrawal in February of 1962 was ostensibly premised upon his belief that the NDP was then becoming or had become a "citadel of trade union cliques."⁵⁹ Although Argue offered little substantive evidence to support his charges, his defection created a sense of betrayal and produced the "fiercest battle since the Regina Manifesto in

⁵⁵Le Devoir (Montreal), November 21, 1964.

⁵⁶Globe and Mail, January 3, 1963.

⁵⁷Ibid., December 28, 1962.

⁵⁸Ibid., December 7, 1962.

⁵⁹Ibid., February 19, 1962.

Saskatchewan."⁶⁰ His eventual acceptance of the Liberal candidacy in his home riding of Assiniboia was a serious and embarrassing blow to the NDP.⁶¹

The party's response to these defections has been swift and vindictive when the renegade has happened to be relatively prominent and has decided to run as a candidate for another party. Much emphasis was reportedly placed upon beating Hazen Argue during the 1962 federal election by not seriously contesting the race in Assiniboia in the hope that the PC candidate would win.⁶² If this was the NDP's strategy, it failed to produce the desired results in 1962. Argue won that contest with 7,739 votes compared to the 7,386 and the 5,153 votes cast for the PC and NDP candidates respectively. In 1963, however, the same PC candidate who ran in 1962 defeated Argue by 9,393 to 7,311 votes. The same NDP candidate who contested the riding in 1962 captured only 3,683 votes in the 1963 election.⁶³ Roderick Stewart, the defeated NDP candidate for the federal riding of Waterloo South in the 1963 election, defected and decided to run as a Liberal in that same riding during the federal by-election in 1964. The NDP made this campaign almost a personal vendetta against Stewart and managed to trounce him by an overwhelming margin of votes.⁶⁴

⁶⁰ Ibid., February 20, 1962.

⁶¹ Ibid., March 24, 1962.

⁶² Regina Leader Post, June 5, 1962.

⁶³ Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, p. 839; Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1963, p. 838.

⁶⁴ Globe and Mail, September 10, 1964; November 6, 11-12, 1964.

Rancor from the Left

Parties of the democratic left tend to attract a whole spectrum of zealots ranging from the more doctrinaire socialists to Communists and fellow travelers. The NDP has been concerned about possible infiltration by these groups since it was discovered that about six Communists were seated at the founding convention as New Party Club delegates despite efforts to keep them out.⁶⁵ Since then, the party has been particularly vulnerable to infiltration by various Communist-oriented individuals through its youth section. Although the party has tolerated the NDY's uncompromising position against Canada's participation in NATO, it has been very harsh with individual members of the youth section who have been identified with certain revolutionary leftist organizations.

Eleven members of the NDY in British Columbia were ousted for belonging to a Trotskyite group.⁶⁶ Ten members of the Ontario NDY were expelled for forming a Trotskyite-Marxist organization called the Young Socialist Alliance. Those expelled charged that they were being purged for advocating Canada's withdrawal from NATO, favoring the Cuban revolution, and endorsing total nationalization of the Canadian economy. The party maintained, as it had in the British Columbia case, that these youths had violated the party's rule forbidding its members to belong to any other political party or movement.⁶⁷

The party's problems did not stop with young radicals. Cedric

⁶⁵Toronto Daily Star, August 1, 1961.

⁶⁶Globe and Mail, December 10, 1962.

⁶⁷Ibid., June 3, 1963; February 25, 1964.

Cox, brother-in-law of Harold Winch (MP, Vancouver East) and an MLA representing Burnaby in the British Columbia legislature, embarrassed the party by taking a two week sojourn in Cuba as a guest of the Castro Government. He went as a member of the Vancouver Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. NDP Provincial Leader Robert Strachan and Provincial President Frederick Vulliamy publicly chastized Cox. Rumors spread that the old socialist hero might face expulsion, to which Cox replied, in a television interview taped in Cuba, that it was none of the party's business. "The NDP is supposed to be a party of free men. . . ." ⁶⁸

Cox was not expelled by the party for that trip, but his subsequent behavior brought censure. Cox and H. W. Herridge (MP, Kootenay West) were officially censured by the British Columbia section of the party for attending a May Day rally in Vancouver. They were charged with allowing themselves to be used by Communists or Communist-front organizations. ⁶⁹

Expulsions and censures have not halted the doctrinaire leftists; if anything, they may have helped organize them. H. W. Herridge showed this author a copy of "Caucus," a bulletin of socialist thought and discussion published by the NDP Socialist Caucus in British Columbia. This undated, mimeographed bulletin is the medium for all those who hope to promote socialism "within the ranks of the NDP to the end of inducing the majority to accept their views." The bulletin has attacked the party's NATO stand and its bland approach to public

⁶⁸ Ibid., January 8, 12, 1963.

⁶⁹ Ibid., August 15, 1963.

ownership. It has poured out vehement attacks upon the NDP leadership for witch-hunts and purges, and it has labeled the New Democrat (official organ of the NDP in eastern Canada) as the voice of the "establishment which maintains the iron law of oligarchy in the party."⁷⁰

The Merger Movement

The efforts of some of those on the opposite end of the spectrum from the doctrinaire left have been of more serious concern to the party and its leadership. While the handful of vocal dissidents on the left is clearly discernible, the concept of merger with the Liberal Party involves a more complex set of forces within the party. Merger has involved members of the "inner circle." It has also drawn the attention of individuals who are considered moderates by programmatic standards but who are otherwise opposed to the union base in the party and/or the so-called "establishment" headed by Knowles, Douglas, and Lewis.

The concept of merger between the NDP and the Liberals is not, however, a new phenomenon. One of the more persistent traditions in Canadian politics is to discuss the possibility of a merger between the Liberal Party and whatever party of the democratic left happened to prevail at a given point in time. The Liberals absorbed all of the Progressive Party except the "Ginger Group" during the late 1920s, and there had always been talk about the CCF merging with the Liberals. The formation of the NDP has, if anything, enhanced the traditional

⁷⁰ Issues of the "Caucus" were furnished for the author's perusal during an interview with H. W. Herridge, MP Kootenay West, Ottawa, October 24, 1964.

practice of urging merger between the two parties.

Individual members of the NDP have suggested merger. Douglas Fisher, who is considered a moderate and who backed Hazen Argue over Tommy Douglas, told an NDP nominating convention in the federal riding of Spadina (Ontario) that, if the NDP could destroy the "reactionary elements in the Liberal Party, the two parties could move closer together."⁷¹ Val Scott, the almost victorious NDP candidate in the federal constituency of York Centre in 1962 and 1963, has suggested "Operation Candor." In a letter to every influential federal and provincial NDP leader, he deplored the tendency within the party to become resigned to the old CCF role of being a social and educational force on the political scene. Unwilling to wait 20 or 30 years for the NDP to come to power, he urged the party to re-examine its attitudes and premises, including the "unhappy and inhibiting marriage" with trade unions and its "smug evangelical" approach to the electorate. Furthermore, he suggested that the party seriously consider a possible merger or alliance with the Liberals.⁷²

In December of 1963, several Liberals and NDP members met at the home of John Wintermeyer, former Ontario Liberal Leader who had led his party to a resounding defeat in the provincial elections earlier that year. Present at the unauthorized and informal meeting were Murray Cotterhill, Public Relations Director of the USA and defeated NDP candidate in the provincial riding of Lakeshore; Arthur

⁷¹Globe and Mail, October 24, 1962.

⁷²Ibid., November 13-14, 16, 1963.

Reaume, Liberal MPP for Essex North and chairman of the management committee of the Ontario Liberal Association; Andrew Thompson, MPP for Dovercourt and leading contestant for the post of Provincial Leader of the Liberals; Eamon Park, Assistant Canadian Director of the USW and Federal Treasurer of the NDP; and Desmond Sparham, former director of New Party Clubs.⁷³

A report of the talks was sent to NDP Provincial Leader Donald MacDonald and Faquhar Oliver, acting leader of the Ontario Liberals. Although there was apparently no consensus achieved on the subject of merger, MacDonald responded to the report by repeating his former pledge to have his party work with the Liberals only to secure an adequate medicare plan for Ontario. Furthermore, reports from the meeting disclosed the fact that a merger between the two parties would be satisfactory to the NDP members present at Wintermeyer's home only if the internal operations of the Liberal Party were democratized and it became less reliant upon corporate sources for its financial backing.⁷⁴

At the federal level, a supposedly secret meeting took place in the Ottawa apartment of Liberal Finance Minister Walter Gordon in November of 1963.⁷⁵ Almost seven months later the Montreal Gazette carried a more detailed report of the meeting. According to this newspaper account, Tommy Douglas, Doug Fisher, and David Lewis were the NDP representatives. The Liberals present included Walter Gordon and Keith Davey, Liberal Organizer. Prime Minister Pearson was

⁷³ Ibid., December 23, 1963.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid.

supposed to have attended, but because of illness he did not do so. However, he supposedly telephoned the Gordon apartment and chatted with Douglas.⁷⁶

Although Douglas, Lewis, and Fisher publicly denied that the meeting took place, this author was informed by a member of the NDP caucus, who wishes to remain unnamed, that the account of the meeting given in the Montreal Gazette was accurate and that Douglas and Fisher, when pressed at a meeting of the caucus, admitted that the secret talks had centered upon possible collaboration between the minority Liberal Government and the NDPs in Parliament with a view toward a possible merger of the two parties at some later time. It was also disclosed that the meeting accomplished little relative to the subject of merger except to underscore the NDP's demand that the Liberals democratize their party's internal operations prior to further negotiations.

The merger movement has been somewhat institutionalized in the form of an organization known as the Exchange for Political Ideas in Canada (EPIC). The roots of this organization go back to the Fabian-styled League for Social Reconstruction (LSR) that had provided the intellectual basis of the CCF until the early 1940s. After many LSR members became involved in official CCF work, a group of admirers of J. S. Woodsworth set up an independent educational organization called the Woodsworth Memorial Foundation of Ontario (WMFO). By 1952 the WMFO had become interested in a somewhat broader educational program than could be performed under the CCF banner. It also considered selling Woodsworth House in Toronto, which served as the meeting place

⁷⁶Montreal Gazette, June 22, 1964.

for the group as well as the office of the Ontario CCF. Consequently, David Lewis led a coup against the directors of the WMFO, replaced them with "loyal" CCFers, and operated it as an official party apparatus until 1962.

In July of 1961, Desmond Sparham, Director of New Party Clubs, called a meeting to explore the possibility of creating a forum for political ideas. Armed with funds granted by the faltering WMFO, Sparham started to promote a project called EPIC in 1962. When he unwisely suggested in 1963 that the project might serve as a vehicle for the exchange of ideas between the NDP and the Liberals, he was summarily denounced and fired as the director of the project.

The project seemed destined for oblivion. But in an effort to save it, Sparham contacted the Toronto Branch Exchange Committee which included Douglas Fisher and Carl Hamilton. It also included Pauline Jewett, a Liberal MP and political scientist, and Andrew Thompson, then a leading candidate for the post of Provincial Leader of the Liberal Party in Ontario. This group agreed to proceed with the project despite angry protests from the leaders of the NDP in Ontario.⁷⁷ In 1964, New Democrats and left-wing Liberals from across Canada spent a weekend together at Hart House in Toronto to found the organization called EPIC. Ostensibly, it was designed as another intellectual and educational group, but its founding convention became involved with the merger issue. In fact, an effort to insert a clause into the organization's constitution making it an offense

⁷⁷ "A Canadian Fabian Society," Canadian Forum, Vol. 44 (July, 1964), pp. 73-74. Thompson became Leader of the Ontario Liberals in September of 1964. Globe and Mail, September 4, 1964.

punishable by suspension for a member to use EPIC as a means for promoting merger was defeated.

Douglas Fisher was elected President of the 230-member organization. Pauline Jewett was elected Vice-President. Mark MacGuigan, a Liberal and a law professor at the University of Toronto, became Treasurer. Of the ten directors, five are New Democrats, two are Liberals, and three belong to no political party.⁷⁸

Except for Lewis' and MacDonald's refusal to attend the meeting at Hart House, there has been no attempt to interfere with EPIC on the part of the NDP leadership. In light of the experiences of the WMFO, however, the new group probably will not be allowed to become a major vehicle for merger unless the NDP leadership should ever want to move in that direction. If that occurred, the leadership would undoubtedly want to establish control over the terms of the merger and would not allow this independent group to proceed unguided. For the present, however, EPIC is an impotent but bothersome organization confined largely to Ontario.

It is unlikely that the merger concept will proceed to the point of fruition. The conditions upon which formal merger would have to be based (i.e., programmatic similarity, attitudes about the internal operation of the merged party apparatus, and a balance in the power advantages that could be obtained by each of the two parties contemplating the move) have not been established within the federal and provincial dimensions of the NDP or the Liberal Party. Programmaticly, the NDP and the Liberals could probably tolerate each other

⁷⁸ Globe and Mail, May 25, 1964.

at the federal level, except on the nuclear issue. There would even be some advantage to both parties in terms of political power. The Liberals could probably form a majority government if they could win the seats currently held by the NDP in metropolitan Toronto and win those taken by the PC in certain other urban areas where the Liberals and New Democrats have tended to cancel each other's support under the existing arrangement. The NDP, on the other hand, would obtain an opportunity to be part of the government. Aside from the nuclear issue, however, the federal leadership of the NDP has resisted merger on the grounds that the Liberals refuse to democratize their internal operations.

Even if the two parties should reach some sort of accord on the issues that stand in the way of merger at the federal level, many problems would remain at the provincial level. The New Democrats could hardly reach a programmatic agreement with Joey Smallwood's Liberal organization in Newfoundland, the perpetrator of some of the most anti-labor legislation in Canada. Conversely, the Liberals in Saskatchewan refuse to consider merger with their major rival for the control of that province. Ross Thatcher has repeatedly denounced the merger idea. On one occasion he said: "Surely after all these years we [Liberals] have learned that the . . . NDP stands for socialism, for government ownership, and for bureaucratic control."⁷⁹ On another occasion he pointed out that "any attempt to promote an alliance between the Liberals and Socialists will meet with the unswerving

⁷⁹Ibid., December 1, 1962.

resistance of the Saskatchewan Liberal Party."⁸⁰ It is reasonable to assume that the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan, the leaders of which have chosen to ignore the whole subject, have similar feelings about merger with Ross Thatcher and his cohorts.

In Ontario, where the Liberals are most anxious to pursue a merger in order to dislodge the entrenched PC Government, the Provincial Leader of the NDP has become one of the most outspoken critics of the idea.⁸¹ Despite MacDonald's pious defense of the sanctity of NDP independence, the fact remains that the Liberals have been in serious trouble in Ontario and the NDP stands as much chance of cutting into the PC margin of seats in the Provincial Legislature as do the Liberals.

Conversely, the NDP is the major challenger for the right to govern in British Columbia. Although the tiny Liberal organization would certainly enhance the NDP's chances of beating Premier Bennett's Social Credit machine, the merger would have to take the form of the Liberals joining the NDP. This would be exactly the reverse of the type of merger that is being discussed elsewhere in Canada.

Many of these same difficulties would stand in the way of an electoral alliance rather than a formal merger between the two parties. Because the NDP and the Liberals tend to draw their greatest electoral support in many of the same areas, one observer concluded that the NDP could expect to gain little from an electoral alliance with the Liberals. In exchange for a few seats, the NDP would generally have had

⁸⁰ Ibid., February 15, 1964.

⁸¹ Ibid., October 7, 1963; January 24, 1964. Vernon Singer, "Should the NDP Join the Liberal Party," Globe and Mail Magazine, February 10, 1964.

to stand down in a proportionately greater number of ridings than the Liberals in the 1962 and 1963 federal elections. Conversely, this same author argues that the NDP could have gained a few more seats and given up its existence in fewer ridings if it would have made an electoral alliance with the PC, a proposition that has not been completely ignored by the NDP particularly in western Canada.⁸²

Quebec and the NDP

"Quebec n'est pas une province comme les autres." This statement is commonly heard in Canada, and it has special meaning to the NDP. Although the party is extremely weak in the province and almost non-existent outside Montreal, the effort expended by the NDP in addressing itself to the needs and aspirations of Quebec has been substantial. Furthermore, while victory in Quebec is not prerequisite to obtaining control of the House of Commons, governing Canada without consideration of Quebec is quite a different matter. Thus, it is important that something more than passing reference be given to the NDP's status in that province.

The CCF had paid little attention to Quebec and allowed the small Quebec Social Democratic Party to operate for it at the provincial level. The new party concept, however, included a fresh approach to Quebec and French Canada as part of the quest for a broader organizational and electoral base.

Co-operative federalism, the two-nation concept, and promises to protect the French language and culture became the basis of the

⁸² J. M. Wilson, "Why not Join the Liberals," Canadian Forum, Vol. 44 (October, 1964), pp. 145-47.

new party's fresh approach. They were embedded in the NDP's Federal Program and embellished in the 1963 Policy Statement. Internally, the party granted special representation to French Canada by insisting that several federal officers be French-speaking. To date, however, the NDP is organized on a provisional basis in that province, and there is a separate Socialist Party of Quebec operating at the provincial level.

The reasons for this situation are as complex as the politics of Quebec. No political movement with roots in that province has escaped the swirling dialogue over Quebec's role in the country called Canada. The fundamental issue is how far Quebec ought to be inserted into the total life of the country. A whole spectrum of opinions exist. At the risk of oversimplification, this spectrum seems to range between militant separatists and those who want a substantial degree of autonomy for Quebec within the existing constitutional framework.

From the start, the NDP elements in Quebec were torn by a similar range of views. There were those such as Michael Oliver and Gerald Picard who favored a provincial section of the NDP not unlike that created in most other provinces. There were those such as Michael Chartrand, former leader of the Quebec Social Democratic Party, who wanted to continue the situation that prevailed under the CCF. Finally, there was a whole collection of ardent separatists who did not want any association with the national party.

The NDP factions in Quebec finally agreed to call a founding convention for the provincial section for March, 1963. Position

papers and discussion guides were drafted by various individuals and elements scheduled to attend the convention. Because of the federal election called for early April of 1963, the founding convention was not held.⁸³

The feuding factions finally met in Montreal on June 29-30, 1963 at an orientation congress held to prepare the way for a founding convention in 1964. It split immediately over the dilemma of trying to reconcile economic planning with biculturalism. Despite the two-nation concept and the principle of co-operative federalism, the radicals refused to accept what they viewed as a basic commitment on the part of the national party to make extensive use of the federal government. To them, economic planning was the NDP's raison d'être, and biculturalism was merely its ticket to country-wide significance.⁸⁴

The position paper prepared by André L'Heureux, Associate NDP National Secretary; Jacques-Yvon Morin, Professor of International Law at the University of Montreal; and Michael Chartrand stated the demands of the separatists. The first paragraph proposed a new constitution for Canada that would be "a pact defining precisely the jurisdiction of the Confederation and the State of Quebec." It included demands that Quebec be given control over all judicial matters in civil and criminal law and jurisdiction over broadcasting, the press,

⁸³ Globe and Mail, July 7, 1963.

⁸⁴ Ramsay Cook, "Crisis in the NDP," Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (August, 1963), pp. 111-13.

cultural affairs, education, railroads, and air transportation. It asked that this new pact guarantee Quebec priority over "all sources of revenue necessary to the development of a social democratic state."⁸⁵

The position paper presented by the Provisional NDP Council of Quebec was more moderate in tone and demanded only that a clearer definition be made of the specific dimensions of federal and provincial powers. Like the document submitted by L'Heureux, et. al., the moderates also demanded that jurisdiction over all constitutional questions be taken from the Canadian Supreme Court and granted to a new constitutional court.⁸⁶

The fight raged between the two factions with the English-speaking elements and most of the trade union delegates opposing the radicals. The former were called federalists or, in more scornful tones, "Pan-Canadians." The latter were dubbed La Gauche Nationale. After delegates from both sides threatened to walk out, the orientation congress reached an agreement to establish an independent Parti Socialiste du Quebec (PSQ) which would concern itself strictly with provincial politics. The NDP would concentrate on the federal field. No compromise resulted on the subject of Canadian federalism and the congress adopted policies very close to those presented by L'Heureux and his associates.⁸⁷

⁸⁵ "Document B-2," submitted to the Provisional Provincial Council of the NDP in Quebec for presentation at the orientation congress, dated February 2, 1963, pp. 1-4.

⁸⁶ Globe and Mail, June 30, 1963.

⁸⁷ Thomas Sloan, "An NDP Monster with Two Heads," Globe and Mail Magazine, August 17, 1963.

On the weekend of November 16, 1963, the PSQ held its founding convention and elected Michael Chartrand its President. It adopted a program containing the separatist themes endorsed at the orientation congress, provisions for massive public ownership to enable Quebec to control her economic well-being, and plans for extensive welfare services under provincial control.⁸⁸ Some of the 125 delegates wanted to revoke the agreement allowing the NDP to contest federal elections in the province and set up a federal section of the PSQ. A resolution was passed, however, which stated that any attempt by the NDP to interfere with the autonomy of the PSQ would bring open warfare.⁸⁹ The prospects for this may be imminent because Terence Grier reported during an interview that the split between the NDP and the PSQ is so complete that the NDP is seriously considering participation in the next provincial election in Quebec.⁹⁰

The NDP in Quebec is still operating on a provisional basis; that is, the NDP organization that exists for the purpose of contesting federal elections in that province has not yet held a formal founding convention.⁹¹ After Michael Oliver left active participation in the party to serve on the Royal Commission on Bi-Lingualism and Bi-Culturalism, and after Gerald Picard retired because of ill health,

⁸⁸ Globe and Mail, November 15, 18, 1963.

⁸⁹ Thomas Sloan, "Socialists Form a New Party," Globe and Mail Magazine, December 7, 1963.

⁹⁰ Interview with Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

⁹¹ Letter from André Prelect, Provisional Provincial Secretary of the NDP, Quebec Section, to the author, September 30, 1964.

the party languished in Quebec. Provincial Leader Robert Cliché has revived it somewhat. Since he was appointed Associate Federal NDP President, the Quebec section has apparently re-established some of the ties with the national party that were lost when Oliver and Picard left the scene.⁹²

Finally, the democratic left in Quebec, particularly at the provincial level, must content with the fact that the Liberal leadership in Quebec (i.e., Jean Lesage and René Levesque) is very progressive and endorses public ownership as one means of enhancing Quebec's control over its own economic and political destiny. To split the leftist vote is to run the risk of allowing the Union Nationale to win, a situation that is opposed even by the officially non-political CNTU. Thus, the presence of the Lesage-Levesque brand of French nationalism seasoned with socialism compounds an already difficult situation for the NDP in Quebec.⁹³

The Organizational and Financial Base of the NDP

Except for some embarrassing defections, some largely impotent thrusts from the left, the yet uncrystallized merger movement, and the problem with the more separatist-oriented SDP in Quebec, the NDP has had a rather tranquil history since its founding. In terms of its moderate programmatic posture, internal cohesion has been basically maintained within the party. Evidence of disenchantment over the party's ties with labor have been more vocal than real, and the NDP

⁹² Le Devoir (Montreal), December 5, 1964.

⁹³ Cook, "Crisis in the NDP"; Jean-Marc Leger, "Has French Canadian Socialism Been Born?", Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (August, 1963), pp. 100-101.

leadership has not yet been challenged by a well organized rival power structure since Argue's defeat.

As an organized party phenomenon, however, the NDP has suffered from some fundamental weaknesses. The party had been founded upon the assumption that the CCF was no longer a viable instrument for broadening the organizational and financial base of the democratic left in Canada. The NDP, which MP Harold Winch called a "repackaged version of the CCF for merchandizing purposes," has made some advances toward establishing more extensive organizational roots in Canada; and it has been able to bring more financial weight to bear upon promoting and extending the democratic left in Canadian politics.⁹⁴ But the gains have not been spectacular, and the additional financial effort has been put forth only with strenuous effort and deficit financing.

A Profile of the NDP's Organizational Base

Although this study is concerned with the national dimension of the NDP and its relationship to the national arena of Canadian politics, the extent to which the party is organized and deployed throughout the nation has a direct impact upon its national posture. The elaborate structural apparatus common to parties of the "mass" variety, in addition to being an instrument for the development of party policy and program, is an instrument for waging election campaigns. The notion of a mass membership base is predicated upon the assumption that members are votes as well as a key source of manpower and money for participating in the crucially important electoral arena.

⁹⁴ Interview with Harold Winch, MP Vancouver East, Ottawa, October 26, 1964.

There are at least three basic indicies that can be used to test the depth and deployment of the NDP's organizational base in Canada. Each of them suffers from certain statistical inadequacies, and some of them must be judged in terms of variables over which the party has little or no control. Nevertheless, it is possible to set forth trends and to define the basic contours of the party's organizational base.

One indication of the viability of the party in the various provinces is expressed in the number of individual members enrolled in each provincial section. Figures utilized in the following chart are only approximate because the national office does not keep accurate records of individual memberships, and no provincial section except that in Manitoba responded to requests for more accurate data. However, until very recently memberships in all provincial sections were recorded on a monthly basis because annual dues were collected from each member during the month corresponding to the anniversary of his entrance into the party. Except in Ontario, where a system has been recently established to require all members to pay their dues during a specified month regardless of when they joined the party, the number of members tends to fluctuate from month to month.⁹⁵ This fluctuation tends to be most pronounced immediately before and after a provincial or national election. The Manitoba NDP, for example, recorded over 4,000 individual members prior to the provincial election held in

⁹⁵ New Democrat, October, 1964. This is the official organ of the NDP in eastern Canada and is published by the Ontario section of the party.

December of 1962 and only 1,590 members in January of 1963.⁹⁶ Fluctuation is also more pronounced after an every member canvass (i.e., all members as well as those whose memberships have lapsed are contacted), a scheme pioneered by the CCF-NDP in Saskatchewan.⁹⁷ In short, the approximate figures set forth in Table 7, which are based upon the amount of money forwarded to the national party for each individual member and adjusted to account for family and sustaining memberships, are sufficient to indicate the relative membership pattern among the various provinces.⁹⁸

In most provinces, individual NDP memberships slightly exceed those of the CCF at any point in its history. The CCF in Saskatchewan recorded almost 32,000 members in May of 1944, but that was its peak performance.⁹⁹ By December of 1959, it had fallen to 24,069 individual members. The other large provincial sections of the CCF recorded memberships quite below the NDP figures set forth in Table 7. The CCF in British Columbia, for example, listed 6,103 individual members in December of 1959; the Ontario section listed 6,767 in July of 1959

⁹⁶ NDP, Manitoba Section, Report of the Third Annual Convention, held at the Fort Gary Hotel in Winnipeg on November 22-23, 1963, p. 30.

⁹⁷ See the endorsement giving the concept of an every member canvass by Donald MacDonald, NDP Provincial Leader in Ontario, in his "Broad Membership Base Is Key to Success," New Democrat, September, 1964.

⁹⁸ Membership figures supplied during an interview with Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, Ottawa, October 26, 1964. The number of electors in each province used for purposes of calculating the percentage of electors who are individual members of the NDP was obtained from Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the General Election of 1963, p. viii.

⁹⁹ McHenry, The Third Force in Canada, p. 84.

and 5,931 in January of 1960.¹⁰⁰

TABLE 7

Profile of Individual Memberships in the NDP

Province	No. of individual NDP members (1964)	Individual NDP members as % of electors on the most recent federal voting list (1963)
Saskatchewan	37,000	7.3
British Columbia	8,000	.9
Ontario	13,000	.4
Manitoba	2,500	.5
Alberta	2,500	.4
Nova Scotia	700	.19
New Brunswick	300	.1
Quebec ^a	1,000	.04
Newfoundland and Prince Edward Is.	100	.04
Total	64,600	.65

^aMembers claimed by the NDP in contrast to those claimed by the SDP of Quebec.

The number of affiliated members in each province is less indicative of the party's organizational base. To date, trade unions have been the only types of organizations that have affiliated with the party. Even the more leftist-oriented National Farm Union has refused to join because, as NFU President Alfred Gleave told the 1963 NDP Federal Convention, it wishes to negotiate with "governments of any stripe."¹⁰¹ The number of union members in each province, moreover, is quite disproportionate to the general population spread across Canada. Since there is a strong tendency for industrial-type

¹⁰⁰ NDP Founding Convention Delegates File, NDP National Headquarters, Ottawa, file dated July, 1961.

¹⁰¹ Globe and Mail, August 8, 1963.

unions with a CCL tradition to affiliate while craft unions with a TLC heritage do not, the complexion of the union base in a given province affects the number of affiliated groups that can be reasonably expected to respond to the party. In addition, the CNTU (Catholic), located essentially in Quebec, did not participate in the formation of the NDP and has not officially urged its locals to affiliate. Finally, the commitment obtained from members of groups which affiliate with the party is tenuous when compared to that obtained from individual members who must decide to join the party. Members of affiliated groups make a conscious choice only if they wish to avoid paying the sixty cent fee to the party each year (i.e., contract out).

With these limitations in mind, however, the most recent data reveal that affiliated memberships tend to follow the pattern indicated on the previous chart concerning individual memberships. When the uneven spread of CLC memberships in Canada is disregarded, the provincial sections of the NDP can be ranked as noted in Table 8.¹⁰²

There are several important aspects of the party's affiliated membership that must be stressed. Only about 16 per cent of the CLC membership has been incorporated into the party, and about 50 per cent of that represents steel and auto unions.¹⁰³ Although the CLC

¹⁰²The number of affiliated members in the NDP in each province is recorded in the "Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council and supplied to the author during an interview with Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, October 26, 1964. The percentages of the total CLC membership affiliated with the party in each province were calculated from data supplied in the "Memorandum" and the official 1963 membership figures of the CLC as recorded in Canadian Labour, Vol. 9 (June, 1964), p. 22.

¹⁰³Calculated from data found in the "Memorandum."

continued to urge its affiliates to join the party even after the CCF-NDP defeat in Saskatchewan in 1964, the number of affiliated members has not increased significantly.¹⁰⁴

TABLE 8

Profile of Affiliated Memberships in the NDP

Province	Number of affiliated locals (1963)	Number of affiliated members (1963)	Percentage of electors who are affiliated members (1963)	Percentage of CLC membership affiliated with the NDP (1963)
Ontario	431	150,000	4.4	27
B. C.	40	31,888	3.4	17
Nova Scotia	26	9,245	2.3	22
Manitoba	35	6,122	1.2	10
Alberta	38	5,707	.8	9
Sask.	44	3,517	.7	8
New Bruns.	16	1,344	.43	5
Nfld./P.E.I.	7	1,291	.51	13.2
Quebec	52	8,695	.3	2.4 ^a
Total	689	218,392	2.2	16

^aQuebec ranks higher than might be expected since the calculations are based on CLC memberships. Almost one-fourth of Quebec's union members belong to the Catholic-oriented CNTU. If these were included, Quebec would rank slightly lower.

There is some evidence that the party is shifting more attention upon getting individual unionists to join as individual members of the NDP. This has been a tradition in the Saskatchewan section of the party, but the Toronto District Labour Council recently started distributing registration forms through its locals to try to convert

¹⁰⁴Globe and Mail, April 21, 25, 1964.

its 150,000 adherents into direct NDP members.¹⁰⁵ Douglas Fisher and others in the party have been urging more emphasis upon this kind of membership drive among trade unionists for some time.¹⁰⁶

Despite these problems, the party received \$114,389.24 including the portion rebated to provincial sections, from affiliated dues during the sixteen-month period from the NDP Founding Convention to June 30, 1963.¹⁰⁷ In addition, the party receives donations from various unions during election campaigns. Although the CLC top leaders have not run as NDP candidates or made campaign speeches for the party, the staff and field workers of the CLC were urged to accept nominations and work for the party where their normal duties would permit.¹⁰⁸ The labor base has not been a total failure.

An index of formal participation in elections is another means of determining the depth and deployment of a party's organizational base. Running candidates is a key function of a political party, although it is often only a pro forma method of indicating the party's presence and not an indication that the party is a serious competitor in the electoral arena. This is especially true during national elections since one method of projecting the image that a party is national in scope is to run as many candidates as possible. The following chart summarizes the level of electoral participation recorded by the NDP in

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., February 8, 1963.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid., October 5, 1964.

¹⁰⁷ Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, pp. 28-29.

¹⁰⁸ Globe and Mail, February 8, 1963.

each province.¹⁰⁹ It is premised upon the assumption that running a candidate is at least indicative of the presence of the NDP in a constituency and the presence of some level of party organization no matter how crude.

TABLE 9

Levels of NDP Participation
in the Electoral Arena

Province	Percentage of provincial ridings contested by the NDP during the last provincial election	Average percentage of federal ridings contested by the NDP during the 1962 and 1963 federal elections
Sask.	1964 election -- 100	100
B. C.	1963 election -- 100	100
Alberta	1963 election -- 92	100
Ontario	1963 election -- 90	95
Manitoba	1962 election -- 69	97
Nova Scotia	1963 election -- 47	86
New Bruns.	1963 election -- 0	70
Quebec ^a	1962 election -- 0	66
Nfld. ^b	1962 election -- 0	57
P. E. I.	1962 election -- 0	100

^aThe provincial manifestation of the NDP in Quebec, the Parti Socialiste du Quebec, was not formed when the 1962 provincial election occurred.

^bThe NDP did not contest the election, but the union-backed Newfoundland Democratic Party that sent delegates to the NDP Founding Convention ran five candidates.

Statistical inadequacies aside, there are certain generaliza-

¹⁰⁹ Percentages of ridings contested were calculated from data located in the official reports of the various provincial election officers and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada for the federal elections in 1962 and 1963. Since the official report of the 1964 provincial election in Saskatchewan has not yet been published, the figures for that provincial election were calculated from the returns reported in the Regina Leader Post, April 23, 1964.

tions that can be drawn from the data utilized in the foregoing charts. As a party premised upon the basic assumptions of a "mass" organization, the NDP has fallen far short of a mass membership base. Individual and affiliated members together have accounted for only about two per cent of the entire electorate in Canada. In terms of individual members, whose commitment is generally more immediate and conscious, the party has been most successful in Saskatchewan. No other provincial section comes close to claiming more than seven per cent of the electorate as individual members.

More importantly, the membership base and the level of electoral participation tend to be consistently weakest in the Maritimes and Quebec. On balance, the provincial sections in British Columbia, Ontario, and Saskatchewan are the most extensively organized and the most electorally active in Canada. Alberta and Manitoba tend to occupy an intermediate position.

The most obvious discrepancy in the profiles of the various provincial sections of the NDP requires explanation. Although the Saskatchewan section has the largest percentage of the electorate enrolled as individual members and has contested all ridings in both provincial and federal elections, it has registered a relatively weak performance in terms of affiliated memberships.

Aside from the fact that Saskatchewan is predominately non-urban and tends to be heavily non-unionized, its relatively weak position relative to affiliated union members is enhanced by a long

tradition of stressing individual over affiliated memberships.¹¹⁰

The British Columbia section, on the other hand, has had a long and successful relationship with the most politically-minded labor movement in Canada.¹¹¹ Ontario, of course, is the center of the steel and automobile industries and consequently the home of the large auto and steel unions which have been rather eager participants in the NDP. About 63 per cent of the NDP affiliated memberships in that province are attributable to UAW and USW affiliates.¹¹²

A more complete evaluation of the viability of the NDP can be made after the organizational profiles of the various provincial sections are contrasted with the electoral response given to the party since its founding. Before proceeding with an analysis of the NDP vote, however, there are several other aspects of the internal dimensions of the party that must be explicated.

Financial Problems

Maintaining a rather elaborate party structure and extending the NDP's organizational base in Canada is largely dependent upon the financial status of the party. It is difficult to obtain precise figures to document this aspect of the NDP's internal operation despite the fact that it claims to be, and in most respects is, the only party in Canada that makes a full and public disclosure of its sources

¹¹⁰ For a statement of the traditional CCF view on this subject see CCF, Saskatchewan Section, Provincial Executive Meeting Minutes, Regina, September 12, 1959.

¹¹¹ Globe and Mail, May 1, 1962.

¹¹² Computed from data presented in the "Memorandum."

of revenue and its expenditures. Yet, there are separate campaign funds set up by NDP candidates which do not appear in official financial reports. Similarly, trade unions often supply special monetary gifts during campaigns, loan the party staff assistance, and promote the NDP through regular union communications media. None of these contributions are reported in the official reports either.

Nevertheless, the basic financial status of the national level of the NDP can be obtained from the treasurer's report presented at the 1963 Federal Convention. This will be supplemented with data concerning the larger provincial sections which have made their financial reports available or whose financial situation has become the subject of press coverage.

A summary of the NDP Federal Treasurer's Report of 1963 is provided in Illustration VIII in the Appendix. In terms of Canadian dollars, the national level of the party reportedly spent \$507,271.27 between the NDP Founding Convention and June 30, 1963. Almost 25 per cent of that was listed as general campaign expenditures for the 1962 and 1963 federal elections. In addition, each of the regular operating budgets was allocated extra funds designated for these elections. Hence, the total spent on the two federal elections amounted to \$186,683.52 or about 37 per cent of the total expenditures during the sixteen-month period between August of 1961 and June of 1963.

These seem to be nominal sums for a national party to spend on servicing its own national apparatus, financing the national party's contribution toward two national elections, and assisting the various provincial sections with organizational and promotional efforts during a period of sixteen months. But in comparison to previous CCF national

expenditures, the NDP has been able to concentrate substantially more financial resources upon elections and servicing the internal structure of the party. Expenditures during the twenty-four month period between June of 1952 and June of 1954 are indicative of the CCF's financial effort. The period was chosen because it represents neither the zenith nor the nadir of the CCF, yet it does include expenditures for at least one federal election. Including expenditures charged to campaign activities for the 1953 federal election, the national level of the CCF spent \$84,364.44 during this twenty-four month period.¹¹³ Compared to figures in Illustration VIII, this would not have covered the regular operating budget for the NDP's Department of Organization for the sixteen month period between August of 1961 and June of 1963.

Although expenditures by the national party have been generally above the amounts expended by the national level of the CCF, they have had to be raised, in part, by borrowing. Two national elections have put severe strains upon the party, and Terence Grier publicly admitted during the 1963 national election campaign that the NDP had to rely heavily upon "passing the hat" at campaign rallies, advertizing in newspapers for donations, and bank loans.¹¹⁴ The national party, moreover, reported a deficit of \$41,698.81 on August 31 of 1962. By tightening election expenditures for the 1963 campaign, the national party was able to reduce this reported deficit to \$14,331.61 by June 30 of 1963.¹¹⁵

¹¹³ CCF, Report of the Thirteenth National Convention, held at Edmonton, Alberta on July 28-30, 1954, p. 16.

¹¹⁴ ¹¹⁴ Wj Winnipeg Free Press, March 9, 1963

¹¹⁵ Illustration VIII, Appendix.

The party has also had to operate on borrowed capital in some of the larger provincial sections. The Manitoba NDP reported a deficit of 2,618.46 on August 31, 1962. After spending over \$55,000 during 1963, including expenditures for the provincial election, it recorded a debt of \$6,790.36.¹¹⁶

The NDP in British Columbia, however, is reportedly in the worst financial condition. It inherited a deficit of about \$4,700 from the old provincial CCF.¹¹⁷ Helping to run two federal elections for the party in that province in addition to an expensive provincial election in 1963 aggravated the financial dilemma. To add further to the crisis, Bill 42 had been passed by the Social Credit Government shortly after the NDP was formed. It forbade any trade union from contributing to, or expending on behalf of, a political party or a candidate any money deducted from an employee's wages under check-off or paid to it as a condition of membership in the union.¹¹⁸

The law was upheld by a provincial trial court and sustained on appeal to the British Columbia Court of Appeals.¹¹⁹ With money from the more affluent Saskatchewan section of the party, the plaintiff for the NDP's interest (Oil, Chemical, and Atomic Workers' International Union, Local 16-611) represented by Tom Berger (former NDP-MLA) pressed an appeal before the Canadian Supreme Court. It lost the

¹¹⁶ NDP, Manitoba Section, Report of the Third Annual Convention, Appendix pp. 3-4.

¹¹⁷ Vancouver Sun, October 27, 1961.

¹¹⁸ Globe and Mail, March 14, 1962.

¹¹⁹ Ibid., January 1, 1963.

appeal by a four to three decision.¹²⁰ In early 1964, the court rejected an application for a rehearing of the case.¹²¹ The promise of a labor party that had been symbolized by the new party concept was seriously eroded in British Columbia.

This combination of financial pressures prompted Robert Strachan, Provincial Leader of the NDP in British Columbia, to state publicly in the party newspaper that, unless the party could raise \$15,000 in a hurry, the party would fold in that province.¹²² By the Fall of 1964, the British Columbia section of the party was holding a lottery on the outcome of the British general election and selling ball point pens for \$1.00.¹²³

In all fairness, the NDP's financial problems and its flaccid organizational base, particularly in Quebec and the Maritimes, must be judged partly by the fact that the party has not had a sustained length of time to concentrate on these internal considerations. In a period of slightly over three years, the NDP has had to wage two federal elections, participate in seven out of ten provincial campaigns, and engage itself in numerous provincial and federal by-elections. Unfortunately this almost continuous campaigning occurred at a time when the party was just getting started, a time when it should have been concentrating on extending its organizational base, recruiting members, and solidifying its financial position.

¹²⁰ Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers' International Union, Local 16-601 vs. Imperial Oil Ltd. and the Attorney General of British Columbia, Canadian Law Reports, Part 10 (1963), pp. 584-609.

¹²¹ Globe and Mail, January 29, 1964.

¹²² Ibid., May 16, 1964.

¹²³ Ibid., October 1, 1964.

CHAPTER VI

THE NDP AND THE COMPETITION FOR VOTES

Political parties operating within representative democracies have been viewed as vital links between political man and the political system. By educating the electorate, clarifying choices, and illuminating issues, they provide a major symbolic referent through which the complex democratic process is systematized and made manageable. In terms of society-at-large, parties have been viewed as mediators of conflict, organizers of opinion, devices for selecting political leaders, and manager-operators of the policy-making machinery of government.¹ Yet, whatever else they do in a democratic system, parties compete for control over the official policy-making power of the government. Ultimately, however, this competition for power is reduced to a competition for votes.

Between the founding of the NDP in August of 1961 and the Fall of 1964, there was an almost unbroken succession of provincial and federal elections. Although the party has not contested all of them, it has participated in two federal elections, six out of ten provincial elections, and numerous federal and provincial by-elections. It would seem, therefore, that the NDP has competed in a sufficiently large

¹ A survey of the literature concerning the functional aspects of party life is set forth in Neil McDonald, The Study of Political Parties (Garden City; Doubleday, 1955), pp. 19-27.

number of electoral contests during its relatively short existence to warrant a rather detailed investigation into its relationships to the electoral dimensions of Canadian politics. Such an investigation must proceed from an understanding of the historical and political setting which prevailed during each of the elections contested by the party. Having accomplished this, an analytic evaluation of the patterns of NDP electoral support can be attempted. The former will be developed in the current discussion; the latter will be the subject of the next chapter.

The 1962 Federal Election

On April 17, 1962, almost four years after the Conservatives had won a national electoral victory unequalled in the history of Canadian politics, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced that deliberate obstruction of government business by the opposition forced him to ask for the dissolution of Parliament. A national election was called for June 18, although it was reported that September 12 had been previously considered by the Prime Minister.² On April 19, 1962, the Twenty-Fourth Session of the House of Commons formally closed in the midst of a filibuster over the utilization of Commons as an agency for granting divorces to citizens of Quebec and Newfoundland, which provide no legal remedies for persons seeking such action.³

On the surface it seemed to be a blunder to call an early

²Diefenbaker's official announcement is cited in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), February 17, 1962, pp. 3033-34.

³Ibid., April 18, 1962, pp. 3114-3128.

election. Support for the PC during the period between January and March of 1962, according to the Canadian Institute of Public Opinion (CIPO), stood at 38 per cent compared to about 43 per cent for the Liberals. In the Summer of 1961, the PC had been the choice of 41 per cent of those persons included in the CIPO sample, while 39 per cent favored the Liberals.⁴ Unemployment had been a persistent problem, particularly during the early 1960s when it had ranged up to 11 per cent and averaged more than seven per cent of the total labor force. Having stood at less than five per cent when the PCs came to power in 1957, this unemployment rate was a serious blot upon the party's record.⁵ Budget deficits totaling five billion dollars had been accumulated over the five years of PC rule. A balance of payments deficit, a decline in the general economic vitality of the nation, and a decline in Canada's international prestige arising largely out of the muddled condition of the Government's policy toward nuclear weapons compounded the situation.⁶

Nevertheless, according to the BNA Act, Diefenbaker had to call elections prior to the fifth anniversary of his victory on March 31, 1958.⁷ An election on or near that anniversary date involved the risk of a winter campaign, a generally unfavorable season

⁴CIPO data cited in Toronto Daily Star, July 19, 1961; Vancouver Sun, June 9, 1962.

⁵Canadian Statistical Review, Historical Summary (August, 1963), p. 25.

⁶William H. Hessler, "The Canadians Go to the Polls," The Reporter (June 7, 1962), pp. 30-32.

⁷BNA Act, Art. IV, sec. 50 as amended. Cited in the Appendix of Dawson, The Government of Canada, p. 553.

for elections and a time of the year when unemployment is usually most serious. Furthermore, it must have been apparent to Diefenbaker that the balance of payments situation was destined for further deterioration because, about two months after he announced the date of the 1962 election (i.e., May 2, 1962), he proclaimed the devaluation of the Canadian dollar to 92.5 per cent of the American dollar in an attempt to stimulate exports.⁸ These factors undoubtedly influenced Diefenbaker's decision to call a June election. It was equally apparent, however, that the PC Government was unlikely to be able to build much of a record in Commons during the Summer. But it was not obstruction and harassment from the opposition parties that thwarted the huge PC majority in Commons. The Government and the PC Party were so split over fiscal policy and other matters that it was virtually impossible for them to develop a consistent and detailed legislative program that could be presented to the Commons. Diefenbaker's Government, in short, was crippled by its own internal discord.⁹

The Campaign

Campaigning did not officially begin until after Parliament closed its session in April. On the twenty-fifth of that month the Liberals officially opened their campaign by announcing their "Seventy-Five Promises."¹⁰ The content of this election manifesto was drawn

⁸The Canada Gazette, Vol. 96, part 2, May 2, 1962, pp. 1-3.

⁹For a summary of the problems confronting the PC during this period see John Saywell (ed.), Canadian Annual Review, 1962 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), pp. 3-9, 89-93, 161-67.

¹⁰Globe and Mail, April 26, 1962.

from the book Troubled Canada by Walter Gordon, the Finance Minister in the Liberal "Shadow" Cabinet, and from the Galbraithian program adopted by the party at the Kingston Conference of 1960.¹¹

Expecting an early election, the NDP combined electioneering with its efforts to organize the party at the provincial and local levels following its founding convention in August of 1961. Officially, however, the NDP 1962 campaign started after the close of Parliament with a rally in the riding of Regina which was to be contested by NDP Federal Leader Thomas Douglas.¹²

The final weeks of the NDP campaign were characterized by a flurry of activity. Douglas, who carried the brunt of the NDP national effort, was engaged in what he called a "compact campaign" that included the use of regularly scheduled airlines rather than chartered jets like those employed by the PC and Liberal Parties. Despite a "shoestring" budget, Douglas succeeded in making a 6,500 mile tour during the final week of the campaign. Each of these tours included a spectacular succession of parades, motorcades, and rallies. In Toronto, for example, he appeared before a rally of 7,000 people. Six thousand people attended a rally in Hamilton.¹³ The following day Douglas spoke to the largest rally of the campaign. About 10,000 people filled the Vancouver Gardens auditorium while others jammed a nearby building or stood on the lawn outside the Gardens to hear his

¹¹ N. Caiden, "The Canadian General Election of 1962," Australian Quarterly, Vol. 34 (September, 1962), p. 73.

¹² Globe and Mail, February 7, 1962; April 26, 1962.

¹³ Toronto Daily Star, June 11, 1962; Globe and Mail, June 13, 1962.

speech via loudspeakers.¹⁴

One of Douglas' favorite topics during the campaign was medicare. Although the NDP's position on the issue involved a promise of federal grants to help provincial governments operate health services, Douglas castigated the doctors in Saskatchewan who were on strike against the recently passed CCF-NDP medicare legislation in that province.¹⁵ Thus, he was caught defending the party's national health plank in light of the embarrassing problem in Saskatchewan.

Another favorite topic for domestic consumption was the NDP's promise regarding old age pensions. Since the Liberals had incorporated proposals to amend the Old Age Pensions Act and to raise the amount of existing pensions to \$70.00 a month, Douglas was forced to reiterate that the idea was originally proposed by the CCF, then by the NDP, and finally stolen by the Liberals.¹⁶

Throughout the campaign Douglas also stressed the unemployment problem. As the campaign progressed, however, he shifted from an emphasis upon a planned economy as a solution for the problem to the more specific ideas contained in the guaranteed job plank of the 1961 NDP Federal Program. This prompted criticism not unlike that which had been raised when the issue was debated at the NDP Founding Convention. Hence, Douglas again had to go on the defensive in an effort to counter charges that the scheme was unworkable in a democratic

¹⁴Vancouver Sun, June 14, 1962.

¹⁵Globe and Mail, May 7, 1962.

¹⁶Ibid., April 30, 1962.

society.¹⁷

Hazen Argue's well-publicized defection in February of 1962 became somewhat of an issue for the NDP. Argue's contention at the time of his defection and throughout the campaign was that the NDP was controlled by trade unions and was being financed by them. Despite efforts to portray Argue's defection as a personal response to his defeat at the NDP Founding Convention, Douglas had to defend the party by responding to Argue's charges.¹⁸

The only proposal which the NDP could clearly promote without being caught in a tangled defensive maneuver was that concerning the installation of nuclear weapons on Canadian soil. The Liberals, when they mentioned it at all, responded to this issue by saying that they were not in favor of atomic weapons in Canada "under current conditions" but that they reserved the right to judge differently in the future.¹⁹ The PC largely ignored the whole subject.

All parties talked about the so-called "Diefendollar," but few exploited the issue fully. The NDP held that the devaluation of the Canadian dollar represented a return to tight money.²⁰ Devaluation was also condemned as a "gimmick to pay-off Tory businessmen, especially certain wealthy manufacturers and those who exported for them."²¹ Pearson called the move a threat to price stability. Social

¹⁷ Ibid., May 16, 1962; Vancouver Sun, June 2, 14, 1962.

¹⁸ Winnipeg Free Press, June 18, 1962.

¹⁹ Globe and Mail, May 1, 1962.

²⁰ Winnipeg Free Press, June 15, 1962.

²¹ Vancouver Sun, June 8, 1962.

Credit Leader R. A. Thompson called it "funny money," while Premier Manning of Alberta and Premier Bennett of British Columbia disagreed whether the rate of 92.5 Canadian cents to an American dollar was too high or too low.²²

Except for the NDP, parties tended to obscure rather than clarify issues.²³ Diefenbaker ran a particularly shallow campaign relying heavily upon his personal appeal. Even that tactic was ineffectively utilized until the last days of the campaign.²⁴ In terms of the electorate, polls conducted by the CIPO a few days before the balloting indicated that the campaign had not created any decisive changes. The trend away from the PC continued, but public opinion had not settled upon a single alternative to the Diefenbaker Government. The Liberals had increased their support to 42 per cent of those interviewed, while the PC dropped to 32 per cent. The remaining 26 per cent was split evenly between the NDP and the SC.²⁵ As one observer put it, "The election [promised] to be a referendum on everything and on nothing. . . ."²⁶

An Indecisive Mandate

A record number of voters were eligible to cast ballots on June 18, 1962 (i.e., 9,800,000 of which about 1,200,000 were new,

²² Winnipeg Free Press, June 15, 1962.

²³ Ramsay Cook, "Old Wine and Apathy," Canadian Forum, Vol. 42 (June, 1962), p. 1.

²⁴ Caiden, "The Canadian General Election of 1962," p. 75.

²⁵ CIPO data cited in Vancouver Sun, June 16, 1962.

²⁶ Hessler, "Canadians Go to the Polls," p. 32.

youthful voters and 273,412 were newly eligible immigrant voters). A record 1,018 candidates fought for the 265 seats in the House of Commons.²⁷ When all of the record-breaking 7,772,656 ballots were counted, the Liberals had won 36.7 per cent of the vote compared to 37.4 per cent for the PC. The SC had made a major recovery from its smashing defeat in 1958 by capturing 11.7 per cent of the vote. The NDP had obtained almost 14 per cent of the vote compared to the less than 10 per cent obtained by the CCF in 1958. The PC retained a slim plurality in Commons with 116 seats compared to the 100 seats captured by the Liberals and the 49 seats held by third parties. Canada had elected another minority government similar to that which had prevailed after the 1957 election. The only surprise in this otherwise indecisive contest was the fact that the SC had won 30 seats after having been totally eliminated from Commons in 1958. Twenty-six of these represented ridings in Quebec.²⁸

Although a more detailed analysis will be made later, it was evident from the overall election returns that the NDP had suffered a rather serious blow in terms of its expectations. At the time the new party concept was being promoted, it had been estimated that the party could win between 50 and 60 seats in the next federal election.²⁹ Although it had increased the representation of the democratic left from 8 to 19 seats in Commons, the NDP was a long way from these

²⁷ Globe and Mail, March 5, 1962; June 16, 1962.

²⁸ Caiden, "The Canadian General Elections of 1962," p. 82.

²⁹ NCNP, Report of the Election Sub-Committee, NCNP File II (c), undated.

previous estimates.

Furthermore, it was obvious that the election had produced both encouraging and disappointing results relative to certain NDP personalities. Stanley Knowles had recaptured Winnipeg North Centre after having been defeated in 1958. David Lewis obtained York South for the NDP, a riding that had not been in the hands of the CCF since the 1953 election. But these victories had to be contrasted with the fact that Walter Pitman, the hero of the Peterborough by-election, had failed to get re-elected. Most disappointing was the defeat of Tommy Douglas, who lost Regina to the PC candidate by a humiliating 9,507 votes. Related to the defeat of these NDP personalities was the re-election of Hazen Argue, who had run as a Liberal. In fact, the NDP candidate in Assiniboia ran far behind the second place PC candidate (i.e., Liberal, 7,583; PC, 7,394; and NDP, 5,183).³⁰

A Postscript: The Burnaby-Coquitlam Federal By-Election

Douglas' defeat in Regina, which he maintained was the result of heavy expenditures by the medical profession and the decision by certain Liberal leaders not to contest vigorously the election in that riding, presented certain difficulties for the NDP. The most obvious problem was the fact that the party's Federal Leader would not be seated in Commons and therefore would have no official contact with the NDP caucus. On June 18, 1962, Erhart Regier announced that he intended to resign as MP from Burnaby-Coquitlam. Since Regier was a

³⁰ Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1962 General Election, pp. 181, 279, 739, 839, 878.

long-time friend of Tommy Douglas, and since the riding which he represented had been solidly CCF since it was created in 1953, it was surmised that Regier's move was designed to allow Douglas to win an easy by-election and get a seat in Commons.³¹

After some problems concerning the legal details of Regier's resignation were settled, Diefenbaker scheduled a by-election for October 22, 1962.³² Douglas, assisted by Regier, prepared to wage another campaign to win a seat in Commons. Although the President of the Burnaby-Coquitlam PC Association was caught trying to make a deal with the Liberal and SC Parties to name a joint candidate, each of these parties plus one independent entered the race.³³

It was basically a quiet campaign except for the anti-fascist heckling directed at Real Caouette during a SC rally. Except for the subject of Douglas' move from Saskatchewan to British Columbia just to obtain an easy victory, it was also an issueless campaign.³⁴ When it was over, Douglas had polled slightly more than 50 per cent of the vote, a trifle better than Regier had done in the four-way contests during the general election.³⁵ The NDP Federal Leader was sent to Ottawa, but the victory in Burnaby-Coquitlam did not alter the number of NDP seats in the House of Commons.

³¹ Vancouver Sun, June 19, 1962.

³² Globe and Mail, August 6, 1962.

³³ Vancouver Sun, October 20, 1962.

³⁴ Globe and Mail, October 18, 1962.

³⁵ Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, By-Elections Held in 1962, pp. 3-6.

The Federal Election of 1963

With the help of SC votes and sometimes those of the NDP, the minority Government that had been elected in June was able to survive five motions of non-confidence following the Speech from the Throne and two such motions after the first supply bill had been introduced, all of which occurred between September 28 and the 1962 Christmas recess.³⁶ Shortly after the House of Commons reconvened in early 1963, the Government failed in its attempt to combine a number of supply motions into a single package.³⁷ Consequently, the Government faced the immediate prospect of a motion of non-confidence on each of the five supply bills which Diefenbaker had tried to combine. Rumors of a spring election began to circulate in light of the budgetary situation facing the Government. Diefenbaker's speech at the annual meeting of the PC Student Federation tended to confirm such rumors.³⁸

But it was not the crisis over supply that really plagued the Diefenbaker Government in early 1963. Rather, it was the monstrous faux pax created by the Government's handling of the nuclear arms issue that tore the PC caucus asunder and eventually led to the party's defeat.

Details of the events leading to the defeat of the Diefenbaker Government, the first since 1926 when the Government led by Arthur Meighen was toppled, will be presented in a subsequent chapter. At

³⁶ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), September 27-December 20, 1962, passim.

³⁷ Globe and Mail, January 23, 1963.

³⁸ Ibid., January 28, 1963.

this point it is sufficient to note that Diefenbaker had vacillated between the pro-nuclear advice of his Defense Minister, Douglas Harkness, and the anti-nuclear views of his External Affairs Minister, Howard Green. After much maneuvering between a policy of delay and hints that Canada would accept atomic weapons, Diefenbaker adopted the concept of accepting such weapons if an international crisis should arise. But this policy, as publicly expounded by Diefenbaker, began to conflict with statements being made by Harkness. The PC ranks began to split, Harkness tendered his resignation, the Cabinet started to disintegrate, and the Government fell in the midst of chaotic and conflicting stories about Canada's policy regarding nuclear arms. The vote sustaining a non-confidence motion in Commons was 143 to 111 with 98 Liberals, 28 Social Crediters, and 16 New Democrats defeating the combined strength of 109 Conservatives and two New Democrats.³⁹

The Campaign

The election was set for April 8, 1963. Before carrying his campaign to the people, Diefenbaker asked for and received a vote of confidence from the PC caucus as well as expressions of loyalty from individual members of his party. The event was marred by the purposeful absence of Edward Morris of Halifax, Arthur Smith of Calgary, and Douglas Harkness. Furthermore, Trade and Commerce Minister George Hees and Associate Defense Minister Pierre Sevigny resigned on the same day that the PC caucus voted.⁴⁰

³⁹Parliamentary Debates (Commons), February 5, 1963, pp. 3461-63.

⁴⁰Globe and Mail, February 7, 1963.

The Conservatives built their campaign around the nuclear issue, maintaining that Canada should not accept atomic arms at that time. This anti-nuclear theme, however, was promoted in the form of a thinly veiled anti-Americanism, an attitude that undoubtedly had been developing in Diefenbaker's mind for some time. During the 1962 election, Diefenbaker had threatened to use the contents of a "working paper" that allegedly had been inadvertently left behind during President John F. Kennedy's 1961 visit to Ottawa. The memorandum, reportedly salvaged from the conference room, suggested that Canada be "pushed" into joining the OAS and into increasing its aid to India. Diefenbaker had also been disturbed by the very personal attention given to Lester Pearson by Kennedy prior to a White House dinner that had been scheduled for winners of the Nobel Prize for Peace. The dinner, it must be noted, occurred on April 29, just as Diefenbaker opened his 1962 election campaign.⁴¹

In view of these events, it is possible to comprehend Diefenbaker's dismay when the US State Department declared on January 30, 1963 that the Canadian Government had not made any arrangements for implementing its promise to accept atomic warheads for the BOMARC missiles stationed in that country and that it had not made any formal effort to negotiate the details of the problem. The announcement came in the midst of the debate on nuclear arms in both the House of Commons and within the PC caucus. Furthermore, it tended to contradict statements by Douglas Harkness that a new series of negotiations between Canada and the United States had in fact been inaugurated. To

⁴¹New York Times, April 21, 1963.

Diefenbaker, however, American impatience with Canada's reluctance to fulfill its nuclear commitments had finally taken the form of a direct attempt to interfere in Canadian politics.⁴² When the Government fell because of the nuclear issue, it was almost assured that Diefenbaker would give vent to both his personal and official displeasure with American behavior during the preceding two or three years.

When Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara's testimony before the House Appropriations Committee on February 13, 1962 was made public about a week before the Canadian election, the anti-American campaign being carried out by the Conservatives became more candid and certainly more vehement. McNamara had stressed the obsolescence of BOMARC missiles but added that these above ground missile sites made prime targets for any aggressor. One use for them, he asserted, was to draw the fire of the enemy.⁴³ Since the State Department was urging Canada to fulfill its commitment to put nuclear warheads on these obsolete missiles, Diefenbaker began to attack the United States for wanting to make Canada into a "nuclear decoy."⁴⁴ This continued to be his primary theme until election day, the first rally candid anti-American campaign since Sir Robert Borden waved the anti-American flag in 1912.

Aside from the nuclear issue, however, Diefenbaker transformed the campaign into a test of his personal attractiveness as a leader for the nation and for his party. At times he became almost maudlin

⁴² Globe and Mail, February 1, 1963.

⁴³ Ibid., March 30, 1963.

⁴⁴ Winnipeg Free Press, April 1, 1963.

about the "powerful forces" arrayed against him. These included the Liberals who were viewed as masters of deceit and obstructionism, certain persons and groups within his own party, and certain individuals outside of Canada. If this was not enough, Diefenbaker would also tell his audiences that he had to contest this election without the benefit of adequate funds. In Saskatchewan he admitted that the PC had only a little more than one million dollars to spend compared to over three and a half million in 1962.⁴⁵

The Liberals built their campaign around the concept of "stable government," which later became personalized in the form of the slogan "Pearson or Paralysis."⁴⁶ As expressed by Walter Gordon, Liberal Campaign Chairman, the key issue of the campaign was not anti-Americanism, Liberal obstructionism, or nuclear weapons but the "crying need for a strong and decisive government."⁴⁷ What the Liberals meant by this "stable government" theme, of course, was that Canada needed a majority Liberal government.

This basic campaign theme was supplemented with both gimmicks and promises. The former included a coloring book featuring twelve caricatures attacking Diefenbaker, the SC, and the NDP.⁴⁸ The Liberals also created the "Truth Squad." Led by Judy La Marsh, this group of Liberals followed in Diefenbaker's footsteps revealing every alleged untruth, half truth, and partial truth uttered by the PM in his

⁴⁵ Ibid., March 4, 9, 1963; Globe and Mail, April 5, 1963.

⁴⁶ Globe and Mail, March 21, 1963.

⁴⁷ Ibid., February 11, 1963.

⁴⁸ Winnipeg Free Press, March 11, 1963.

campaign speeches. The "Truth Squad" became the subject of so much criticism and buffoonery that Pearson disbanded it shortly after it had been created.⁴⁹

At a more substantive level, the Liberals did stress certain programs that they intended to implement if they won a majority in the House of Commons. Their position on nuclear arms was reasonably clear, urging that Canada fulfill its existing commitments relative to the BOMARC missiles stationed in Canada while promising to follow that action with a complete renegotiation of the nuclear issue in light of the new weapons systems being developed by the United States.⁵⁰ The implicit assumption behind the second half of this nuclear policy was that new technology, particularly in terms of intercontinental nuclear delivery systems, was likely to make Canada obsolete as a site for defensive missiles.

Many of the domestic planks set forth in the "Seventy-Five Promises" utilized by the Liberals in 1962 were repeated in 1963. There was to be an expanded program of municipal loans and agricultural price supports. A job program would be introduced into Parliament a month after a Liberal majority took over the reins of government. Family allowances were to be extended to include young people past the age of 16 to help finance the cost of education and a system of scholarships providing \$1,000 a year to needy students would be implemented.⁵¹ Pearson promised the voters in Quebec and the nation that

⁴⁹ Globe and Mail, March 12, 16, 1963.

⁵⁰ Ibid., February 14, 1963; Toronto Daily Star, March 27, 1963.

⁵¹ Globe and Mail, March 2, 5, 1963; April 13, 1963.

Canada would have a distinctive flag to replace the red ensign, a full inquiry into the problems of bi-lingualism and bi-culturalism, and a transfer of succession duties to the provinces. To French Canadians in Quebec he specifically promised an additional \$150,000,000 in equalization payments over the next five years, a guarantee that all civil servants would be free to utilize either French or English while engaged in official business, and an expansion of the CBC's French language radio and television programs.⁵² Liberal campaign promises also included plans for a national health plan, the federal government's contributions to which would be determined after the various provinces had made clear exactly what services they would include in their provincial health schemes. They also developed the concept of "voluntary economic planning" that would be administered by a newly created industry department. Despite Diefenbaker's gradual removal of all of the temporary increases in tariffs that had been included in the 1962 austerity program, the Liberals continued to pound the need for policies that would create an expansion in Canadian trade.⁵³

An attempt has been made to set forth some of the details of the Liberal campaign because the party tended to confront the electorate with issues more than it had in 1962. Furthermore, the concept of "stable government" tended to force the Liberals to concentrate more of their fire upon the SC and the NDP than had been the case in 1962. Everywhere that either of the third parties had shown strength in 1962 the Liberals pressed the idea that these parties undermined the concept

⁵²Le Devoir (Montreal), February 12, 1963.

⁵³Globe and Mail, February 20, 1963; March 7, 1963; April 1, 1963.

of parliamentary government and rendered it ineffective in the face of the host of evils created during the six years of Conservative rule. Hence, the NDP was attacked in British Columbia while the SC tended to receive most of the Liberal fire in the prairie provinces of Alberta and Manitoba.⁵⁴ Both of them were denounced in Quebec, where the SC had performed amazingly well in 1962 and where there were rumors that some voters, particularly in Quebec City, were becoming interested in the NDP.⁵⁵

Before turning to the NDP, it should be noted that the Social Credit Party was the subject of much more attention in the 1963 election campaign. The most striking fact about the SC in 1963, however, was not the French nationalism projected during Real Caouette's campaign in Quebec; but rather, it was the development of a very noticeable split between the Quebec wing and the remaining sections of the party. Careful reading of the press coverage given to the SC campaign reveals a basic split between Robert Thompson, the national leader of the party, and Caouette, the SC leader in Quebec. Most indicative of the developing schism was the position taken by Thompson and Caouette relative to the nuclear issue. The latter was candidly opposed to nuclear weapons for Canada. The former assured the voters that a SC cabinet would turn the nuclear question over to a non-partisan defense committee in Parliament. In an attempt to explain this obvious conflict, Thompson tried to promote the idea that Caouette would agree

⁵⁴Vancouver Sun, February 23, 1963; Winnipeg Free Press, March 2, 1963.

⁵⁵Le Devoir (Montreal), February 12, 1963; March 18, 1963.

to atomic arms for Canada if a non-partisan committee recommended them. The Quebec leader, however, continued to preach an absolute anti-nuclear policy.⁵⁶

Douglas officially launched the NDP campaign on February 15 by asserting that the key issue facing the Canadian electorate was that concerning nuclear arms. The election, he predicted, would be a "referendum on this issue."⁵⁷ The NDP strategy was to present itself as the only party that was clearly and consistently opposed to the acquisition of nuclear arms. The PC position was labeled as indecisive, but it was characterized as essentially pro-nuclear in orientation. "The only difference between the Conservatives and the Liberals," Douglas told one audience, "was that the latter would accept them in April and the former would accept them in May."⁵⁸ The Liberals, however, were constantly singled out as unscrupulous politicians who were willing to risk war for votes.⁵⁹

There were even some anti-American overtones to the NDP campaign against nuclear arms. In Hamilton, Douglas attacked the American "militarists who wanted Canada to be part of the intercontinental ballistic missile complex so that the Russians would have a larger target to shoot at."⁶⁰ The day after McNamara's speech before the House Appropriations Committee was made public, Douglas told a huge crowd in

⁵⁶ Globe and Mail, February 8, 23, 1963; March 5, 1963.

⁵⁷ Ibid., February 16, 1963.

⁵⁸ Ibid., March 28, 1963.

⁵⁹ Ibid., April 2, 1963; Winnipeg Free Press, March 4, 1963.

⁶⁰ Globe and Mail, March 28, 1963.

Toronto that Canadians would not approve of useless BOMARCS being used as "missile bait" in Canada.⁶¹

The NDP essentially conducted its campaign against the Liberals. Except for references to the PC while campaigning for votes in the prairie provinces and some references to the SC in Quebec, the NDP strategy was to compare its program to that of the Liberal Party. It compared its version of economic planning with the vague concept of voluntary planning that was promoted by the Liberals. It compared its medicare plank with that of the Liberals. It attacked the Liberals for evading social issues like unemployment with their notions about recovery first which smacked of austerity while the "city of unemployed" in Canada continued to suffer. It reminded voters that the NDP also favored a distinctive flag for Canada and that it had a more comprehensive approach to the French-English issue than the Liberals. It charged the Liberals with deceit for their statements that the NDP would take Canada out of NATO. The NDP, Douglas maintained, could support a NATO while being opposed to nuclear arms just as well as Denmark, Norway, and Portugal.⁶²

Most importantly, the NDP attempted to respond to the "stable government" theme advanced by the Liberals. First, it tried to dispel the notion that minority government equaled ineffective government. Some of the worst governments Canada had experienced, Douglas asserted, were majority governments. "Governments with big majorities go to

⁶¹Ibid., March 30, 1963.

⁶²Ibid., March 1-2, 6-8, 1963; April 2, 1963.

sleep, become arrogant and overbearing."⁶³ Second, the NDP attempted to present an aura of sweet reasonableness relative to its approach to minority government. As the polls began to indicate that such a situation was likely to prevail again, Douglas revealed that he was prepared to sit down with the leader of the largest group in the House of Commons and work out the necessary arrangements by which the government could tackle the socio-economic problems of Canada in a situation free from the constant threat of non-confidence motions. "We would be prepared to continue our support," he added, "just as long as the party in power made an honest effort to strengthen and expand the Canadian economy. We would not expect another party to carry out our program, but we would insist that they implement the beneficial aspects of their own program."⁶⁴

The campaign tactics utilized by the NDP in 1963 were not significantly different from those utilized in 1962. Douglas again bore the brunt of the campaign, making several tours of the country and participating in rallies and motorcades. The largest rally of the 1963 campaign was again sponsored by the NDP; the more than 16,000 people who jammed the Maple Leaf Gardens in Toronto broke all known attendance records for campaign rallies in Canadian history.⁶⁵ There was less use of television in 1963, partly because of the limited funds available to the NDP but more precisely because Douglas hated to use television and preferred direct confrontation with a live audience. Party planners

⁶³ Ibid., March 6, 1963.

⁶⁴ Winnipeg Free Press, March 28, 1963.

⁶⁵ Globe and Mail, March 28, 1963.

also found that Douglas was "good" for no more than a five minute exposure on television. Hence, the party's television programs tended to include a generous number of film clips from his sparkling performances at various NDP rallies.⁶⁶

As the campaign progressed, it became increasingly evident that the general results would be as indecisive as those of the 1962 election and that the NDP would not extend its popular support much beyond that which it had acquired in 1962. The CIPO reported the following trends in the percentages of popular support for the various parties.⁶⁷

TABLE 10

Percentages of Popular Support for Canadian Parties According to CIPO Polls, 1962-63

	PC	Lib.	NDP	SC
June, 1962 election	37%	37%	14%	12%
October, 1962	33	47	9	11
February 2, 1963	33	44	12	11
March 9, 1963	32	41	11	16
April 5, 1963	32	41	14	13

It was evident that the trend away from the PC that had been registered in 1962 had continued, but the anti-PC vote did not seem to be sufficiently concentrated to result in a majority government. Support for third parties continued to remain at about 25 per cent despite the Liberals' campaign for stable government. As one historian from

⁶⁶ Winnipeg Free Press, March 8, 1963.

⁶⁷ CIPO data cited in Ibid., April 6, 1963.

the University of Toronto put it, the "will" of the electorate was likely to be "as diverse, as discordant, and as conflicting as the history, the geography, the social structure, and the economy of the nation itself."⁶⁸

An Indecisive Liberal Mandate

The results of the election were as indecisive as had been predicted. According to the official returns, the Liberals had won almost 42 per cent of the votes and had obtained 130 seats, which meant that Canada had acquired another minority government. The PC had dropped to about 33 per cent of the popular vote and had acquired only 94 seats. Although the shift from the PC was more apparent in 1963, about a fourth of the popular vote was again captured by third parties. The SC increased its percentage of the vote from about 12 per cent in 1962 to slightly over 13 per cent in 1963, but it dropped from 30 to 24 seats in the House of Commons. The NDP received more popular votes than it had obtained in 1962, but its percentage of the vote had slipped from 14 per cent in 1962 to slightly more than 13 per cent in 1963. In terms of seats, the NDP's representation in Commons fell from 19 to 17 as a result of the 1963 federal election.⁶⁹

Douglas had predicted that the NDP would win about twice the number of votes that it had won in 1962. Later he predicted that the NDP would win about 2,000,000 votes, but he would not speculate about

⁶⁸ John Saywell, "The Two-Party System: Has It Ever Existed?" Globe and Mail Magazine (April 6, 1963), pp. 10-11, 17.

⁶⁹ Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1963 General Election, p. xx. Data regarding seats were obtained from the Globe and Mail, April 15, 1963.

the number of seats that his party would carry.⁷⁰ By election day he was predicting that the NDP would pull about 18 per cent of the popular vote and still refused to speculate on the number of seats.⁷¹ The party fell short of all these forecasts. The NDP, moreover, had again experienced some rather embarrassing defeats. Walter Pitman, the tarnished hero of Peterborough, repeated his dismal 1962 performance. Of more serious consequence was the defeat of David Lewis, who had become Douglas' right hand assistant in Parliament.⁷² The party lost Ralph McInnis from Nova Scotia, the only national symbol of the NDP's existence in the Maritimes.⁷³ Tom Berger, a trade union lawyer and one of the authors of the British Columbia NDP Constitution, had captured Vancouver-Burrard in 1962 but went down to defeat in 1963. The well known Erhart Regier, who tried to pick up another seat for the NDP by running in Fraser Valley, British Columbia, failed to get elected.⁷⁴ Otherwise, the personnel in the NDP caucus remained the same as it had been after the 1962 election.

Federal By-Elections During the Pearson Years

There have been six federal by-elections between the time that the Pearson Government assumed power in mid-1963 and the end of 1964.

⁷⁰Globe and Mail, March 2, 1963.

⁷¹Ibid., April 8, 1963.

⁷²Ibid., April 11, 1963.

⁷³Ibid., April 13, 1963.

⁷⁴Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for the 1963 General Election, pp. 779, 813.

The first two contests were held in the Montreal constituencies of Laurier and St. Denis on February 10, 1964. Both ridings were solidly Liberal by tradition. In 1962 and 1963, the NDP had more than doubled any previous CCF performance in these ridings, making them two of the better sources of NDP votes in the province. The NDP renominated Mrs. Rejeanne Dinelle, a housewife and labor organizer, to run again in St. Denis. Gerald Picard, then NDP provincial Leader in Quebec, ran in Laurier. The PC, usually the second-place party in Laurier and St. Denis, was again in competition. Real Caouette's Le Raillieement des Creditistes, which was an off-shoot of the SC Party, entered the race; the regular SC organization did not compete. The Rhinoceros Party, organized for the expressed purpose of satirizing and lampooning the established parties, contested both ridings.⁷⁵

The Liberals easily carried both by-elections. The Credistes candidate ran a very poor second in Laurier and behind the second-place PC candidate in St. Denis. After campaigning against Pearson's failure to implement his 1963 promise to renegotiate the nuclear issue, the NDP succeeded in placing fourth in both contests. Compared to its 1963 performance, its percentage of the votes had fallen from 13 to 7 per cent in Laurier and tumbled from 11 to a paltry 4 per cent in St. Denis.⁷⁶

On June 22, 1964, by-elections were held in the federal ridings of Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, and Nipissing, Ontario. In the first, the

⁷⁵ Globe and Mail, January 14, 1964; February 10, 1964.

⁷⁶ Computed from a reproduction of the Official Working Papers of the Chief Electoral Officer, Federal By-Elections in St. Denis and Laurier.

NDP ran a virtually unknown psychology student from the University of Saskatchewan. The PC was concerned with retaining the seat, and the Liberals were anxious to win it so that the province could be represented in the Pearson Cabinet.⁷⁷ The NDP candidate ran behind the disappointed Liberals and polled 24 per cent of the vote compared to the 21 per cent and the 17 per cent captured by the NDP in 1962 and 1963, respectively.⁷⁸ In Nipissing, a riding that had been held by the Liberals since 1921, the Reverend Harry MacKay also ran third in a three-way race. After being nominated at one of the largest and most enthusiastic constituency association nominating meetings ever held by the NDP in Nipissing, MacKay succeeded in obtaining only 3,562 out of the 26,049 votes cast in this Liberal bastion.⁷⁹ In 1962 and 1963, the party had averaged about nine per cent of the vote.

In the Fall of 1964, federal by-elections were held in Waterloo South, Ontario, and Westmoreland, New Brunswick. The latter was of little consequence to the NDP although the party did make a feeble attempt in that traditionally Liberal riding.⁸⁰ In Waterloo South, however, the NDP not only contested a consistently PC riding but actually won. Arrayed against the NDP candidate, S. M. (Max) Saltsman, were James Chapin, son of the deceased PC MP from Waterloo South, and

⁷⁷ Regina Leader Post, June 22, 1964.

⁷⁸ Official Working Paper of the Electoral Officer, Federal By-Election in Saskatoon.

⁷⁹ Globe and Mail, May 21, 1964; Official Working Paper of the Chief Electoral Officer, Nipissing Federal By-Election.

⁸⁰ New Democratic Newsletter, October, 1964; Globe and Mail, November 10, 1964.

Roderick Stewart, an NDP defector who ran for the Liberals.⁸¹ A poll conducted by the University of Waterloo indicated another PC victory although it appeared that the results would be close.⁸² The press did not discount the possibility of an NDP upset in view of the sparkling and well-organized campaign that Saltsman had conducted.⁸³ When the results of the November 9 balloting were revealed, Saltsman had become the eighteenth NDP MP in the House of Commons. He beat the PC contestant by 2,412 votes. Stewart lost his deposit in an attempt to beat the man who had served as his campaign manager when he ran in Waterloo South for the NDP in 1962 and 1963.⁸⁴

The Competition for Votes at the Provincial Level

Many observers of Canadian politics have noted that there is an unwritten political law that provinces tend to be controlled by a party other than that which governs in Ottawa. Indeed, third parties which have never come close to forming a government at the federal level have governed at the provincial level. The governments formed by the CCF in Saskatchewan, the SC in Alberta and British Columbia, and the Union Nationale in Quebec attest to this fact. One explanation for this "political schizophrenia" is that voters rationally decide to counter-balance the power in Ottawa by electing a different

⁸¹ Globe and Mail, September 8, 1964; November 6, 1964.

⁸² Ibid., October 24, 1964.

⁸³ Ibid., November 6, 1964; Toronto Daily Star, November 7, 1964.

⁸⁴ Globe and Mail, November 11, 1964.

party during provincial elections.⁸⁵ Another and probably more reasonable set of explanations is that this situation, particularly as it related to third parties, is the consequence of the complexities of Canadian political life and/or that voters merely express a different set of motives at the two levels of government in the Canadian federal system.⁸⁶

Despite the lack of adequate behavioral studies to confirm or deny these hypotheses, it can be shown that there has been a distinct disparity between the provincial and federal electoral support given to all minor parties excepting the CCF. The SC, it is true, has been electorally potent at the provincial level in Alberta and British Columbia; but it has been relatively inconsequential during federal elections in these provinces, particularly since 1953. It scored some rather spectacular electoral successes in Quebec during the 1962 and 1963 federal elections, but it has not competed in Quebec provincial elections. Similarly, Le Ralliement des Creditistes is strictly a federal phenomenon composed of ex-SC MPs from Quebec, although there are rumors that it may contest the next provincial election in Quebec. The Union Nationale of Quebec never contested federal elections.

But for the CCF, electoral success was most prominent where it was a serious contender for seats at both levels of government.

⁸⁵ Steven Muller, "Federalism and the Party System in Canada," Paper delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, St. Louis, September 6-9, 1961, p. 1-14.

⁸⁶ Leslie Lipson, "Party Systems in the United Kingdom and the Older Commonwealth: Causes, Resemblances, and Variations," Political Studies, Vol. 7 (February, 1959), p. 28. Harold Scarrow, "Federal-Provincial Voting Patterns in Canada," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, Vol. 26 (May, 1960), p. 297.

Its provincial victories in Saskatchewan were consistently matched by victory during federal elections until 1958. Even in that fiasco it was the CCF that offered the most serious challenge to the PC. In British Columbia, the CCF was consistently a serious contender for provincial and federal seats. In Manitoba, the CCF areas of support elected candidates to both the provincial and federal legislatures. The story was repeated at a less spectacular scale in Ontario and Nova Scotia.⁸⁷ Only in Quebec, where the Social Democrats and not the CCF contested provincial elections, was there a discernible deviation from this general relationship between the electoral performance of the CCF at the two levels of Canadian politics.

Before investigating the relationship between provincial and federal electoral support for the CCF's successor, it is necessary to document the participation of the NDP in provincial elections and the general results of that participation. During its short existence, every province has held a general election and several have staged important by-elections. Some of these contests were of extraordinary consequence to the NDP; others were merely occasions for the party to announce its existence by running candidates. A few were of no import to the party, except insofar as its absence from the contest indicated its weakness in that particular province.

Uncontested Provincial Elections

Four of the more inconsequential provincial elections relative to the NDP were held in Quebec, Newfoundland, New Brunswick, and Prince

⁸⁷Data utilized in this analysis were drawn from Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 90-224.

Edward Island in 1962. There were no NDP candidates in any of these contests. The Newfoundland Democrats contested five ridings.⁸⁸ Except for the delegates which this party sent to the NDP Founding Convention, however, there has been no evidence of a formal relationship between the NDP and the Newfoundland Democratic Party, a labor-backed political organization that was formed in 1959. In Quebec, the Social Democratic Party eventually reasserted itself as the provincial manifestation of the NDP, but that event did not occur until after the 1962 provincial election had been held. Except for the fact that the NDP's absence may have contributed to the further decline of the Union Nationale in Quebec by not creating an additional split in the anti-Union Nationale vote, none of these four elections was seriously affected by the lack of NDP competition.

The Manitoba Election of 1962

The Manitoba election of December 14, 1962 was of more serious consequence to the NDP. The contest cost the party two out of the ten seats it held in the provincial legislature and a decline of five per cent in the popular vote. Since the CCF had been only two seats shy of becoming the official opposition in Manitoba, this loss was considered a serious blow to the NDP's prestige.⁸⁹ The Liberals had expanded their representation in the legislature from 11 to 13 seats, and the Conservatives had lost one of their 36 seats to the SC. Therefore it was evident that the NDP had lost its two seats to the

⁸⁸ Globe and Mail, November 20, 1962.

⁸⁹ NDP, Manitoba Section, Report of the Proceedings of the Third Annual Convention, held at the Ft. Gary Hotel in Winnipeg, November 22-23, 1963, p. 3.

Liberals.⁹⁰

Alberta Election of 1963

Two months after the 1963 federal election, the province of Alberta staged what appeared to be a plebiscite to re-elect Premier Manning's Social Credit Government. In 1959, the SC captured 56.3 per cent of the vote and won 63 out of the then 65 seats in the provincial legislature.⁹¹ The PC organization in the province was leaderless and divided over the question of public versus private development of the oil deposits in Alberta. The Liberals, who had dropped from a respectable 15 seats in 1955 to a single seat after the 1959 election, were similarly divided on the oil issue as well as over the question of public opposite private power.⁹² The NDP was financially and organizationally exhausted by the recent federal elections and had trouble finding candidates to contest the election scheduled for the middle of June.⁹³

When the voting returns were completed, Manning's Social Credit Party had captured 60 out of the then 63 ridings. The Liberals elected two of their candidates, and the remaining seat was captured by a coalition (SC-PC) candidate. Eighty-five per cent of all losing candidates lost their 100 dollar deposits.⁹⁴ Only one NDP candidate was able to

⁹⁰ Globe and Mail, December 15, 1962; January 7, 1963.

⁹¹ Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 221.

⁹² Globe and Mail, September 1, 1962; November 19, 24, 1962.

⁹³ Alberta NDP, Report of the Third Alberta NDP Convention, held at the Palliser Hotel in Calgary on February 8-9, 1964, Sec. V, pp. 1-2.

⁹⁴ Globe and Mail, June 20, 1963.

save his deposit, despite the fact that the party captured 9.5 per cent of the vote in 1963 compared to the CCF's 4.3 per cent in 1959. This increase in the percentage of the popular vote, however, was the result of the fact that the party ran 56 candidates in 1963 compared to the CCF's 29 candidates in 1959.⁹⁵

In retrospect, the Alberta election was basically a mandate for the private development of oil and gas resources in the province. The well financed SC organization, reportedly assisted by the rabidly laissez faire Citizen's Mineral Rights and Justice League sponsored by the oil and gas industry, won a stunning victory over all other parties. Manning attacked the Liberals, Conservatives, and NDP alike for advocating socialism despite the fact that only the NDP was reasonably united and consistently in favor of public ownership of the oil, gas, and electric power resources in the province.⁹⁶ Clearly the NDP seemed to have little support in Alberta with its booming oil and gas economy.

The British Columbia Election of 1963

Ever since 1952 when the CCF missed an opportunity to form a government in British Columbia by a single seat, the socialists have been trying to dethrone W. A. C. Bennett and his Social Credit Government. In 1960, the CCF came closer to that goal than it had been able to do since that fateful election in 1952. It captured 32.7 per cent

⁹⁵Report of the Third Alberta NDP Convention, Sec. V, p. 2.

⁹⁶Globe and Mail, September 1, 1962; November 24, 1962; June 20, 1963.

of the vote and 16 of the 52 seats in the provincial legislature compared to the 38.8 per cent and the 32 seats acquired by the SC. The Conservatives for the second time in succession failed to elect a single MLA, and the Liberals obtained only 4 seats and 21 per cent of the vote.⁹⁷ The socialists and the SC, in short, became the only serious competitors for power since the governing Liberal-Conservative coalition fell in 1952.

Results of the several by-elections that had occurred in the province between the founding of the NDP and the 1963 general election were mixed. On September 4, 1962, the widow of George Hobbs barely managed to retain the riding of Revelstoke for the NDP. She carried the election by a scant 61 votes compared to the 500-vote margin registered by her husband in the 1960 general election, but it was reported that the SC had put forth a much greater effort to capture Revelstoke in 1962.⁹⁸

Three months later there was another by-election. This one was held in the most populous riding in British Columbia, one that had been held by the SC for nine years. For the first time in recent history the PC seemed to be serious about running in a provincial contest in a province in which it had failed to elect a single MLA since 1953. Davie Fulton, former National Works Minister in the Diefenbaker Cabinet, had been appointed organizer for the PC in British Columbia. One of his first acts was to announce that his party intended to attack

⁹⁷ Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224.

⁹⁸ Vancouver Sun, September 6, 1962; British Columbia, Statement of Votes, General Election of 1963 and the By-Elections of 1962 and 1963, p. 126

vigorously the SC Government of W. A. C. Bennett. The by-election in Vancouver-Point Grey, he added, would be utilized for that purpose.⁹⁹

The NDP, with little hope of winning in Point Grey, welcomed Fulton's presence and his decision to reassert the PC in the province. A drain of a few votes away from the SC in a handful of constituencies, it was argued, might allow the NDP to win control of the provincial government at the next general election. The Point Grey by-election was viewed as a test of that hypothesis.¹⁰⁰

Apparently the NDP's reasoning was valid, at least on this occasion. A Liberal carried the riding with 22,055 votes. The PC candidate obtained an amazing 9,128 votes compared to a surprisingly low 8,575 votes for the SC nominee. As expected, the NDP candidates polled a weak 5,350 votes; but the SC representation in the legislature was cut by one while the tiny Liberal caucus had been increased from four to five members.¹⁰¹

The humiliating defeat of the SC candidate in the Vancouver-Point Grey provincial by-election in December of 1962 gave some of the anti-Bennett forces cause to believe that the trend was running in their favor. That notion was shaken somewhat in July of 1963 when the SC emerged victoriously from a by-election in the provincial riding of Columbia.

Despite the fact that the by-election occurred in an essentially SC bailiwick during the height of the area's lucrative tourist

⁹⁹ Globe and Mail, December 1, 1962.

¹⁰⁰ Vancouver Sun, December 13, 1962.

¹⁰¹ British Columbia, Statement of Votes, p. 132.

season, the key issue of the contest concerned the controversial Columbia River proposal. The only party with a consistent and unobscured position on this issue, at least for the consumption of voters in a riding which lay in the heart of the proposed river development project, was the Social Credit Party of Premier Bennett. His plans for developing the electric power generating capacity of the area and selling part of the power to American consumers in the Seattle area was admittedly grandiose, but it was also uncluttered with reservations.¹⁰²

The Liberals in the province were caught between their opposition to much of Bennett's grand design and the fact that Lester Pearson, the newly elected Liberal Prime Minister, announced just four days before the by-election was held that an agreement had been made between Ottawa and Premier Bennett to allow the latter to negotiate with the United States for the best possible price for the electric power that would be generated on the Columbia River.¹⁰³ Similarly, the PC could not dispel the fact that its provincial leader, Davie Fulton, had once called the proposed Columbia River project a giveaway to the United States. The NDP tried to soft-pedal its official policy of seeking a re-examination of the proposed pact, but it was caught short when Tommy Douglas stormed into the riding preaching the official party doctrine on the issue.¹⁰⁴

The by-election drew much attention. All parties imported

¹⁰² Globe and Mail, July 12, 1963.

¹⁰³ Ibid., July 11, 1963.

¹⁰⁴ Ibid., July 15, 18, 1963.

prominent personalities in an effort to woo the 4,224 voters in the riding. Even the United States State Department had a man on the scene to witness a bitter and vindictive campaign in a province that is well known for its bitter and vindictive politics.¹⁰⁵ In the end, however, the SC candidate was victorious. He carried 1,122 or 37 per cent of the votes. The reinvigorated PC Party, led by Fulton, placed second with 685 votes. The Liberals were third with 643, and the NDP candidate trailed with a paltry 609 votes.¹⁰⁶ The thesis that a reinvigorated PC Party led by Davie Fulton would be an asset to the NDP was transformed into a spurious assumption. Instead of the PC draining "free enterprise" votes from the SC and thus enhancing the NDP, the PC seemed to have drained anti-SC votes from the NDP.¹⁰⁷

About one month after the Columbia by-election, Premier Bennett called a general provincial election for September 30, 1963. The reasons for this move are not entirely clear. There was no official need for an election until 1965, the Government certainly was not in jeopardy, and Pearson's agreement to allow Bennett to negotiate the price of electric power removed the need for the latter to obtain a mandate with which to prod the federal government on that long standing issue. Bennett's official announcement said that the reason for the election could be found in his visits to London and his recent attendance at the Premiers' Conference in Halifax. The key issues of the election, he noted, would be the development of the Columbia and Peace

¹⁰⁵ Ibid., July 15, 1963.

¹⁰⁶ British Columbia, Statement of Votes, p. 125.

¹⁰⁷ Globe and Mail, July 18, 1963.

Rivers and his policy of public power. The purpose of the election would be to provide him with a mandate before attending the Dominion-Provincial Conference in November, a conference which he called "the most important in Canada's history."¹⁰⁸

Behind this seemingly unrelated triad of reasons, issues, and purposes were several circumstances. Inferentially, at least, there was some reason for stressing public power as an issue. A month before he announced the election the Supreme Court of British Columbia had ruled that Bennett's controversial confiscation of the British Columbia Electric Company, Ltd., was illegal and that he had offered to compensate the property owners about \$20,000,000 less than the property was worth. Much confusion existed after the court's decision, confusion over who would operate the company while appeals were made and over the exact procedures that were to be utilized for possible renegotiation of the price to be paid by the Government.¹⁰⁹

Bennett obviously felt that he could solve the whole complex issue before the election and thereby save face. The day before he called the election, for example, he told the press that the only hurdle to be cleared in the power controversy was the price and that the Government was prepared to pay more than the \$192,000,000 evaluation set by the court.¹¹⁰ If this was his reasoning, it paid off handsomely because settlement was reached two days before election day. The Government finally paid \$25,281,306 more than it had originally

¹⁰⁸ Ibid., July 30, 1963.

¹⁰⁹ Ibid., July 30-31, 1963; August 2, 6, 27, 1963.

¹¹⁰ Ibid., July 22, 1963.

offered the company and \$4,286,233 more than the figure set by the court.¹¹¹

The river development issue, on the other hand, was less obvious. It can be surmised that, having obtained permission from the Pearson Government to negotiate the price of the power to be sold in the United States, Bennett felt it necessary to have a mandate or a symbol of popular support before starting negotiations with the Americans.

The relationship between Bennett's trips to London and Halifax, his proposed participation in the Dominion-Provincial Conference, and the provincial election was even more obscure. It is known that the London visit involved Bennett's interest in increasing British sales in British Columbia and that at least one province (i.e., Ontario) was sceptical about the deal.¹¹² Since trade was a subject at Halifax and was likely to be raised at the Dominion-Provincial Conference scheduled for November of 1963, Mr. Bennett may have felt the need to dramatize his position opposite that of Ontario to the trade-conscious Liberal administration in Ottawa.

Whatever Bennett's reasons, the fact remains that the election occurred in the midst of events which focused much national and international attention upon the province. The NDP, so successful in British Columbia during the 1962 and 1963 federal elections, launched a major effort to topple the Bennett Government. Votes were solicited at rallies and in a door-to-door canvass. Money was donated by NDP

¹¹¹ Ibid., September 28, 1963.

¹¹² Ibid., September 13, 22, 1963.

members and trade unions from all over Canada.¹¹³

In this development-conscious province the NDP promised public investment to encourage the development of coal reserves, the petrochemical industry, low grade iron ore reserves, and off-shore oil deposits. More importantly, the NDP urged public investments to expand secondary and tertiary industries so that British Columbia would be less dependent upon extractive enterprises.¹¹⁴ Its proposals regarding social services included a medical care plan that, unlike the one adopted in Saskatchewan, would be financed entirely with tax revenues and not user premiums. The education plank was comprehensive and provincially oriented. Under an NDP government, Strachan promised, the cost of education would be shifted to the provincial level except for some local responsibilities to the area of school construction. The elderly would receive additional allowances. High rise apartments would be built for the aged with provisions for a resident registered nurse in each building plus adequate recreation facilities designed for retired people. In addition, the NDP promised a provincial automobile insurance scheme and massive doses of provincial aid to municipalities in the form of grants for welfare services, highways, and hospitals.¹¹⁵

Bennett started the SC campaign later than the other parties. Except for promises to cut electric rates and build two new bridges in

¹¹³Vancouver Sun, September 5, 20, 1963.

¹¹⁴Ibid., September 4, 1963.

¹¹⁵Ibid., September 10-11, 23, 1963; Globe and Mail, August 30, 1963.

the Vancouver area, both of which were promised for 1970, Bennett offered the voters nothing that had not been on the SC agenda long before the election was called.¹¹⁶ He singled out the NDP's medicare and resource development planks, labeling them unrealistic and destined to force the province into bankruptcy.¹¹⁷ Since Bennett had eliminated all the province's debts by establishing "contingent liabilities," it was certainly not unexpected that such an attack would be made.¹¹⁸

The PC generally ignored the NDP and pressed its anti-Bennett crusade. In part, the PC attacked Bennett's integrity, his dictatorial methods, and his irresponsible rule. But the crusade also included a promise to delay the Peace River project, which was Bennett's pet project and which had already been started, in favor of the Columbia River project, which was still in the preparatory phase and which Fulton had once denounced. For spice, the Conservatives nominated Harry Purdy, former president of the expropriated British Columbia Electric Company, Ltd., to run in Point Grey.¹¹⁹

The Liberals, under their new leader Ray Perrault, implemented their anti-socialist crusade early in the campaign. The SC was attacked as a socialistic menace.¹²⁰ The NDP, Perrault chided, was even worse. "Give Strachan his way and he would turn British Columbia

¹¹⁶ Globe and Mail, September 30, 1963.

¹¹⁷ Ibid., September 6, 1963.

¹¹⁸ New York Times, September 29, 1963.

¹¹⁹ Globe and Mail, September 5, 30, 1963.

¹²⁰ Ibid., August 31, 1963.

into a Soviet Union with cowboy chaps."¹²¹

W. A. C. Bennett, the man who fought the 1960 election defending private power companies, whose Government expropriated a major power company a year later, whose party passed some of the harshest labor legislation in Canada, the wizard of "eliminating" government debt, the builder of one of the best highway networks in Canada, and politician par excellence, was returned to an unprecedented fifth term as Premier of British Columbia. His party captured 40.83 per cent of the vote and 33 seats, which was an improvement over its 1960 performance. The Liberals garnered 19.98 per cent of the vote and 4 seats, which was almost identical to their 1960 performance. The PC won 11.27 per cent of the vote, which was almost double its 1960 record. However, it won no seats, which equaled its 1960 standing. The NDP obtained 27.8 per cent of the vote compared to 32.7 per cent in 1960. It won 14 seats compared to the 16 it had obtained in the previous election.¹²²

The NDP had suffered a rather serious setback in a province which had become its major source of electoral strength in federal elections and the province in which it had hoped at least to form a minority government in 1963. Had the party retained all of the 16 seats it had won in 1960 and gained the seven ridings which it had lost by a handful of votes in 1960, the NDP could have won a plurality of seats in the legislature and formed a minority government. Instead,

¹²¹ Vancouver Sun, September 10, 1963.

¹²² Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 224; British Columbia, Statement of Votes, p. 15.

the NDP lost three of its 16 seats and gained only one of the seven marginal ridings--Nanaimo. Its percentage of the vote in these marginal ridings, except for Nanaimo, was actually lower than it had been in 1960. The greatest gains in these constituencies were registered by the PC, underscoring the fallacy that a reinvigorated Conservative organization would drain votes from the SC and allow the NDP to win.¹²³

Among the more noteworthy defeats registered by the NDP was that suffered by Cedric Cox, the man who had been publicly chastized for his trip to Cuba. He lost the riding of Burnaby, which had been solidly socialist for 30 years. Mrs. Margaret Hobbs, who had won the Revelstoke by-election a year earlier to replace her deceased husband in the legislature, also lost her seat. Camille Mather, wife of NDP MP for New Westminister, lost in the provincial riding of Delta, which formed part of her husband's federal constituency. Tom Berger, who had recently lost a close federal election in Vancouver-Burrard, failed to win in the provincial riding of Burrard by an equally close margin. Talk about contesting the election in the courts for what the NDP viewed as gross fraud in voting procedures helped sooth the bitter disappointment that many members of the party felt, but it did not alter the fact that the NDP had been badly beaten.¹²⁴

Ontario Election

Unlike the situation in British Columbia where the SC was in rather firm control but challenged by an anxious NDP, Ontario politics

¹²³British Columbia, Statement of Votes, p. 15.

¹²⁴Globe and Mail, October 2, 1963; November 16, 1963.

had been almost monopolized by the PC. Except for the Liberal victories in 1934 and 1937, the PC had reigned supreme throughout most of Ontario's history. The CCF, unlike its counterpart in British Columbia, had not come close to forming a government since 1943, when it carried 34 seats compared to the 38 seats won by the Conservatives. It had not been the official opposition since 1948, when the party won 21 seats compared to the 14 carried by the third-place Liberals. The best that the socialists had been able to do since that time was the five seats that it had obtained in 1959.¹²⁵

Several months after the NDP had been formed, it had an opportunity to test its electoral appeal in Ontario. The five provincial by-elections held on January 18, 1962 had never been CCF bailiwicks. Two of them were located in urban Toronto (Beaches and Eglinton), while the remaining three (Brant, Kenora, and Renfrew South) were predominately non-urban in character.¹²⁶ Hence, the NDP concept could be tested in terms of the possibilities for expanding the electoral base of the Canadian democratic left in both urban and rural environments.¹²⁷

¹²⁵ Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 211.

¹²⁶ Globe and Mail, January 5, 1962.

¹²⁷ The rural tests in Ontario were of particular significance because NDP Leader Donald MacDonald, who represented an urban constituency, had seized upon the marketing plight of the hog producers in the province and had thereby obtained some recognition as a friend of the farmer. This tie between the NDP Leader and the farming community became manifested in the form of "honks and jeers" and choruses of "Old MacDonald Had a Farm" from members of other parties when MacDonald rose to make a speech in the Ontario Legislature. Globe and Mail, October 11, 1961.

When the ballots were counted, the NDP had run third in all five contests. The major gratification that the NDP could find in the election returns was that it had generally improved upon the CCF performance in the same ridings during the 1959 general election. Taking the results of the five contests en toto, the NDP had captured 17 per cent compared to the CCF's 13.7 per cent in 1959. Upon closer examination, however, it was discovered that the Liberals had also improved upon their 1959 performance (i.e., 44.8 per cent compared to 37.6 per cent in 1959).¹²⁸ It was evident that the NDP had failed to cut into the Liberal support which had been a hopeful source of NDP votes.¹²⁹

In terms of some of the specific ridings involved, the reaction to the NDP was mixed. In urban Eglinton, the party did about as well as the CCF in 1959, which was poor to say the least. In urban Beaches, it was truly competitive; but the CCF had been equally competitive in that riding. The most serious blow occurred in the farming constituency of Brant where Robert Good, a dairy farmer, had hoped to triple the CCF's performance if not win for the NDP.¹³⁰ He failed to match the 1959 CCF performance.¹³¹

Five days before the voters in British Columbia went to the polls to reaffirm their allegiance to what one author called "pork-barrel politics,"¹³² the electorate went to the polls in Ontario to

¹²⁸ Ontario, Legislative Assembly, Returns from By-Elections, 1960 to 1962 and the General Election of 1963, pp. 5-6.

¹²⁹ Globe and Mail, January 20, 1962.

¹³⁰ Ibid., January 5, 1962.

¹³¹ Ibid., January 19, 1962.

¹³² Margaret Prang, "West Coast Democracy," Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (November, 1963), p. 172.

participate in what another writer called "the unwanted election."¹³³ It had been more than a year and a half since the fledgling NDP organization in Ontario had contested the five by-elections discussed above. In both the 1962 and 1963 federal elections, the party had sent six MPs to Ottawa, twice the number of MPs ever elected by the CCF in that province. Ontario, moreover, was the home of David Lewis, who had contributed so much to the formation of the NDP. In terms of membership it was also the provincial section of the party which best characterized the marriage between the CCF and the CLC. It was important, therefore, that the NDP put on a reasonable performance in the provincial election and hopefully expand its representation in the Legislative Assembly.

The PC, contesting its first election since Robarts replaced the retired Leslie Frost as provincial leader in 1961, decided to conduct an informal campaign that would appeal to an electorate which was experiencing economic prosperity. Unemployment stood at a low 3.5 per cent, the gross provincial product had almost reached an annual rate of seven per cent, and the Government reported that almost \$300,000,000 worth of new business had been added to the provincial economy within the preceding year.¹³⁴ What Robarts promised was more of the same, a continuation of the achievements of his eighteen-month-old administration.

The Liberals, led by the efficacious John Wintermeyer, tried to adopt the campaign tactics of John Kennedy to the Ontario setting.

¹³³Fred Schindeler, "The Unwanted Election," Canadian Forum, Vol. 43 (November, 1963), pp. 172-73.

¹³⁴Globe and Mail, September 24, 1963.

But somehow, the concept of a "Springboard for Progress" never quite moved beyond the stage of distributing a 7,000 word document called the "Liberal Plan for Ontario."¹³⁵

Instead, the Liberal campaign became a crusade against the sins of omission and commission ostensibly perpetrated by the Conservatives. Wintermeyer inserted almost a scandal a week into the campaign, starting with charges of complicity between the PC and the Northern Ontario Natural Gas Company (NONG), a long-standing and politically sordid affair that reappeared in the news when the president of NONG was indicted for perjury.¹³⁶ Subsequently, Wintermeyer charged the PC with conspiring with the expanding army of Mafia members in the province, altering the report of investigations into financial irregularities committed by the Department of Municipal Affairs, being a partner in the mysterious process by which liquor licenses were obtained in the city of London, cheating on highway contracts, and being involved in questionable land transactions in the White River area.¹³⁷ Gambling syndicates, Wintermeyer asserted, had a friend in the office of the Provincial Secretary. For evidence to support this charge, the Liberals pointed to the resignation of Robert Cudney, Deputy Provincial Secretary, who refused to deny press allegations that his candid performance before a crime probe conducted by Justice W. D. Roach in 1962 had resulted in insults and abuses from his boss--Provincial Secretary

¹³⁵ Ibid.

¹³⁶ Ibid., August 23-24, 1963.

¹³⁷ Ibid., August 26, 28-29, 1963.

John Yaremko.¹³⁸

This is not to say that the PC ignored all issues in its informal campaign or that the Liberals were concerned with nothing except scandals. Robarts did talk about a plan that combined free choice with low cost insurance against heavy medical expenses, but he admitted that the details had not been worked out. The Premier also promised expanded loans to municipalities and more assistance to Toronto's rapid transit system. The Liberals talked about an expanded provincial role in education and a massive housing program. Both took strong positions on pensions, with the PC endorsing its own concept of an Ontario portable pension system and the Liberals backing the federal pension scheme promoted by Judy La Marsh, Federal Health and Welfare Minister.¹³⁹ If anything proved to be an issue which persistently separated the Liberals and Conservatives, it was the subject of pensions.

Nevertheless, it is fair to assert that only the NDP tried to conduct its campaign on the basis of programmatic issues in this essentially issueless campaign.¹⁴⁰ It presented an eleven-point platform which included a contributory medicare plan for all citizens, economic planning, jobs for everyone, community development, expanded educational opportunities, consumer protection, public automobile insurance, agricultural marketing and co-operative services, development

¹³⁸ Ibid., September 17, 19, 1963.

¹³⁹ Ibid., August 27-28, 30, 1963; September 5-6, 9, 12, 18, 24, 1963.

¹⁴⁰ Schindeler, "The Unwanted Election," p. 172.

of northern Ontario, co-operative federalism, and a contributory pension plan that would guarantee all citizens 50 per cent of their income upon retirement. Relative to this last proposal, the NDP was prepared to endorse the basic idea of the federal program sponsored by the Liberals, but felt that it was acceptable only until a more comprehensive plan could be devised.¹⁴¹

Despite an earmarked campaign fund of \$67,000, money was at a premium for the NDP. Most of these provincial funds were spent on printing and advertizing. Third on the list of priorities was the money spent for paid organizers.¹⁴² Donald C. MacDonald, leader of the Ontario section of the party, had to travel alone most of the time and generally utilized his own automobile to cut expense. Posters were abundantly produced, but they were generally produced in basements by a manual silk-screen process.¹⁴³

Ten new ridings had been created in the Toronto area, raising the total number of seats in the Legislative Assembly to 108.¹⁴⁴ The PCs and Liberals contested all 108 of them. The NDP ran in 97 while the SC and various breeds of independents contested only scattered constituencies. The PC won 46 per cent of the vote and took 77 of the 108 seats. Its rural base had held, and it managed to emerge victorious

¹⁴¹ Globe and Mail, August 26, 1963; September 6, 1963.

¹⁴² NDP of Ontario, Provincial Election Committee, Statement of Revenue and Expenditures for the Eight Month Period Ending March 31, 1964, copy supplied by Desmond Morton, Assistant Provincial Secretary, February 26, 1965.

¹⁴³ Globe and Mail, September 13-14, 1963.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid., September 23, 1963.

in a number of urban ridings where the Liberals and NDP split the anti-PC vote. Thirty-five per cent of the vote and 24 seats went to the Liberals. The NDP captured a disappointing 15.6 per cent, which was less than it had garnered in 1959. However, it won 7 seats or two more than it previously had occupied in the provincial legislature.¹⁴⁵

Of the five seats it held prior to the election, the NDP successfully retained all but Oshawa, located in the heart of the major automobile-producing city. Scarborough West was picked up for the party by Stephen Lewis, son of David Lewis. The party carried one of the ten new ridings that had been created in metropolitan Toronto (Toronto-Yorkview), and it ran second in three of the others. Finally, the NDP captured Ft. William from the Liberals.¹⁴⁶

The NDP eventually acquired another seat in the Ontario legislature as a result of a September 10, 1964 by-election in the Toronto riding of Riverdale. James Renwick, a corporation lawyer and former member of the board of the Norwich Union Insurance Societies, won what many observers considered a spectacular victory after a sparkling campaign which avoided heavy emphasis upon the programmatic gospel of the NDP.¹⁴⁷ Renwick carried Riverdale with 38.5 per cent of the vote compared to the NDP's third place 22.6 per cent in 1963. The PC, which carried this Conservative bailiwick with 50 per cent of the vote in

¹⁴⁵ Returns from . . . The General Election of 1963, p. 53.

¹⁴⁶ Ibid., pp. 54-70, 522, 541.

¹⁴⁷ John Smart, "By-Election in Riverdale," Canadian Forum, Vol. 44 (September, 1964), p. 127.

1963, won only 30.5 per cent against Renwick. The Liberals shared second place with an equal percentage.¹⁴⁸

On the same day that Renwick scored an upset in Riverdale, the PC captured the Liberal stronghold of Windsor Sandwich. In this by-election, almost unnoticed by the press, the NDP was able to improve its performance from 19.8 per cent of the vote in 1963 to 21.4 per cent.¹⁴⁹ This was hardly an encouraging performance in a riding which had been severely wrenched from its historical voting traditions by a PC candidate who was handicapped by the bad publicity resulting from Roberts' embarrassing introduction and subsequent withdrawal of the so-called "police-state" legislation.¹⁵⁰

Nova Scotia Election of 1963

Shortly after Roberts and his PC Government were returned to power in Ontario, Premier Robert Stanfield of Nova Scotia led his Conservatives to a landslide victory. The election of October 8, 1963 was the third PC victory in that province since the twenty-three years of Liberal rule came to an end in 1956.¹⁵¹

Although the NDP contested 20 of the 43 provincial ridings, the party's major interest in the election was focused upon the coal mining districts around Cape Breton. Its last provincial stronghold in that

¹⁴⁸ NDP of Ontario, The Riverdale Story, A By-Election Study (Toronto: November, 1964), p. 34.

¹⁴⁹ The New Democrat, October, 1964.

¹⁵⁰ This legislation would have allowed the police to question suspects in secret and to detain them indefinitely. Globe and Mail, March 20, 23-24, 1964; April 17, 1964.

¹⁵¹ Scarrow, Canada Votes, p. 204.

area was Cape Breton Centre, which it had held since 1945. The area remained in economic difficulty, but federal and provincial efforts had eased the burden of the miners with make-work projects and by the lowering of the retirement age.¹⁵²

The campaign was basically uninspiring and generally devoid of burning issues. The PCs ran on Stanfield's record. The Liberals promised fishermen and farmers more attention than they had received from Stanfield. The NDP, campaigning without a provincial leader, stressed public ownership of all public utilities. All parties promised some kind of medicare if Ottawa promised sufficient financial support to run it.¹⁵³

Stanfield's PC organization swept 39 ridings and obtained 56 per cent of the vote compared to the 27 seats and the 48.3 per cent that it had captured in 1960. The Liberals dropped from 15 seats to four and slid from 42.6 per cent of the vote in 1960 to only 40 per cent in 1963. The NDP lost its only seat in the Nova Scotia legislature and dropped from nine per cent of the vote in 1960 to only four per cent in 1963.¹⁵⁴ The NDP had lost all of its symbols of existence in Nova Scotia as a result of the 1963 federal and provincial elections.

Saskatchewan Election

A year before the formation of the NDP, the CCF was returned

¹⁵²Globe and Mail, August 3, 1963.

¹⁵³Chronicle Herald (Halifax), October 4, 8, 1963.

¹⁵⁴Legislature of Nova Scotia, Returns of the General Election for the House of Assembly Held on October 8, 1963, pp. 80-87.

to power in Saskatchewan with 38 of the 55 seats in the provincial legislature.¹⁵⁵ Four of these seats were lost through by-elections, two of which occurred after the NDP was created. On December 13, 1961, the CCF-NDP lost the Weyburn by-election that had been called to fill the seat vacated by Premier Douglas, who had resigned to lead the newly formed NDP. In November of 1962, the party lost the by-election in the rural riding of Prince Albert.

There were several logical reasons for the CCF's defeat in these ridings, both of which had traditionally voted for the party. The CCF had governed Saskatchewan since 1944, and governing parties tend to suffer from some attrition. Second, both ridings had been carried in 1960 by narrow margins. That election had been contested by the CCF, PC, SC, and the Liberals, while the by-elections were strictly CCF-Liberal battles. The transfer of a few SC and PC votes to the Liberals in 1961 was sufficient to defeat the reigning CCF.¹⁵⁶

There was some embarrassment involved in the loss of these two by-elections, particularly the one in the Weyburn area which had been represented in the House of Commons from 1935 to 1944 and in the provincial legislature from 1944 to 1961 by the man who had become the Federal Leader of the NDP. The Weyburn campaign, moreover, was fought primarily upon the medicare issue. Because that issue had been publicized throughout Canada, the defeat of the CCF candidate was considered

¹⁵⁵ Saskatchewan, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1960, pp. 1-2.

¹⁵⁶ Globe and Mail, December 14-15, 1961; Regina Leader Post, November 17, 1962. Comparative data for the 1960 results in these ridings are located in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1960, pp. 1-2.

a serious blow to the NDP's image as the champion of a comprehensive health plan for Canada. It was not surprising, therefore, that someone placed a wreath on Donald MacDonald's desk in the Ontario legislature the day after the news from Weyburn was published.¹⁵⁷

The most significant thing about these by-elections was that the CCF had been beaten in a two-way fight, giving rise to the assumption that the CCF Government could be toppled if the anti-CCF vote was not split. The PC became concerned about this assumption even before the by-election was held in Prince Albert. Most of the PC's provincial leaders concluded that the party should restrain its activities at the provincial level. Hopefully the Liberals would beat the CCF, and the PC could then compete with Liberals at the provincial level while still continuing to triumph over a weakened CCF organization during federal elections. Other provincial leaders of the PC retorted that the party should consolidate its federal gains in Saskatchewan by vigorously competing at the provincial level. The issue was settled for purposes of the Prince Albert contest when the local PC leaders simply refused to nominate a candidate.¹⁵⁸

When CCF-NDP Premier Woodrow Lloyd announced that an election would be held on April 22, 1964, the press began its close tally of the number of candidates that were nominated by each of the parties. The mathematics of the contest seemed to become more important than personalities or issues, although one observer reported that the CCF-NDP ran a lackluster campaign while the Liberals set into motion an

¹⁵⁷Globe and Mail, December 15, 1961.

¹⁵⁸Regina Leader Post, September 13, 1962; December 29, 1962.

astute campaign backed by four years of organizational effort and lots of money.¹⁵⁹ Ross Thatcher put forth a new image of reasonableness and moderation. He promised that the Liberals would keep the CCF's medicare plan but administer it better. He endorsed free textbooks for all students, more provincial grants to schools and municipalities, long term credit to farmers, an extensive highway program, and tax reduction. In an affluent province he stressed the relative stagnation of the provincial economy vis-à-vis its neighbors. In an essentially one crop economy, he emphasized industrial growth. In an area that had a stable population, Thatcher criticized the lack of population growth. The problem was that the CCF did not run against this version of Ross Thatcher but against the blustering anti-socialist version of Thatcher that had prevailed in 1960.¹⁶⁰

When the election was over, it was the mathematics of the contest that seemed to have prevailed. During the 1960 general election there had been four-way fights in every riding (i.e., CCF, Liberal, PC, SC). In 1964, two and three-way fights were the rule. The PC contested 43 of the 59 ridings. The SC, however, was most conspicuous by its absence, contesting only two ridings.¹⁶¹

When Norman Ward analyzed the results of the election he concluded that the CCF had been beaten despite the mathematics of the contest. He noted that the Liberals captured 13 of the former CCF

¹⁵⁹ Norman Ward, "Saskatchewan in 1964," Canadian Forum, Vol. 44 (June, 1964), pp. 55-56.

¹⁶⁰ Ibid., p. 56.

¹⁶¹ Regina Leader Post, April 23, 1964.

seats in those ridings where there was a CCF-PC-Liberal contest and concluded that the presence of the PC had not helped the CCF. He noted that of the 12 CCF-Liberal contests the Liberals took only three seats from incumbent CCFers, thus contradicting the experiences of the Weyburn and Prince Albert by-elections.¹⁶²

What Ward seemed to overlook was the absence of the SC. The CCF-NDP had polled almost the same percentage of votes as it had in 1960 (i.e., 40.5 compared to 40.8 in 1960), but the SC vote had dropped from about 12 per cent to less than one-half of one per cent in 1964. Since the PC merely increased its percentage of the vote from 14 to 19 per cent, it would seem that the Liberals tended to draw most of their eight per cent increase from the SC.

In those three-way contests in rural areas which were carried by the Liberals, the SC vote seemed to have gone to the victors. Had these SC votes gone to the PC, as some CCFers had hoped, the hypothesis that the presence of an active PC candidate would have aided the CCF-NDP might have been sustained. In the cities of Regina, Saskatoon, Moose Jaw, and Weyburn this hypothesis tended to work, and the CCF-NDP captured 11 of its 25 seats in those ridings. Thus, where the SC vote went to the Liberals the CCF tended to be defeated. Where it went to the PC the CCF survived. The twelve two-way fights that Ward used to support his position that the mathematics of the election were irrelevant happened to be areas where the SC and PC had done so poorly in 1960 that, for all practical purposes, they were two-way contests. Even so, the three seats taken from the CCF were apparently obtained

¹⁶²Ward, "Saskatchewan in 1964," pp. 56-57.

by the shift of the PC and SC votes to the Liberals. In short, the mathematics of the election was a vital factor in the CCF's defeat; but it was the absence of the SC that tended to help the Liberals carry rural Saskatchewan and ultimately the election.¹⁶³

The election was close, the Liberals winning by only 752 more votes than the CCF-NDP. The race in the riding of Hanley was decided in a recount, but the defeated CCF candidate took the results to court.¹⁶⁴ After the court declared the election invalid, a by-election was held. Former CCF Attorney General R. A. Walker again entered the race to defeat the man who had scored an apparent victory in April-- Herbert Pinder, Liberal Industry Minister. The PC again contested the seat. On December 16, 1964, the CCF recaptured Hanley with 4,525 votes. The Liberal candidate drew a disappointing 3,711 votes, and the PC trailed with 1,693. The standings in the legislature stood at 32 Liberals, 26 CCFers, and one PC.¹⁶⁵

Time and experience has not been exceedingly kind to the NDP in terms of its general electoral performance. At the federal level it has won a few spectacular by-elections like Peterborough and Waterloo South. In terms of percentages of votes or seats in Commons the NDP stands somewhere between the disappointing CCF performance in 1958 and the stalemated performance of the CCF following World War II. It has recouped part of the loss suffered during the Diefenbaker landslide,

¹⁶³ Electoral data by ridings were published in the Regina Leader Post, April 23, 1964. Comparative data are located in Saskatchewan, Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1960, pp. 14-15.

¹⁶⁴ Globe and Mail, September 18, 22, 1964.

¹⁶⁵ Ibid., December 18, 1964.

but that is about all. At the provincial level it has been virtually wiped out of Nova Scotia, lost in its bid for power in British Columbia, made only slight gains in Ontario, and had to yield the reigns of government in Saskatchewan. But these are generalizations that must be probed further.

CHAPTER VII

ELECTORAL RESPONSE TO THE NDP:

AN ANALYSIS AND APPRAISAL

The electoral performance of the NDP can be subjected to varied interpretations. Compared to the dismal electoral response obtained by the CCF in 1958, the records established by the NDP in the 1962 and 1963 federal elections have been rather spectacular. When its federal election record is judged in terms of certain expectations that were held at the time it was created, there is room for disappointment. Those who wish to argue that the NDP has performed badly at the provincial level of politics need only cite the fact that the socialists no longer govern Saskatchewan. Those who are interested in supporting the notion that the party continues to be a viable electoral force at the provincial level can cite its continued strength in British Columbia or point to its spectacular victory in the provincial by-election held in Riverdale, Ontario.

Such observations and judgments are at best superficial and fail to expose some of the fundamental trends that have occurred relative to the NDP's electoral support. Although scholars of Canadian parties and elections continue to be handicapped by the lack of data and analyses comparable to those developed by the Survey Research Center at the University of Michigan relative to voting behavior in the United States, it is possible to develop some rather sophisticated

generalizations about the NDP's electoral performance based upon existing data.¹

Shifts in the Electoral Support
Obtained by the Democratic Left

The CCF was overwhelmingly a western phenomenon drawing the bulk of its electoral support from the wheat-producing province of Saskatchewan.² In addition, the CCF was predominately a rural party, primarily because its electoral support was concentrated in rural Saskatchewan.³ As a party operated upon the assumptions of a "mass" organization, the CCF could boast a high correlation between its membership base and its electoral performance. Despite much bickering within the party over the merits of individual opposite affiliated memberships, the correlation between memberships and electoral performance tended to be independent of the particular type of membership concept that was employed. Electoral successes were obtained where individual memberships were emphasized, and they were obtained where affiliated trade unions provided the bulk of the party's membership base.

¹Public opinion polls are conducted by the CIPO, but the data obtained from the 1,500 sample of persons over 21 years of age tend to reflect only general party preferences held by voters. Rarely are the results of these polls broken down according to age, sex, income, occupation, ethnic, or religious factors. Certainly there is nothing comparable to The American Voter (New York: John Wiley, 1960) by Angus Cambell, et. al., which represents the culmination of many years of intensive survey research regarding voting behavior in the United States.

²Federal election trends concerning the CCF are noted in Illustration IV, Appendix. Generalizations concerning its provincial electoral support were obtained from Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 201-227.

³The urban-rural pattern of the CCF's electoral support was set forth in Chapter II.

These basic trends have been altered since the NDP was formed. Although the most dramatic changes have occurred relative to its support during federal elections, at least one profound repercussion has occurred relative to the relationship between the federal and provincial electoral records established by the democratic left in Canada.

Federal Elections: A New Bastion
of Power in the West and the Rise
of an Eastern Enclave

The CCF's successor continues to be predominately a western party in terms of its electoral support. As noted in Table 11, however, there has been a slight decline in the level of support obtained by the democratic left in western Canada and a significant increase in the level of electoral support given to it in eastern Canada since the last reapportionment of federal seats in 1952.⁴

TABLE 11

Levels of Electoral Support for the
CCF and NDP by Region

Region	CCF (1953-58)		NDP			
	Av. %	Av. no. seats	1962 %	1962 Seats	1963 %	1963 Seats
West	22	16	20	12	18	11
East	7	2	11	6	13	6
Maritimes	2	0 ^a	7	1	5	0
Canada	11	18	13.5	19	13.2	17

^aCCF carried one seat in Nova Scotia in 1953, but lost it in 1957 and 1958.

⁴Computed from data set forth in Illustrations IV and V, Appendix.

The decline in the number of seats carried by the democratic left and in the percentage of votes cast for it in western Canada has been caused primarily by the persistent erosion of its electoral support in Saskatchewan. In fact, the declining position of the NDP in that province and the expansion of its power in British Columbia has completely altered the locational pattern of the electoral support obtained by the democratic left in western Canada. The New Democrats have become the third-ranking contender in Saskatchewan, once the CCF's chief source of electoral support. The primary source of support for the democratic left in terms of the percentages of votes cast is now located in British Columbia, a situation that has not been replicated since 1935. Excepting the two seats that were carried by the NDP in Manitoba in 1962 and 1963, both of which had been lost by the CCF in 1958, the province of British Columbia has become the only source of MPs for the democratic left in western Canada. Table 12 illustrates the shifts that have occurred relative to the electoral support obtained by the NDP vis-à-vis that of the CCF in the four western provinces.⁵

TABLE 12

Levels of Electoral Support for the CCF
and NDP in the Four Western Provinces

Province	CCF (1953-58)		NDP			
	Av. %	Av. no. seats	1962		1963	
			%	Seats	%	Seats
B. C.	24	6	31	10	30	9
Sask.	36	7	22	0	18	0
Man.	22	3	20	2	17	2
Alberta	6	0	8	0	7	0

⁵Ibid.

The trend toward a rival center of electoral support for the NDP in eastern Canada, the urban and industrial heart of the country, has been concentrated almost entirely in the English-speaking province of Ontario. In terms of percentages of votes, support for the NDP in that province has exceeded all previous records set by the CCF and has been more than five percentage points higher than the average level of support obtained by its predecessor subsequent to the last reapportionment of federal seats. In terms of victories, the NDP has doubled the legacy left by the CCF in 1958 and tripled the average 1953-1958 record of that party. Ontario, in short, has become the second most productive source of MPs for the New Democrats.

Despite its heightened sensitivity and concern about the French problem, there is no evidence of a major electoral encroachment by the NDP in Quebec. Although it has improved upon the record set by the CCF in that province, the NDP has been an impotent contender during federal elections.

The NDP's electoral performance compared with the average CCF performance between 1953 and 1958 in the two eastern provinces is illustrated in Table 13.⁶

TABLE 13

Levels of Electoral Support for the CCF
and NDP in the Two Eastern Provinces

Province	CCF (1953-58)		NDP			
	Av. %	Av. no. seats	1962		1963	
			%	Seats	%	Seats
Ontario	11	2	17	6	16	6
Quebec	3	0	4	0	7	0

⁶ Ibid.

In the Maritimes, the NDP has virtually replicated the CCF's feeble record. It managed to recapture Cape Breton South, Nova Scotia, in 1962, only to lose it in an exceedingly close race in 1963. In the other Maritime provinces the NDP improved upon the CCF performances, but the small increases in the percentage of the vote that it obtained in 1962 were generally lost in the following election. A graphic comparison of the CCF and NDP electoral performances in the Maritime provinces is set forth below.⁷

TABLE 14

Levels of Electoral Support for the CCF
and NDP in the Maritime Provinces

Province	CCF (1953-58)		NDP			
	Av. %	Av. no. seats	1962		1963	
			%	Seats	%	Seats
N. S.	5	0 ^a	9	1	6	0
P. E. I.	1	0	4	0	1	0
Nfld.	.4	0	5	0	4	0
N. B.	2	0	4	0	4	0

^aAfter several victories in Cape Breton South, the CCF lost that riding in 1957 and 1958.

Federal Elections: The Urbaniza-
tion of the NDP Vote

It was noted in Chapter II that the CCF, despite its concentration of candidates in urban ridings, tended to score a greater proportion of its victories and a much better performance in terms of percentages of votes in non-urban ridings.⁸ Like its predecessor, the

⁷Ibid.

⁸The definitions of urban and non-urban ridings utilized in this discussion are the same as those developed in Chapter II.

NDP had tended to contest a greater percentage of federal seats located in urban ridings.⁹ Unlike its predecessor, however, the NDP has achieved its best electoral records in urban ridings.

As Table 15 illustrates, the New Democrats have scored most of their victories in urban ridings. On the average the party has won about two-thirds of its seats in urban constituencies, whereas the CCF used to win about two-thirds of its victories in rural constituencies.¹⁰

TABLE 15

CCF and NDP Victories in Urban and
Non-Urban Federal Constituencies

Victories	CCF			NDP	
	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Urban	9 (10%)	7 (8%)	3 (3%)	13 (13%)	11 (10%)
Non-Urban	14 (18%)	18 (24%)	5 (7%)	6 (5%)	6 (4%)
Total	23 (13%)	25 (16%)	8 (5%)	19 (9%)	17 (7%)

Figures in parentheses represent the percentage of victories out of the total number of candidates run in each category.

In terms of voting percentages, the NDP has also tended to perform better in urban as compared with rural constituencies. If approximately 30 per cent of the vote or more is considered necessary to place a party into contention when there are at least two other

⁹In 1962, it contested 104 of the 109 seats located in urban ridings and 114 of the 154 seats located in non-urban ridings. In 1963, it contested 105 and 125 urban and non-urban seats respectively. Computed from data presented in Illustration V, Appendix.

¹⁰Data for the CCF have been reproduced from a chart presented in Chapter II. Data for the NDP have been calculated from evidence presented in Illustration V, Appendix.

parties seriously competing for votes, it can be shown that the NDP has been significantly more competitive in urban rather than rural ridings. Table 16 summarizes the performances of the CCF and the NDP in urban and non-urban ridings according to the number of candidates whose percentage of the vote was above or below this criterion for competitiveness.¹¹

TABLE 16

Number of CCF and NDP Candidates in Urban
and Non-Urban Federal Constituencies
According to Percentages of
Popular Votes

Percentage of the Vote Obtained	CCF						NDP			
	1953		1957		1958		1962		1963	
	U ^a	N-U ^b	U	N-U	U	N-U	U	N-U	U	N-U
59.1 - 69	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	1	0	0
49.1 - 59	3	6	1	0	0	0	2	0	1	1
39.1 - 49	4	10	2	10	5	4	7	2	5	3
29.1 - 39	4	8	7	12	3	11	8	3	11	4
19.1 - 29	16	4	15	7	12	10	22	22	17	12
9.1 - 19	29	14	28	15	32	15	39	26	42	23
0 - 9	37	35	34	30	42	35	26	60	29	82
Total Candidates	93	77	87	74	94	75	104	114	105	125
Total Seats Involved	109	154	109	154	109	154	109	154	109	154

^aU - urban

^bN-U - non-urban

Whereas about one-tenth of the CCF candidates in urban ridings obtained approximately 30 per cent of the vote or more, roughly 15 per

¹¹Ibid.

cent of the NDP candidates in urban constituencies achieved that distinction. About one-third of the CCF candidates in non-urban ridings fell into the competitive category until the party's rural support began to evaporate in the 1958 election. The performance of the NDP in non-urban ridings has been dramatically less impressive. In 1962, almost seven per cent of its candidates in rural constituencies won 30 per cent of the vote or more; a year later the figure was slightly over six per cent.

Federal Elections: Continuity
Between NDP Electoral Support
and Type of Membership Base

The CCF struggled to develop a rather large membership base to provide itself with votes as well as the necessary money and manpower for competing in the electoral arena.¹² Although its membership never reached mass proportions and was never large enough to account for more than a small proportion of the votes cast for the party, there was a basic continuity between the level of its organizational base as reflected by memberships and the level of its electoral performances. For the CCF, however, the continuity between memberships and electoral performances tended to be independent of the particular type of membership concept that was employed. It scored its best electoral performances in Saskatchewan, where individual memberships were used almost exclusively. On the other hand, its second best electoral record was established in British Columbia, where affiliated trade unions

¹²The relationship between membership and money as well as the levels of "involvement" obtained by the CCF from its membership base during its prime are discussed in Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 62-70.

provided the bulk of the CCF's membership base. Neither concept of membership seemed to be an "ideal" model for the party to apply in all situations, although the subject was vigorously debated within the party's ranks.

One of the issues that was settled when the NDP was created concerned the types of memberships that were to be allowed. Although provisions were made for incorporating direct (i.e., individual) as well as indirect (i.e., affiliated) members into all provincial sections of the party, the NDP's membership base has become almost exclusively composed of persons belonging to affiliated CLC unions. The only exception, as noted in Table 17, is the Saskatchewan section of the party, where the traditional emphasis upon individual or direct memberships has been perpetuated.¹³

TABLE 17

Per Cent of Total NDP Membership Represented
by Affiliated CLC Members, 1963

Provincial Section--NDP	Per Cent	Provincial Section--NDP	Per Cent
Nova Scotia	93	British Columbia	80
Ontario	92	New Brunswick	77
Nfld. and P. E. I.	92	Manitoba	70
Quebec ^a	90	Alberta	70
		Saskatchewan	9

^aAlmost one-fourth of Quebec's union members belong to the Catholic-oriented CNTU which is not affiliated. The figure utilized here reflects only the percentage of NDP affiliated members who are members of CLC unions. Membership figures used for purposes of computation represent members claimed by the NDP, in contrast to the PSQ.

¹³Computed from individual membership data obtained during an interview with Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, Ottawa, October 26, 1964 and from affiliated membership data set forth in the "Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council.

With this generalization in mind, it is possible to proceed with a comparison between the NDP's organizational base as reflected by memberships and its electoral performances. For purposes of analysis, the following data have been reproduced from the NDP membership profiles developed in an earlier chapter.¹⁴

TABLE 18

Profiles of NDP Membership Base

Individual Members as % of Electorate	Affiliated CLC Members as % of Electorate	Total Members as % of Electorate
<u>Sask.</u> 7.3/	Ont. 4.4	<u>Sask.</u> 8.0/
B. C. .9	B. C. 3.4	Ont. 4.8
Man. .48	N. S. 2.3	B. C. 4.3
Ont. .4	Man. 1.2	N. S. 2.5
Alberta .4	Alberta .8	Man. 1.7
N. S. .19	<u>Sask.</u> .7/	Alberta 1.2
N. B. .1	Nfld./P. E. I. .5	Nfld./P. E. I. .54
Que. ^a .04	N. B. .43	N. B. .5
Nfld./P. E. I. .04	Que. ^b .3	Que. .07

^aThis figure represents members claimed by the NDP as opposed to its provincial manifestation, the PSQ.

^bAlmost one-fourth of Quebec's union members belong to the Catholic-oriented CNTU which is not affiliated with any political party. The figure used here represents only CLC affiliates.

When the data presented above are compared with the performances of the NDP in the 1962 and 1963 federal elections, it becomes obvious that the continuity between membership levels and electoral strength is more perfect when only the NDP's affiliated membership

¹⁴Data for this chart were drawn from the Organizational Profile Charts set forth in Chapter V.

base is considered. Only then is the relative position of the Saskatchewan section of the party in terms of memberships reasonably equated with the relative position of the federal electoral performance of the NDP in that province. Because of its vastly superior individual membership base, the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP ranks well above all other sections in terms of the total percentage of the electorate who are members of the party. But the NDP's record in that province during federal elections ranks considerably below the electoral performance of the NDP in British Columbia, where the democratic left has enjoyed a historic and intimate association with organized labor. If NDP victories rather than its percentage of the votes are utilized for purposes of evaluation, the federal performance of the Saskatchewan section of the party ranks considerably below that of the Ontario section, where the number of members representing affiliated trade unionists increased from 16,657 in July of 1958 to 150,583 in December of 1963.¹⁵ Hence, the continuity between the NDP's membership base and its federal electoral performance, a continuity that tended to be independent of the type of memberships involved during the CCF era, tends to exist only in terms of a particular type of memberships involved.

Provincial Elections: An Electoral Anomaly Emerges

It has been noted previously that there was a close relationship between the federal and provincial electoral performances of the

¹⁵Data for 1958 obtained from NDP Founding Convention Delegates File. Data for 1963 obtained from "Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council.

CCF. The only exception to this pattern was found in Quebec, where the CCF was formally maintained as an instrument for contesting federal elections after 1953. Nevertheless, its federal performances were as feeble as that of its provincial manifestation in Quebec--the Social Democratic Party.

In order to evaluate the NDP in terms of this generalization, it will be necessary to present a rather detailed summary of the provincial and federal electoral records established by the NDP and its predecessor. The following chart presents the average percentages of votes obtained by the CCF at the federal and provincial levels during the period between the 1952 federal reapportionment and the last elections contested by that party. The electoral records of the NDP at the provincial level and its average performance during the two federal elections are included for comparative purposes.¹⁶

It can be concluded from the data presented in Table 19 that the basic consistency between federal and provincial electoral performances has persisted since the NDP was launched. Generally, the more productive sources of electoral support for the party during federal elections continue to be among the more productive sources of support for the party during provincial contests. The more marginal sources of federal support tend to be in those provinces in which its support is extremely weak during provincial elections, where the NDP has not entered provincial contests, or where a formal or informal manifestation

¹⁶ Provincial and federal election statistics set forth in Table 19 for the CCF were computed from data presented in Scarrow, Canada Votes. Provincial data for the NDP were obtained from the sources cited in the section of the previous chapter dealing with the NDP's quest for votes during recent provincial elections. Federal statistics concerning the NDP were computed from data presented in Illustration V, Appendix.

of the NDP (e.g., PSQ in Quebec or the Newfoundland Democrats) has developed.

TABLE 19

Comparison of the Electoral Performances
of the CCF and NDP at the Provincial
and Federal Levels

Province	CCF		NDP	
	Av. % of vote, prov. elections	Av. % of vote, fed. elections (1953-58)	% of vote, prov. elec.	Av. % of vote, fed. elections (1962-63)
Sask.	1952-60 (45)	36	1964 (41)	20
B. C.	1952-60 (31)	24	1963 (28)	31
Man.	1953-59 (20)	22	1962 (17)	19
Ont.	1951-59 (18)	11	1963 (16)	17
Alberta	1952-59 (9)	6	1963 (10)	7
N. S.	1953-60 (6)	5	1963 (5)	8
Que. ^a	1952-56 (.8)	3	1962 (0)	6
Nfld. ^b	1956 (.5)	.4	1962 (0)	5
P. E. I. ^c	1951 (3)	1	1962 (0)	3
N. B. ^d	1952 (1)	2	1963 (0)	4

^aThe CCF contested the 1952 election and won about .8 per cent of the vote. The SDP contested the 1956 election and obtained about .8 per cent. Neither party ran in 1960. The NDP did not enter in 1962, and the SDP had not been re-formed.

^bThe CCF contested only the 1956 election. The Newfoundland Democratic Party entered the 1959 and 1962 elections. In 1956, the CCF percentage appears on the chart.

^cThe CCF did not enter the 1955 or 1959 election. The chart includes only its performance in 1951.

^dThe CCF did not enter the 1956 or 1960 elections. The chart includes only its performance in 1952.

Within this basic pattern, however, one notable discrepancy seems to be developing. The rapid decline of electoral support for the democratic left in Saskatchewan during federal elections has not been replicated during provincial elections. The nine point spread between the average provincial and federal performances of the CCF in

Saskatchewan, most of which can be attributed to the dismal CCF record during the 1958 federal election, has been more than doubled since the NDP made its appearance. This growing discrepancy between the federal and provincial electoral performances of the CCF-NDP suggests that the party is developing into a strictly provincial phenomenon in Saskatchewan.

It would be spurious to conclude that a mass membership base predicated upon affiliated trade unions is a superior instrument for competing in the electoral arena. The continued electoral strength of the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP at the provincial level of politics is sufficient proof that an organization almost exclusively composed of individual members can be a viable instrument for competing within the electoral arena. The point is that the decision to retain the name of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation for provincial purposes in Saskatchewan seems to have become more than a symbolic gesture to pacify those who resisted the formation of the NDP in 1961. In almost every respect, the Saskatchewan section has become an anomaly within the total framework of the NDP. In terms of the percentage of the electorate enrolled, the membership base of the Saskatchewan section of the NDP continues to be superior to that which exists in any other provincial section, although it has not taken steps to implement fully the concept of affiliated memberships that was clearly explicated in the NDP Federal Constitution. The continued maintenance of a large organizational base in Saskatchewan has been followed by continued electoral viability during provincial elections, but it has not resulted in a comparatively equal performance during federal elections as had been the case prior to the formation of the NDP. This would

suggest that the CCF-NDP organization in Saskatchewan has become primarily an instrument for competing at the provincial level, and it has chosen to retain the title and organizational premise of the old CCF for that purpose.

Scope of the Electoral Shifts Associated
with the Emergence of the NDP

To base an appraisal upon the basic shifts that have occurred relative to the electoral support obtained by the NDP in contrast to that of the CCF would be somewhat misleading. Some serious qualifications must be noted, and only a riding by riding analysis can provide insights into these qualifications.

The Urbanization Trend, the
Margin of Gain

British Columbia, as noted previously, has become the bastion of electoral support for the NDP. More than half of its federal victories in British Columbia, the second most urbanized province in Canada according to the definition of urbanism developed by the Canadian Bureau of Statistics, have been scored in urban ridings.¹⁷ The CCF tended to score slightly more than half of its victories in non-urban ridings. A similar pattern prevails when the number of CCF and NDP candidates who obtained 30 per cent of the vote or more but who failed to win are categorized according to urban and rural ridings. The following table illustrates these points.¹⁸

¹⁷The urban-rural composition of the Canadian population according to provinces is set forth in Illustration I, Appendix.

¹⁸Computed from Illustration V, Appendix.

TABLE 20

Number of Urban and Non-Urban Ridings in which
CCF and NDP Candidates Were Victorious or
Competitive, British Columbia

	CCF						NDP			
	1953		1957		1958		1962		1963	
	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C
Urban	3	1	3	1	2	2	6	0	5	1
Non-urban	4	2	4	1	2	3	4	0	4	1
Total	7	3	7	2	4	5	10	0	9	2

V - CCF or NDP candidate victorious
C - CCF or NDP candidate competitive but
not victorious

According to the data presented in the preceding chart, the urbanization of the NDP's electoral support has not been very pronounced in British Columbia. The rather narrow margin of gain for the NDP in the urban areas of British Columbia becomes more evident when the urban ridings in which the CCF and the NDP were victorious and/or competitive (i.e., obtained 30 per cent of the vote or more) are listed.¹⁹

TABLE 21

Urban Ridings in which the CCF and/or NDP Candidate
Was Victorious or Competitive, British Columbia

	CCF			NDP	
	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Burnaby-Richmond	C	C	C	V	V
Burnaby-Coquitlam	V	V	V	V	V
Vancouver East	V	V	V	V	V
Vancouver-Kingsway	V	V	C	V	V
Vancouver-Burrard	-	-	-	V	V
New Westminster	-	-	-	V	V

V - Candidate victorious
C - Candidate competitive but not victorious

¹⁹ Ibid.

The six federal ridings listed in Table 21 are located in the metropolitan area of Vancouver, which contains 10 of the 12 urban ridings in the province. The NDP has gained an average of eight percentage points over the 1953-1958 CCF electoral performance in the four unlisted Vancouver ridings, but it must equal that growth rate in Vancouver South, Vancouver Centre, and Coast-Capilano to become competitive. It must more than double it in the solidly PC riding of Vancouver Quadra to win 30 per cent of the vote. It should be noted that the NDP transformed New Westminister into a source of victory by achieving the former level of growth and made a serious encroachment in Vancouver-Burrard by replicating the latter.

The chances of repeating the New Westminister story in Vancouver Centre and Vancouver South, however, would seem to be infinitely more probable than in Coast-Capilano. First, the CCF had been competitive in the federal ridings around New Westminister, Vancouver Centre, and Vancouver South during the 1940s. No historic precedent or base of that kind exists relative to the federal riding around Coast-Capilano, formerly the riding of Vancouver North. Second, the CCF and the NDP have had a solid base of electoral support in the provincial ridings that are included in the areas covered by Vancouver Centre, Vancouver South, and New Westminister. Although both the CCF and its successor have won in Mackenzie, one of the two provincial ridings that are included in the area covered by the federal constituency of Coast-Capilano, they have been exceedingly weak in the provincial riding of North Vancouver. The latter is much more populous than the former; and when the two provincial ridings are combined to form Coast-Capilano, the heavy anti-socialist vote in the North Vancouver

area more than cancels the advantage gained by the party in the Mackenzie area.

The chances of a repeat performance of the spectacular Burrard story in Vancouver Quadra seem rather remote. The CCF had been competitive in Burrard during the late 1940s, but the socialists have been weak in Quadra since that riding was created in 1946. Second, Quadra has been consistently a PC haven, whereas the electoral trends in Burrard have been rather unstable, making it more plausible for a party to attract electoral support than would be the case in a riding where the voting pattern is persistent and entrenched. Finally, the federal riding of Vancouver Quadra corresponds roughly to the provincial riding of Vancouver-Point Grey, where the NDP ran a poor fourth in the 1963 provincial elections.

The remaining two federal ridings that have been classified as urban are located in the metropolitan area of Victoria. The average CCF performance in the federal riding of Victoria was about 11 per cent between 1953 and 1958; in Esquimalt-Saanich, it was about 16 per cent of the vote. The NDP record in 1962 and 1963 averaged around 14 and 20 per cent of the vote in Victoria and Esquimalt-Saanich respectively. Victoria is a triple-member riding for provincial purposes, and all three NDP candidates ran third in 1963. In the provincial ridings of Esquimalt and Saanich the NDP placed a very weak second in 1963. Hence, there is little evidence to suggest a major electoral breakthrough for the NDP in the metropolitan area of Victoria.²⁰

²⁰ Federal electoral records of the CCF and the NDP in these areas are set forth in Illustration V, Appendix and in Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 104-188. Data concerning provincial performances were obtained from the Vancouver Sun, October 1, 1963 and British Columbia,

The NDP therefore appears to be well entrenched in six of the twelve federal ridings of the urban type in British Columbia and could probably make an encroachment upon Vancouver Centre and Vancouver South. But this record is predicated almost entirely upon support generated by the CCF. In terms of victories or competitiveness the NDP has added only New Westminster and Vancouver-Burrard to the legacy left by its predecessor. Nevertheless, the NDP has moved into a position of electoral dominance in the urban portions of British Columbia. No other single party had done as well.

Forty-seven of the 85 federal constituencies in Ontario fall into the urban category. Between 1953 and 1958, there was almost no perceptible tendency toward an urban or a rural basis of support for the CCF in that province. In 1953, it won its only victory in the urban riding of York South. In 1957, and again in 1958, the CCF captured the urban constituency of Timmins; but its two other victories were scored in non-urban ridings. The CCF was competitive but not victorious in Timmins in 1953. It was competitive but not victorious in Toronto-Davenport in 1957, and no ridings fell into that category in 1958.

As indicated in Table 22, the trend toward an urban basis of electoral support has become more evident since the NDP was created.²¹ Nevertheless, the dimensions of the NDP gains in urban Ontario can be best illustrated by comparing the urban ridings in which the CCF and

Statement of Votes, 1963, p. 15. Comparisons of the areas covered by various provincial and federal ridings were from the official constituency maps supplied by the Chief Electoral Officer of British Columbia and the Chief Electoral Officer of Canada.

²¹ Computed from data presented in Illustration V, Appendix.

the NDP were competitive and/or victorious. Because of the numbers involved when discussing the urban ridings of Ontario, Table 23 and the subsequent discussion categorizes the ridings according to the metropolitan area or major urban area involved.²²

TABLE 22

Number of Urban and Non-Urban Ridings in which
CCF and NDP Candidates Were Victorious
or Competitive, Ontario

	CCF						NDP			
	1953		1957		1958		1962		1963	
	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C
Urban	1	1	1	1	1	0	4	3	4	4
Non-urban	0	0	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	1
Total	1	1	3	1	3	0	6	3	6	5

V - CCF or NDP candidates victorious

C - CCF or NDP candidates competitive but
not victorious

TABLE 23

Urban Ridings in which the CCF and/or NDP Was
Victorious or Competitive, Ontario

Metropolitan or Major Urban Area	Riding	CCF			NDP	
		1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Timmins	Timmins	C	V	V	V	V
Toronto	York South	V	-	-	V	C
"	York Centre	-	-	-	C	C
"	Danforth	-	-	-	V	V
"	Greenwood	-	-	-	V	V
"	Davenport	-	C	-	-	-
Ft. Wm./Pt. Arthur	Ft. William	-	-	-	-	C
Hamilton	Hamilton South	-	-	-	C	V
Peterborough	Peterborough ^a	-	-	-	C	C
Kitchener-Waterloo	Waterloo South ^b	-	-	-	-	-

V - party victorious C - party competitive

^aPeterborough was captured in 1960 by-election.

^bWaterloo South was captured in 1964 by-election

²²Ibid.

Timmins became a solid CCF bailiwick in the late 1950s, and York South was a rather erratic source of electoral support for the CCF after it was initially captured in a by-election in 1942. Toronto-Davenport can be eliminated from consideration since the CCF barely obtained the necessary percentage of the votes to place itself in the competitive category in 1957. Hence, the CCF was a significant electoral force in roughly two urban ridings in Ontario. All other ridings on the chart represent gains since the NDP was formed.

Probably the most solid gains for the New Democrats have been registered in the Toronto constituencies of Danforth, Greenwood, and York Centre. In all three cases the NDP managed to append more than 15 percentage points to the average performance of the CCF between 1953 and 1958, a growth rate that was sufficient to place the NDP into a winning position in Danforth and Greenwood. In York Centre, it was sufficient to place the party in a very strong competitive position (i.e., 34.2 and 33.4 per cent of the vote in 1962 and 1963, respectively).

It should be noted, however, that all three of these federal ridings are located in areas in which the democratic left has had rather strong support during provincial elections. The provincial riding of Woodbine, which corresponds to the federal constituency of Greenwood, had been a historic CCF bailiwick and was retained by the NDP in the 1963 provincial election. The CCF also ran rather well in the provincial equivalents of the federal riding of Danforth. The CCF, for example, controlled the provincial riding of Toronto-Beaches from 1948 to 1951 and was the second-placed contender from 1951 to 1959. In 1963, the NDP came within 820 votes of winning in Beaches.

Stephen Lewis did carry the newly created seat of Scarborough West, which covers part of the area included in the federal riding of Danforth. In the provincial riding of York Centre, the CCF historically ranked third in an electoral situation in which the vote was almost evenly divided among the Liberals, PC, and CCF. For the 1963 election, the area was reapportioned, and the new riding of Yorkview was carved out of the area covered by York Centre. The NDP candidate carried that newly created riding in a close three-way fight. The southeastern corner of metropolitan Toronto, generally the location of what electoral power the CCF had in Toronto, has become a virtual fortress for the NDP.

Outside Toronto, the NDP has apparently made a rather substantial gain in Hamilton South. Its competitive position in that riding in 1962 and its victory in 1963 were again predicated upon a rather well developed CCF electoral performance. The average CCF percentage of the vote between 1953 and 1958, for example, had been about 27 per cent, or just below the mark required to place it in the competitive category as defined in this discussion. Furthermore, the provincial riding of Hamilton East embraces the most populous portions of the federal riding of Hamilton South, and the CCF record in that provincial constituency has been consistently excellent. The NDP retained the seat in the provincial election of 1963.

Fort William, unlike the federal ridings discussed above, had not been a productive area for the CCF after the early 1940s. In federal elections it slipped badly after 1945, and its average percentage of the vote between 1953 and 1958 was around 22 per cent. At the provincial level, the CCF lost control of Fort William in 1948 and

continually slipped until it ranked in third position in 1959. Hence, the growth rate obtained by the NDP in the federal riding of Fort William and its 1963 victory in the provincial riding by that name represents a major accomplishment.

It is difficult to appraise the NDP performance in Peterborough and Waterloo South. The CCF was traditionally weak in Peterborough at the federal as well as at the provincial level. The spectacular victory scored by Walter Pitman in the 1960 federal by-election has been followed by defeat and a decline in the NDP's percentage of votes, although the party continues to be ranked as competitive in that riding. On the basis of historical evidence, the recent NDP victory in Waterloo South is predicated upon a more substantial foundation. The CCF federal performance between 1953 and 1958 was nearly triple that which it obtained in Peterborough. It captured the provincial riding of Waterloo South twice (i.e., 1943 and 1958), and it ran second in that riding during all other provincial contests. In 1963, the Liberals and the NDP almost tied for second-place behind the PC candidate.²³

While the record of the NDP in urban Ontario is impressive when compared to that of the CCF, most of the NDP gains have been obtained in areas in which the CCF's performance fell slightly below the criterion for competitiveness and/or in areas in which the CCF performed well during provincial elections. There is nothing unique or

²³ Federal data for the CCF prior to 1953 were obtained from Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 104-144. Federal data for the period 1953 to 1963 were drawn from Illustration V, Appendix. Provincial data were obtained from The Returns from the Records of the (Ontario) General Election, 1963, pp. 54-70 and from Roderick Lewis (ed.), A Statistical History of All Electoral Districts of the Province of Ontario since 1867, passim.

surprising about this situation, but it should be noted that all of the federal ridings discussed thus far represent less than one-fifth of the total urban ridings in Ontario. NDP victories in these constituencies represent less than one-tenth of the total urban seats in the province. Hence, the question is raised concerning the NDP's potential in Ontario's remaining urban constituencies.

The unsettled condition of Canadian politics makes predictions concerning future electoral trends at the federal level even more hazardous than usual. Nevertheless, it is possible to group the remaining urban ridings in Ontario into those in which the NDP might be reasonably expected to make an electoral "breakthrough" and those in which its future electoral growth remains highly "questionable." The experiences of the NDP in Danforth, Greenwood, and Waterloo South suggest that the party can make electoral "breakthroughs" if it has a relatively traditional base of about 25 per cent of the vote with which to start. In Danforth and Greenwood, such a base existed prior to the formation of the NDP; in Waterloo South, it took two federal elections for the NDP to move into such a position before it proceeded to win the recent federal by-election in that riding. The Riverdale story underscores this proposition at the provincial level. Victory in this case was built upon an average CCF performance of about 27 per cent of the vote, a record that was compiled after the present boundaries of the riding were established in 1955. Except for the federal riding of York Centre, where the NDP moved into a competitive position by doubling the 1953-1958 CCF record of 17 per cent of the vote, the NDP has made no electoral breakthroughs in federal ridings of the urban type without a base of about 25 per cent of the vote. Allowing for some

leeway, an average of 20 per cent of the vote in 1962 and 1963 will be utilized in the subsequent discussion to designate ridings in which an electoral "breakthrough" is statistically most probable. All other urban ridings will be designated as "questionable" areas of NDP support.²⁴

TABLE 24

Status of the NDP Electoral Performance
in Urban Ontario

Metropolitan or Major Urban Area	Total Seats Involved	NDP Victorious and/or Competitive (1962-63)	Breakthrough (1962-63)	Questionable (1962-63)
Hamilton	4	1	1	2
Kitchener-Waterloo	2	1 ^a	0	1
London	2	0	0	2
Ottawa ^b	5	0	0	5
Windsor	3	0	1	2
Brantford	1	0	0	1
Ft. Wm./Pt. Arthur	1	1	0	0
Guelph	1	0	1	0
Kingston	1	0	0	1
Niagra Falls	1	0	0	1
Oshawa	1	0	1	0
Peterborough	1	1	0	0
St. Catherines	1	0	0	1
Sarnia	1	0	0	1
Sault St. Marie	1	0	1	0
Timmins	1	1	0	0
Toronto	20	4	7	9
Totals	47	9	12	26

^aWaterloo South won in a by-election in 1964.

^bArea includes Hull which is in Quebec.

If a similar chart were constructed for the 1953-1958 CCF record, only two ridings would fall into the "victorious and/or

²⁴Computed from Illustration V, Appendix.

competitive" category, ten would be listed in the "breakthrough" column, and 35 would be listed as "questionable." Clearly, the NDP record based upon these criteria has surpassed that of its predecessor.

One reason for the NDP's electoral growth in urban Ontario is that it has developed a highly effective method for transforming those ridings in which it has been competitive or approached the "breakthrough" criterion into sources of victory. Through a technique dubbed the "gang attack method of campaigning," the NDP is able to concentrate professional talent and money upon a particular riding, train local workers in the use of the campaign techniques employed in the "gang attack," and move on to another riding in which the party is competitive or near the "breakthrough" criterion.²⁵

The "gang attack" was used to elect Kenneth Bryden in the provincial riding of Woodbine in 1959. It was used in the provincial riding of Beaches in a by-election in 1961 when the NDP candidate lost by a scant 400 votes. It was used the following year to elect Reid Scott to Parliament from the federal riding of Danforth. Stephen Lewis employed it to win in Scarboro West (provincial) in 1963, and he directed its use to elect his father (David Lewis) in the federal riding of York South in 1962. The same team used in York South moved to York Centre for the 1963 federal election. Although the NDP lost that contest by a narrow margin, the "gang attack" was repeated in the provincial equivalent of York Centre (i.e., Yorkview) a few months later; the NDP candidate won. The most recent examples of the "gang attack" in operation and perhaps the most spectacular displays of its

²⁵Globe and Mail, November 12, 1964.

ramifications occurred in the provincial by-election in Riverdale and the federal by-election in Waterloo South, both of which took place in 1964.²⁶

According to a lengthy pamphlet published by the Ontario NDP, the party's spectacular victory in Riverdale was "almost a perfect campaign."²⁷ Although the party does not expect that it can replicate the same intensive effort every time the "gang attack" is employed, particularly in general elections, the Riverdale story is offered by the NDP as a model for "other New Democrats."²⁸ In particular, the party stresses three features of the Riverdale crusade: professional management, canvasses of the electorate, and "Operation Multiplication."

Professional management for the Riverdale by-election was supplied by Stephen Lewis, considered to be one of the most astute campaign strategists in Canada.²⁹ He served as the general campaign manager for the NDP candidate--James Renwick. Marjorie Pinney, a full-time organizer for the Ontario section of the party, directed the canvassing of the electorate. Wally Ross, loaned to the party by the USW, was in charge of the sign and poster campaign; Lester Johnson was hired to direct the production of the necessary signs and posters. Only Lewis and Johnson received salaries from the general campaign fund. They received \$500 and \$400 respectively. Miss Pinney's salary was paid by the NDP Provincial Caucus, and Wally Ross drew his paycheck

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ontario NDP, The Riverdale Story (Toronto: 1964), p. 35.

²⁸ Ibid., p. i.

²⁹ Globe and Mail, November 12, 1964.

from the USW.³⁰

Four canvasses were made of the voters in Riverdale. Each voter was visited at least once by the candidate. On three other occasions they were canvassed by volunteers. The first or "blitz" canvass was conducted with the help of 250 of the delegates attending the Ontario NDP Provincial Convention that was meeting in Toronto on August 10-12, 1964. The second canvass was directed at the female electorate and was executed with the help of the women's committee of the NDP. The third canvass was carried out by volunteers between August 24 and September 3, 1964.

During each of these special canvasses, the voter was handed a piece of literature emphasizing one feature of the NDP appeal. The first canvass stressed a few key issues such as medicare and the police state bill introduced by the Robarts Government earlier that year. Literature for the second canvass featured the candidate in a leaflet entitled "Talk It Over with Jim." During the final canvass, the voter was handed a brochure attacking the incumbent Conservatives.³¹

Aside from contacting voters and supplying them with literature about the NDP, the canvassers made it a point to check the accuracy of the voting lists. About 400 new voters were added to the lists as a result of this effort. Furthermore, the canvassers tried to ascertain the mood or preference of the voters on each occasion, thereby giving the party information upon which to redirect or strengthen its efforts.³²

³⁰ The Riverdale Story, p. 40.

³¹ Ibid., pp. 7-10.

³² Ibid., pp. 7-10, 37-38.

In addition to the literature distributed during the special canvasses and the use of radio and billboard advertising, the NDP implemented the concept of "little men." The first manifestation of this concept was a folder deposited in every household mailbox in the riding. When opened, the folder featured a life-size picture of James Renwick.³³ The second manifestation of the concept was called "Operation Multiplication" which featured hundreds of cardboard cutouts of Renwick. On the morning of election day, "down every sidewalk in the riding were . . . lines of Renwick figures saying 'Vote Renwick Today'."³⁴

Over \$11,000 were used in Riverdale, not counting such indirect assistance as that supplied by the provincial caucus or the USW in the form of salaries for two of the full-time staff. About half of the general campaign chest was donated by trade unions affiliated with the party. Sources of campaign contributions are listed below.³⁵

TABLE 25

The Sources of Funds for the NDP General
Campaign Chest, Riverdale Provincial
By-Election, 1964

Source	Amount
Donations from individuals	\$ 2,130
Raised by federal caucus	2,000
Raised by Ontario Women's Committee	455
Special subscription at Ontario NDP Convention	1,000
Riverdale Riding Association share	629
Proceeds from NDY Victory Dance	300
Total non-union funds	\$ 6,514

³³ Globe and Mail, September 4, 1964.

³⁴ The Riverdale Story, p. 31.

³⁵ Ibid., pp. 39-40.

TABLE 25--Continued

Source	Amount
Donation, United Steelworkers (Hamilton Local)	\$ 2,000
Donation, United Steelworkers (Toronto District)	500
Donation, United Packinghouse Workers, Local 114	269
Donation, United Hod Carriers, Local 183	500
Donation, Toronto and District Political Education Committee	500
Contributions collected through Toronto Area Labor Council	594
Total union contributions	\$ 4,363
Total campaign chest	\$11,377

There are 50 federal ridings of the urban type that are located outside Ontario and British Columbia. The NDP performance in these ridings has been quite unimpressive. In fact, there has been a general decline in the NDP performance compared with that of its predecessor, a legacy that hardly aroused much envy. The performances of the CCF and the NDP in these 50 urban constituencies outside Ontario and British Columbia are summarized in Table 26.³⁶

TABLE 26

CCF and NDP Electoral Performances in Urban Areas
Outside Ontario and British Columbia

Province	Total Urban	CCF Competitive and/or Victorious (1953-58)	NDP Competitive and/or Victorious (1962-63)
Alberta	5	0	0
Manitoba	4	2	2
Saskatchewan	2	2	0
Nova Scotia	3	1	1
New Brunswick	2	0	0
Newfoundland	1	0	0
Quebec	33	0	0
Totals	50	5	3

The two Manitoba ridings in which the NDP has been competitive

³⁶ Computed from data set forth in Illustration V, Appendix.

and/or victorious are Winnipeg North and Winnipeg North Centre. The CCF was in a similar position in the same two constituencies. The one urban riding in Nova Scotia in which the NDP is listed as having been competitive and/or victorious happens to be Cape Breton South, the same riding in which the CCF scored its only victory in the Maritimes. Conversely, the NDP has failed to perpetuate the competitive and/or victorious position of the CCF in the urban ridings of Saskatoon and Regina, although one observer has predicted a resurgence of the party's electoral support in those constituencies.³⁷ Since the cities of Regina and Saskatoon were the major bulwarks of CCF-NDP support during the party's disappointing defeat in the 1964 Saskatchewan provincial election, there is some room for optimism. Transforming this provincial support into federal victories, however, will depend upon the extent to which the Saskatchewan section of the party has become a provincially-oriented anomaly.

Aside from the three ridings in which the NDP has continued to be competitive and/or victorious and the two Saskatchewan ridings mentioned above, support for the NDP has been extremely limited in the urban areas outside Ontario and British Columbia. Despite some electoral growth in the five urban ridings in Alberta, the NDP managed to obtain an average of less than 10 per cent of the vote in 1962 and 1963. Its performance in the two Winnipeg ridings in which it was not competitive has been about the same as that achieved by the CCF, which was mediocre to say the least. Aside from Cape Breton South, the two remaining urban seats in Nova Scotia are located in the dual riding of

³⁷"The Voting Mood of the Nation," Globe and Mail Magazine, February 6, 1965.

Halifax. The NDP has failed to build upon the trivial CCF record, and in 1963 it chose to run only one candidate in that city. In St. John, New Brunswick, the NDP has averaged about five per cent of the vote. It more than doubled the CCF record in the city of Moncton, New Brunswick, by winning an average of 12 per cent of the vote in 1962 and 1963. In St. John's, Newfoundland, the party broke a CCF precedence and ran a candidate in 1962. Response to the NDP represented less than two per cent of the vote, and the party failed to nominate a candidate for the 1963 federal election.

What electoral growth the NDP has obtained in the heavily urbanized province of Quebec has been concentrated in Montreal. The average gain over the 1953-1958 CCF electoral performance in that city has been about 10 per cent, but it must double that gain in 20 of the 22 ridings in the metropolitan area of Montreal in order to become competitive. In Maisonneuve-Rosemont and Outremont-St.-Jean, it must equal that 10 per cent gain to achieve a competitive position.³⁸

Except for Regina and Saskatoon, there simply are no urban ridings in Alberta, Manitoba, Quebec, or the Maritimes in which the NDP is even close to becoming competitive. Without a massive shift of votes, the party's electoral growth is likely to remain concentrated in the urban centers of Ontario and British Columbia.

The Losses in Rural Canada

The decline of the democratic left in non-urban ridings is even more dramatic than its electoral growth in urban areas. In terms of

³⁸Detailed evidence of the performances of the CCF and the NDP in the 50 urban ridings outside Ontario and British Columbia is located in Illustration V, Appendix.

competitiveness (i.e., 30 per cent of the vote or more) and/or victories, there has been a clear and decisive withdrawal of electoral support from the democratic left in rural Canada. That withdrawal has been most distinct since the NDP was formed, underscoring the refusal of farm organizations to endorse or become affiliated with the new party concept. The decline of the NDP in rural ridings is graphically illustrated in the following chart.³⁹

TABLE 27

Number of Non-Urban Ridings in which the CCF
and NDP Were Victorious or Competitive

Province (Total non-urban seats)	CCF						NDP			
	1953		1957		1958		1962		1963	
	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C	V	C
Saskatchewan (15)	9	6	9	3	1	6	0	0	0	0
British Columbia (10)	4	2	4	1	2	3	4	0	4	1
Manitoba (10)	1	2	3	1	0	2	0	0	0	0
Ontario (38)	0	1	2	0	2	0	2	0	2	1
Totals, non-urban	14	11	18	5	5	11	6	0	6	2
Total victories	23		25		8		19		17	

V - Party victorious

C - Party competitive but not victorious

Most of the decline in the non-urban support for the NDP has occurred in the wheat belt of Saskatchewan and Manitoba. After those losses, what non-urban support the party has retained in Ontario and British Columbia has been drawn essentially from rural areas of a non-agricultural variety. The two Ontario non-urban ridings which were captured by the CCF in 1957 and 1958 were retained by the NDP. Neither

³⁹Ibid.

of them is agriculturally oriented. Timiskaming is essentially a gold mining and lumbering area.⁴⁰ Although the federal riding of Port Arthur includes the city by that name, a city which is part of the Fort William-Port Arthur major urban area, the riding covers a huge chunk of Ontario's pulp and mineral resources. In addition, its economic base includes grain elevators for storing wheat shipped from the prairies to eastern markets, a declining railroad industry, and some limited farming.⁴¹ The vast and sparsely populated riding of Cochrane, to the east of Port Arthur, has been the only non-urban riding in Ontario in which the NDP achieved a competitive position. It achieved that only in 1963. Hunting, pulp-making, and some mining in the southern part of the riding characterize the economic base of Cochrane.⁴²

In British Columbia, the CCF consistently carried Nanaimo, Comox-Alberni, and Kootenay West. In 1953, it carried Okanagan Boundary; but that victory was replaced by a win in the riding of Skeena in 1957 and 1958. The NDP has retained all four of the non-urban ridings that were held by the CCF in 1958. Skeena has the least agriculturally oriented economic base. This huge piece of Canada's geography is located in the sparsely populated mining, fishing, and forestry area in northwestern British Columbia near the Alaska Panhandle. Comox-Alberni and Nanaimo are essentially commercial fishing areas, although both of them include some dairy farming. Kootenay West and

⁴⁰ Wilfred List, "Is the Social Credit the Key to Timiskaming Riding?" Globe and Mail, March 25, 1963.

⁴¹ Wilfred List, "Low Key Fight in Port Arthur," Globe and Mail, March 28, 1963.

⁴² Mention of the NDP in Cochrane was made by Wilfred List, "The Tea Party in Algoma West," Globe and Mail, March 29, 1963.

Kootenay East, which constitute the non-urban ridings in British Columbia that appear in Table 27 as a victory and a competitive riding respectively for the NDP in 1963, are located in the rugged ranching, fruit-producing, lumbering, and mining area in eastern British Columbia.⁴³

All four non-urban ridings currently held by the NDP will undoubtedly continue to be NDP havens. Expansion of its rural base, however, seems rather remote. Except for Cochrane in Ontario and Kootenay East in British Columbia there are no non-urban federal ridings in which the NDP has been competitive but not victorious. There are only four rural ridings in which the NDP ran second in 1962 and/or 1963 but failed to obtain 30 per cent of the vote to place it in the competitive category. In three of these--Humbolt, Rosetown-Biggart, and Yorktown in Saskatchewan--the party's percentage of the vote declined slightly in 1963. In Fraser Valley, British Columbia, it obtained 26 per cent of the vote in 1963 compared to 25 per cent in 1962.⁴⁴ At least one observer has predicted an upsurge in votes and possibly a victory for the NDP in Fraser Valley.⁴⁵

⁴³Census Divisions 1 and 2 in British Columbia involve essentially the same territory included in Kootenay East and Kootenay West. Census Division 9 corresponds to the areas covered by the federal riding of Skeena; Division 5 covers the ridings of Nanaimo and Comox-Alberni. Census of Canada, 1961, Reference Maps, Vol. 1, Pt. 1, Bul. 1.1-9, pp. 5, 19. Generalizations concerning the agricultural as well as other facets of the economic base of these census divisions were obtained from *Ibid.*, Vol. 5, Pt. 3, Bul. 5.3-4, pp. 17, 30 and Vol. 3, Pt. 1, Bul. 3.1, pp. 227-50.

⁴⁴Illustration V, Appendix.

⁴⁵"Voting Mood of the Nation," Globe and Mail Magazine, February 6, 1965.

The Unionization of the NDP
Membership Base: Electoral
Ramifications

It is difficult to establish the precise dimensions of the electoral response given to the NDP by members of CLC unions who are affiliated with the party. The fact that only 17 per cent of the total labor vote went to the NDP in 1963, according to a CIPO poll, is of little help in determining the relationship between the party's affiliated membership base and its electoral support.⁴⁶ The fact that electoral support for the NDP tends to be best in those provinces in which it has built its best affiliated trade union base may merely indicate that the party is able to put forth a more intensive campaign for votes with the help of union money, a situation noted in the Riverdale episode. Without deprecating the financial dimension of the relationship between the party's trade union base and its electoral performance, the actual voting support derived from the NDP's affiliated trade unionists is of immediate importance to the party. After all, it would be possible for trade unions to give financial support to a political party without formally affiliating with it.

Until some sophisticated survey research is done in this area, the voting ramifications of the NDP's trade union base must remain inferential. Nevertheless, it is possible to make some reasonably valid inferences by noting the electoral performance of the NDP in those areas where major portions of its trade union base are located. For example, about 22 per cent of the 41,100 CLC union members in Nova Scotia are affiliated members of the NDP. Of these 9,245 affiliated

⁴⁶ CIPO Poll cited in Vancouver Sun, April 27, 1963.

members of the party, roughly two-thirds are members of UMW and USW locals located in the federal riding of Cape Breton South. If members of other unions in Cape Breton South that are affiliated with the party are included, roughly 7,000 or 75 per cent of the total affiliated membership of the NDP in Nova Scotia is accounted for.

In 1962 and 1963, about 38,000 voters cast ballots in Cape Breton South. The NDP polled 17,409 and 13,327 votes in 1962 and 1963, respectively, most of them concentrated in the cities of Sydney, Glace Bay, and New Waterford, where the bulk of the NDP affiliated trade unions are located. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that a sizeable proportion of the NDP vote came from the 7,000 affiliated trade unionists and their families in Cape Breton South.⁴⁷

A similar assumption can be made relative to the NDP support in British Columbia. Over 90 per cent of the trade union members whose unions are affiliated with the NDP are located in the metropolitan area of Vancouver where, it has been noted, the NDP tends to dominate federal and provincial elections. Conversely, only 82 trade unionists are affiliated members of the NDP in the metropolitan area of Victoria, where the party has not done well.⁴⁸

In Ontario, where 150,583 trade unionists are affiliated

⁴⁷The number of NDP affiliated trade union members in Nova Scotia are broken down according to the location of the union locals involved. When compared to the list of cities and polling places included in the riding of Cape Breton South provided in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer for 1962 and 1963, it is possible to determine approximately how many of the affiliated members are located in the riding. Affiliated membership data obtained from the "Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council, dated December 31, 1963.

⁴⁸"Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council.

members of the party, there are indications of strong union support for the NDP at the polls. The largest bloc of USW members who are affiliated with the party (i.e., 15,335) is located in Hamilton.⁴⁹ The NDP, it has been noted, carried Hamilton South in 1963 and retained the provincial riding of Hamilton East in 1963. Similarly, over a fourth of the 150,583 union members affiliated with the NDP belong to unions in the Toronto area.⁵⁰ How many of the affiliated members in Toronto voted for the NDP is debatable; but on the basis of the party's rather successful electoral record in metropolitan Toronto, it can be assumed that at least part of the credit must be attributed to its trade union base.

There are other areas where the NDP vote tends to be concentrated in the same areas in which its affiliated trade union base tends to be located. Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Regina are examples. But it is equally important to note where the NDP vote appears to be weak despite sizeable concentrations of affiliated trade union members. The third largest bloc of USW members (i.e., 6,081), supposedly one of the most pro-NDP unions in Canada, is located in Sault-Saint-Marie, which forms part of the federal riding of Algoma West.⁵¹ The NDP has not done exceedingly well in federal elections in that riding, nor has it performed well in the provincial riding of Sault-Saint-Marie, which is more in

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid.

⁵¹ Ibid.

conformity with the boundaries of the city itself.⁵² Wilfred List, who interviewed USW leaders in Sault-Saint-Marie before the 1963 federal election, reported that there were no guarantees being given that the union could deliver the vote of its membership to the NDP.⁵³

Another of the most enthusiastic NDP supporters within the ranks of Canada's union movement is the UAW. The largest single bloc of UAW members affiliated with the party (i.e., 11, 952) is located in Oshawa, home of the General Motors' operation in Canada.⁵⁴ Ironically, the federal riding in which Oshawa is located (i.e., Ontario) has been a traditional stronghold for the PC, partly because neither the Liberals nor the socialists have been able to build a sufficient margin of votes in the city to overcome the PC's lead in the outlying areas.⁵⁵ However, the NDP even failed to retain the provincial riding of Oshawa in 1963, the boundaries of which embrace only the city of Oshawa.⁵⁶ As John Brady, Chairman of the UAW Political Action Committee in Oshawa, remarked on the eve of the 1963 federal election: "Members of the union support the party in the plant, but we can't account for the fact that they don't vote in large enough numbers for

⁵²Federal performances of the NDP in Algoma West are cited in Illustration V, Appendix. Provincial performances are cited in A Statistical History . . . of the Province of Ontario Since 1967, p. 238 and in Returns from the Records for the 1963 General Election, p. 63.

⁵³Wilfred List, "The Tea Party in Algoma West,"

⁵⁴"Memorandum" prepared for the NDP Federal Council.

⁵⁵Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962, pp. 150-55; Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1963, pp. 149-53.

⁵⁶Globe and Mail, September 27, 1963.

the NDP at the polls."⁵⁷

Hence, the evidence concerning the voting ramifications of the NDP's trade union base tends to be mixed. The high correlation between its affiliated membership base and its electoral performance that prevailed when only provincial trends were observed gives way to a patchwork of positive correlations when the issue is reduced to individual ridings. On the basis of the inferential evidence cited above, the application of survey research techniques to the problem would probably reveal an even greater patchwork of positive correlations.

An Appraisal

On the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter, it can be concluded that there has been a fundamental shift in the nature and location of the electoral support generated by the democratic left since the NDP was formed. The urbanization of the support obtained by the democratic left, however, has been the consequence of its growth in a few key urban areas and its tremendous decline in non-urban areas. What electoral growth the NDP has obtained in urban areas generally has been built upon the best urban records developed by the CCF. Excepting the ridings of Fort William, Vancouver-Burrard, and York Centre, the NDP has not moved into a competitive or victorious position in any federal riding in which the CCF's electoral legacy was less than 20 per cent of the vote, or in which the CCF had not built a substantial record of support during provincial elections. Despite the expansion of its affiliated trade union base, the NDP has tended to perform well

⁵⁷Ibid., March 18, 1963.

in those union bailiwicks in which the CCF had established a foothold during federal and/or provincial elections.

While the NDP's capacity to expand upon the urban support developed by the CCF or its ability to translate some of its predecessor's support into NDP victories should not be deprecated, it should be noted that the New Democrats have almost exhausted the potentialities of electoral growth predicated upon the CCF's record in urban Canada. It controls both CCF bailiwicks in urban Manitoba and has vacillated between victory and near victory in the only CCF area of support in the urban portions of the Maritimes. There are a few ridings in the Vancouver area (i.e., Vancouver Centre and Vancouver South) in which the NDP can attempt to build upon its predecessor's record. There is a chance that the party can exploit the CCF's former record in Saskatoon and/or Regina, Saskatchewan. An extremely weak CCF electoral precedent exists in the urban portions of Alberta. The CCF was a negligible factor in the urban ridings of Quebec. The only urban ridings in which the CCF left much of an electoral base upon which the NDP can build are located in Ontario.

Since the NDP's predecessor had developed only one urban victory in Ontario and left almost no legacy of competitive ridings, the NDP has built its electoral growth in those urban ridings in which the CCF had reached what has been defined as a breakthrough position. In every case where the NDP moved from a breakthrough position to victory, the riding was formerly held by the PC. Danforth, Greenwood, Hamilton South, and Waterloo South were all taken from the Conservatives. The New Democrats originally captured Peterborough from the PC and have remained in a competitive position behind the PC candidate during the

1962 and 1963 federal elections. Conversely, the NDP has been able to win in a former Liberal riding on only one occasion; that was in York South in 1962. It has moved into a rather solid competitive position in the Liberal riding of York Centre and barely managed to reach a competitive position in the Liberal riding of Fort William in 1963. In short, the NDP has tended to capitalize upon the CCF electoral base in urban ridings held by the PC. Its record against Liberal opposition has been much less impressive.

This situation presents certain difficulties for the NDP. The PC has definitely become a non-urban party. In the province of Ontario, for example, the Conservatives carried only 14 of the 47 urban ridings in 1962. In 1963, they managed to retain only seven of them, all located outside the metropolitan area of Toronto. The Liberals, on the other hand, are the major contenders in urban Canada. In 1962, they captured 28 of the 47 urban seats in Ontario and won 35 of them in 1963. About half of these Liberal victories were obtained in the Toronto area. Hence, the NDP's major competition for electoral support in urban Ontario is the Liberal Party. As noted above, this is the party against which the NDP has competed least effectively. It is also the party with the closest facsimile of the Galbraithian program developed by the NDP.

Assuming that the NDP does not develop an effective method for translating its competitive or breakthrough positions into victories where the Liberals now have control, what are the dimensions of the dilemma that it faces in urban Ontario? The following chart summarizes the data upon which an answer to this question must be

based.⁵⁸

TABLE 28

Competitive and Breakthrough Performance
of the NDP in Urban Ontario

	Liberal victories		NDP in a competitive or breakthrough position behind Liberal winner		PC victories		NDP in a competitive or breakthrough position behind PC winner	
	1962	1963	1962	1963	1962	1963	1962	1963
Metropolitan Toronto (20 seats)	14	18	5	9	3	0	2	0
Rest of urban Ontario (27 seats ^a)	15	18	2	2	11	7	5 ^b	4 ^b
Total urban Ontario (47 seats ^a)	29	36	7	11	14	7	7	4

^aIncludes Hull (Quebec) which is part of metropolitan area of Ottawa.

^bOne of these, Waterloo South, was captured by NDP in 1964 by-election.

In 1962, there were two PC ridings in Toronto in which the NDP was in a competitive or breakthrough position (Broadview and York-Scarborough). Both of them were captured by the Liberals in 1963. Outside the metropolitan area of Toronto, it would appear that there are more PC ridings for the NDP to exploit. But it has captured Waterloo South, slipped in Peterborough, and barely maintained itself in a breakthrough position in Wellington South. Only the Oshawa area (i.e.,

⁵⁸ Computed from data in the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962 and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1963.

the federal riding of Ontario) is left. Although the NDP is in a rather favorable position, having obtained 27 and 26 per cent of the vote in the federal riding of Ontario in 1962 and 1963 respectively, it has had trouble converting its large UAW affiliate into electoral support in Oshawa. Hence, the NDP must develop a method for translating its competitive or breakthrough positions into victories in urban ridings currently held by the Liberals. There are only two such ridings outside Toronto (i.e., Fort William and Algoma West). Hence, it must challenge the Liberals in metropolitan Toronto. Since the Liberals can mount a major effort in all of these ridings simultaneously while the NDP must resort to concerted forays in specific ridings, the result is likely to be a frustrating pattern of NDP gains and losses similar to that which prevailed in York South and York Centre. The NDP utilized the gang attack to win the former in 1962. It shifted its attention to the latter in 1963 only to lose York South in the process.

By almost any measure, the NDP appears destined to remain a minor party in Canada. It has virtually exhausted the potentialities of its predecessor's electoral base in all urban areas except those in Ontario where it must develop an effective challenge to the Liberals. Excepting Fraser Valley in British Columbia and Cochrane in Ontario, the prospects of an NDP resurgence in rural Canada seem nil.

Furthermore, its status as a minor party, while not in immediate jeopardy, is in serious trouble because it lacks what Frank Sorauf calls a "structure of incentives."⁵⁹ During its prime, the

⁵⁹ Frank Sorauf, Political Parties in the American System (Boston: Little, Brown, 1964), p. 81.

CCF could formally offer the incentive of "ideology" to its followers. At least within the confines of its bastion of power in Saskatchewan it could offer the incentives derived from being the party in control of "public policy," the dispenser of "patronage," and the guardian of "economic rewards."⁶⁰ The NDP has no tight ideology, and Tommy Douglas' crusade against the "fat cats" seems shallow when it is juxtaposed with the NDP Federal Program. The New Democrats do not govern their current bastion of power in British Columbia and are a long way from that exalted position in Ontario. None of the incentives that can be manipulated by a party of government are available to the NDP at any level of government in Canada. Should the existing condition of stalemate and minority government at the federal level give way to the more normal pattern of very long periods of domination by one major party followed by a "massive alternation" to the other major party, the NDP would lose whatever incentives there are to be had by being a prominent force in a minority government situation.⁶¹ Meanwhile, the creation of the NDP in 1961 provided something around which the dispirited democratic left could rally. Whether the enthusiasm generated in the Ottawa Coliseum in August of 1961 can continue to substitute for a more substantial "structure of incentives" should a majority government be returned is debatable.

⁶⁰ Ibid., pp. 81-83.

⁶¹ Howard A. Scarrow, "Voting Patterns and Canada's New Democratic Party," Political Science, Vol. 14 (March, 1962), p. 3.

CHAPTER VIII

THE NDP IN PARLIAMENT: THE POLITICS OF MINORITY GOVERNMENT

For more than a decade scholars have argued whether parties function most characteristically with reference to the "larger decision-making arena that is the electorate"¹ or the formal arena of political decision-making that is the government. It is not the purpose of this inquiry to explore this question, much less to answer it in terms of the operational assumptions and realities of the Canadian party system. The fact remains that political parties are the sine qua non around which the decision-making process in both arenas is organized in Canada. Hence, it would be impossible to understand the relationship between the NDP and the Canadian political system-at-large without supplementing the previous observations concerning its electoral performance with an analysis of its performance in the House of Commons.

To chronicle the NDP's response to the myriad policy issues that have come before Commons during the more than three and one-half years that have elapsed since the party was founded in 1961 would be a gargantuan task. Indeed, it is dubious whether an analysis

¹ Heinz Eulau, Samuel Eldersveld, and Morris Janowitz (eds.), "Arenas of Political Decision-Making--Introductory Note," Sec. V., Political Behavior (Glencoe, Illinois: Free Press, 1956), p. 265.

premised upon such a chronicle would be of significant value. In order to provide a more penetrating analysis, one premised upon more than a chronicle of positions taken and votes rendered by the NDP, the performance of the party relative to six specific policy issues will be examined at length. Two of the six issues (i.e., one involving the question of nuclear arms and one concerning fiscal policy), in addition to indicating its reaction to the substantive aspects involved, provided crucial tests for the NDP as it has tried to cope with the problem of minority government. This will be the concern of the present chapter. The remaining case studies concern the NDP's performance relative to the issues of parliamentary reform, redistribution, constitutional revision, and the relations between the two major cultural groups in Canadian society. These will be treated in the subsequent chapter.

Leadership in the NDP Federal Caucus

Before proceeding with the case studies, it would be useful to identify the leaders and the patterns of leadership that have prevailed within the NDP caucus.

Leadership in the NDP Caucus Prior to the 1962 Federal Election

It has been noted previously that the established leadership faction in the CCF lost control over the party's federal caucus as a result of the defeats suffered by Stanley Knowles and M. J. Coldwell during the 1958 federal election. It has also been noted that Douglas Fisher, Frank Howard, H. W. Herridge, and Arnold Peters tried to maintain that situation by supporting Hazen Argue for the post of CCF

National Leader to replace the retiring Coldwell. Having accomplished this feat at the 1960 CCF National Convention, the Argue faction tried to obtain control over the post of NDP Federal Leader. Although this dream was shattered when T. C. Douglas defeated Argue at the NDP Founding Convention in 1961, the nine-man federal caucus that the NDP inherited from its predecessor remained firmly in the hands of Argue and his four major supporters.²

An Interlocking Directorate Emerges

Approximately one year after the NDP was created, the Knowles-Lewis-Douglas faction that had obtained fundamental control over the party-at-large acquired personal control over key posts within the NDP caucus. Argue had defected from the party prior to the 1962 federal election, and Douglas succeeded him as leader of the party in the House of Commons after winning the Burnaby-Coquitlam by-election in October of 1962. David Lewis, National Vice-President of the NDP, was elected to his first term in Commons in June of 1962 and became deputy leader of the caucus. Knowles recaptured Winnipeg North Centre and became chief whip. The post of vice-chairman of the caucus went to Harold Winch, an NDP National Vice-President and the man who had been chosen to make the official NCNP reply to Douglas Fisher's charges that the new party leadership was systematically relegating Argue to a subordinate position in all matters pertaining to the formation of the new party.

²Eight CCF MPs had been elected in 1958 and one New Party MP (i.e., Walter Pitman) had been elected during the 1960 Peterborough by-election.

Excluding the caucus secretary, a highly routinized post that is ordinarily staffed with freshmen MPs, the top echelons of the leadership in the party-at-large held sway over four of the six key posts in the caucus following the 1962 election. The other two posts were held by individuals who had challenged the new party leadership by supporting Argue. Fisher, who was one of the more caustic critics of Lewis and Knowles during the leadership fight, became caucus chairman. His colleague, Frank Howard, became deputy whip.

Excepting the leader of the party in Commons, a position which automatically goes to the person who is elected NDP Federal Leader at the biennial party convention providing that person is also elected to Commons,³ all leadership posts in the caucus are filled by secret ballot. Hence, it is virtually impossible to discover the exact reasons why the established NDP leadership faction was unable to control the selection of personnel to fill the posts of caucus chairman and deputy whip. Perhaps Fisher and Howard had developed a rapprochement with the prevailing leadership of the NDP. Neither of them, for example, had been fundamentally opposed to the basic programmatic position taken by the party in 1961; and the Argue episode was technically settled. Perhaps the leadership was willing to accept this arrangement in order to dispel some of the bitterness generated by the long leadership struggle and Argue's subsequent defection from the party.

Assuming that experience in Commons was considered a relevant criterion for occupying positions of responsibility in the caucus, it

³NDP Federal Constitution, as amended 1963, Art. VI, sec. 2.

should be noted that the Knowles-Lewis-Douglas combine had little choice but to accept the prospect that certain posts in the caucus would go to individuals who had rebelled against it at one time or another. Aside from Knowles, Douglas, Winch, and Lewis,⁴ only eight of the nineteen NDP MPs elected in 1962 had previous experience in Commons. Four of the eight (i.e., Fisher, Howard, Herridge, and Peters) had been members of the Argue faction during the leadership fight. Murdo Martin had been a prominent participant in the rebellion which had embarrassed the new party leadership at the 1960 CCF National Convention, a rebellion that led to the rejection of the leadership's proposal to leave the post of CCF National Leader vacant after Coldwell's retirement. He had also joined Fisher in attempting to restrain the former CCF National Secretary, Carl Hamilton, from interfering in the affairs of the caucus and the party in behalf of the anti-Argue forces. The sixth member of this eight-man collection of experienced MPs was Colin Cameron, who had been one of the most vocal opponents of the moderate program presented by the new party leaders to the NDP Founding Convention. That left Thomas Barnett and Malcolm MacInnis. Both men had been returned to Commons in 1962 after absences of several years (i.e., Barnett was not in Commons between 1958 and 1962; MacInnis had been absent between 1957 and 1958). Neither man had been prominently associated with attempts to move the NDP toward a more doctrinaire socialist position. Moreover, neither of them had been especially prominent in the affairs of the caucus during their

⁴Lewis, as noted previously, had served as CCF National Secretary from 1937 to 1950 and attended caucus meetings in that capacity. After more than a decade of such experience it is reasonable that he be included in the "experienced" category.

tenure in Commons before the NDP was created.

Following the 1963 federal election, there were several changes in the personnel representing the NDP in the House of Commons. Lewis, MacInnis, and Thomas Berger had been defeated in that election. William Howe was added to the ranks of the NDP contingent in Commons. Douglas Fisher became deputy leader to replace Lewis, which probably reflected Fisher's accommodation to the prevailing leadership configuration within the caucus and the party-at-large. Certainly, the fact that Fisher has an uncanny "instinct for the self-aggrandizing power play" has not gone unnoticed.⁵ Andrew Brewin, who had been CCF National Treasurer and a leader in the affairs of the Ontario section of the CCF and the NDP, moved into the position of caucus chairman. Otherwise the key posts in the NDP caucus continued to be occupied by the same persons who occupied them after the 1962 election. On balance, the prevailing leadership faction in the extra-parliamentary party continued to hold sway over most of the key posts within the NDP caucus.⁶

The NDP and the Problem of Minority Government

Throughout most of its brief existence, the NDP caucus has had to operate within the context of a minority government situation. Although there have been numerous issues of public policy submitted by the two minority governments that have existed since 1962, many of them involving matters over which the NDP had made a priori

⁵ Globe and Mail, October 28, 1964.

⁶ A summary of the positions held by NDP MPs within the caucus and the party-at-large is set forth in Illustration IX, Appendix.

programmatic commitments, there have been few instances in which the NDP has had to face the critical problem of reconciling its principles with the distinct probability that it alone had the necessary votes to sustain or topple the government. The NDP's performances during two of these dilemma situations are set forth in the following case studies.

The NDP and the Crisis over
Nuclear Arms, 1963

On February 1, 1962, the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) assumed control over the BOMARC-B missile base at North Bay, Ontario.⁷ More than two years had elapsed since the Diefenbaker Government had decided to acquire missiles from the United States and to integrate them into the Canadian arm of the North American defense system. Throughout this two-year period, the Canadian Government was severely criticized for not revealing its intentions regarding the acquisition of nuclear warheads for which these missiles were designed. But the actual presence of "twenty-eight headless missiles point^{ed} skyward from the launching pads at North Bay" was an anomaly that could not be ignored for very long.⁸

Prior to the installation of the BOMARC-B missiles at North Bay, the Diefenbaker Government promoted the idea that disarmament was its primary goal and that the spread of nuclear arms should be curtailed as long as there was any possibility of disarmament among the

⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), February 1, 1962, p. 431.

⁸ John Saywell (ed.), Canadian Annual Review, 1962 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1963), p. 90.

nations of the world. When disarmament negotiations faltered, the Government invoked the argument that the American policy of vesting final control over the use of nuclear arms in the President of the United States conflicted with Canada's interest in establishing joint control over any nuclear weapons that might be acquired from its partner in the North American defense system.

Shortly after the missile site at North Bay was completed, Diefenbaker shifted from the subject of joint control toward the idea of acquiring nuclear warheads in the event of war. The addition of this line of argument to the arsenal of explanations offered by the Government for its delaying tactics became evident when Diefenbaker made mention of it during a speech delivered at Edmonton.⁹ A few days later, United States Secretary of State Dean Rusk announced that the Americans were willing to negotiate a program of joint control,¹⁰ thereby eliminating that subject as a plausible explanation for Canada's delay in deciding to acquire nuclear warheads and forcing Diefenbaker to rely upon the concept set forth in his Edmonton speech.

There was probably no other argument that could have been offered by the Government that was so open to attack as that announced by Diefenbaker at Edmonton, and the Liberals lost little time in trying to expose the ludicrous nature of the idea to acquire nuclear

⁹The Prime Minister, when questioned by Pearson about his speech at Edmonton, reasserted the possibility of acquiring nuclear warheads in the event of war. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), February 26, 1962, pp. 1250-51.

¹⁰Globe and Mail, March 5, 1962.

arms in the event of a war. On March 19 and 20, the Liberals tried to trap Douglas Harkness, the pro-nuclear Minister of Defense, into revealing the exact means by which the Government hoped to acquire and install nuclear warheads within the estimated seventeen minutes that it would take a Soviet ICBM to cross the polar ice cap and move southward into Canada and the United States. Harkness avoided the trap by insisting that the issue under consideration was a bill for supplementary defense estimates and that a review of general defense policy was therefore beyond the scope of debate. With the help of a ruling by the chairman of the committee on supply, he was able to make his argument stick.¹¹ That was the last opportunity to probe the Government's nuclear policy before Diefenbaker announced the dissolution of Parliament on April 17, 1962.

It should be noted at this point that the NDP basically refrained from attacking the Government over the anomalous situation at North Bay during the early months of 1962. In fact, Walter Pitman pleaded with the Liberals to drop their attempt to use the debate on supplementary estimates for the Department of National Defense as an occasion to probe the Government about the subject of nuclear arms.¹² While Pitman certainly had a point when he argued that it was useless to explore a subject over which there seemed to be little prospect of arriving at a decision, it was also expedient for the NDP not to have the Government pressed toward making a decision on nuclear weapons. After all, the Government's vacillation and delay on that issue meant

¹¹ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), March 19-20, 1962, pp. 1946-64, 1968-2014.

¹² Ibid., March 19, 1962, pp. 1959-61.

that there was a chance that the anti-nuclear views of External Affairs Minister Howard Green might eventually prevail over the views of the pro-nuclear Minister of Defense.¹³ Furthermore, any delay in deciding whether to acquire nuclear arms had the effect of being in accord with the NDP's anti-nuclear policy.

The nuclear issue did not receive much attention during the 1962 federal election. Although both the NDP and the SC were unequivocally opposed to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, it was virtually impossible to establish a meaningful dialogue so long as both major parties were unwilling to confront the issue. The Conservatives tended to avoid the issue lest they expose the schism that had been developing within the party. The Liberal Party, on the other hand, had been quite willing to attack the Conservatives in Commons for what Pearson had called "two years of indecision and procrastination, confusion and contradiction."¹⁴ But it was in no better position to confront the nuclear issue during an election campaign than were the Conservatives. Technically, the party continued to be unequivocally opposed to Canada acquiring nuclear arms under any circumstances, a policy adopted by the party in 1960 and reaffirmed

¹³Erhart Regier, after denouncing the Diefenbaker Government for failing to deal with the economic crisis sweeping the country, devoted part of his speech in reply to the Speech from the Throne in January of 1962 to praise the Minister of External Affairs for his efforts to secure world disarmament. The Minister of Defense, according to Regier, was responsible for undercutting those efforts by preaching the need for Canada to acquire nuclear arms. Ibid., January 25, 1962, pp. 201-203.

¹⁴Ibid., January 22, 1962, p. 41.

in January of 1961.¹⁵ The tenor of the attacks made by the Liberals in the Commons, however, suggested the possibility of a move toward reversing that policy. The result was the bland 1962 election promise to oppose the acquisition of nuclear arms under "current conditions."¹⁶

The minority Government elected in June of 1962 did not convene Parliament until September 27 of that year. The Speech from the Throne contained no mention of the nuclear issue, and the subsequent debate was devoted almost entirely to the austerity program that the Government had implemented to stimulate the sagging Canadian economy,¹⁷ Following the defeat of three motions of non-confidence,¹⁸ the Commons turned its attention to an interim supply bill and several non-controversial items on the Government's legislative agenda (i.e., export credits, farm credits, and an amendment to the Food and Drug Act), all of which were expected to consume the time that remained before Commons adjourned for the Christmas recess.

Had it not been for the Cuban crisis in October of 1962, the

¹⁵Globe and Mail, January 9, 1961.

¹⁶Ibid., May 1, 1962.

¹⁷Parliamentary Debates (Commons), September 27 to October 12, 1962, passim.

¹⁸The PC and SC joined to defeat an NDP amendment to the Liberal motion of non-confidence, an amendment specifying the NDP's lack of confidence in the Government's handling of the economic recession. The PC and SC again joined forces to defeat the NDP and Liberal Party on the very generalized motion of non-confidence offered by Pearson. The PC and NDP then combined to defeat the SC motion expressing lack of confidence in the Government for not implementing the SC notion of debt-free money, a maneuver that was designed to allow the SC to oppose the Government without causing its defeat. The NDP, it was known, would not endorse any of the SC's weird monetary schemes. Ibid., pp. 231-32; 439.

subject of nuclear arms might not have been raised at all. At best, it would have probably continued to be bantered about in an atmosphere of utter stalemate. But the exposure of the Soviet missile build-up on Castro's island and the subsequent confrontation between the United States and Russia made it virtually impossible for the stalemate over nuclear arms to continue in Canada.

The first indication that a break had occurred in the stalemate was the shift that took place relative to the nuclear policy of the Liberal Party. It was obvious that the Liberals were drifting away from an explicit anti-nuclear position when Charles Drury (Liberal, St.-Antoine-Westmount) delivered a lengthy speech during debate on the interim supply bill in December of 1962. Recalling the Government's admission on October 25 that the BOMARC missiles at North Bay had not been armed with nuclear warheads even after the Cuban crisis, Drury launched into a long discourse about Canada "dishonouring her international obligations."¹⁹ According to Drury, Canada had acquired a responsibility and an obligation to help defend North America and to insure the preservation of the American second-strike capability.²⁰

The shift in the Liberal position relative to the acquisition of nuclear arms became undeniable in January of 1963. Lester Pearson, in addressing the York-Scarborough Liberal Association, advanced the same line of argument used by Drury.²¹ Later, during the debate on

¹⁹ Ibid., December 14, 1962, p. 2681.

²⁰ Ibid., pp. 2678-84.

²¹ Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.

estimates for the Department of National Defense, Pearson surveyed the contradictions and evasions that had characterized the Government's approach to nuclear arms, noted that the BOMARC missiles and the CF-100 (Voodoo) interceptors under Canadian control were useless during the Cuban crisis because they lacked the kind of warheads and armaments for which they were designed, and set forth the following statement as his viewpoint on the entire controversy. "The Canadian government has made certain pledges and has accepted certain defence commitments on behalf of Canada which can only be carried out by Canadian forces if nuclear warheads are used."²²

There was also some evidence that the Cuban crisis had prompted the pro-nuclear wing within the PC to become more persistent. The first indication of this came early in January of 1963, when the PC convention defeated a strongly supported motion urging the party to endorse a pro-nuclear policy.²³ Then, on January 28, Minister of Defense Douglas Harkness issued a statement to the press which purported to explain the meaning of a speech delivered by Diefenbaker in Commons on January 25. Harkness' version made it seem that the Prime Minister had taken an unequivocal stand in favor of acquiring nuclear arms.²⁴ In light of the evidence cited by Peter Newman, and in view of the responses given by both Diefenbaker and Harkness during the question periods on January 28 and 29, it would seem that the maneuver by the Minister of Defense resulted from an unintentional

²²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), January 25, 1963, p. 3117.

²³Globe and Mail, January 21, 1963.

²⁴Ibid., January 29, 1962.

misinterpretation of Diefenbaker's position.²⁵ Nevertheless, Harkness had exposed the zeal with which members of the pro-nuclear faction in the PC searched the words and deeds of their leader for any sign that he was ready to make a decision about nuclear arms.

While Harkness was considering the possibility of resigning his post as Minister of Defense to protest Diefenbaker's unwillingness to end the farce that substituted for a nuclear policy, the United States Government announced its rebuttal to the speech delivered by the Prime Minister on January 25. "It was just conceivable," wrote Newman, "that Diefenbaker might have had time to reconcile the differences in his cabinet" had it not been for the announcement issued by the United States on January 30, 1962.²⁶ In a move that was unprecedented in the history of Canadian-American relations, the United States flatly denied that Canada had proposed any practical arrangement whereby it could arm its forces with nuclear weapons in the event of a crisis, a point that Diefenbaker had stressed on January 25. Furthermore, the announcement denied that the Nassau talks in December had resulted in any decision which might cast doubt upon the RCAF's continued nuclear role in the defense of North America, another point that Diefenbaker had discussed at length on January 25.²⁷

²⁵Diefenbaker's speech on January 25 was dilatory enough to prompt headlines that the Government was ready to scrap the \$685 million worth of nuclear-carrying equipment as well as Harkness' interpretation that Canada was ready to acquire nuclear arms for the nuclear-carrying arsenal. Peter Newman, Renegade in Power: The Diefenbaker Years (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1963), pp. 361. Diefenbaker's speech is set forth in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), January 25, 1963, pp. 3125-37.

²⁶Newman, Renegade in Power, p. 366.

²⁷Globe and Mail, January 31, 1963.

On January 31, Harkness delivered a lengthy speech during the emergency debate on the announcement made by the United States, a speech which restated the same theme that he had offered to the press when he explained Diefenbaker's January 25 speech.²⁸ Unable to reconcile this view with that which the Prime Minister continued to hold throughout the hurried negotiations that were held by the PC on the weekend of February 1-3, Harkness tendered his resignation.²⁹ As the cabinet disintegrated, the Commons took up debate on a general motion of non-confidence introduced by Lester Pearson.³⁰

Relating the NDP's unequivocal anti-nuclear position to any one of the events that had unfolded since the beginning of 1963 was a rather simple matter. Andrew Brewin, who had replaced Herridge as the chairman of the NDP's caucus committee on external affairs and defense matters after the 1962 election, delivered a scathing attack upon the shift in the Liberal Party's approach to nuclear arms.³¹ Similarly, the NDP could and did denounce the announcement made by the United States State Department. Not only was it a blatant intrusion into Canadian politics, according to Douglas, but the American insistence that a program of joint control eliminated any possibility of the spread of nuclear arms was "not the view which the United States took

²⁸Parliamentary Debates (Commons), January 31, 1963, pp. 3321-25.

²⁹The announcement was made on Sunday, February 3, and was read in Commons the following day. Ibid., February 4, 1963, p. 3377.

³⁰Pearson's rambling speech introducing the motion of non-confidence appears in Ibid., pp. 3395-96; 3402-12.

³¹His attack was made at a meeting of the Timmins NDP Constituency Association. Globe and Mail, January 14, 1963.

when nuclear missiles, presumably under the control of the Soviet Union, were stationed in Cuba."³² Finally, the NDP was as decisive as any party when it came to pointing out the ludicrous situation that had been revealed by Harkness' interpretation of Diefenbaker's speech of January 25 and the need to resolve the obvious crisis within the Government that had been revealed by Harkness' resignation.

When these events had to be judged collectively and related to the NDP's anti-nuclear policy, however, it was clear that the party faced a major dilemma. The Liberal motion of non-confidence charged the Government with lack of leadership in the fields of economic as well as nuclear policy. The NDP could not disagree with the fact that the record of the PC Government was one of atrophy and indecision. Douglas was quick to point out that the Government had done nothing to grapple with the immediate problem of unemployment, that it had failed to deal effectively with the balance of payments situation, that it made few gestures toward recognizing the plight of the agricultural sector of the economy, and that it had stalled all considerations of a realistic medicare program.³³ But to support the rambling Liberal non-confidence motion at a time when the major issue facing the Commons and the nation was the nuclear crisis involved the risk that the NDP would be associated with the pro-nuclear stand taken by Pearson. Furthermore, it was possible that Harkness' resignation would eliminate or substantially reduce the influence of the pro-nuclear faction within the PC and possibly prompt Diefenbaker

³²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), January 31, 1963, pp. 3291-92.

³³Ibid., February 5, 1963, pp. 3459-60.

to associate himself openly with the anti-nuclear Minister of External Affairs. On the other hand, it was quite possible that Harkness' resignation would lead to the dethronement of John Diefenbaker as leader of the PC, a situation that could only result in an immediate shift toward a policy of accepting nuclear weapons.

It was reported that the NDP caucus was divided over how to deal with the Liberal motion of non-confidence and the unsettled power fight that was apparently taking place within the PC.³⁴ A speech by Knowles, attacking Pearson for not being more specific in making his motion of non-confidence, gave rise to rumors that the NDP might vote with the PC.³⁵ But Douglas set the record straight later in the day by stressing the point that the NDP, in supporting the Liberal motion, was not endorsing a policy of acquiring nuclear devices to fulfill any commitments that the Government had made by acquiring BOMARCs and Voodoos. It had decided to support a non-confidence motion on the grounds that the Government had been generally derelict in its approach to all phases of public policy and had indicated its continued interest in concluding an agreement to make nuclear arms available to Canada.³⁶

When it came time to vote, 16 NDP MPs aligned themselves with 98 Liberals and 28 Social Crediters to sustain the Liberal non-confidence motion. The same alignment sustained an SC amendment to

³⁴Globe and Mail, February 5, 1963.

³⁵Ibid., February 6, 1963. Knowles' speech is set forth in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), February 5, 1963, pp. 3398-99.

³⁶Ibid., February 5, 1963, pp. 3460-61.

the motion specifying lack of confidence in the Government's nuclear policy. Herridge and Cameron voted with the PC on both divisions.³⁷

Colin Cameron revealed the dilemma that had faced the NDP when he told reporters that, while the Government's nuclear policy continued to be ambiguous, it was evident that there was no "very great danger" that it would actually acquire nuclear arms. Herridge, who had not been unknown to revolt against the NDP leadership in the past, told reporters that it was better to stand by Minister of External Affairs Howard Green than to support the Liberals' pro-nuclear views.³⁸

While it is true that the NDP leadership had not established a strong case to support the idea that the PC was moving toward a pro-nuclear position, Cameron and Herridge had overlooked the fact that Douglas had stressed the party's interest in legislation concerning issues other than defense, the passage of which seemed nil so long as the Diefenbaker Government remained in power. Furthermore, it was almost a foregone conclusion that a Liberal government would emerge from an election following a defeat of the Diefenbaker regime, bringing to power a party with which the NDP could co-operate on issues like pensions, medicare, unemployment, and industrial development. Although the Liberal Party might accept nuclear arms for the present, it had a long history of opposing them and had promised to renegotiate Canada's nuclear commitments in light of the growing obsolescence of fixed missile sites like those at North Bay. The

³⁷ Ibid., pp. 3461-63.

³⁸ Globe and Mail, February 6, 1963.

latter was at least a reasonable facsimile of the NDP's position that all nuclear commitments that Canada might have made by accepting missiles designed to carry nuclear devices ought to be scrapped. Hence, it is possible to conclude that the NDP's position during the vote on the subject of non-confidence, Cameron and Herridge aside, represented a plausible and possibly a brilliant performance in terms of the party's interest in maximizing its ability to promote the broader dimensions of the NDP program. Judged strictly in terms of the nuclear question, however, the NDP performance can be viewed as a tactical mistake. Subsequent events proved Cameron and Herridge correct. Diefenbaker was not ousted, and the PC has not endorsed the acquisition of nuclear arms. The Liberals, on the other hand, have acquired nuclear arms and have steadfastly refused to present evidence that the Pearson Government is pressing for a renegotiation of Canada's nuclear role.

The NDP and the Gordon
Budget of 1963

When it became apparent that another minority government situation was likely to prevail after the 1963 election, NDP Federal Leader Thomas Douglas told a campaign audience that the New Democrats were prepared to support the party that obtained the largest number of seats in Commons for a "reasonable period of time" if that party made "an honest effort" to implement a program of economic recovery.³⁹ After the results of the election were published, however, Douglas told reporters that he had no plans to meet with Lester Pearson to

³⁹Winnipeg Free Press, March 28, 1963.

work out an arrangement between the NDP and the Liberals. Furthermore, he stipulated that the party would "decide upon a course of action" at a meeting of the NDP Federal Executive and the NDP caucus.⁴⁰

This apparent equivocation on the part of Douglas, plus some audacious remarks by Real Caouette (Deputy Leader of the SC), led to speculation that the NDP and the SC would support the Conservatives to prevent the pro-nuclear Liberals from assuming power.⁴¹ Notwithstanding the possibility that such an arrangement might have been contemplated by certain individuals within the NDP,⁴² the basic issue

⁴⁰ Globe and Mail, April 10, 1963.

⁴¹ Several days after the election, the spokesman for the dissident elements within the Quebec wing of the SC--Real Caouette--claimed that the Conservatives had offered to give the SC two seats in a cabinet headed by Diefenbaker and had agreed to make Stanley Knowles of the NDP the Speaker of the House of Commons in exchange for the support of these two minor parties. To prevent such chicanery, Caouette claimed that he and five other Social Crediters from Quebec had agreed to offer their support to the Liberals just twenty minutes before Douglas was supposed to telephone Robert Thompson (Leader of the SC) in order to confirm the NDP's willingness to support such an alliance. Le Devoir, April 13, 1963. The story was promptly denied by Thompson and Douglas, and the six SC dissenters subsequently withdrew their offer to back the Liberals. Globe and Mail, April 13, 18, 1963. It was later revealed that Caouette wanted to retaliate against Thompson's equivocal stand on nuclear arms during the 1963 campaign, a stand that had cost the SC votes in Quebec, according to the vehemently anti-nuclear Caouette. Apparently Caouette, who was engaged in an increasingly bitter power struggle with Thompson, wanted to embarrass the SC leadership by making it appear that Thompson's equivocation was really a cover for a pro-nuclear policy. This line of argument becomes exceedingly plausible in light of the break in the SC ranks several months later and the creation of the Ralliement des Creditistes. Globe and Mail, July 6, 1963; August 31, 1963; September 2, 1963.

⁴² Herridge and Cameron, it should be recalled, had supported the Diefenbaker Government during the crisis over Canada's nuclear policy in order to achieve exactly what the rumored PC-SC-NDP alliance was supposed to accomplish--to keep the anti-nuclear Conservatives in power.

confronting the party was whether it should announce its intention not to support any motion of non-confidence directed at the minority Liberal Government for a specified period of time, or whether it should assume a more pragmatic position similar to that set forth by Douglas during the campaign. Frank Howard, who had built his campaign for re-election around a promise not to vote for any motions of non-confidence during the first two sessions of Parliament following the 1963 election, urged the NDP caucus to adopt a similar course of action. The leadership, however, wanted to take a more independent approach, that is, to announce that the NDP would give the Liberals a reasonable period of time in which to implement its domestic program while reserving the right to vote on any issue strictly in terms of NDP principles.⁴³

The course of action outlined by the NDP leadership admittedly involved risks, but it had the advantage of placing the Liberals on notice that they could expect to obtain the support of the NDP only on an ad hoc basis. It did not take the New Democrats long to verify the fact that they were willing to assume the risks involved in order to promote the party's principles, at least for the record. On May 20 and 21, Douglas delivered a reply to the Speech from the Throne, stipulating that the NDP was "prepared to give the government a chance to carry out its domestic program for economic recovery"⁴⁴ and that

⁴³ Interview with Frank Howard, MP, Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964. Frank Howard revealed the split in the NDP over the course of action it should follow in a newsletter published in a Prince Rupert, British Columbia, newspaper. A copy of the letter and a story about it appeared in Globe and Mail, June 11, 1963.

⁴⁴ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), May 20, 1963, p. 72.

it would oppose the glib non-confidence motion that had been offered by Diefenbaker.⁴⁵ He concluded his speech, however, by offering an amendment to the PC motion, expressing regret that the Government had indicated its intention to acquire nuclear arms for Canadian forces, "thereby lessening the chances of nuclear disarmament and increasing the danger of nuclear war."⁴⁶

The NDP, it would seem, could not have chosen a more explosive issue with which to serve notice that it intended to pursue a course of action premised upon its own programmatic commitments. All of the opposition parties, with varying degrees of explicitness, had campaigned against the acquisition of nuclear arms. But the probability that the Government would be defeated was not as immediate as it appeared. The Liberals had to obtain only three votes from other parties to sustain the Government, assuming all 265 members were present and voted. Frank Howard, who had promised not to help bring down the Government, could be depended upon at least to abstain, thereby giving the Liberals, in effect, one of the three votes that they needed. Furthermore, several Conservatives could be expected either to vote with the Liberals or abstain; after all, some of them had done much worse by helping to topple their own party from power a few months earlier.

Assuming that the NDP had made a similar calculation that

⁴⁵The PC motion attacked the Liberals for failing to announce an economic program that would give "Canada a full opportunity to continue the social advances and economic growth of 1962," a statement of questionable validity in the NDP's view. Ibid., May 21, 1963, p. 85.

⁴⁶Ibid.

the Government was in no immediate danger of falling--and it would be difficult to believe that a party which had borrowed heavily in order to finance the 1963 campaign was prepared to face another election--the vote on the Douglas amendment contained few surprises. Two PCs, Douglas Harkness and John McIntosh, voted with 118 Liberals and four Social Crediters (including Thompson) to defeat the combined strength of 16 NDPs, 19 Quebec SCs, and 78 Conservatives. Eleven PCs were absent and three were paired with Liberals. Frank Howard, as expected, did not cast a vote.⁴⁷ The 124 to 113 vote prompted Knowles to remind the Liberals that, while the NDP did not feel that the country should be subjected to another election, it would not shrink from doing its duty. "I am sure," he told the Commons, "that after the narrow defeat of the NDP's amendment the government . . . will drop its arrogance and realize that it must pay some attention to the wishes of parliament as a whole."⁴⁸

Following the defeat of the PC motion of non-confidence by a vote of 147 to 76,⁴⁹ the debate on the Speech from the Throne continued without any further tests of confidence. By the end of May, the Government was able to introduce the following portions of its legislative program: (1) a proposal to establish a special parliamentary defense committee; (2) a measure designed to create an economic council that would be empowered to investigate economic trends and publish reports upon which the private and public sectors

⁴⁷ Ibid., pp. 134-35.

⁴⁸ Ibid., May 22, 1963, p. 146.

⁴⁹ Ibid., May 22, 1963, pp. 228-29.

of the economy could make plans to meet the needs of the future; (3) a proposal to create a department of industry that would include an area development agency to advise industry about the economic opportunities and problems that existed in various parts of Canada and coordinate various tax and other financial incentives designed to promote industrial expansion in areas of economic decline; and (4) a proposal to establish a municipal development and loan board designed to provide financial assistance to urban areas.⁵⁰

Throughout the initial stages of debate over these matters, the NDP continued to express a willingness to allow the Government time to implement its program for economic recovery while reserving the right to judge specific proposals in terms of its own programmatic orientations. The New Democrats insisted that they were favorably disposed toward all of the measures outlined above; but they felt constrained to ask the Government to inaugurate a more comprehensive system of economic planning than had been included in the proposals regarding the creation of an economic council and a department of industry, and to consider a more massive public works program than that included in the proposal to create a municipal development and loan fund. Unemployment, the NDP maintained, could not be reduced with feeble gestures toward economic planning and a meager program of capital investment in urban areas.⁵¹ The NDP also continued to raise the sensitive nuclear issue by demanding that the Liberals produce documentary proof that the Diefenbaker Government had committed Canada

⁵⁰ Ibid., May 30 to June 12, 1964, passim.

⁵¹ Ibid.

to a policy of acquiring nuclear weapons, proof that would end the confusion created by Diefenbaker's repeated assertions that no such commitment had ever been made and the Pearson Government's contention that it had taken steps to fulfill such a commitment.⁵²

For approximately one month, the contrariety that was inherent in the NDP's approach to the minority Pearson Government did not present any major problems for the New Democrats in the Commons. On June 13, however, Minister of Finance Walter Gordon presented the Government's budget to the Parliament. Within two weeks the NDP's promise to allow the Liberals a reasonable period of time in which to implement a program of economic recovery was placed in direct and seemingly immutable conflict with its decision to vote in terms of its own programmatic principles.

The budget crisis, or at least one aspect thereof, started to take shape the day after Gordon presented the budget to Parliament. On Friday, June 14, Douglas Fisher rose during the question period and asked Gordon whether the budget had been prepared with the assistance of outside (i.e., non-governmental) consultants. Gordon responded to this seemingly innocuous question by stating that he

⁵² Knowles' motion to that effect was passed by a vote of 140 to 64, with 64 Conservatives voting against the combined strength of the NDP, SC, and the Liberals. Prior to the vote, Diefenbaker urged the Liberals to produce such documents if they existed. Then he promptly voted against Knowles' motion. Ibid., June 5, 1963, pp. 687-90. The Liberals, on the other hand, eventually hedged on the matter and refused to produce the documents for reasons of security. Globe and Mail, June 19, 1963. Shortly after Canada formally agreed to accept nuclear arms, Diefenbaker introduced a motion requesting that the Liberals produce the documents upon which this agreement was based. That motion was defeated by a vote of 105 to 91 with the PC, NDP, and sixteen Social Crediters voting against 105 Liberals. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), October 2, 1963, pp. 3118-19.

had received advice from a number of people. Later that day, however, he consented to place the names of the three outside consultants who, after having been sworn to secrecy, assisted him in the preparation of the budget. Two of the consultants, Gordon revealed, were on temporary leaves of absence from two Toronto investment firms.

The news that two of Gordon's consultants were regularly employed by investment firms precipitated immediate demands for additional information concerning the preparation of the budget and assurances that precautions had been taken to insure that the contents remained secret until Gordon presented it to the Commons. After all, as several opposition MPs pointed out, the budget did contain a proposal to impose a 30 per cent tax on the sale of shares in Canadian corporations to non-residents, plus proposals to make some significant changes in the withholding tax imposed upon foreign investors who collected dividends from corporations with less than 25 per cent of their voting shares held by Canadians.⁵³

The NDP caucus spent the weekend following Gordon's disclosure that outside consultants had been privy to the budget proposals trying to agree upon a strategy. Douglas Fisher had told reporters that he intended to introduce a motion calling for Gordon's resignation;⁵⁴ but other members of the caucus, it was rumored, had serious reservations about supporting such a severe course of action. The moderate point of view eventually prevailed, and Fisher told the representatives of the press that he was not going to demand Gordon's

⁵³Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 14, 1963, pp. 1169-71, 1198-1202.

⁵⁴Globe and Mail, June 15, 1963.

resignation because it had become apparent to him that the Minister of Finance had merely followed a tradition established by the former Government.⁵⁵

On Monday, June 17, Diefenbaker introduced a motion to adjourn the Commons in order that a "matter of urgent public importance" could be discussed, namely, Gordon's admission of facts relating to the preparation of the budget, facts which constituted a "flagrant departure from constitutional budgetary practice" and imperiled the "essential secrecy of the budget."⁵⁶ The NDP, which reportedly had a similar motion ready to be introduced,⁵⁷ vigorously supported the PC move. After a brief debate, the Speaker of the House of Commons ruled that Diefenbaker's motion was out of order on the grounds that the matter could be dealt with during the regularly scheduled debate on the budget. Knowles appealed the ruling, only to have it upheld on division by a vote of 97 to 69. The Liberals drew the support of Thompson and several of his Social Crediters against 58 PCs and 11 NDPs.⁵⁸

Although Knowles and Diefenbaker continued to raise the issue during the question periods on Monday and Tuesday, the concern over the Government's use of outside consultants was immediately overshadowed when Gordon announced that the Government was withdrawing its proposal to impose a 30 per cent tax on the sale of shares in

⁵⁵ Ibid., June 17, 1963.

⁵⁶ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 17, 1963, p. 1235.

⁵⁷ Globe and Mail, June 18, 1963.

⁵⁸ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 17, 1963, pp. 1240-41.

Canadian corporations to foreign investors pending the formulation of detailed administrative procedures for collecting the tax.⁵⁹ The disclosure that this action constituted a concession to one of the demands made by the President of the Toronto Stock Exchange in a letter to Gordon, coupled with the fact that the Minister of Finance had announced his decision prior to the closing of the stock markets in Canada, created a major panic in Commons and caused prices in the stock market to suffer the sharpest decline since the Cuban crisis.⁶⁰

George Nowlan, the financial critic for the Conservatives, opened the debate on the budget later in the day by making a caustic attack upon the participation of outside consultants, the effect of Gordon's withdrawal of the 30 per cent takeover tax upon the stock market, and several features of the budget itself. He concluded his speech by introducing a want of confidence motion containing four specific criticisms: (1) The Minister of Finance, in failing to maintain the constitutional practice of the essential secrecy of the budget, had seriously weakened public confidence; (2) In general, his budget proposals would endanger and curtail the expansion of the economy; (3) The extension of the 11 per cent sales tax to include certain building materials, machinery, and equipment constituted a retrograde and inexcusable action; (4) The proposals purporting to bring about Canadian control over the Canadian economy were doomed to failure and would result in the deterioration of Canada's

⁵⁹ Ibid., June 19, 1963, p. 1321.

⁶⁰ Globe and Mail, June 20-21, 1963.

international obligations.⁶¹

In 1962, after criticizing the fiscal policies set forth by the minority Diefenbaker Government, the SC offered an amendment to a Liberal motion of non-confidence condemning the Government for failing to adopt the fiscal and monetary policies advocated by the Social Credit Party. Since it was understood that the New Democrats could not support such an amendment, the SC was able to express its dissatisfaction with Diefenbaker's policies without causing the Government to be defeated. Having voted for their party's amendment to the Liberal motion, the Social Crediters were freed to vote with the Diefenbaker Government against the main motion.⁶²

In 1963, spokesmen for the SC delivered a series of attacks against the Gordon budget and insisted upon elucidating many of the unorthodox monetary and fiscal policies with which their party had become associated.⁶³ But they did not introduce an amendment to the PC motion of non-confidence condemning the minority Liberal Government for failing to adopt these policies; nor did they choose to reveal the SC's position relative to the PC motion itself. Consequently, the members of the NDP caucus were faced with the distinct possibility that the SC would cast its lot with the PC and vote for the motion of non-confidence, thereby placing the burden of deciding

⁶¹ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 19, 1963, pp. 1346-56.

⁶² Ibid., October 2, 9, 1962, pp. 138-39, 340-41.

⁶³ Ibid., June 20-21, 1963, pp. 1384-1390, 1438-1443.

the fate of the Pearson Government squarely upon the New Democrats.

Colin Cameron, who served as chairman of the financial committee within the party's caucus, delivered the main NDP speech during the six-day debate on the Gordon budget. In general, he refrained from attacking the Minister of Finance for using the employees of several investment houses to assist him with the preparation of the budget. Instead, he focused upon the content of the budget itself, calling it a "patchwork quilt made out of a lot of scraps of pre-Keynesian economies and tattered attempts at modern economics."⁶⁴ Specifically, he criticized the Government for trying to perpetuate the concept of a balanced budget while attempting to delude the nation into believing that the Government was committed to a program of public expenditures designed to stimulate the economy. He praised the Minister of Finance for at least recognizing the need to reduce foreign ownership of Canada's resources and industries, but he questioned any proposed solution to that problem that did not include a program of public investment in the Canadian economy to replace the capital that had been traditionally supplied by foreign investors. The NDP, he added, was especially appalled by Gordon's actions regarding the 30 per cent takeover tax, actions which caused a "tizzy" in the stock market.⁶⁵ He attacked the notion of developing industrial expansion by granting tax incentives to industry and the regressive nature of the sales tax that Gordon wanted to extend to cover building materials. He wondered how much effect the proposed

⁶⁴ Ibid., June 20, 1963, p. 1390.

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 1393.

municipal loan fund would have if the Government proceeded with its plans to loan \$400 million over a period of three years, especially in light of the fact that the loans could not be used to finance schools, hospitals, sewers, and public housing.⁶⁶

While Cameron's speech and Reid Scott's elaboration thereof⁶⁷ suggested that the NDP could not support the Gordon budget, the party did not reveal the dilemma that it faced regarding the PC motion of non-confidence until moments before the vote was taken. On the night of June 24, Douglas repeated the NDP's criticisms of the Gordon budget, calling it a "regressive and schizophrenic" collection of proposals that had been presented after an "unbelievable amount of fumbling, bungling and ineptitude."⁶⁸ Having made these points, the NDP Federal Leader admitted that the party was trapped between its decision to permit the Government a reasonable period of time in which to carry out a program of economic recovery and its belief that the motion of non-confidence offered by the PC contained valid criticisms of the Government's inept and poorly conceived attempt to formulate a budget. Since the party felt that the Government had not had a reasonable period of time, and since the NDP did not believe the people wanted to have a third federal election within a period of fifteen months, Douglas announced that the fourteen members of the NDP caucus who were present would abstain during the vote on the PC motion. Ignoring cries of "shame" from the members of other parties,

⁶⁶Ibid., pp. 1390-95.

⁶⁷Ibid., June 21, 1963, pp. 1441-47.

⁶⁸Ibid., June 24, 1963, pp. 1518-19.

Douglas concluded his speech with the following remarks.

By abstaining from voting we are saying to the government that we are prepared to see you stay in office in the hope that you will do something to implement the promises you made to the people of Canada. But by abstaining, we are also stating that we have no confidence in this budget, that we will not be associated with this dismal budget and the disastrous consequences which we believe will flow from its implementation.⁶⁹

After adjourning to the galleries, the fourteen New Democrats and the three Social Crediters who followed them watched the proceedings as the PC motion was defeated by a vote of 113 to 73. One hundred and three Liberals and ten Social Crediters were pitted against the 73 Conservatives who were in their seats.⁷⁰

The NDP's problems did not end with the defeat of the PC motion of non-confidence. The following day the Conservatives demanded a division on a motion by the Minister of Finance to refer the budget resolutions to the committee of ways and means where they could be examined in detail without subjecting the Government to further motions of non-confidence. Again the members of the NDP caucus abstained as 119 Liberals and Social Crediters upheld the motion to send the budget to committee over the protests of 74 Conservatives.⁷¹

With debate on the budget concluded and the budget resolutions safely before the committee of ways and means, Diefenbaker tried to keep the issue alive by invoking the "ancient doctrine that the redress of grievances should be considered before the grant of

⁶⁹ Ibid., p. 1521.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 1521-22.

⁷¹ Ibid., June 26, 1963; Globe and Mail, June 29, 1963.

supplies is maintained in the House of Commons."⁷² As soon as Gordon introduced a motion that the Commons go into committee of supply, the Leader of the PC submitted the following amendment.

That this house regrets that the government by its failure to clarify many doubts and uncertainties in some of its economic policies has created and continues to create confusion and chaos in various sectors of the economy, thereby contributing to a lamentable slowing down of expected expansion and growth.⁷³

Without formally announcing the abandonment of its recent policy of abstaining during crucial votes, Douglas stipulated that the NDP was in general agreement with the terms of the amendment offered by Diefenbaker. But he quickly added that the amendment expressing non-confidence in the Government's economic policies did not contain a remedy and that therefore the NDP felt compelled to offer an amendment expressing its regret that the Government had failed to introduce the

kind of economic planning that would promote economic growth and full employment, and more particularly has failed to institute a large scale program of housing and public works, to create a more effective consumer demand, and to introduce a system of parity prices for primary products.⁷⁴

Although the Speaker ruled it out of order, a ruling which was sustained on division by a vote of 158 to 14,⁷⁵ it was clear that the NDP's maneuver was not unlike that utilized by the SC in 1962.

Certainly, it could not expect to obtain broad support for an amendment

⁷² Arthur Beauchesne, Rules and Forms of the House of Commons of Canada (4th ed.; Toronto: Carswell, 1958), p. 198.

⁷³ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), July 2, 1963, p. 1739.

⁷⁴ Ibid., pp. 1747-48.

⁷⁵ Only the NDP voted against the ruling. Ibid., p. 1749.

which contained so many "socialistic" principles.

After failing to get its amendment accepted, the NDP caucus met during the evening recess and reportedly decided to vote against the Diefenbaker amendment on the grounds that it was shallow and couched in vague generalities.⁷⁶ When the vote was taken, however, 13 of the 14 New Democrats who were present voted with 61 Conservatives and a lone Social Crediter (Guy Marcoux) in favor of Diefenbaker's amendment. Ninety-six Liberals, eight Social Crediters, and Frank Howard of the NDP combined to defeat the PC amendment expressing non-confidence in the Government's economic policies.⁷⁷

Although the NDP let it be known that it had decided to reverse its earlier decision to vote against the Diefenbaker amendment, partly because Gordon had resumed the debate after the evening recess by making a sneering reference to the NDP's abstention on June 24,⁷⁸ it should be noted that only 61 Conservatives remained in their seats for the vote on Diefenbaker's amendment expressing lack of confidence in the Government's economic policies. While the New Democrats might have been piqued by Gordon's apparent inability to appreciate the fact that the NDP's previous abstention had helped to save the Government, it must have been evident to the NDP that the abstention of 33 Conservatives eliminated any chance that the Government would be defeated during the latest crisis over the Gordon budget. The NDP could therefore express its displeasure with the

⁷⁶Globe and Mail, July 4, 1963.

⁷⁷Parliamentary Debates (Commons), July 2, 1963, pp. 1764-65.

⁷⁸Globe and Mail, July 4, 1963.

economic policies of the Pearson Government without violating its promise to allow the Liberals a reasonable period of time in which to implement their domestic program. Indeed, Reid Scott, in announcing to reporters that the NDP would be able to vote as it desired for the remainder of the session, noted that the party had become convinced that the PC would not allow the Government to fall because many Conservatives were seen making their exit just before the vote on Diefenbaker's amendment was recorded.⁷⁹

By its own admission, the NDP's approach to the problem of minority government following the 1963 election was applicable only in those situations in which the party could be reasonably sure that the Government would obtain direct or indirect support from one or more of the other opposition parties. Furthermore, it should be noted that the technique of abstaining in a dilemma situation aroused so much controversy within the ranks of the NDP that it has probably lost its utility as a device for circumventing similar dilemmas in the future. Not only had the NDP caucus become divided over the idea of abstaining during a crisis situation, particularly after the party's chief whip (Stanley Knowles) returned from a trip to California and severely criticized his colleagues for the stunt they had pulled on June 24,⁸⁰ but it was reported that many members of the extra-parliamentary organs of the party were highly critical of the abstention policy. In an apparent move to prevent the issue from exploding on the floor of the party's biennial convention scheduled to meet in

⁷⁹Ibid.

⁸⁰Ibid.

Regina on August 6-9, 1963, Douglas announced to the press following a pre-convention meeting of the NDP Federal Council that the seventeen NDP MPs were freed from the party's campaign promise to give the party in power a fair and reasonable period of time during which the NDP would refrain from joining any drive to turn it out of office.⁸¹

While the announcement made by Douglas on the eve of the 1963 NDP Federal Convention seemed to indicate that the party had made a fundamental shift in its approach to the minority Liberal Government, and that henceforth the NDP would vote strictly in terms of its own principles, it must be recalled that Douglas, Fisher, and Lewis attended a secret meeting held in the Ottawa apartment of Walter Gordon in November of 1963, a meeting that was reportedly devoted, at least in part, to the subject of collaboration between the NDP and the Liberals in the House of Commons. The mere fact that the meeting was held suggests the possibility that the NDP continued to be exceedingly interested in having the Liberals remain in power. All that Douglas' announcement in Regina had done, it would seem, was to remove a formal commitment to prevent the defeat of the Pearson Government, thereby eliminating what had become a highly visible and an exceedingly embarrassing standard against which the party's conduct in the Commons could be judged. The NDP's performance in the parliamentary arena since the 1963 budget crisis, several important aspects of which are documented in the next chapter, tends to confirm the idea that the shift in policy announced by Douglas at Regina was more symbolic than real.

⁸¹ Ibid., August 6, 1962.

CHAPTER IX

THE NDP IN PARLIAMENT: THE POLITICS OF DIVORCE, DISTRIBUTION, FLAGS, AND FORMULAS

The NDP caucus, as previously noted, has had to operate within the context of a minority government situation since 1962. Nevertheless, it has been basically free to play what might be termed the more conventional role of an opposition party, either because many of the issues of public policy with which it became concerned did not become matters of confidence, or the New Democrats could depend upon members of other parties to assume the burden of deciding the fate of the government. The following case studies examine the NDP's role as an opposition party in situations other than those in which it has had to reconcile its principles with the distinct possibility that it alone could topple or sustain the government.

Parliamentary Reform: The Divorce Blockade, 1960-1963

Like its predecessor, the NDP has been committed to the reform of the procedures utilized in Parliament. It has recommended a more effective use of the committee system in the House of Commons, a review of the voting procedures used in that body, and expanded research facilities for individual MPs. It has also recommended the abolition of the Senate, which it views as an undemocratic anachronism

in the legislative process. Although the NDP and its predecessor have pressed these ideas before Commons on numerous occasions, the most notable and certainly the most publicized contribution of the democratic left in the area of parliamentary reform was that which culminated in the passage of legislation regarding the procedure for handling divorce petitions filed by persons residing in the provinces of Quebec and Newfoundland.

According to one of the enumerated powers listed in Section 91 of the BNA Act, Parliament has jurisdiction over marriage and divorce legislation in Canada.¹ In 1930, Parliament passed the Canadian Divorce Act, which granted provincial governments the power to create divorce courts. Quebec and Newfoundland never took advantage of the power granted by this legislation. Consequently, Parliament continued to be the vehicle for granting divorces to persons living in these two provinces.

The procedure was rather simple. Divorce petitions were introduced in the Senate as private bills. They were then sent to a standing committee on divorce where the evidence set forth to support each of the petitions was ostensibly examined. Upon the recommendation of the committee, the Senate would pass the divorce bills and forward them to the House of Commons. Ordinarily, the Commons would receive a whole series of these private bills from the upper chamber, and it usually passed them en masse with little or no debate. Excepting periodic grumbles about the procedure and the introduction of private bills to substitute a more judicious method for handling

¹BNA Act, Art. VI, sec. 91, as amended. Cited in the Appendix of Dawson, The Government of Canada, p. 564.

these divorce bills, the system for granting divorces to persons living in Quebec and Newfoundland went unchallenged.

Although J. S. Woodsworth had been one of those who introduced bills to change the system, the CCF never went on record in favor of changing the divorce procedure in Parliament.² Resolutions were introduced periodically at party conventions only to be referred to the council or executive where they were tabled for future consideration.³ The subject of divorce, moreover, was not raised at the NDP Founding Convention. A resolution concerning divorce procedures was introduced at the 1963 NDP Federal Convention, but it was referred to the caucus for consideration.⁴

Nevertheless, the CCF and NDP became associated with a highly controversial and widely publicized crusade to change the procedure for handling divorces in Parliament. The exact origins of the crusade are difficult to trace, but the following facts are known. Shortly after the 1958 election, three members of the tiny CCF caucus (i.e., Winch, Howard, and Peters) tried to draw attention to the divorce issue by raising questions concerning some of the divorce bills laid before the Commons. There was nothing particularly unusual about

²Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

³Typical of the resolutions concerning divorce that were presented to CCF conventions was that presented in 1954. The resolution noted that Quebec had been historically concerned about threats to provincial autonomy. Therefore, it was recommended that jurisdiction over all divorces be removed from Parliament and assumed by the provinces. CCF, "Resolution 214," Report of the CCF National Convention, held at Edmonton, Alberta on July 28-30, 1954, p. 31.

⁴NDP, Proceedings of the Second NDP Federal Convention, held at Regina, Saskatchewan, on August 6-9, 1963, p. 44.

their move; other MPs had done the same on other occasions. But a year later, Peters and Howard repeated the tactic of questioning several divorce bills. This time they were offered \$5,000 if they dropped their inquiry into a particularly questionable divorce bill.⁵ The two MPs were reportedly incensed by the offer of a bribe and they decided to eliminate the anachronism of having Parliament decide what was clearly a judicial function.

Their strategy was borrowed from their colleague, Erhart Regier. The entire divorce problem in Parliament, Regier had once asserted almost in jest, could be solved by a systematic blockade or filibuster of every divorce bill that came before Commons.⁶ The probability that such a strategy would be successful was enhanced by the fact that closure was a sensitive topic with parliamentarians, especially since the pipeline controversy of 1956. Furthermore, no government, assuming it was hostile to the proposed reform, was likely to impose the controversial rule to cut off debate that was generally confined to an already limited period of time allocated for discussing private bills. Nor was it likely to donate any of the time allotted to its own legislative program by agreeing to an extension of the debate on private bills in the hope that a minor party would run out of personnel to keep the blockade in effect.

⁵The case involved a Montreal woman who claimed that her husband had rigged the evidence to support a charge of adultery (the only grounds upon which Parliament could grant a divorce) in order to acquire complete control over a multi-million dollar construction firm that she had placed under joint ownership when she and her husband were married. Toronto Daily Star, April 9, 1960.

⁶Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

On March 1, 1960, Arnold Peters asked a few questions about several divorce bills awaiting passage in Commons. On the surface, his maneuver resembled that which some of the CCF MPs had employed in 1958 and 1959. After the one hour that was allotted for debating private bills had elapsed, however, only thirteen divorce bills had passed; and no other private bills had been considered.⁷ Three days later, Peters repeated his performance. Four bills passed that day, and about 170 divorces remained on the order paper.⁸ A week later Peters was joined by Howard, and the blockade became a two-man affair. Excepting an occasional question or comment from other members of the CCF caucus, it remained a two-man crusade throughout the remainder of the 1960 session.

Although Howard had tried to explain that the reason for the blockade was to force an end to what he called an "insult upon the House of Commons and the . . . Senate,"⁹ opposition to the spectacle in Commons every Tuesday and every second Thursday of the month began to mount. Few critics, according to one observer, were in favor of the anachronistic procedure employed to grant divorces to couples living in Quebec and Newfoundland, but they were concerned about the fact that Peters and Howard had managed to deny over six hundred unhappily married couples a chance to be divorced during the 1960 blockade.¹⁰ Peters and Howard finally relented as the pressure

⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), March 1, 1960, pp. 1601-1608.

⁸ Ibid., March 4, 1960, pp. 1772-80.

⁹ Ibid., March 15, 1960, p. 2092.

¹⁰ Saywell (ed.), Canadian Annual Review, 1962, pp. 13-14.

mounted and allowed all pending divorce bills pass en masse two days before the third session of the Twenty-Fourth Parliament was prorogued.¹¹

Commons reconvened on November 17, 1960, and the two CCFers lost little time in threatening another blockade unless the procedure was changed. On December 16, a bill was introduced by M. D. Morton (PC, Davenport) designed to transfer the entire divorce procedure out of Commons by making the Senate alone responsible for granting divorces to persons living in Quebec and Newfoundland. According to the bill, the transfer of the divorce procedure to the Senate had to be renewed for each session of Parliament. It was clearly an expediency, and the two CCF MPs lost little time in noting that fact. But after expressing hope that it would become the forerunner of a more permanent solution, Peters and Howard supported the Morton bill. After one hour of debate, it was passed.¹²

Unfortunately, no one would sponsor the bill in the Senate, thus killing its chances for enactment. The blockade was therefore re-established in Commons during the Summer of 1961. By the Fall of that year, Peters and Howard had 356 divorce bills piled up on the order paper. Again they relented and allowed all of them to pass as the final weeks of the session approached.¹³ This move may have been a response to the criticism that had been aroused by the renewal of

¹¹ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), August 9, 1960, pp. 783-41.

¹² Ibid., December 16, 1960, pp. 903-904, 907-908.

¹³ Ibid., September 26, 1961, p. 8941.

the blockade. Perhaps it came in response to the fact that "certain" party leaders had also become concerned about the adverse publicity that had been directed at the democratic left.¹⁴ After all, about four hundred divorce bills were stalled in Commons at the time the NDP was being launched at the Ottawa Coliseum.

Whatever the reasons for relenting, Howard and Peters restored the blockade shortly after Parliament opened in January of 1962. This time they made sure that the small caucus that the NDP had inherited from its predecessor went on record in favor of the blockade. This was done by calling for and obtaining divisions on four separate divorce bills. All of the NDP MPs who were present voted against the four bills, while the Liberals and Conservatives voted for passage.¹⁵ There was no relenting after the caucus had demonstrated its support for the blockade by voting with Howard and Peters. When the session ended on April 18, the two NDP MPs were still filibustering divorce bills.¹⁶

When the minority PC Government had had been elected in June of 1962 finally called Parliament into session in the Fall, the blockade was resumed. About seven hundred divorce bills were on the order paper, half of them left over from the previous session and half of them represented bills that had been processed by the Senate during

¹⁴ Frank Howard admitted that pressure had been brought upon him and Peters by "certain" party leaders. He denied that he or Peters listened to their advice to drop the blockade. Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

¹⁵ Argue was absent at the time. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), April 12, 1962, p. 2992-95.

¹⁶ Ibid., April 18, 1962, pp. 3115-25.

the final stages of the preceding session.¹⁷ The press reported that Howard and Peters had the support of the entire NDP caucus and that it had been decided to make the crusade to reform the divorce procedure in Parliament a matter of policy.¹⁸ Howard informed this author that this support from the leadership and the remaining members of the caucus developed as the crusade began to show signs of "paying off."¹⁹

With their seventeen colleagues behind them, Howard and Peters exerted every effort to force Commons to change the procedure. But there were to be no expediencies like the Morton bill, not while the blockade helped embarrass a floundering PC Government. When Nicholas Mandzink (PC, Marquette) introduced a bill to transfer the divorce procedure to the Senate, for example, the NDP caucus refused to consent to a request to allow the bill to move up on the order paper.²⁰ Without the consent of all parties, the bill languished near the bottom of the order paper while the blockade continued to be in effect until the Diefenbaker Government fell in February of 1963.

When the minority Government headed by Lester Pearson assumed office following the 1963 election, about 1,100 divorce bills were encumbered in the Commons. The blockade was so effective that the Senate had stopped processing divorce bills.²¹ Then, almost without

¹⁷ Globe and Mail, September 7, 1962.

¹⁸ Ibid., October 4, 1962.

¹⁹ Interview with Frank Howard, MP Skeena, Ottawa, October 23, 1964.

²⁰ Globe and Mail, December 20, 1962.

²¹ Ibid., June 20, 1963; July 18, 1963.

warning, Mandzink introduced a revised version of his previous bill to reform the divorce procedure on August 1, 1963. With enthusiastic assistance from the Liberals, especially Secretary of State J. W. Pickersgill, the bill was quickly passed by the Commons and sent to the Senate on the same day that it was introduced.²² After some negotiations concerning amendments suggested by the Senate, the bill was ready for Royal Assent on August 2, 1963.²³

As finally enacted, the legislation required the Speaker of the Senate to appoint a divorce commissioner to hear all petitions for divorce from citizens of Quebec and Newfoundland and make recommendations concerning the disposition of each case to a standing Senate committee for divorce. The committee would then review all recommendations and submit resolutions to the Senate as a whole. A divorce would become final upon passage of a resolution by that body. Appeals could be made in the form of private bills introduced in the Commons.²⁴

Although there was no division on the bill in Commons, it is known that Peters expressed approval of Mandzink's bill and stated that it contained sufficient judicial features to enable him to accept it as the next best thing to putting the entire process into the hands of the Exchequer Court, a plan that he had persistently

²²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), August 1, 1963, pp. 2883, 2900-2903.

²³Parliamentary Debates (Senate), August 1-2, 1963, pp. 469-88, 491-99, 506-507, 525-28.

²⁴Parliamentary Debates (Commons), August 2, 1963, pp. 2987-88.

advocated. Douglas referred to the passage of the bill in Commons as a "red letter day in the life of Parliament," and Reid Scott noted that the NDP was stimulated to press for a review of the whole thorny question of the grounds for divorce in Canada.²⁵

It had taken more than three years of concerted effort, first by two individual CCF/NDP MPs and later by the caucus as a whole, before the Commons was relieved of the ludicrous chore of passing upon hundreds of divorce petitions filed by residents of Quebec and Newfoundland. In certain respects it was a Pyrrhic victory for the democratic left. Not only had it exposed itself to severe criticism in order to secure a relatively minor procedural reform affecting the work of the House of Commons during the few hours devoted to private bills each month, but it had brought about this reform by utilizing a technique that it generally abhorred (i.e., a blockade or filibuster).

Nevertheless, the efforts of Peters and Howard, as well as the caucus in general, must be judged in light of several extenuating circumstances. First, procedural reform is generally difficult to obtain and reforming the procedure for handling divorces in Parliament was no exception. While most politicians verbally denounced the traditional procedure, it did not take much probing on the part of Peters and Howard to reveal the fact that some vested interests had developed around the procedure for handling divorces filed by persons residing in the two provinces in question. Although they did not uncover widespread bribery, it was revealed that the names of certain

²⁵Ibid., August 1, 1963, pp. 2900-2902.

lawyers and private investigators appeared on petitions for divorce time and time again, suggesting the possibility that a highly organized business had been developed around the divorce procedure, and suggesting the further possibility that the procedure had not remained totally free of politics.

Second, the CCF/NDP did have some interest in reforming the procedure for handling private bills, especially if that reform had the effect of allowing more time to be spent on private bills introduced by members of Commons. After all, the democratic left, perhaps more than any other group or party, has made use of the privilege of introducing private bills as a method for getting its views and its programs on the record.

Finally, the performances of Peters and Howard, as well as the caucus itself, must be viewed as a crusade for a cause which was simply believed to be morally right. Not only has the CCF/NDP been dubbed the "conscience of Parliament" on numerous occasions, but it has not been unusual for members of the democratic left to become associated with causes that were either unpopular or unlikely to arouse much sympathy for those who took them up. Hence, the divorce episode must be judged in much the same context as the performance of the democratic left relative to alleged infringement of civil rights during an investigation held by the Royal Canadian Mounted Police into the activities of several school teachers and students who had toured a Communist party headquarters in British Columbia, its crusade against the treatment received by prisoners in St. Vincent de Paul penitentiary, or its concern over the obstacles encountered

by atheists seeking Canadian citizenship.

Redistribution of Federal Constituencies

It is rather interesting to note that the NDP did not include the subject of redistribution in its 1961 federal program. Considering the fact that the non-urban areas in Canada have been traditionally over-represented in the House of Commons, it is not surprising that the rural-based CCF never went on record in favor of granting urban areas a more generous quota of the seats in Commons. But starting with the time that the new party concept was first considered in 1958 and continuing through the formative stages of the NDP's development, it was clear that the successor to the CCF was not likely to be an overwhelmingly rural phenomenon. Farm organizations did not hesitate to reject affiliation with the new party, while organized labor-- particularly the CLC--became a major factor in the development of the NDP. Furthermore, the primary reason for forming the NDP was to reverse the electoral decline suffered by the CCF, a decline which was manifested in the non-urban bastions of the CCF.

There are several possible reasons for this apparent lack of concern over redistribution on the part of the NDP. It is possible that the subject was simply lost in the shuffle during the formation of the party, although it is doubtful that urban leaders such as Knowles of Winnipeg or Lewis of Toronto were oblivious to the urban-ization trend or its possible electoral ramifications. A more plausible explanation for the fact that the subject of redistribution was ignored in the draft program presented to the NDP Founding Convention is that the new party leaders were faced with the need to

retain support within the CCF, an organization that continued to contain many members from non-urban areas despite its electoral decline in those areas during federal elections. Furthermore, it is quite conceivable that any attempt to get the new party to go on record in favor of redistribution based upon a more equitable application of the population principle would have compounded the fears of many CCFers that organized labor, ordinarily associated with urban areas, was going to dominate the party.

While the party-at-large did not take an official position regarding the subject of redistribution, the NDP representatives in the Commons eventually responded to what might be called the NDP's vested interest in "urbanizing" the redistribution formula. Prior to the election of the Pearson Government in 1963, however, there was no evidence of a concerted NDP drive to urge Parliament to take action on the subject of redistribution. Douglas Fisher had introduced a bill to amend the BNA Act with respect to redistribution during the second, third, fourth, and fifth sessions of the Twenty-Fourth Parliament. As he noted in 1962 when his bill reached the stage of a second reading, the bill was designed to freeze the number of seats granted to each province as a result of the 1952 redistribution formula. He was particularly interested in maintaining the number of seats allocated to Saskatchewan and Manitoba. In addition, his bill was designed to create an independent redistribution commission that would be empowered to make adjustments in the boundaries of federal constituencies. Fisher hoped that deviations from a strict population formula would not exceed five or seven per cent,

but he added that there ought to be four classes of ridings--urban, suburban, rural, frontier--so that consideration could be given to the kinds of life-styles that prevailed in each type of environment and hopefully solve some of the problems facing those who represented huge geographical territories.²⁶ How he proposed to reconcile a deviation of five or seven per cent from a strict population formula with this latter notion was left to the imagination. It can be inferred, however, that this inconsistency reflected the fact that most of his constituency (i.e., Port Arthur), one of the largest in Canada, was sparsely populated, remote, and difficult to cover; whereas, the party that he represented, which had not yet contested a general election, was in the midst of a major attempt to rebuild its electoral base, presumably with the support of the urban-oriented CLC.

Excepting Fisher, the other members of the caucus that the NDP inherited from the CCF did not engage in the debate concerning a redistribution bill that was introduced by Diefenbaker during the final weeks of the parliamentary session preceding the 1962 election. Fisher's contribution to that debate consisted of a comparison between his bill to create a commission with the power actually to perform the redistribution function and Diefenbaker's proposal to create a single commission to recommend redistribution formulas and possible changes in the boundaries of federal ridings to Parliament.²⁷

²⁶ Ibid., April 10, 1962, p. 2672.

²⁷ Ibid., April 9-10, 1962, pp. 2645-52, 2668-72; April 17, 1962, p. 3049.

No action was taken on either bill prior to the 1962 election, much to the relief of the Conservatives--the party that stood to lose most by any urbanization trend that might be embedded into a redistribution formula.

When the minority PC Government finally called Parliament into session in the Fall of 1962, Fisher again introduced his bill; and Diefenbaker again submitted his version of a redistribution commission.²⁸ But there seemed to be little interest in proceeding with the subject of redistribution since it was likely that the Diefenbaker Government would fall as a result of its own internal divisions or be forced to return to the hustings for another mandate before any redistribution formula could be prepared and implemented. All that Fisher could say during the second reading of his bill was that if the SC was going to sustain the Government by voting with it on almost every issue, then Commons should proceed with some solution based on data collected during the 1961 decennial census and certainly before another election.²⁹ The rest of the nineteen-man NDP caucus, thirteen of whom represented urban ridings, remained silent. More important matters attracted their attention, including the growing budgetary crisis and the issue of atomic weapons for Canada.

Following the election of the minority Pearson Government in April of 1963, Fisher again introduced his bill to amend the BNA Act relative to the subject of redistribution.³⁰ The Speech from the

²⁸ Ibid., October 1, 1962, pp. 30, 40.

²⁹ Ibid., October 12, 1962, pp. 477-79.

³⁰ Ibid., May 20, 1963, p. 32.

Throne, delivered on May 17, 1963, also contained a promise that a redistribution bill would be introduced.³¹ On November 27, Secretary of State J. W. Pickersgill introduced a resolution to have Commons go into committee to consider a proposal to create the office of federal representation commissioner. The commissioner, according to the proposal, would have the power to act upon the reports of electoral boundary commissions that were to be the subject of subsequent legislation. A few days later, the Commons discussed the resolution. Conservative spokesmen pressed the idea of one commission rather than ten (i.e., one for each province). Knowles, who emerged as the NDP spokesman on the subject of redistribution, questioned the Government about the method that would be employed to appoint the members of the boundary commissions in each province. His suggestion was that a system similar to that employed in the province of Manitoba ought to be utilized; that is, the commissions should be composed of the chief electoral officer in each province, the chief justice of each province, and the president of a university in each province. The notion of creating the office of federal representation commissioner, the specific issue before Commons at this point, was not seriously debated.³² Indeed, a bill to create such an office was formally introduced on December 9 and passed on December 17, 1963 without arousing any significant controversy.³³

It was late in the session when the bill designed to create

³¹ Ibid., May 16, 1963, pp. 6-7.

³² Ibid., November 22, 26, 1963, pp. 5058, 5109, 5112-27.

³³ Ibid., December 9, 17, 1963, pp. 5599, 5992.

the post of representation commissioner was passed. The prolonged debate of the highly controversial budget submitted by Finance Minister Walter Gordon had delayed action on most items that had been included in the Throne Speech. Nevertheless, Pearson managed to keep a promise that he had made to Douglas as the budget crisis began to ebb in July, a promise that the Government would introduce a bill to create electoral boundary commissions when Parliament resumed its work following the brief summer recess.³⁴ The bill concerning electoral boundary commissions was finally introduced three days after the Commons passed the bill to create the office of representation commissioner.³⁵ Although there was no time to take action on the bill before the Christmas recess, Pearson had made it clear that the Government intended to move forward with a redistribution plan, a commitment that was most advantageous to the NDP since it stood to gain from any redistribution system or formula that tended to be favorable to the urban-oriented Liberals.

Nineteen-hundred-sixty-four will undoubtedly go down in Canadian history as the year of the great flag debate. Almost every other major piece of proposed legislation, including the bill to establish electoral boundary commissions, was delayed by the prolonged debate concerning the adoption of a distinctive Canadian flag. Only when all parties agreed to a temporary suspension of the flag debate in early November did Commons resume work on the Government's electoral boundary commissions bill that Pickersgill had re-introduced

³⁴Globe and Mail, July 25, 1963.

³⁵Parliamentary Debates (Commons), December 20, 1963, p. 6194.

in March of 1964.³⁶

Much of the debate during the second reading of the bill in November centered upon the question of how much deviation from a strict population formula the boundary commissions would be allowed to make. The Government had urged a 20 per cent deviation, and the rural-based Conservatives generally stood by a proposal to allow 33 $\frac{1}{3}$ per cent deviation. The NDP spokesman, Stanley Knowles, expressed hope that the commissions would tend to operate in terms of a 10 or 15 per cent deviation and reserve the 20 per cent tolerance provided in the bill for exceptional cases.³⁷

The second major point of contention involved the Government's proposal concerning the method of appointing the four members of each boundary commission. The Government's bill contained provisions to have the newly appointed Representation Commissioner, Nelson Castonguay (formerly Canada's Chief Electoral Officer), serve on each of the ten boundary commissions. A second member and the chairman of each commission, according to the Government's bill, would be a judge appointed by the senior justice in each province. The remaining two members would be appointed by the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition. Knowles was particularly upset by this obvious exclusion of minor parties in the appointment process and defended an amendment to the bill that he had introduced in April of 1964 to have all members of the commissions other than Castonguay appointed by the chief justice

³⁶ Globe and Mail, November 7, 1964.

³⁷ A summary of the various proposals concerning the amount of deviation to be allowed was set forth during the debate on November 13, Parliamentary Debates (Commons), November 13, 1964, pp. 10055-65.

of each province from certain classes of people (i.e., provincial registrars of vital statistics, provincial surveyors general, and chief electoral officers of the provinces).³⁸

The Liberals allowed a free vote on all features of the bill except the basic principle of establishing ten rather than one boundary commission. Hence, compromise became necessary not only to obtain support from other parties but to retain the support of some of the Liberal MPs from rural areas. As finally passed by a voice vote, the legislation contained a PC amendment to allow 25 per cent deviation from a strict population formula, a PC amendment to allow the 25 per cent tolerance to be exceeded should the relevant boundary commissions decide to perpetuate the existence of the dual member ridings in Nova Scotia and Prince Edward Island, and a revised version of the Knowles amendment whereby the Speaker of the House of Commons would appoint two members of each boundary commission in addition to Castonguay and the chief justice of each province.³⁹ The NDP could at least take pride in the fact that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition would not appoint any members to the commissions.

One item that the Government had considered in 1963 was not included in the legislation passed in 1964, namely, a proposal to amend the BNA Act to expand the size of the House of Commons from 263 to 283 members in order to prevent Quebec from losing any seats

³⁸ Ibid., November 12, 1964, p. 9998.

³⁹ Ibid., November 12, 16, 1963, pp. 9998-99, 10028-32, 10113.

during redistribution.⁴⁰ By avoiding this issue, the rule adopted in 1952 under which no province could lose more than 15 per cent of its seats in Commons during any one redistribution continued to be in effect. In 1952, the rule had the effect of adding two seats to the 263 seats mandated by the BNA Act, thereby preventing Saskatchewan from losing two more seats in the 1952 redistribution. When the rule is applied to 1961 census data, it has the effect of creating a House of Commons of 264 members. Nova Scotia would lose two of its 12 seats (i.e., 16.6 per cent of its representation) if the rule did not exist. Hence, there will be an additional seat above the 263 seats mandated in the BNA Act when redistribution under the 1961 census is officially completed. The following table, adapted from data presented in the *Globe and Mail*, summarizes the number of seats allocated to each province in 1952 and the number of seats that each province can expect to have as a result of the application of existing rules for allocating seats to 1961 census data. The table also sets forth the maximum and minimum population of federal ridings in each of the provinces under the 25 per cent deviation formula that was included in the 1964 legislation creating electoral boundary commissions.⁴¹

⁴⁰ Globe and Mail, November 22, 1963.

⁴¹ Ibid., November 14, 1964.

TABLE 29

Redistribution of Federal Seats on the Basis
of Legislation in Effect After
November 16, 1964

Province	No. of Seats (1952 redist.)	No. Seats Based upon 1961 Census and Existing Rules	Max. Pop. 1961 Census	Min. Pop. 1961 Census
Nfld.	7	7	81,760	49,056
N. B. ^a	10	10	74,743	44,846
P. E. I. ^a	4	4	32,696	19,618
N. S. ^b	12	11	83,751	50,251
Que.	75	74	88,838	53,303
Ont.	85	88	88,581	53,149
Man.	14	13	88,624	53,174
Sask.	17	13	88,960	53,376
Alberta	17	19	87,628	52,577
B. C.	22	23	88,538	53,123
Yukon/N. W. T.	2	2	--	--
Totals	265	264		

^aProtected by "Senate Floor," a BNA Act provision guaranteeing a province representation in Commons at least equal to the number of senators representing that province. BNA Act, Sec. 51 (3).

^bProtected by fifteen per cent rule of 1952. Representation Act, R. S. C. 1952, c. 334.

Every political party has an interest in the terms of any redistribution formula that might be put into service. What is most significant about the NDP's approach to redistribution in 1964 is not that it favored a formula designed to give urban areas a more equitable share of the seats in the House of Commons, but that among the various parties it pressed for the smallest amount of deviation from a strict population arrangement. After two federal elections, it is true, the NDP had emerged as an overwhelmingly urban party. But in view of its silence regarding the subject of redistribution prior to

1963, excluding the confused proposals set forth by Fisher, it can be assumed that the leadership had become convinced that the party's future was inextricably tied to urban areas, and that therefore the party did not have to make any gestures to rural interests, which had been the electoral mainstay of its predecessor. This line of argument is further buttressed by the fact that the NDP did not raise the issue of Saskatchewan losing three seats unless something were done to freeze the 1952 formula for allocating seats to the various provinces, a matter that had been foremost in Fisher's mind when he discussed his bill in April of 1962. Apparently there was little to be gained in perpetuating three more seats in Saskatchewan for the PC to win.

The Great Flag Debate of 1964

At the time, Lester Pearson's 1963 campaign pledge concerning the adoption of a distinctive national flag seemed to be little more than another in a long series of similar pledges by politicians of virtually every political stripe. When the Prime Minister of the newly installed minority Liberal Government, in response to a question raised by Georges Valade (PC, St. Mary), told the House of Commons that he intended to fulfill his 1963 campaign pledge within two years of taking office, only one MP was prompted to pursue the matter by asking a supplementary question.⁴² Proposals calling for a distinctive flag had become almost a ritual in the Commons, and politicians had become rather indifferent to proposals concerning a new flag that did not specify the exact design that was to be substituted for the red ensign. No really serious attempt had been made to do that since

⁴²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), May 17, 1963, p. 21.

the mid-1940s, when a special committee worked almost two years to pick a flag design only to have it quietly shelved.

When Pearson appeared before the Canadian Legion meeting in Winnipeg in mid-May of 1964 and told it that the time had come to adopt a distinctive maple leaf flag to replace the Legion's beloved red ensign,⁴³ the subject of a new flag had suddenly become more than a platitude. And when he appeared before a press conference the following day and publicly displayed two versions of a maple leaf flag that were to be considered by the Government,⁴⁴ all of the trite promises that had been made in the past now seemed to be moving toward conversion into a genuine and concrete proposal.

About a week later, the minority Liberal Government introduced a resolution calling for the adoption of a new flag to replace the red ensign.⁴⁵ The specific design sponsored by the Government featured three red maple leaves on a white background with narrow blue bars at the verticle edges. In addition to "Pearson's Pennant," as the critics called it, the resolution contained a proposal calling for the adoption of the union jack as the official symbol of Canada's

⁴³Winnipeg Free Press, May 17, 1964; Globe and Mail, May 18, 1964.

⁴⁴Globe and Mail, May 19, 1964.

⁴⁵The red ensign had a long history, but it was not until 1945 that an order-in-council was issued which recognized it as the flag of Canada until such time as Parliament formally adopted a national flag. A review of the history of the red ensign and the union jack, which had also served as the Canadian flag, was provided by Pearson in a speech opening the formal debate on the Government's proposed maple leaf flag. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 15, 1964, pp. 4320-28.

membership in the British Commonwealth.⁴⁶

At stake were the very symbols of the cultural bifurcation that characterizes Canadian society and politics. The maple leaf, around which "Pearson's Pennant" was designed, had been the emblem of French Canada long before the BNA Act was passed in 1861.⁴⁷ The red ensign, featuring a union jack in the upper left hand corner, had long been a symbol of foreign domination to many French Canadians and a constant reminder that Anglo-Canadians had not fully accepted the idea that the BNA Act had created a confederation composed of two distinct nations.

As noted in a previous chapter, the NDP had accepted the basic premise that Canada was composed of two nations and had tailored several aspects of its federal program (e.g., the NDP pension proposal) to fit that premise. Furthermore, the NDP program included a proposal concerning the adoption of a distinctive national flag, although it failed to specify a design that it was prepared to support. When "Pearson's Pennant" was made public, the NDP's task was to reconcile three related variables: its programmatic posture toward French Canada, its programmatic position relative to a distinctive flag, and the particular design suggested by the Liberal Government.

The NDP made no official response to Pearson's speech at the

⁴⁶The flag resolution first appeared in Votes and Proceedings in the House of Commons on May 26, 1964. It was formally introduced in Commons two days later. Parliamentary Debates (Commons), May 28, 1964, p. 3675.

⁴⁷Globe and Mail, May 21, 1964.

1964 meeting of the Canadian Legion, nor did it respond to the two versions of the maple leaf design that Pearson displayed to newsmen following that speech. T. C. Douglas was quoted by the press as being personally in favor of a flag designed around the maple leaf motif, but hastened to point out that the matter would have to be decided by the NDP caucus if and when the Government actually introduced a resolution concerning a new flag into Commons.⁴⁸

When the resolution was finally introduced, the NDP quickly revealed its criticisms and its suggestions. Speaking for the party during the first stage of formal debate on the flag resolution, Douglas chastized the Liberal Government for introducing the flag issue before action had been taken on a long list of important legislation that it had already placed before Commons, including the vitally important subjects of pensions and redistribution. Although Douglas congratulated the Prime Minister for "grasping [a] thorny nettle that his predecessors [had] all evaded," he questioned the Government's "scale of values and . . . order of priorities."⁴⁹

More specifically, the NDP's renowned expert on parliamentary procedure--Stanley Knowles--took the Government to task for combining two distinct propositions within a single resolution. On June 15, he sparked an extended debate on the matter by citing several recognized authorities, particularly Beauchesne and Bourinot, to support his contention that the proposition concerning the national flag (i.e., the maple leaf flag) ought to be separated from the proposition

⁴⁸ Ibid., May 19, 1964.

⁴⁹ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 16, 1964, pp. 4347-49.

regarding a symbol to designate Canada's membership in the Commonwealth (i.e., the union jack).⁵⁰ Why Pearson had combined the two propositions and then refused to consider any suggestion for separating them, is open to conjecture. While the maple leaf could be viewed as a sop to French Canada and the union jack as a gesture to other Canadians, it seemed rather dubious that the minority Liberal Government could put together a single base of support for a vote dealing with both proposals at once. He could undoubtedly get support from Quebec MPs outside the ranks of the Liberal Party for the maple leaf per se, and the support of certain English-speaking MPs for the union jack per se. Whether he could get either of these groups to support both flags simultaneously, however, was highly speculative. Nevertheless, the Speaker of the House, Alan Macnaughton (Liberal, Mount Royal), ruled that the two propositions were to be treated separately.⁵¹ Knowles had won his point, the twelve French-speaking Creditistes expressed overwhelming support for the ruling, Diefenbaker charged that the ruling was the result of collusion between the Government and the Speaker, and Pearson reportedly "looked contented."⁵²

After noting that New Democrats would have preferred the Government to submit two or three designs for a national flag to a joint committee of the House and Senate, Douglas explicated the NDP's position regarding the three leaf design that was contained in the

⁵⁰ Ibid., June 15, 1964, p. 4293.

⁵¹ Ibid., p. 4307.

⁵² Globe and Mail, June 16, 1964.

Government's resolution. In announcing his party's intention to trim two leaves from "Pearson's Pennant," Douglas stressed the following point. "There are not three Canadas, there is only one Canada made up of two founding races, with two official languages, with two cultures, with many ethnic groups--but one country, with one purpose and one destiny."⁵³

As the flag debate proceeded, it became increasingly evident that the Conservatives were severely split along English-French lines with the English-speaking Diefenbaker faction favoring the retention of the red ensign, while the handful of Quebec Conservatives, led by Leon Balcer (PC, Trois-Rivières), urged swift passage of the Government's maple leaf design. Diefenbaker rallied his supporters behind the concept of a national plebiscite on the subject and implemented a filibuster against the flag resolution in Commons.

The NDP's response to the protracted and seemingly unproductive flag debate was at least consistent with its earlier criticism that the Government had jeopardized other important legislation pending in Commons. Aside from scheduled breaks to deal with estimates and supply bills, none of the items which were of particular concern to the NDP had been given serious attention, particularly the Government's proposed comprehensive pension scheme and the subject of redistribution. When negotiations between the leaders of the five parties failed to produce an agreement whereby debate could be limited without invoking the controversial closure rule, Stanley

⁵³Parliamentary Debates (Commons), June 16, 1964, pp. 4349-51.

Knowles recommended that the leaders meet with the House Standing Committee on Parliamentary Procedure. As the Chairman of that committee, Knowles sent a letter to each of the leaders suggesting that the meeting would not deal with the flag debate. Rather, it would be concerned with finding a solution to the general problem of establishing a voluntary set of ground rules for expediting debate in the House of Commons. The proposal was denounced by Diefenbaker; and one of his chief lieutenants, Gordon Churchill (PC, Winnipeg South Centre), called the proposal made by the NDP MP from Winnipeg North Centre a "flagrant abuse of the rules."⁵⁴

The debate continued into the month of September with Diefenbaker refusing to lift his blockade. The pressure was shifted to Pearson as Douglas joined an attempt to get the Prime Minister to refer the flag issue to a special committee of the Commons. After previous refusals to consider such a proposal, Pearson agreed to submit the flag resolution to a fifteen-member special committee composed of seven Liberals, five Conservatives, one NDP, one Social Credit, and one Creditistes. The committee was to make its report within six weeks.⁵⁵

When the special committee reported on October 29, no progress had been made on pensions, redistribution, or the Government's proposal to abandon certain uneconomic rail lines, because debate on an interim supply bill had consumed most of the time gained by

⁵⁴ Globe and Mail, August 26, 1964.

⁵⁵ Ibid., September 10, 1964. The names of all fifteen members were reported five days later. Reid Scott (NDP, Danforth) was the NDP representative. Ibid., September 15, 1964.

referring the flag issue to committee. Interim supply was of particular importance to Pearson since dissolution remained a distinct possibility unless the PC ceased its unusually protracted debate on the issue prior to November 6. On that date, the Government would have no further funds with which to meet its obligations, and it is traditionally held that a Government should call an election if such a situation arises.⁵⁶

Although Diefenbaker was in a position to force an election by filibustering the interim supply bill, a class of legislation that cannot be subjected to closure, it was almost certain that the election would be a referendum on the flag. An election on that issue could have been disastrous for Diefenbaker and the Conservatives, not because public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of "Pearson's Pennant,"⁵⁷ but because the party could not have confronted the electorate with any degree of unanimity on the flag issue. Many of the fissures that had been exposed within the PC over the nuclear issue in 1963, moreover, were still evident. An election based upon this most recent strain upon the internal cohesion of the party was likely to shatter what control Diefenbaker continued to hold over it.

Almost at the last moment, the interim supply bill to cover the Government's expenses for November and December was passed.⁵⁸

⁵⁶ Ibid., October 31, 1964.

⁵⁷ Results of public opinion polls on the flag issue revealed that 43 per cent of those polled favored "Pearson's Pennant," 47 per cent either disapproved or were indifferent, and 10 per cent had not even seen the proposed design. CIFO Release, September 26, 1964.

⁵⁸ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), November 14, 1964, p. 9758.

Although Diefenbaker apparently wanted no election at the time, he remained adamantly opposed to Pearson's proposal to limit debate on the report filed by the flag committee. Again the pressure was shifted to Pearson. This time it was suggested that Pearson shelve debate on the committee's report until some other items on the legislative agenda could be given consideration. Douglas was particularly concerned about getting to work on pensions, redistribution, and the Government's proposed national labor code.⁵⁹

Pearson was also anxious to get action on some of his key legislative proposals, for his Government had not established much of a record in the year and a half that it had been in office. By agreeing on November 7 to shelve the flag debate until the end of that month,⁶⁰ Pearson had virtually assured the nation and the Parliament that he was prepared to invoke closure. Unless he wanted to break his promise to have the flag issue settled by Christmas of 1964, he would have about two weeks to cut off any renewal of the PC filibuster before Commons adjourned for the Christmas recess.

Debate on the flag committee's report started on November 30. After considering over twelve hundred designs, the committee had reported on October 29 that it had voted to recommend a modified version of the maple leaf design submitted by the Liberal Government. Its recommendation featured a single red maple leaf on a white background flanked by wide red bars at the verticle edges. The vote in committee was ten to four, with the NDP and SC, and Creditistes

⁵⁹Globe and Mail, November 7, 1964.

⁶⁰Ibid.

representatives reportedly joining the seven Liberals and a lone PC against four Conservatives.⁶¹

"Totally unacceptable," cried Diefenbaker, as he reiterated his previous position that he would not consent to limiting debate concerning the committee's report unless near unanimity was achieved by the fifteen-man committee.⁶² When it came time to debate the committee's recommendation, Diefenbaker offered an amendment calling for a national plebiscite. The PC amendment to the committee's report was debated at length and finally defeated on December 10, 1964. Twelve NDP's opposed the amendment calling for a plebiscite, two favored it (i.e., Herridge and Mather, both from British Columbia), and four were absent when the vote was taken.⁶³

When one of Diefenbaker's cohorts moved to amend the committee's report by instructing it to recommend the adoption of the red ensign, the probability of another week or more of debate seemed imminent. Pearson appealed to Diefenbaker to allow the committee's original recommendation to come to a vote, but the appeal was summarily denied. At that point Pearson gave notice that Rule 33 (i.e., closure) would be employed.⁶⁴ Remembering what the invocation of closure during the pipeline debate in 1956 had cost the Liberals

⁶¹ Ibid., October 30, 1964. The Chairman, a Liberal, was not eligible to vote except in the case of a tie according to rules established by the committee.

⁶² Ottawa Journal, October 30, 1964; Globe and Mail, October 30, 1964.

⁶³ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), December 10, 1964, p. 11004-11005.

⁶⁴ Globe and Mail, December 11, 1964.

in the 1957 election, Diefenbaker commented: "It couldn't be better."⁶⁵

On December 14, 1964, closure was imposed by a vote of 152 to 85. Four PCs, eight NDPs, seven SCs, and all twelve Creditistes joined 121 Liberals to defeat a lone Liberal, seventy-three PCs, nine NDP, and two SCs. The NDP split badly on the closure motion, worse than any other party.⁶⁶ By tradition, the party opposed closure. Both Douglas and Knowles reportedly spurred the NDP caucus to stick by that tradition, especially in light of the fact that the Liberals could expect to pick up the necessary votes to close off debate from the SC and the Creditistes.⁶⁷ But Knowles and Douglas were joined by only seven of their colleagues, including Herridge, who was undeniably a red ensign supporter, and Mather, who had voted for a plebiscite. Eight others broke with the leadership and voted for closure (i.e., Fisher, Winch, Barnett, Cameron, Brewin, Webster, Prittie, and Saltsman).⁶⁸

The rest was anticlimatic. The single loaf recommendation made by the committee was passed by a vote of 163 to 78. This time, only Bert Herridge, the avid supporter of the red ensign, broke ranks as the NDP voted with all but one Liberal, six of the nine SCs, and all twelve of the Creditistes to adopt the committee's

⁶⁵ Ibid., December 12, 1964.

⁶⁶ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), December 14, 1964, p. 11076.

⁶⁷ Globe and Mail, December 12, 1964.

⁶⁸ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), December 14, 1964, p. 11076.

report.⁶⁹ On the same day, fourteen of the NDP members who remained in Commons opposed the committee's second recommendation concerning the symbol of Canada's membership in the Commonwealth. With Herridge leading the attack, the NDP voted in favor of a PC amendment to substitute the red ensign for the committee's choice--the union jack. The amendment was defeated 130 to 87.⁷⁰ After the failure of a Social Credit Rally attempt to limit the committee's report to a national flag and thereby eliminate the necessity of voting on a Commonwealth flag, the Commons adopted the union jack by a vote of 185 to 25. Only Peters and Howard opposed as twelve of their colleagues gave their consent to the union jack proposal.⁷¹

The nation-at-large was not split into two irreconcilable camps with Anglo-Canadians supporting the red ensign while French Canadians stood resolutely behind the maple leaf flag. Many non-French-speaking Canadians favored a distinctive flag for the nation, and many supported a maple leaf design.⁷² In the House of Commons, however, the voting was almost exclusively along French-English lines.

⁶⁹ Ibid., December 17, 1964, pp. 1138-39.

⁷⁰ Ibid., pp. 11273-74.

⁷¹ Ibid., pp. 11298-99.

⁷² A CIPO Release on May 27, 1964 indicated that 45 per cent of those polled favored a distinctive flag. As noted previously, 43 per cent of all Canadians approved of "Pearson's Pennant" on September 26, 1964. According to the CIPO Release on that date, there was overwhelming support for the maple leaf design in Quebec. People living in big cities across Canada tended to favor it more than those living in small towns and rural areas. Objections to it were most often expressed by persons living in small towns and rural areas outside Quebec.

The twelve Creditistes, all from Quebec, supported the maple leaf flag en masse. The performance of the regular SC caucus featured Quebec MPs casting ballots against MPs from western Canada. The PC split along French-English lines, with the ten Quebec PCs casting votes against Diefenbaker's red ensign supporters.

While all but one of the non-Quebec MPs in the Liberal Party supported the maple leaf design, it should be noted that that party has been emotionally and electorally wedded to French Canada. Furthermore, it was the party of government; and the vote on the maple leaf flag had been precipitated by action taken by the Government. Although Pearson finally reversed his previous plan to have his Government stand or fall on the flag issue, there is little doubt that his announcement of a free vote was a meaningless gesture. A mass defection of English-speaking Liberals from the position taken by Pearson and the Government would have certainly precipitated a vote of confidence. Even if such a motion were defeated, there would have been much pressure on the Prime Minister to call an election.

Excepting the vote cast by Herridge, who is British by birth and a maverick by instinct, the NDP's performance on the question of a national flag for Canada cannot be explained in terms of an Anglo-French configuration within its ranks or on the basis of any electoral ties between the democratic left and French Canada, or on the basis that the NDP wanted to avoid a threat to the Government and a possible election. There were no French Canadians in the NDP caucus, and there were no MPs representing a Quebec constituency. Until 1961, when the NDP was formed, the democratic left had made

virtually no programmatic gestures to accommodate the wishes of French Canadians. Its electoral support in Quebec had been and continued to be almost nil. The NDP's votes were not needed in Commons to pass the maple leaf flag to avoid a crisis and a possible election. The votes of the twelve Creditistes as well as the Quebec representatives in the SC and PC were more than enough to do that.

While the NDP leadership was undoubtedly a factor in the party's performance, there was no mention of the fact that the whip was applied during the vote to close debate, nor was there any indication that it was applied during the votes on the substantive aspects of the flag issue. Hence, it can be concluded that the position taken by the NDP leadership and all but one of the members of the NDP caucus relative to the maple leaf flag reflected a basic attempt to fulfill the party's programmatic position concerning the adoption of a distinctive flag. More than that, it represented an attempt to manifest, at least at the level of symbolism, the party's commitment to the "quiet revolution" that is taking place in French Canada. How far it would be willing to go toward manifesting that commitment at a substantive level is open to debate, but an analysis of the NDP's position on the subject of establishing a formula for amending the BNA Act provides some insights into this problem.

The NDP and the Favreau Formula for Amending the BNA Act

Canadians have long agreed that the need to submit amendments to what is popularly regarded as the Canadian constitution (i.e., BNA Act) to the British Parliament is an anachronism, a relic of

colonialism, and a symbol that Canada is less than sovereign. Repatriation of the BNA Act, as the notion of eliminating Britain's role in the amendment process is often called, would be a rather simple matter were it not for the fact that some type of formula for amending the BNA Act must be made available for that which would be eliminated. It has been traditionally understood, moreover, that such a formula should have the approval of all provincial governments as well as the federal government, a tradition that has made the search for an amendment formula exceedingly difficult and complex.⁷³

On two recent occasions, once in 1961 and again in 1964, negotiations between the federal and provincial governments actually reached the point where a draft bill concerning an amendment formula was made available for consideration. The 1961 bill, popularly known as the Fulton formula in honor of its chief author E. Davie Fulton (Minister of Justice and Attorney General for Canada in the Diefenbaker Government), was never passed because the governments of Quebec and Saskatchewan, for entirely opposite reasons, withheld their approval. Jean-Marc Leger, considered to be one of the more responsible spokesmen for Quebec nationalism, referred to the 1961 formula as "centralistic" in theme and therefore an inherent threat to French Canada.⁷⁴ Frank Scott, Dean of the Law School at McGill University and an advisor to the CCF Government of Saskatchewan, called it a "freezing formula" designed to prevent the transfer of certain

⁷³A brief summary of the search for such consensus is provided in E. R. Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," Canadian Bar Review, Vol. 43 (May, 1965), pp. 268-80.

⁷⁴Le Devoir, December 4, 1961.

functions to the central government to meet pressing problems confronting the nation-at-large.⁷⁵ At a more specific level, Jean Lesage, Premier of Quebec, reportedly wanted the formula to include a revocation of Section 91 (1) of the BNA Act, added in 1949, giving Parliament unilateral power to develop and submit to the Queen any amendments concerning matters over which it had exclusive legislative jurisdiction.⁷⁶ The CCF Government of Saskatchewan, on the other hand, was concerned about any proposal that explicitly or implicitly prevented the transfer of powers listed under Section 92 (i.e., legislative powers of the provinces) to the federal government. Premier Douglas, before he resigned to become NDP Federal Leader, and his successor, Woodrow Lloyd, cited the need for nationwide control over agricultural marketing legislation and noted the impossibility of achieving such legislation under the Fulton formula unless all provincial governments agreed.⁷⁷

On September 2, 1964, the following communiqué was issued at the close of the Federal and Provincial Conference held at

⁷⁵Montreal Star, December 4, 1961.

⁷⁶It has been customary, in about one-half of the cases, for the federal government to consult with the provincial governments before requesting the British Parliament to pass a proposed amendment to the BNA Act. Lesage's goal, it appeared, was to remove any chance that the Parliament could use Section 91 (1) to broaden its jurisdiction to include items which might conceivably fall under Section 92--legislative powers of the provinces--without having to observe the tradition of consulting the provinces regarding changes in the distribution of federal and provincial powers. Saywell (ed.), Canadian Review, 1961, pp. 25-27.

⁷⁷Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," pp. 275-76.

Charlottetown, Prince Edward Island.⁷⁸

The Prime Minister and Premiers affirmed their unanimous decision to conclude the repatriation of the BNA Act without delay. To this end they decided to complete a procedure for amending the Constitution of Canada based on the . . . Fulton formula of 1961, which they accept in principle. An early meeting of the Attorney General of Canada and the provinces will be held to complete the amending formula devised by the 1961 Conference, and to report to the Prime Minister and Premiers.

Pursuant to this communiqué, the federal and provincial attorneys general held several meetings in Ottawa during the first two weeks in October. Subsequently, it was announced that an amendment formula drafted by the attorneys general had been unanimously accepted by the Prime Minister and the provincial premiers at a Federal-Provincial Conference meeting in Ottawa on October 14, 1964.⁷⁹

At the time, it was assumed by many observers that passage of the Favreau formula, named for Guy Favreau (Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada in the Liberal Government until July of 1965),⁸⁰ would be swift. The CCF Government of Saskatchewan that had helped prevent the passage of the 1961 Fulton formula had been toppled in April of 1964, and the Liberal Government that replaced it proved to be exceedingly co-operative during the negotiations that led to the Favreau formula. Furthermore, that formula included provisions that met Premier Lesage's former objections

⁷⁸Text of the communiqué appears in Parliamentary Debates (Commons), September 30, 1964, p. 8589.

⁷⁹Text of the announcement appears in Ibid., October 15, 1964, p. 9067.

⁸⁰The formula has sometimes been called the Fulton-Favreau formula because of the similarity between it and the 1961 draft bill.

regarding Section 91 (1) of the BNA Act.⁸¹

By the Spring of 1965, however, all of the provinces except Quebec had formally approved the 1964 draft bill.⁸² The Lesage Government, bound by legal and political considerations to submit the matter to both houses of the Quebec legislature, the only bicameral provincial legislature in the country, has not been able to secure the support of the Union Nationale which controls the upper chamber or Legislative Council. Daniel Johnson, leader of that party, has denounced the Favreau formula as an "attempt at enslavement and integration of French Canadians."⁸³ He has also described it as a manifestation of a "centralistic doctrine" that would inevitably undermine the future development of French Canada and the province of Quebec.⁸⁴

Although Pearson has consistently refused to submit the Favreau formula to Parliament until it has been officially approved

⁸¹Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," pp. 276-77.

⁸²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), May 5, 1965, p. 960.

⁸³Ottawa Citizen, February 1, 1965. Cited in Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," p. 278.

⁸⁴Globe and Mail, May 31, 1965. It should be noted that Lesage has been unsuccessful in an attempt to get legislation designed to limit the veto power of the Legislative Council. Consequently, the Lesage Government passed an order in council asking the British Parliament to pass an amendment to the BNA Act that would limit the powers of the Legislative Council, the irony of which is too evident to require explanation. The Pearson cabinet has approved the proposed amendment and sent it on to the British Parliament without having submitted it to the Canadian Parliament, where it could be attacked and possibly stalled or defeated. Its constitutionality has been seriously questioned by the NDP and other parties. Globe and Mail, July 3, 1965.

by all of the provincial governments, the opposition parties in Commons have had several opportunities to place the views on the record. The first opportunity to debate the issue came when Favreau, in response to a request made by Reid Scott of the NDP, allowed the subject to be raised on September 30, 1964 during the scheduled debate concerning the estimates for the Department of Justice. Since the debate took place prior to the meetings of the federal and provincial attorneys general in October of that year, the only framework within which the subject of an amendment formula could be discussed was that provided by the brief communique issued at the close of the Federal Provincial Conference at Charlottetown early in September. But as Scott noted in making the request, the communiqué left the impression that the attorneys general were to utilize the 1961 Fulton formula as a point of departure and that said officials ought therefore to be made cognizant of the views held by the various parties represented in Commons.⁸⁵ What he failed to mention, however, was that the provincial counterpart of the NDP was no longer in power in Saskatchewan. Since the party would not be represented at the meetings of the attorneys general, it was in desperate need of some vehicle through which it could state its case in the hope that would at least be considered.

Since their meetings were held in camera, it is not known whether the attorneys general considered the views presented by the various parties on September 30. It was reported, however, that

⁸⁵ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), September 25, 1964, pp. 8432-33.

Favreau took detailed notes during the debate.⁸⁶ At least he became aware that the PC favored the Fulton formula, hoped that the Pearson Government would not surrender any of Parliament's powers under Section 91 (1), and urged that the Bill of Rights Act passed by the Diefenbaker Government would become an entrenched part of the BNA Act (i.e., all provinces would have to agree to any amendments designed to modify it). He also learned that the SC favored the non-controversial idea of repatriating the BNA Act and the equally non-controversial notion of entrenching those portions of the act dealing with language and educational rights. In addition, Guy Marcoux of Quebec noted that the SC favored any formula that would protect and perpetuate the view that the BNA Act was a pact between two separate nations. Furthermore, Favreau discovered that the Creditistes held similar views but wanted the formula to provide for the immediate transfer of all federal control over credit, trade, immigration, and direct taxation to the provinces.⁸⁷

What Favreau learned from the NDP was not unexpected. Andrew Brewin, speaking for the New Democrats, told the Commons that his party accepted the notion of repatriating the BNA Act, but that it was not prepared to support any formula that would tend to freeze the existing distribution of powers among the federal and provincial governments. According to the NDP spokesman, no portions of the constitution should be entrenched other than the following:

⁸⁶ Globe and Mail, October 1, 1964.

⁸⁷ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), September 30, 1964, pp. 8589-93, 8599-9008.

- (1) Section 51 (a) guaranteeing every province representation in Commons at least equal to the number of representatives it had in the Senate,
- (2) Section 93 regarding provincial jurisdiction over education,
- (3) Section 133 concerning language rights,
- (4) A new section dealing with fundamental human rights--a Bill of Rights.

Conversely, the NDP refused to give its consent to the entrenchment of any part of Section 92 dealing with provincial legislative powers, especially Section 92 (13) dealing with provincial control over property and civil rights. To entrench the latter, or to make ineffective any provision for delegating subjects covered by it to the federal government by requiring that federal legislation passed under such a delegation of authority be effective only in those provinces that gave their consent, would virtually eliminate any possibility for developing a nationwide agricultural marketing system, a truly national labor code, or a nationwide system of policing the stock market. Furthermore, the NDP opposed the entrenchment of the amendment formula itself. Changes in the method for amending the BNA Act once it was repatriated, like all aspects of the constitution excluding those which the NDP would entrench, should be accomplished with the consent of two-thirds of the provinces representing at least one-half of the nation's population.⁸⁸

On October 15, Favreau announced to the House of Commons that a draft bill regarding an amendment formula had been developed by the

⁸⁸ Ibid., pp. 8593-98.

attorneys general of the federal and provincial governments and unanimously approved by Pearson and the premiers of the ten provinces at a Federal-Provincial Conference in Ottawa the preceding day.⁸⁹ During the ensuing debate, the Liberal discovered that the SC and the Creditistes continued to believe that any amendment formula that was passed ought to protect the two-nation concept of the Canadian confederation. Whether these parties would support or reject the Favreau formula if it came to a vote was left to the imagination, at least insofar as the record was concerned.

Diefenbaker had few kind words for the Favreau formula despite the similarities between it and the 1961 Fulton formula. The PC's objections centered upon the provision for modifying Section 91 (1) of the BNA Act. It was Diefenbaker's contention that this concession to Quebec made the formula "excessively rigid," and that it would inevitably lend to the "emasculatation of strong central government."⁹⁰ Although this line of argument was seriously undermined when E. Davie Fulton (former PC Minister of Justice and alleged contender for Diefenbaker's job as leader of the Conservative Party) told the press that the Favreau formula was not substantially different than that which bore his name,⁹¹ Diefenbaker continued to excoriate the Liberals over the provision to alter

⁸⁹ Ibid., October 15, 1964, p. 9067. The texts of the Fulton and the Favreau formulas appear in the Appendicies to Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," pp. 307-13.

⁹⁰ Parliamentary Debates (Commons), October 15, 1964, pp. 9067-69.

⁹¹ Globe and Mail, November 5, 1964.

Section 91 (1). Indeed, he made this same argument part of his general motion of non-confidence following the Speech from the Throne in April of 1965.⁹²

As expected, the NDP delivered a scathing attack upon the 1964 draft bill. Brewin called it a "monumental error" to allow a legitimate national aspiration to repatriate the BNA Act to result in the "exchange of the easy yoke of a relic of colonialism for the self-imposed bondage of a constitutional straitjacket."⁹³ Refusing to be coy about the matter, Brewin noted that there might be some rationale for accepting the Favreau formula if it had to be judged only in terms of the "point of view now prevalent in . . . Quebec, a point of view which is concerned with expanding and protecting provincial rights."⁹⁴

Two features of the Favreau formula were particularly repugnant to the NDP, both of which were in direct conflict with the principles enunciated by the party prior to the meeting of the attorneys general. First, the NDP refused to accept the entrenchment of Section 92. The Liberals quickly pointed out that certain portions of Section 92 (i.e., those dealing with prisons, certain types of local works, and matters pertaining to property and civil rights) had not been entrenched, because provisions had been

⁹²Parliamentary Debates (Commons), April 5, 1965, pp. 25-26. The motion was defeated by the combined vote of the Liberals and Creditistes (106) opposite the PC, NDP, and several SC (93). Ibid., April 7, 1965, pp. 89-90.

⁹³Ibid., October 15, 1964, p. 9069.

⁹⁴Ibid., p. 9070.

made whereby jurisdiction over matters covered by these specified portions of Section 92 could be delegated to Parliament whenever four provinces agreed to do so. Brewin was equally quick in retorting that this delegation scheme was not an effective method for making the amendment process flexible. After all, the NDP spokesman noted, the Favreau formula specifically stated that any piece of federal legislation resulting from such a delegation arrangement would have effect only in those provinces that had officially consented to the arrangement. In effect, the NDP insisted, those portions of Section 92 that would be delegated were also entrenched insofar as the refusal of one province to consent to the transfer of jurisdiction to Parliament would prevent Parliament from establishing legislation that would be nationwide in scope and application. Hence, one province could veto and thereby destroy the effectiveness of a national labor code, to take only one example offered by the NDP. The best that could be expected under such an arrangement was a hodgepodge of federal and provincial labor codes to replace the existing hodgepodge of provincial labor legislation.⁹⁵

Second, the Favreau formula provided for the entrenchment of the amendment formula itself, a feature that virtually eliminated any possibility that the NDP could be persuaded to accept the other repugnant aspects of the formula--including the absence of a Bill of Rights--in the hope that adjustments could be made in the future.⁹⁶

Brewin presented essentially the same arguments during his

⁹⁵Ibid., pp. 9069-72.

⁹⁶Ibid., p. 9070.

reply to the Speech from the Throne in April of 1965.⁹⁷ More importantly, he presented a draft preamble that he hoped would be inserted into the BNA Act. In general, Brewin's preamble stressed the equal partnership between the two founding nations and the special status of Quebec as the guardian of a distinct language and culture in Canada. It concluded, however, with a plea to establish a federal system premised upon a flexible distribution of powers that would enable the central government to deal effectively with social and economic problems affecting Canada as a whole. In short, it envisioned strong provincial governments to protect local and regional aspirations regarding the preservation of cultural and linguistic differences, while at the same time assuring the central government the power to deal with socio-economic matters which transcended these differences.⁹⁸

To the extent that the search for an amendment formula represents another manifestation of the French-English dichotomy in Canadian politics--and in large part it has been historically viewed as such insofar as Quebec has been the leading proponent of provincial rights--it becomes apparent that the NDP's programmatic commitment to the two-nation concept has been more of a platitude than a serious attempt to deal with the ramifications of the so-called "quiet revolution" currently under way in French Canada. Symbolic gestures such as the maple leaf flag and a willingness to acknowledge the traditional linguistic and cultural rights of the Québécois will no longer suffice.

⁹⁷Ibid., April 12, 1965, pp. 288-89, 309-11.

⁹⁸Ibid., p. 312.

French Canadians have transformed these into minimal expectations.⁹⁹ This does not imply that the NDP is naive or unaware of the ramifications of the "quiet revolution" occurring in Quebec. It merely illustrates the fact that the NDP's commitment to various forms of national economic planning and regulation, certain aspects of which could be implemented only if the BNA Act were to be amended to provide Parliament with powers currently vested in the provinces, is antithetical to the more fundamental and far-reaching demands being made by French Canada, even those advanced by the more moderate spokesmen for French Canadian nationalism.

While the NDP caucus has explicated and given substance to the party's programmatic commitment to work for a "flexible" amendment formula,¹⁰⁰ it has been no less concerned about the tactical side of the problem. On numerous occasions it has urged Pearson to submit the issue to a special parliamentary committee. In suggesting this course of action, the NDP has not disguised the fact that it wants the subject of an amendment formula reopened, preferably before a committee on which it would have some representation. Nor has it restrained its disgust with the fact that the Favreau formula was developed in camera without the benefit of expert advice.¹⁰¹ A special committee,

⁹⁹The "quiet revolution" has generated a whole spectrum of demand systems in Quebec. For a summary of these demand systems see Frank Scott and Michael Oliver (eds.), Quebec States Her Case (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1964), passim.

¹⁰⁰NDP Federal Program, p. 46.

¹⁰¹One of the most eminent French Canadian experts, Paul Gérin-Lajoie, was represented at the meetings of the attorneys general. Since he also happens to be the Minister of Education for Quebec, sent to represent that province instead of the Attorney

the NDP has maintained, could hear testimony from scholars of constitutional law, the prospects of which would not be exactly disconcerting to the NDP since some of the most eminent specialists in constitutional law happen to oppose the Favreau formula.¹⁰²

While it is not inconceivable that Pearson would consent to the NDP's request, especially if the Favreau formula became the target of a filibuster similar to that staged by the PC during the flag debate, the chances of his doing so seem rather remote. Unlike the flag issue, Pearson could not make major concessions regarding the Favreau formula if and when it is introduced into Parliament without jeopardizing the delicate consensus that has been developed among the various provincial governments. Hence, if Pearson consented to submitting the 1964 draft bill to a special committee, it would be a gesture similar to that which the Liberals made by allowing the opposition parties to express their views during the debate on the estimates for the Department of Justice in 1964. It would be a gesture to undermine charges by the PC and the NDP that Commons had been presented a fait accompli--the Favreau formula. Meanwhile, the "easy yoke of a relic of colonialism" seems to be preferable to the NDP; and so long as the Legislative Council in Quebec retains its veto power there will be no "self-imposed

General, it could be argued that Gérin-Lajoie fails to qualify as an "independent" expert. Alexander, "A Constitutional Strait Jacket for Canada," pp. 284-85.

¹⁰² See ibid., pp. 262-313, and Bora Laskin, "Amending the Constitution: Applying the Fulton-Favreau Formula," McGill Law Journal, Vol. 11 (May, 1965), pp. 2-28.

bondage of a constitutional straitjacket,"¹⁰³ as Brewin called the Favreau formula.

¹⁰³Parliamentary Debates (Commons), October 15, 1964,
p. 9069.

CHAPTER X

THE RECONSTRUCTED LEFT IN CANADA:

SOME CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS

For almost three decades the CCF served as the political vehicle for the democratic left in Canada. Born in the midst of an obdurate economic depression, it quickly embraced the proposition that such "chaotic waste and instability" in the economy could be eliminated only when a socialized economic order replaced the existing capitalist system.¹ A transformation of this kind, the CCF maintained, could be accomplished only when the party system in Canada ceased to operate on the basis of a quixotic battle between two parties representing the capitalist class (i.e., the Liberal and Conservative Parties) and became premised upon a discernible left-right dialogue. To that end the CCF sought political power based upon the combined electoral support of farmers, dedicated socialists, and members of organized labor.

The CCF officially adhered to these fundamental principles throughout most of its history, even as these principles were being challenged by two disturbing developments. First, capitalism not only evinced viability during and after World War II; but it also proved capable of producing affluence on a massive scale. In the

¹Regina Manifesto, cited in Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, p. 160.

process, the major assumption upon which the socialist model was based became less and less relevant. Second, the concept of a broad-based party of the democratic left manifested itself as a distinctly regional and overwhelmingly agrarian phenomenon in a society that was rushing headlong toward an urban-industrial order.

Although the CCF had tempered its programmatic posture on an ad hoc basis, it was not until 1956 that it made a comprehensive effort to come to terms with the socio-economic developments that had occurred in Canada by abandoning the revered Regina Manifesto in favor of a more moderate version of socialism. The adoption of the Winnipeg Declaration, however, did not generate a broader base of support for the party. Indeed the moderation of its programmatic posture in 1956 was followed by the electoral disaster in 1958. Clearly, the decline of the CCF was not simply the consequence of ideological obsolescence, real or imagined. Something more than a new program seemed to be required if the democratic left were to be advanced as a meaningful force in Canadian politics.

The formation of the CLC in 1956 offered some hope that the democratic left could at least obtain additional financial support and possibly some additional electoral support from organized labor. Presumably, it was expected that the craft-oriented TLC unions could be persuaded to abandon their Gompersian attitudes regarding political action as they had apparently abandoned their equally historic attitudes toward industrial unions by joining with the CCL to form this new labor organization. Rather than endorse the CCF, as had been the tradition of many CCL and a few TLC unions, the leadership of the CLC

presented to the organization's 1958 convention the idea of creating a new party that would embrace the CCF, organized labor, farm organizations, professional people, and other liberally-minded individuals. As conceived by the union leaders in collaboration with several CCF spokesmen, particularly Knowles and Lewis, the resolution presented to the CLC at least had the advantage of eliminating the obvious problem of having to promote a party that had been on the wane since approximately 1949, and one that had suffered a major defeat only months before the 1958 CLC National Convention convened.

Several months later a similar resolution was presented to the CCF National Convention. In adopting the resolution empowering its leaders to proceed with the formulation of a draft program and constitution for the proposed new party the CCF, in effect, accepted a quid pro quo that had been worked out by the leadership of the CLC and several members of the party's "inner circle." In exchange for giving up its identity as the historic political vehicle for the democratic left in Canada, the CCF was tacitly promised that the recently formed coalition of TLC and CCL unions would endorse and actively encourage member unions to affiliate with the proposed new party.

In 1961, after a genuine and exhaustive campaign to build rank and file support for the idea, the NDP was launched. Nearly four years have elapsed since that historic event. Within that span of time the party has participated in two federal elections, several provincial elections, carried out rather extensive organizational and membership drives, reviewed its program, and participated in the

parliamentary arena under three different governments. This study has subjected the various aspects of the NDP's formation and subsequent development to a rather detailed investigation and analysis, but the question remains: What has been the significance of the NDP as the "new" political vehicle of the democratic left in Canada?

In terms of its membership base, rough calculations of the available data indicate that the NDP is quantitatively larger than its predecessor ever was. It can be reasonably inferred that the sustained promotion of the new party concept and the creation of the NDP itself generated the drive which led to this increase in membership. But it must also be noted that the composition of the NDP's membership base has been almost identical to that of its predecessor. Excepting the fact that all provincial sections are required by the NDP constitution to provide for affiliated members, a matter that was left to the discretion of the various provincial sections in the CCF and adopted by all but a few of the smaller ones, the NDP is composed of both individual and affiliated members. This constitutional change, however, has not prevented certain provincial sections of the NDP, noticeably the Saskatchewan section, from emphasizing individual memberships. Nor has it ended the concern over the level of involvement obtained from many members who were brought into the party because they did not exercise the contract-out provision afforded to all members of groups which became affiliated with the party. The recent efforts, particularly in Toronto, to convert affiliated trade unionists into individual members is evidence of the continuing concern over this matter.

Similarly, the basic composition of the NDP's affiliated membership, which everywhere excluding Saskatchewan provides the bulk of the party's total membership base, resembles that of its predecessor in almost every detail. No farm organizations, including those that had withdrawn from formal ties with the CCF shortly after it was formed, have been persuaded to affiliate with the new party. The NDP's trade union base, moreover, continues to be overwhelmingly composed of industrial-type unions. Neither the encouragement of the CLC central organization nor the resolution of the long-standing dilemma regarding a uniform policy for incorporating affiliates into a party of the democratic left has prompted most craft unions to become affiliated with the NDP.

Structurally, the NDP is virtually a replica of the CCF. A hierarchy of federal and provincial conventions, constituency associations, and a parallel youth organization has been established. Even the New Party Clubs, which were so painstakingly cultivated during the promotional phase of the new party movement, have been practically eliminated in favor of the constituency association as the basic unit within the NDP. A similar fate was handed the club system early in the history of the CCF.

Despite these similarities, at least two significant structural changes have been wrought since the formation of the NDP. First, there has been a growth in the size of the party's federal headquarters staff, including the addition of a full-time director of women's affairs, a youth director, a director of organization, and several full-time organizers. While embellishing and expanding

the cadre that administered the affairs of the CCF from the office at 301 Metcalfe Street in Ottawa had been a persistent dream, the fulfillment of that dream was inextricably bound to the fiscal nightmares that beset a minor party. Strained as it has been by the almost incessant need to engage in election campaigns, the NDP has certainly been able to bring more financial resources to bear upon the problem of creating a larger national staff.

The second major structural development resulting from the creation of the NDP was related to the attempted rapprochement with the democratic left in French Canada. Not only were all party conventions to be conducted on a bilingual basis, but certain offices within the NDP were to be filled by French-speaking members. In practice, however, there has been some difficulty filling the office of Associate Secretary since André L'Heureux resigned in 1963 during the disruption created by the split within the Quebec section of the party, a split that culminated in the reappearance of the virtually autonomous PSQ in 1963.

The leadership of the NDP, it must be admitted, is essentially that of its predecessor. While there have been some changes, one would be hard pressed to prove that most of them resulted from anything more than a normal replacement of personnel made necessary by death and retirement. Certainly, none of those who filled such vacancies, and this was particularly true of Douglas' move into the slot formerly held by the venerable Coldwell, was beyond the pale of leadership in the CCF. There were a few individuals, and here

persons such as Lewis and Brewin come to mind, who strengthened their positions in the party by seeking and securing seats in the House of Commons. Then there is Knowles, who held important posts within the CCF but chose not to seek a highly visible leadership position within the NDP for reasons explicated elsewhere (see Illustration IX, Appendix).

Similarly, the former CCF coalition, composed of moderate westerners led by Coldwell and Knowles plus the eastern establishment centered in Ontario and led by Lewis, remains basically intact. Because the British Columbia section of the party, unlike that which prevailed in the former western citadel of the CCF, Saskatchewan, has been the traditional home of the more doctrinaire elements within the democratic left, it might be reasonably concluded that in the future the east-west leadership coalition within the NDP will become less ideologically cohesive. To a certain extent the elevation of Colin Cameron, who led the doctrinaire leftists at the NDP Founding Convention, to the office of NDP Federal Vice-President and consequently to a position of formal authority on the council and executive, could be viewed as an indication of such a trend. But it must be noted that moderation has been the prevailing force in the British Columbia section of the party, particularly since it was reconstituted as the NDP. Strachan has put on a new image of reasonableness, the small but vocal left has been subjected to incessant pressure, and Cameron's performance as the party's fiscal expert in Parliament during the crisis over the Gordon budget was noticeably less radical than his performance at the founding convention. Furthermore, if

the analysis of the party's electoral potential is reasonably accurate, the growth pattern within the NDP will probably be recorded in Ontario, thereby enhancing the position of the moderate eastern establishment within the party-at-large as well as within the interlocking directorate linking the extra-parliamentary party with the caucus.

In terms of its basic programmatic posture, it must be conceded that the NDP has not offered the Canadian electorate anything profoundly different than had its predecessor. Both the 1961 NDP Federal Program and the 1963 NDP Policy Statement, not unexpectedly, were extensions of the moderation trend that had been under way within the CCF for many years and formally adopted in the form of the Winnipeg Declaration of 1956. Nevertheless, it must also be conceded that the formation of the NDP enabled the democratic left to settle at least one rather embarrassing programmatic dilemma and to make a renewed attempt to reconcile another dilemma that had been basically ignored for many years. The former, of course, involved the exceedingly contentious question of Canada's participation in NATO. The latter involved the almost forgotten problem of formulating some rationale for making an appeal to French Canada.

For several years the leadership of the CCF had been sharply divided over the NATO issue, which helps explain why the anti-NATO faction was finally able to get the party to go on record in favor of Canada's withdrawal from NATO at the 1960 CCF National Convention. The embarrassment arose when many of the

top CCF leaders refused to accept the party's 1960 position, and some of them made their views known to the public. In addition, there was some embarrassment generated by the fact that one of the key elements in the proposed new party--the CLC--had taken a position regarding NATO which was exactly opposite that adopted by the CCF. Inasmuch as the NCNP was composed almost entirely of CLC and moderate CCF leaders, there was little doubt that the draft program presented to the new party founding convention would recommend reversing the CCF's position on the issue. Hence, the new party movement tended to bring together a hard core of leadership that was favorably disposed toward a pro-NATO policy. Furthermore, the 1961 NDP Founding Convention was not a CCF affair and the anti-NATO faction within that party was swiftly and decisively swept aside by a deluge of votes contributed by the CLC and the more moderate elements within the CCF delegation.

The relationship between the democratic left and French Canada, on the other hand, had not been a burning issue within the CCF. Indeed, there seems to have been little concern with the fact that the CCF was almost exclusively an English-speaking party, or that whatever dialogue it might wish to establish with French Canada had to be channeled through the almost autonomous Social Democratic Party of Quebec. Nevertheless, the very act of promoting a movement ostensibly designed to create a new party that would have nationwide appeal seems to have kindled a genuine concern over the implications of the so-called "quiet revolution" in French Canada vis-à-vis a party of the democratic left. That

the Social Democratic Party of Quebec has been resurrected in the form of the PSQ and that the NDP has been unable to reconcile some of its views (i.e., those regarding an amendment formula) with the demands being made by Quebec and the Québécois does not alter the fact that some of the programmatic concessions made by the NDP relative to French Canada were indeed unprecedented in the history of the democratic left, and most probably a unique by-product of the new party movement itself.

On balance, the NDP is not fundamentally different from its predecessor in terms of program, structure, leadership, or even in terms of the composition of its membership base. But to assert that the NDP is therefore not "new"--as many of its critics have maintained--not only ignores many of the subtle changes that have been wrought within the democratic left since 1961, but also ascribes a purpose to the new party movement that never existed.

Nowhere in the materials and data relating to the formation of a new party that were made available to the author was it ever suggested that a fundamental ideological or programmatic revision was contemplated. That task had been completed in fact even before the Regina Manifesto was formally abandoned in 1956. Nor was there any notion of devising some radically different structural arrangement, only to improve and embellish that which existed. Since the new party movement was, in large part, the contrivance of the existing leadership within the democratic left, it could hardly be expected that the new party concept would include designs to make a fundamental alteration in the realm of leadership.

In the final analysis, then, the formation of the NDP provided a fresh symbol around which the democratic left could hope to rally the newly formed CLC, and hopefully a broader electoral base to replace that which was fleeing from its grasp. As Zakuta has noted, the modification of the CCF's ideology eliminated much of its early preoccupation with the specter of decadent capitalism and the promise of socialism, both of which had substituted as incentives for supporting a party that had no realistic claim to being a potential party of government. Furthermore, electoral decline was accompanied by a noticeable decline in the level of involvement that the CCF was able to obtain from its supporters and members, leaving the bulk of the party's direction and élan in the custody of professionals.² Clearly, there were few realistic options upon which plans for reviving the democratic left could be based in the late 1950s. Whatever claim to becoming a major party the CCF might have had at its peak in 1945 had been eliminated by an incessant erosion of its electoral base. To return to a doctrinaire ideology similar to that which had stirred the CCF during its protest phase was virtually out of the question, because such an ideology was repugnant to both the times and to the leaders of the CCF. Hence, it can be reasonably concluded that the formation of the NDP was an attempt to construct a structure of incentives around a new name, a new symbol, and a new national leader.

In line with this argument, it is possible to show that

²Zakuta, A Protest Movement Becalmed, pp. 141-52.

there was a surge of activity and enthusiasm that surrounded the promotion and formation of the new party. The hundreds of seminars and meetings that were held between 1958 and 1961, as well as the exceedingly well attended and highly publicized NDP Founding Convention, provide some indication that the new party movement generated a certain amount of excitement. Furthermore, the formation of the new party has been followed by a spurt in memberships, a dramatic increase in financial resources, and a moderate growth in electoral support for the democratic left.

Maintaining the viability of such an ephemeral incentive, however, will not be easy as the NDP compiles its own record. The image of "newness" can wear thin. And there is no sign, either in the results of public opinion polls or in the electoral analysis set forth in Chapter VII of this inquiry, that the New Democrats are about to make the kind of dramatic electoral breakthrough upon which a more permanent and substantive structure of incentives could be built.

Meanwhile, a major realignment apparently has been taking shape within the Canadian party system, a realignment prompted by the development of a distinct rural-urban division which has been added to the regional and cultural cleavages around which the system has been traditionally based. This "new" political environment has tended to unsettle long-standing political alignments and further fragment the bases of support upon which nearly every Canadian party has operated in the past. Within this complex political environment, the urban-based NDP may have found its raison d'être. Just as its

predecessor had been erected upon the protests of the beleaguered prairie farmers in the 1930s, the NDP is in a position to mobilize the protests of those threatened by the technological pace of the modern urban-industrial order.

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APPENDIX

ILLUSTRATION I

Urban-Rural Composition of the Canadian Population, 1901-1961

	1901		1911		1921		1931		1941		1951		1956 ^a		1961 ^a	
	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R	U	R
Canada	34.8	65.2	41.7	58.3	45.3	54.7	49.7	50.3	50.9	49.1	53.6	46.4	66.6	33.4	71.1	28.9
N. S.	27.7	73.3	36.7	63.3	41.9	58.1	43.5	56.5	45.4	54.6	55.3	44.7	30.7	69.3	32.4	67.6
N. B.	23.1	76.9	26.7	73.3	31.0	69.0	31.1	68.9	30.9	69.1	32.2	67.8	45.8	54.2	49.1	50.9
Que.	36.1	63.9	44.5	55.5	51.0	49.0	58.6	41.4	59.6	40.4	64.2	35.8	70.0	30.0	74.9	25.1
Ont.	40.3	59.7	49.5	50.5	55.6	44.4	58.7	41.3	59.9	40.1	58.5	41.5	75.9	24.1	79.2	20.8
Man.	24.9	75.1	39.3	60.7	39.2	60.8	42.1	57.9	41.0	59.0	46.2	53.8	60.1	39.9	65.0	35.0
Sask.	6.1	93.9	16.1	83.9	16.8	83.2	20.3	79.7	21.3	78.7	30.2	69.8	36.6	63.4	43.0	57.0
Alberta	16.2	83.8	29.4	70.6	30.1	69.9	31.1	68.9	31.5	68.5	45.8	54.2	56.6	43.4	63.9	36.1
B. C.	46.4	53.6	50.9	49.1	46.1	53.9	55.5	44.5	52.7	47.3	51.0	49.0	73.4	26.6	76.7	23.3
Nfld.											27.0	73.0	44.6	55.4	51.9	48.1

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 7, Part 1, Bul. 2, pp. 7, 24-25.

^aPrior to 1956, the Dominion Bureau of Statistics defined all incorporated municipalities as urban regardless of size. In 1956, the definition was changed to include only incorporated municipalities of 1,000 people or more and added all unincorporated communities of 1,000 or more, plus certain "fringe" (i.e., suburban) areas surrounding urbanized cores.

ILLUSTRATION II

Percentage of Urban Population by Size of Urban Center, 1901-1961

Census Year	Total % Urban Canada	100,000 or more	No. of places	30,000 to 100,000	No. of places	10,000 to 30,000	No. of places	5,000 to 10,000	No. of places	1,000 to 5,000	No. of places	Total % Rural Canada
1901	34.8	8.9	2	6.4	7	4.1	15	5.3	38	10.1	263	65.2
1911	41.7	15.0	4	6.8	9	6.4	31	4.5	46	9.1	311	58.3
1921	45.3	18.9	6	5.6	9	7.7	40	4.4	54	8.7	365	54.7
1931	49.7	22.4	7	6.7	13	8.2	50	4.4	68	8.0	395	50.3
1941	50.9	23.0	8	8.1	19	7.5	51	4.4	74	7.9	428	49.1
1951	53.6	23.9	10	8.2	24	8.8	72	5.1	100	8.2	528	46.4
1961	58.3	22.8	12	12.1	45	10.8	117	5.1	132	7.5	616	
1961 ^a	71.1	43.7		9.8		5.9		-- -- --	11.7	-- -- --		28.9

Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 7, Part 1, Bul. 2, p. 13.

^aFor purposes of this chart the Bureau of Statistics utilized the population of incorporated municipalities per se, and did not apply the data for suburbs as per the 1956 definition of urbanism. Therefore, the 1961 percentages were recalculated by the author from data utilizing the "new" definition of urbanism. Data located in Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Yearbook, 1963-64, p. 161.

ILLUSTRATION III

Percentage Distribution of Employed Persons by Occupational Category

Year	Agricul- ture	Other Primary Industry	Manufac- turing	Construc- tion	Transporta- tion and Utilities	Service Sector ^a			Total Service
						Trade	Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate	Other Service	
1901	45.8	4.6	14.8	5.8	5.3	5.6	18.1		23.7
1911	38.9	6.0	11.7	6.4	6.5	7.4	23.2		30.6
1921	38.2	4.3	11.8	6.1	6.9	8.2	24.5		32.7
1931	34.0	4.6	12.1	6.2	8.3	8.0	26.8		34.8
1941	31.7	6.0	16.7	6.3	8.8	7.9	22.6		30.5
1951	21.8	5.6	27.1	8.6	9.8	12.2	2.2	12.7	27.1
1956	13.9	4.6	25.7	7.4	8.9	15.8	3.5	20.2	39.2
1961	11.1	3.0	25.0	6.7	8.4	16.3	4.0	25.5	45.8
1962	10.5	2.8	25.2	6.9	8.5	16.1	4.0	26.0	46.1


Source: Canada, Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Canada Yearbook, 1963-1964, p. 715; Canada Yearbook, 1961, p. 731; Canada Yearbook, 1943-44, Appendix III, p. 1066.

^aPrior to 1951, the data concerning what is called the "service sector" in this chart were organized differently by the Bureau of Statistics. Thus, to avoid confusion over the pre-1951 data, the category of "finance, insurance and real estate" was combined with the category of "other service" occupations.


ILLUSTRATION IV

Trends in CCF Electoral Support: Percentage of the
Vote in Federal Elections

Ontario and Quebec



Maritimes Excluding Nova Scotia



Nova Scotia





ILLUSTRATION IV--Continued

The West



Figures in parentheses represent the number of seats won by the CCF.

Source: Harold Scarrow, Canada Votes, pp. 90-176.

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I

Metropolitan and Major Urban Areas of Canada (1961):
 Population 1951-1961; Federal Ridings Involved;
 and CCF/NDP Percentage of the Vote Therein
 (* Denotes CCF/NDP Victory)

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Calgary, Alberta	140,645	277,469	Calgary North	5.4	3.9	4.7	9.7	8.5
			Calgary South	5.0	2.6	3.4	7.7	7.0
Edmonton, Alberta	173,748	327,351	Edmonton East	8.3	6.5	4.4	14.5	11.2
			Edmonton West	7.5	5.5	4.4	9.9	6.5
			Edmonton-Strathcona	9.2	6.6	4.4	10.7	8.4
Halifax, N. S.	133,931	183,946	Halifax (2 seats)	3.9	2.2	2.5	3.3	2.1
Hamilton, Ont.	280,293	395,189	Hamilton East	22.0	27.0	21.5	27.0	25.0
			Hamilton West	15.9	14.1	15.4	18.0	18.5
			Hamilton South	28.8	28.1	24.1	32.0	35.8*
			Wentworth	17.7	14.9	13.7	17.0	18.2
Kitchener-Waterloo, Ont.	107,474	154,864	Waterloo South	18.6	16.2	18.2	26.0	26.4
			Waterloo North	14.4	19.6	17.1	16.0	12.2
London, Ont.	128,977	181,283	London	8.7	8.1	7.2	11.5	9.8
			Middlesex East	13.0	9.9	8.7	18.0	11.5
Ottawa, Ont.	292,476	429,750	Ottawa East	--	--	--	5.0	5.7
			Ottawa West	--	--	--	5.0	4.6
			Hull (Que.)	--	--	--	2.8	2.4
			Russell	--	--	--	6.8	6.1
			Carenton	2.9	3.0	3.7	4.9	4.7

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I--Continued

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
St. John, N. B.	78,337	95,563	St. John-Albert	2.4	--	3.3	6.0	4.5
Montreal, Que.	1,471,851	2,109,509	Verdun	5.4	7.7	6.2	10.1	9.8
			St. Anne	2.1	--	2.5	4.7	5.9
			St. Jacques	2.3	3.8	2.7	10.2	10.5
			St. Mary	2.5	3.7	2.8	6.2	6.6
			Hochelaga	4.9	2.9	4.1	9.4	12.0
			Maisonneuve-Rosemont	3.6	7.5	5.2	16.2	18.4
			Mercier	3.1	--	4.2	10.7	14.6
			St. Henri	2.3	3.8	2.4	8.3	8.7
			St. Antoine-Westmont	2.0	--	2.3	5.0	8.1
			St. Laurent, St. Georges	3.0	3.0	3.0	9.2	11.0
			Cartier	6.0	4.1	4.4	9.2	14.1
			Laurier	2.1	1.5	3.7	8.2	13.2
			Lafontaine	6.4	5.2	4.1	8.4	15.4
			Notre Dame-de-Grâce	3.5	2.4	3.4	10.7	15.0
			Mont-Royal	1.8	3.7	4.3	12.7	16.5
			Outremont St. Jean	2.6	6.8	5.5	20.0	18.0
			St. Denis	2.4	4.0	--	9.2	11.0
			Papineau	1.9	8.2	3.8	10.7	11.3
Dollard	2.5	6.9	4.6	11.0	15.4			
Laval	2.4	2.8	3.9	7.2	15.4			
Jacques-Cartier Lassalle	8.7	4.0	5.7	8.3	8.2			
Longueuil	11.1	--	6.8	6.3	7.3			
Toronto, Ont.	1,117,470	1,618,787	Danforth	19.2	26.4	22.8	35.0*	36.8*
			Greenwood	24.2	25.9	21.4	37.7*	39.2*
			Broadview	18.6	18.9	14.0	24.2	26.0

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I--Continued

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Toronto, Ont. (cont.)			Rosedale	17.6	13.3	10.5	15.8	15.0
			St. Pauls	16.1	12.5	9.6	13.8	13.5
			Spadina	12.0	12.6	10.4	18.8	21.6
			Trinity	19.7	22.5	14.2	18.2	17.8
			Davenport	22.9	29.1	19.9	24.0	21.6
			Parkdale	17.4	18.2	13.4	22.4	22.2
			High Park	16.7	15.3	11.9	19.0	17.5
			Eglinton	7.6	7.6	6.5	10.0	12.5
			York-Hamber	18.1	13.7	15.8	27.2	26.8
			York West	22.3	13.6	11.4	18.8	17.4
			York South	36.0*	28.9	20.8	40.5*	37.0
			York Centre	18.9	16.6	13.7	34.2	33.4
			York-Scarborough	12.4	11.9	9.2	22.0	20.2
			York East	22.3	20.0	16.2	24.0	23.8
			Halton	8.9	11.0	10.1	17.5	13.8
Peel	10.1	9.9	10.1	16.5	16.5			
York North	9.4	--	6.4	19.5	19.0			
Quebec (city), Que.	276,242	357,568	Quebec South	--	--	--	4.5	7.9
			Quebec East	--	--	--	1.6	3.3
			Quebec West	--	--	--	.55	3.1
			Quebec Montmorency	--	--	--	--	5.3
St. John's, Nfld.	67,313	89,019	St. John's East	--	--	--	1.5	--
Vancouver, B. C.	561,960	790,165	New West Minister	26.6	23.8	26.0	39.2*	37.0*
			Burnaby-Richmond	31.1	24.9	29.5	38.6*	38.0*
			Burnaby-Coquitlam	37.6*	38.8*	43.1*	50.0*	46.5*
			Vancouver East	50.6*	47.6*	48.6*	54.4*	54.5*
			Vancouver-Kingsway	46.2*	34.3*	42.0	43.0*	47.4*

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I--Continued

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Vancouver, B. C. (cont.)			Vancouver South	19.6	13.5	15.5	25.0	22.8
			Vancouver-Quadra	12.5	8.7	10.0	17.1	14.7
			Vancouver-Burrard	19.3	13.9	17.2	31.4*	31.0
			Vancouver Centre	22.3	10.1	13.9	23.6	23.2
			Coast-Capilano	18.1	12.2	13.8	21.6	22.0
Victoria, B. C.	108,285	141,250	Victoria	13.3	9.3	11.2	14.0	14.6
			Esquimalt-Saanich	16.9	15.6	16.6	20.4	19.6
Windsor, Ont.	163,618	193,365	Essex West	11.2	22.1	19.1	25.0	15.2
			Essex South	--	3.7	3.7	5.5	--
			Essex East	10.1	15.4	19.8	21.0	17.7
Winnipeg, Man.	354,069	471,975	Winnipeg South	19.8	15.5	12.3	15.1	14.0
			Winnipeg S. Centre	22.2	17.9	14.4	16.5	15.0
			Winnipeg N. Centre	53.8*	54.9*	42.3	44.0*	41.0*
			Winnipeg North	49.2*	48.7*	42.0	36.8*	32.4*
Saskatoon, Sask.	72,858	95,526	Saskatoon	48.3*	35.7	25.5	21.6	16.8
Regina, Sask.	89,755	112,141	Regina City	45.7*	35.7*	27.6	29.1	19.5
Brantford, Ont.	47,064	56,741	Brantford	17.8	24.8	14.6	16.0	14.8
Chicoutimi-Jon- Quiere, Que.	76,059	105,009	Chicoutimi	--	--	8.8	3.3	8.6
Drummondville, Que.	34,809	39,307	Drummond-Arthabaska	--	--	--	--	4.1

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I--Continued

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Ft. William-Pt. Arthur, Ont. (Pt. Arthur in rural riding of Pt. Arthur)	68,106	93,251	Ft. William	19.4	26.4	19.9	23.0	29.1
Guelph, Ont.	29,043	41,767	Wellington South	11.9	16.8	8.6	25.8	22.2
Kingston, Ont.	47,560	63,419	Kingston	2.7	3.6	2.7	4.6	7.1
Moncton, N. B.	39,624	55,768	Westmoreland	5.7	3.4	5.9	13.5	10.6
Niagra Falls, Ont.	40,899	54,649	Niagra Falls	11.6	--	10.2	12.0	11.4
Oshawa, Ont.	50,200	80,918	Ontario	18.6	32.0	17.4	27.0	25.8
Peterborough, Ont.	40,106	49,902	Peterborough	6.9	6.9	6.6	36.0	33.6
St. Catherines, Ont.	67,303	95,577	Lincoln	12.4	10.0	9.8	9.5	9.6
St. Jean, Que.	24,940	34,576	St.-Jean-Iberville-Napierville	1.3	--	--	15.0	5.8
Sarnia, Ont.	40,366	61,293	Lambton West	4.9	6.4	7.3	19.5	11.1
Sault St. Marie, Ont.	37,974	58,460	Algoma West	21.6	21.4	16.8	26.2	27.6
Shawinigan, Que.	49,565	63,518	St. Maurice Lafleche	--	13.9	5.3	--	5.6
Sherbrooke, Que.	54,511	70,253	Sherbrooke	--	--	--	.95	3.3

ILLUSTRATION V, PART I--Continued

Metro. Area	Population 1951	Population 1961	Federal Ridings Involved	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Sydney-Glace Bay, N. S.	100,725	106,114	Cape Ereton South	48.9*	28.3	33.9	44.0*	36.2
Timmins, Ont.	37,473	40,121	Timmins	33.6	38.7*	38.0*	45.0*	42.5*
Trois-Riveres, Que.	65,946	83,659	Trois-Riveres	--	--	--	--	2.2
Valleyfield, Que.	24,239	29,849	Beaucharnois-Salaberry	--	--	--	--	5.8

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II

Non-Urban Federal Ridings by Province; CCF/NDP
Percentage of the Vote Therein
(* Denotes CCF/NDP Victory)

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Ontario	Algoma East	--	13.1	9.5	15.0	8.5
	Brant-Haldimand	6.6	9.4	6.3	8.0	8.6
	Bruce	--	--	--	4.8	--
	Cochrane	17.1	17.2	15.6	26.0	29.2
	Dufferin-Simcoe	--	--	--	--	3.1
	Durham	8.8	11.6	8.5	12.0	10.1
	Elgin	--	4.9	4.0	7.0	3.9
	Glengary-Prescott	1.5	--	--	2.3	2.0
	Grenville-Dundas	--	--	--	1.7	2.0
	Grey-Bruce	--	--	--	4.2	2.2
Grey North	8.1	5.7	6.5	14.0	10.3	

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II--Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Ont. (cont.)	Hastings-Frontenac	--	--	--	10.0	4.8
	Hastings South	2.7	--	3.7	5.7	4.2
	Huron	--	--	--	5.1	--
	Kenora-Rainy River	12.1	20.9	12.8	18.5	--
	Kent	--	--	--	--	--
	Lampton-Kent	--	--	--	--	2.9
	Lanark	2.9	--	--	2.2	3.3
	Leeds	--	--	--	--	--
	Middlesex West	2.9	3.7	--	8.2	6.2
	Nickel Belt	16.0	21.2	18.9	10.7	18.4
	Nipissing	8.4	9.1	4.6	9.4	8.5
	Norfolk	3.9	--	--	5.6	5.1
	Northumberland	2.5	--	--	4.1	2.9
	Oxford	--	--	--	6.0	4.8
	Parry-Sound Muskoka	6.2	--	10.0	11.0	8.4
	Perth	--	--	--	6.8	3.8
	Pt. Arthur	24.0	43.2*	38.8*	38.6*	45.5*
	Prince Edward-Lennox	--	--	--	5.3	5.0
	Renfrew North	--	--	--	4.0	4.1
	Renfrew South	2.5	--	--	2.4	1.8
	Simcoe East	6.6	6.1	5.9	9.7	7.9
	Simcoe North	--	--	--	11.0	4.4
	Stormont	--	--	--	3.8	3.2
	Sudbury	16.5	13.8	13.9	14.0	17.0
	Timiskaming	33.5	35.6*	36.0*	32.6*	34.0*
	Victoria	--	4.0	5.0	13.2	12.9
	Welland	15.8	23.6	18.2	16.8	14.0
Wellington-Huron	--	--	--	17.0	7.5	

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II---Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Quebec	Argenteuil-Deux-Montagnes	--	--	--	--	4.1
	Beauce	--	--	--	--	2.9
	Bellechasse	--	--	--	--	--
	Berthier-Maskinongé-Delanaudière	--	--	--	--	1.9
	Bonaventure	--	--	--	--	--
	Brome-Missisquoi	7.9	--	--	--	4.6
	Chambly-Rouville	--	--	--	--	9.4
	Champlain	--	--	--	3.0	2.1
	Chapleau	--	--	--	2.6	--
	Charlevoix	--	--	--	--	--
	Châteauguay-Huntingdon-Laprairie	--	--	--	--	5.4
	Compton-Frontenac	1.5	1.9	1.8	--	2.8
	Dorchester	--	--	--	--	--
	Gaspé	--	--	1.1	--	--
	Gatineau	4.0	--	--	4.0	4.3
	Iles-de-la-Madeleine	--	--	--	--	--
	Joliette-L'Assomption-Montcalm	--	--	--	2.2	5.4
	Kamouraska	--	--	--	--	1.1
	Labelle	0.5	--	--	5.4	5.2
	Lac-Saint-Jean	--	--	12.0	4.8	8.3
	Lapointe	--	--	2.3	--	10.1
	Lévis	--	--	--	--	--
	Lotbinière	--	--	--	--	--
	Metapédia-Matane	--	--	--	1.4	--
	Mégantic	--	--	--	--	4.3
	Montmagny-L'Islet	--	--	--	--	--
	Nicolet-Yamaska	--	--	--	--	1.2
	Pontiac-Témiscamingue	--	--	--	2.2	1.9
	Portneuf	--	--	--	--	--
	Richelieu-Verchères	1.3	--	--	--	3.5

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II--Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Que. (cont.)	Richmond-Wolfe	--	--	--	--	4.2
	Rimouski	--	--	--	1.4	4.5
	Rivière-du-Loup-Témiscouata	--	--	--	--	1.1
	Roberval	--	--	--	--	5.1
	Saint-Hyacinthe-Bagot	--	--	--	--	--
	Saguenay	--	--	--	--	6.3
	Shefford	--	--	2.8	--	6.5
	Stanstead	--	--	--	--	--
	Terrebonne	--	--	--	9.3	9.5
	Vaudreuil-Soulanges	--	--	--	--	--
Villeneuve	--	7.5	--	3.1	7.6	
Nova Scotia	Antigonish-Guysborough	--	--	--	1.6	--
	Cape Breton North and Victoria	--	9.0	--	15.5	11.0
	Colchester-Hants	3.6	3.2	4.4	4.1	2.8
	Cumberland	--	--	--	6.8	4.8
	Digby-Annapolis-Kings	--	--	--	2.4	1.7
	Inverness-Richmond	--	--	--	5.0	--
	Pictou	7.6	2.0	--	7.0	5.4
	Queens-Lunenburg	--	--	--	2.5	--
	Shelburne-Yarmouth-Claire	--	--	--	1.4	0.96
Newfoundland	Bonavista-Twillingate	--	--	--	--	--
	Burin-Burgeo	--	--	--	--	--
	Grand Falls-White Bay-Labrador	--	--	--	10.2	4.0
	Humber-St. George's	--	--	--	17.3	21.4
	St. John's West	--	1.7	0.9	1.1	1.8
	Trinity-Conception	5.8	--	--	--	--

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II--Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Prince Edward Island	Kings	--	1.0	--	5.0	.7
	Prince	3.3	2.1	1.2	4.0	1.4
	Queens (2 seats)	--	0.6	--	3.1	0.6
	Queens	--	--	--	2.6	1.3
New Brunswick	Charlotte	3.5	--	--	3.3	1.0
	Gloucester	1.2	--	--	--	--
	Kent	--	--	--	--	2.3
	Northumberland-Miramichi	4.9	--	--	6.1	4.7
	Restigouche-Madawaska	4.3	--	--	4.3	--
	Royal	--	--	--	4.1	2.4
	Victoria-Carleton	--	--	--	--	--
York-Sunbury	4.5	2.3	2.3	5.5	3.1	
Manitoba	Brandon-Souris	5.3	4.1	5.2	4.9	5.1
	Churchill	18.6	11.7	11.9	17.9	13.6
	Dauphin	43.0*	39.9*	32.2	25.6	6.5
	Lisgar	--	2.3	2.7	2.4	2.1
	Marquette	--	5.8	6.9	7.2	4.6
	Portage-Neepawa	--	7.6	6.8	9.8	6.2
	Provencher	--	1.8	1.8	2.6	--
	St. Boniface	29.9	28.9	20.0	23.6	18.5
	Selkirk	42.6	44.1*	28.4	20.8	11.0
Springfield	15.2	38.0*	29.9	25.0	18.2	
British Columbia	Cariboo	28.7	14.1	14.7	17.0	14.5
	Comox-Alberni	34.7*	35.9*	38.6	38.6*	33.2*
	Fraser Valley	15.3	18.9	17.9	25.0	25.6
	Kamloops	13.2	9.2	12.7	18.0	23.5
	Kootenay East	28.0	21.1	25.0	26.8	29.3

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II--Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
B. C. (cont.)	Kootenay West	49.3*	43.8*	43.5*	37.0*	37.4*
	Nanaimo-Cowichan-The Islands	38.6*	37.6*	41.0*	42.5*	43.5*
	Okanagan Boundary	39.1*	30.0	29.0	27.5	21.2
	Okanagan-Revelstoke	20.0	10.7	12.7	23.4	21.6
	Skeena	30.4	39.1*	39.8*	60.0*	53.0*
Saskatchewan	Assiniboia	52.0*	47.0*	42.1*	24.3	15.2
	Humboldt-Melfort-Tisdale	45.5*	35.7*	32.9	25.2	20.0
	Kindersley	42.4*	38.3*	32.9	25.1	20.6
	Mackenzie	43.9*	40.7*	32.3	22.6	21.2
	Meadow Lake	29.9	25.5	21.2	19.4	16.7
	Melville	40.4	38.8	28.7	24.5	17.8
	Moose Jaw-Lake Centre	52.4*	34.0*	27.1	22.2	19.4
	Moose Mountain	47.5*	33.9*	28.4	20.2	18.5
	Prince Albert	30.9	24.9	16.8	16.1	13.5
	Qu'Appelle	30.9	23.6	16.5	12.0	11.4
	Rosetown-Biggar	55.5*	45.2*	38.5	24.0	21.6
	Rosthern	33.5	30.9	18.8	16.1	12.9
	Swift Current-Maple Creek	42.6	34.5	27.0	23.0	18.7
	The Battlefords	47.6*	39.2*	31.3	23.6	20.0
Yorkton	52.3*	43.3*	34.0	23.6	22.0	
Alberta	Acadia	10.7	7.8	4.9	5.2	4.1
	Athabasca	6.4	7.7	4.4	6.2	4.7
	Battle River-Camrose	12.4	9.7	5.9	6.2	5.0
	Bow River	--	--	--	7.0	6.0
	Jasper-Edson	17.2	10.6	6.4	8.3	5.5
	Lethbridge	--	--	--	7.2	4.8
	Macleod	4.0	5.2	3.6	6.0	5.3

ILLUSTRATION V, PART II--Continued

Province	Non-Urban Riding	1953	1957	1958	1962	1963
Alberta (cont.)	Medicine Hat	--	5.4	3.9	5.9	4.7
	Peace River	10.0	7.5	4.7	9.8	6.4
	Red Deer	6.8	5.4	4.8	4.8	4.0
	Vegreville	--	17.8	7.8	9.2	6.0
	Wetaskiwin	15.2	13.2	8.8	8.5	5.7

Sources:

Population data for metropolitan and major urban areas from Canadian Census, 1961, Vol. 7, Part 1, Bul. 2, pp. 17, 30-34.

CCF percentage of the popular vote from Scarrow, Canada Votes, passim.

NDP percentage of the popular vote computed from Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1962 and the Report of the Chief Electoral Officer, 1963.

ILLUSTRATION VI

Members of the NCNP

CLC	CCF
1. Claude Jodoin, CLC Pres.	1. David Lewis, CCF National Pres.
2. Stanley Knowles, CLC Exec. V-P	2. Hazen Argue, CCF (Acting) Leader
3. Donald MacDonald, CLC Sec.-Treas.	3. Therese Casgrain, CCF V-P
4. William Dodge CLC Exec. V-P	4. Andrew Brewin, CCF National Treas.
5. George Burt, CLC Gen. V-P and Leader in UAW	5. Carl Hamilton, CCF National Sec.
6. William Mahoney, CLC Gen. V-P and Leader in USW	6. Harold Winch, MP and CCF National Exec.
7. Frank Hall, CLC V-P and Leader in Railway Clerks	7. Premier T. C. Douglas, CCF National Council
8. Joe Morris, CLC V-P and Leader in IWA	8. Frank Scott, CCF National Council
9. William Smith, CLC V-P and Leader in CBRT	9. Gerald Picard, CCF National Council and Leader of CCF in Quebec
10. Roger Provost, CLC V-P and Pres. of Quebec Federation of Labor	10. Donald C. MacDonald CCF Ontario Leader

- Added:
1. Walter Pitman, "New Part," MP
 2. Walter Kontak, Professor of Political Science, St. Francis Xavier University
 3. Walter Young, Professor of Political Science, University of Manitoba on leave to University of Toronto representing New Party Clubs
 4. Sam Bowman, Past Sec. of Ontario Farmers' Union
 5. Rev. W. Edgar Mullen, Alberta New Party Clubs
 6. Leo McIssac, P. E. I. farm spokesman and potato co-op leader
 7. Louis Lloyd, Saskatchewan Federated Co-op
 8. Len Lavenlure, V-P of Ontario Federation of Agriculture

Source: New Party Newsletter, Vol. 1 (March, 1960), p. 2; Ibid., Vol. 2 (February, 1961); and Files of the NCNP, "Reports," file I (e)₂ (undated), NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa.

ILLUSTRATION VII

Members of NCNP Sub-Committees

Administration	Knowles, Lewis, Argue, Dodge, Hamilton, Jodoin
Finance	Lewis, Brewin, Mahoney, Casgrain, Burt
Constitution	MacDonald (CLC), Bryden, Provost
Program	Lewis, Jodoin, Argue
Objectives and Principles	Casgrain, Argue
Founding Convention	Lewis, Argue, Bryden, Burt, Dodge, Machoney
Personnel and Hdqts.	MacDonald (CLC), MacDonald (CCF), Jodoin, Dodge
Elections	Lewis, Douglas, Argue, MacDonald (CLC), MacDonald (CCF), Picard, Winch
Liberally-Minded	Brewin, Burt, Casgrain, Lloyd, Scott, MacDonald (CCF)
Promotion and Public Relations	Bryden, Dodge, Douglas, Morris, Picard, Provost, Smith

Source: New Party Newsletter, Vol. 1 (March, 1960), p. 2; Ibid., Vol. 2 (February, 1961); and Files of the NCNP, "Reports," file I (e)₂ (undated), NDP Federal Headquarters, Ottawa.

ILLUSTRATION VIII, PART I

Summary of Income and Expenditures of the Federal
NDP--August 31, 1961 to June 30, 1963

Income	
Membership dues (individual)	\$ 77,487.30
Affiliate fees, less portions rebated to provinces	89,599.90
Sustaining memberships	27,110.58
Contributions	
1962 Election and Victory Fund	117,267.88
1963 Election Fund	72,323.06
Leadership Fund (1962)	3,880.47
New Party Founding Fund (surplus 1962)	1,220.43
Quebec Appeal (1963)	3,799.80
By-election Fund	17,503.16
Other	66,427.16
Sale of literature	16,319.92
Total Revenue	\$492,939.66
Expenditures (total)	507,271.27
Deficit	\$ 14,331.61

ILLUSTRATION VIII, PART II

NDP Expenditures by Classification--
August 31, 1961 to June 30, 1963

Operating Budget	Regular Operating Expenditures	Additional Election Funds Assigned to Administrative Units for 1962 and 1963	Totals
Federal Administration (incl. salaries, supplies, travel, and maintenance of the National Office in Ottawa)	105,245.70	29,550.48	134,796.18
Department of Organization (mainly salaries and grants to provinces)	98,305.49	7,786.59	106,092.08
Department of Research (incl. Director's salary)	19,092.52	4,661.85	23,754.37
Public Relations (printing and literature)	18,439.66	1,190.58	19,630.24
Women's Activities (incl. Director's salary)	13,231.39	5,213.41	18,444.80
Youth Activities (grants to NDY only)	10,169.40	---	10,169.40
Federal Council and Exec. (mainly travel and socialist international fees)	13,451.12	2,103.85	15,554.97
Federal Leadership (salaries for exec. asst., travel, office space, and equipment)	42,652.47	10,041.14	52,693.61
General Election Campaign Funds			
1962		75,349.27	75,349.27
1963		50,786.35	50,786.35
Totals	320,587.75	186,683.52	507,271.27

Source: NDP, Proceedings of the Second Federal Convention held at Regina, Saskatchewan on August 6-9, 1963, pp. 28-30.

ILLUSTRATION IX

Positions Held by MPs in the NDP and in the Caucus, 1962 to Mid-1965

Name	MP		Officer in NDP (7 allowed to be MPs ^d)		Member of National Council (max. of 81 members)		Member of National Executive (max. of 19 members)		Office in Caucus	
	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965
Douglas	x ^b	x	Federal Leader	Federal Leader	x	x	x	x	Leader	Leader
Winch	x	x	V-Pres.	V-Pres.	x	x	x	x	V-Chairman	V-Chairman
Lewis	x	-	V-Pres.	V-Pres.	x	x	x	x	Deputy Leader	--
Cameron	x	x	-	V-Pres.	-	x	-	x	--	--
Brewin	x	x	-	-	x	x	x	x	--	Chairman
Fisher	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	Chairman	Deputy Leader
Knowles ^a	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	Chief Whip	Chief Whip
Howard	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	Deputy Whip	Deputy Whip
Regier	x ^b	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	--	--
Herridge	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	--	--
Barnett	x	x	-	-	x	x	-	-	--	--
Berger	x	-	-	-	x	x	-	-	--	--
Peters	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Martin	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Prittie	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Scott	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Mather	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Webster	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Orlikow	x	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--

ILLUSTRATION IX--Continued

Name	MP		Officer in NDP (7 allowed to be MPs ^d)		Member of National Council (max. of 81 members)		Member of National Executive (max. of 19 members)		Office in Caucus	
	1962- 1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962- 1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962- 1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962- 1963	1963 to mid-1965	1962-1963	1963 to mid-1965
MacInnis	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Howe	-	x	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--
Saltsman	-	x ^c	-	-	-	-	-	-	--	--

Source: Data obtained from photo-copies of materials on file at the NDP Federal Headquarters. Photo-copies supplied were mailed to the author by Terence Grier, NDP Federal Secretary, on May 11, 1965.

^a Although Knowles is considered to have been one of the founders of the NDP and a prominent member of the "inner circle," he declined a nomination to become one NDP Federal Vice-President in 1961. His refusal to compete for this position, which was equivalent to that which he held in the CCF between 1954 and 1961, was regarded to have been prompted by the fact that he was then the Executive Vice-President of the CLC, which had promised not to attempt to dominate the party. Prior to announcing his candidacy for a seat in Commons in 1962, Knowles extricated himself from his official ties with the CLC by resigning from his post in that organization. It is quite probable that he will eventually occupy a formal leadership post in the NDP, other than his seat on the relatively large and comparatively inactive federal council, as soon as sufficient time has elapsed to obfuscate his former position in the CLC.

^b Douglas was elected to Commons as a result of a by-election held to fill the seat vacated by Regier shortly after the 1962 federal election.

^c Saltsman was elected to Commons as a result of the Waterloo South by-election of 1964.

^d The NDP Federal President and Vice-President are not allowed to be MPs, according to the NDP Federal Constitution, Art. VI, sec. 2.

VITA

The author was born in Martinsville, Virginia, on April 4, 1935. Upon graduation from high school in 1953, he entered Millersville State College where he majored in social studies. The B.S. in Education was awarded by that institution in 1957.

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